The Distributed Proofreaders Canada eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal Vol. 15 by Various

TRIAL

THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE

THE INTERNATIONAL

MILITARY TRIBUNAL

NUREMBERG

14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946

PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY

1948

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): The Tribunal will adjourn this afternoon at 4 o’clock in order to sit in closed session.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): Mr. President, the day before yesterday the Tribunal asked if we would ascertain whether or not Document Number D-880 had been offered in evidence. It consists of extracts from the testimony of Admiral Raeder, and we have ascertained that it was offered, and it is Exhibit Number GB-483. It was put to a witness by Mr. Elwyn Jones in the course of cross-examination, and it has been offered in evidence.

MR. DODD: Also, with respect to the Court’s inquiry concerning the status of other defendants and their documents, we are able to say this morning that with respect to the Defendant Jodl the documents are now being translated and mimeographed, and there is no need for any hearing before the Tribunal.

The Seyss-Inquart documents have been heard and are now being translated and mimeographed.

The Von Papen documents are settled; there is no disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defendant Von Papen, and they are in the process of being mimeographed and translated.

With respect to the Defendant Speer, we think there will be no need for any hearing, and I expect that by the end of today they will be sent to the translating and mimeographing departments.

The documents for the Defendant Von Neurath have not yet been submitted by the defendant to the Prosecution.

And with respect to the Defendant Fritzsche, our Russian colleagues will be in a position to advise us more exactly in the course of the day. I expect that I shall be able to advise the Tribunal as to the Defendant Fritzsche before the session ends today.

MR. DODD: Yes, I believe—at least, we have no objection to any of the witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, then; there need not be any further hearing in open court on the cases of the Defendants Jodl, Seyss-Inquart, Von Papen, and Speer until their actual cases are presented.

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Defendant Sauckel): Mr. President, I have a technical question to bring up. Yesterday the witness Hildebrandt arrived, but again it was the wrong Hildebrandt. This is the third witness who has appeared here in this comedy of errors. It was the wrong one for Mende, the wrong one for Stothfang, and the wrong one for Hildebrandt. But this witness knows where the right ones are.

The witnesses had received information in their camp that they were to appear here and they were then taken to the collecting center for Ministerial Directors in Berlin-Lichterfelde. Perhaps it will still be possible to bring these two witnesses here. Especially the witness Hildebrandt, who can testify about the French matters, would be of importance if we could still get him.

DR. SERVATIUS: The name was given accurately. The other man’s name was also Hildebrandt, only not Hubert but Heinrich. He was also a Ministerial Director...

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, one name was Heinrich and the other Hubert, and abbreviated it was “H” for both, Dr. H. Hildebrandt, which apparently caused the confusion.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I say the names of all witnesses had better be given in full; really in full, not merely with initials.

DR. SERVATIUS: I had given the name in full. As to the physician, the Witness Dr. Jäger, I received his private address this morning. He is not under arrest. He was at first a witness for the Prosecution. His private address is in Essen, in the Viehhof Platz, and he is there now.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better take up all these details with the General Secretary, and he will give you every assistance.

DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the case of Sauckel, I should like to make one more remark to the Tribunal.

There are about 150 documents which have been submitted by the Prosecution, and some of them are only remotely connected with Sauckel. No trial brief and no special charges were presented here orally against Sauckel, so that I cannot see in detail to what extent Sauckel is held responsible. The case was dealt with only under the heading of “Slave Labor,” and so the ground of the defense is somewhat unsteady.

I do not intend to discuss every one of these 150 documents, but I should like to reserve the right to deal with some of them later if that should appear necessary. I want to point out only the most important ones, and then return to them in the course of the proceedings. At any rate, may I ask you not to construe it as an admission if I do not raise objections against any of these documents now.

THE PRESIDENT: No admission will be inferred from that. Dr. Servatius, I have before me here a document presented by the French Prosecution against the Defendant Sauckel. I suppose what you mean is that that document, that trial brief entitled Responsabilité Individuelle, does not refer to each of these 150 documents.

DR. SERVATIUS: There was, first of all, a document book, “Slave Labor,” submitted by the American Prosecution, which is not headed “Sauckel” but “Slave Labor”; and I cannot say, therefore, which parts concern Sauckel in particular.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it does say, “...and the special responsibility of the Defendants Sauckel and Speer therefore...” That is the American document book. It does name Sauckel.

THE PRESIDENT: And there is this other trial brief presented by Mr. Mounier on behalf of the French Delegation, which is definitely against Sauckel. But no doubt that does not specify all these 150 documents that you are referring to.

Witness, yesterday near the end of the session we spoke about a manifesto—that memorandum which was intended to impress upon the various offices their duty to carry out your directives and to remove the resistance that existed. Now, you yourself have made statements which are hardly compatible with your directives, it seems. I submit to you Document Number R-124. That concerns a meeting of the Central Planning Board of 1 March 1944. There, with regard to recruitment, you said that, in order to get the workers, one ought to resort to “shanghai,” as was the custom in earlier days. You said:

“I have even resorted to the method of training staffs of French men and women agents ... who go out on man hunts and stupefy victims with drink and persuasive arguments in order to get them to Germany.”

SAUCKEL: That is, as I can see, the report or record of a meeting of the Central Planning Board of the spring of 1944. During that year it had become extremely difficult for me to meet the demands of the various employers of labor represented in the Central Planning Board. At no time did I issue directives or even recommendations to “shanghai.” In this conference I merely used that word as reminiscent of my days as a seaman, in order to defend myself against those who demanded workers of me, and in order to make it clear to the gentlemen how difficult my task had become, particularly in 1944. Actually, a very simple situation is at the root of this. According to German labor laws and according to my own convictions, the “Arbeitsvermittlung” (procurement of labor)—the old word for “Arbeitseinsatz” (allocation of labor)—was a right of the State; and we, myself included, scorned private methods of recruitment. In 1944 Premier Laval, the head of the French government, told me that he was also having great difficulties in carrying out the labor laws where his own workers were concerned.

In view of that, and in agreement with one of my collaborators, Dr. Didier, conferences were held in the German Embassy—the witness Hildebrandt, I believe, is better able to give information about that—with the head of the collaborationist associations, that is to say, associations among the French population which advocated collaboration with Germany. During these conferences at the German Embassy these associations stated that in their opinion official recruitment in France had become very difficult. They said that they would like to take charge of that and would like to provide recruiting agents from their own ranks and also provide people from among their members who would go to Germany voluntarily. Recruitment was not to take place through official agencies but in cafés. In these cafés, of course, certain expenses would be necessary which would have to be met; and the recruiting agents would have to be paid a bonus, or be compensated by a glass of wine or some gin. That way of doing things, naturally, did not appeal to me personally; but I was in such difficulties in view of the demands put to me that I agreed, without intending, of course, that the idea of “shanghai” with its overseas suggestions and so forth should be seriously considered.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did this suggestion come from the Frenchmen, or was it your suggestion?

SAUCKEL: As I have said already, the suggestion was made by the French leaders of these associations.

DR. SERVATIUS: If you read on a few lines in the document, you will find that mention is made of special executive powers which you wanted to create for the allocation of labor; it says there:

“Beyond that, I have charged a few capable men with the establishment of a special executive force for the Allocation of Labor. Under the leadership of the Higher SS and Police Leader a number of indigenous units have been trained and armed, and I now have to ask the Ministry of Munitions for weapons for these people.”

SAUCKEL: That, also, can be explained clearly only in connection with the events that I have just described. At that time there had been many attacks on German offices and mixed German-French labor offices. The Director of the Department for the Allocation of Labor in the office of the military commander in France, President Dr. Ritter, had been murdered. A number of recruiting offices had been raided and destroyed. For that reason these associations who were in favor of collaboration had suggested, for the protection of their own members, that a sort of bodyguard for the recruiting organization should be set up. Of course I could not do that myself because I had neither the authority nor the machinery for it. In accordance with the orders of the military commander, it had to be done by the Higher SS and Police Leader; that is, under his supervision. This was carried out in conjunction with the French Minister of the Interior at that time, Darnand; so as to be able to stand my ground against the censure of the Central Planning Board, I used an example in this drastic form. As far as I know, these hypothetical suggestions were not put into practice.

SAUCKEL: The actual recruitment of foreign workers was the task of the German offices established in the various regions, the offices of the military commanders or similar civilian German institutions.

DR. SERVATIUS: You ordered recruitment to be voluntary. What was the success of that voluntary recruitment?

SAUCKEL: Several million foreign workers came to Germany voluntarily, as voluntary recruitment was the underlying principle.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now, at the meeting of the Central Planning Board—the same meeting which we have just discussed—you made a remark which contradicts that. It is on Page 67 of the German photostat, Page 1827 of the English text. I shall read the sentence to you. Kehrl is speaking. He says, “During that entire period, you brought a large number of Frenchmen to the Reich by voluntary recruitment.”

The speaker continues, “Forced recruitment started when voluntary recruitment no longer yielded sufficient numbers.”

Now comes the remark on which I want you to comment. You answered, “Of the 5 million foreign workers who came to Germany, less than 200,000 came voluntarily.”

SAUCKEL: I see that this is another interruption which I made. All I wanted to say by it was that Herr Kehrl’s opinion that all workers had come voluntarily was not quite correct. This proportion, which is put down here by the stenographer or the man writing the records, is quite impossible. How that error occurred, I do not know. I never saw the record; but the witness Timm, or others, can give information on that.

DR. SERVATIUS: I refer now to Exhibit Sauckel-15. That is Directive Number 4, which has been quoted already and which lays down specific regulations with regard to recruiting measures. It has already been submitted as Document Number 3044-PS. Why did you now abandon the principle of voluntary recruitment?

SAUCKEL: In the course of the war our opponents also carried out very considerable and widespread countermeasures. The need for manpower in Germany, on the other hand, had become tremendous. During that period a request was also put to me by French, Belgian, and Dutch circles to bring about a better balance in the economy of these territories and even to introduce what we called a labor draft law, so that the pressure of enemy propaganda would be reduced and the Dutch, Belgians, and French themselves could say that they were not going to Germany voluntarily but that they had to go because of a compulsory labor service and because of laws.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the proximity of the front have any influence on the fact that people no longer wanted to come voluntarily?

SAUCKEL: Of course I came to feel that; and it is understandable that the chances of victory and defeat caused great agitation among the workers; and the way things looked at the front certainly played an important part.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did purely military considerations also cause the introduction...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): Dr. Servatius, will you ask the witness what he means by a labor draft law. Does he mean a law of Germany or a law of the occupied countries?

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you heard the question, whether you mean a German law or a law of the administration of the occupied countries?

SAUCKEL: That varied. The Reich Government in some of the territories introduced laws which corresponded to the laws that were valid for the German people themselves. Those laws could not be issued by me, but they were issued by the chiefs of the regional administrations or the government of the country concerned on the order of the German Government.

In France these laws were issued by the Laval Government, in agreement with Marshal Pétain; in Belgium, in agreement with the Belgian general secretaries or general directors still in office or with the ministries.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean, in the other countries, by the German Government or the German Government’s representatives? You have only spoken of...

SAUCKEL: The order to introduce German labor laws in the occupied territories was given by the Führer. They were proclaimed and introduced by the chiefs who had been appointed by the Führer for these territories, for I myself was not in a position to issue any directives, laws, or regulations there.

SAUCKEL: The laws were published in the official publications and legal gazettes, as well as being made known through the press and by posters in those territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: I mean the practical execution. How were the people brought to Germany?

SAUCKEL: They were summoned to the local labor office, which was mostly administered by local authorities. Cases had to be examined individually, according to my directives, which have been submitted here as documents. Cases of hardship to the family, or other such cases, were given special consideration. Then, in the normal manner—as was done in Germany also—the individual workers or conscripted persons were brought to Germany.

SAUCKEL: I observed this procedure personally in a number of cities in Russia, France, and Belgium; and I made sure that it was carried out in accordance with orders.

SAUCKEL: At first, such compulsory measures were taken as are justified and necessary in every normal civil administration.

DR. SERVATIUS: You have stated repeatedly in documents, which are available here, that a certain amount of pressure was to be used. What did you mean by that?

SAUCKEL: I consider that every administrative measure taken on the basis of laws or duties imposed by the state, on one’s own nation, or in any other way, constitutes some form of stress, duty, pressure.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were not measures used which brought about some sort of collective pressure?

SAUCKEL: I rejected every kind of collective pressure. The refusal to employ collective pressure is also evident from decrees issued by other German offices in the Reich.

DR. SERVATIUS: Is it not true that in the East the villages were called upon to provide a certain number of people?

SAUCKEL: In the East, of course, administrative procedure was rendered difficult on account of the great distances. In the lower grades, as far as I know, native mayors were in office in every case. It is possible that a mayor was requested to select a number of workers from his village or town for work in Germany.

DR. SERVATIUS: Is that the same as that form of collective pressure, where, if nobody came, the entire village was to be punished?

SAUCKEL: Measures of that kind I rejected entirely in my field of activity, because I could not and would not bring to the German economy workers who had been taken to Germany in such a manner that they would hate their life and their work in Germany from the very outset.

SAUCKEL: Police pressure in the occupied territories could be exerted on order or application of the respective chief of the territory, or of the Higher SS and Police Leader, if authorized.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you exert indirect pressure by your directives, by cutting off food supplies, or similar measures?

SAUCKEL: After the fall of Stalingrad and the proclamation of the state of total war, Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels in Berlin interfered considerably in all these problems. He ordered that in cases of persistent refusal or signs of resistance compulsion was to be used by means of refusing additional food rations, or even by withdrawal of ration cards. I personally rejected measures of that kind energetically, because I knew very well that in the western territories the so-called food ration card played a subordinate role and that supplies were provided for the resistance movement and its members on such a large scale that such measures would have been quite ineffective. I did not order or suggest them.

DR. SERVATIUS: At the meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944 you also stated that, if the French executive agencies were unable to get results, then one might have to put a prefect up against a wall. Do you still consider this to be legally justified pressure?

SAUCKEL: That is a similarly drastic remark of mine in the Central Planning Board which was never actually followed by an official order and not even by any prompting on my part. It was simply that I had been informed that in several departments in France the prefects or responsible chiefs supported the resistance movement wholeheartedly. Railroad tracks had been blown up; bridges had been blown up; and that remark was a verbal reaction on my part. I believe, however, I was then only thinking of a legal measure, because there did, in fact, exist a French law which made sabotage an offense punishable by death.

DR. SERVATIUS: It is on Page 1776, where it says that on the basis of the law it would then be necessary to put a mayor up against a wall.

[Turning to the defendant.] Do you know what laws existed in France compelling co-operation from the French authorities, or whether there were such laws?

DR. SERVATIUS: A number of reports, which were submitted here, concerning the application of measures of compulsion, mentioned abuses and outrageous conditions allegedly caused by recruitment measures. What can you say about that in general?

DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the use of compulsion, a number of reports were brought up here, and you have heard them; reports setting forth measures which must surely be generally condemned. You heard of the burning down of villages and the shooting of men. What can you say to that in general?

SAUCKEL: All these measures are clearly in contradiction to the directives and instructions which I issued and which have been submitted here in large numbers, and to these I must refer. These are methods against which, when I heard as much as hints of them, I took very severe measures.

SAUCKEL: The responsibility for such incidents rests with the local authorities which did these things.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were there any other offices besides the local authorities which dealt with recruitment of labor?

SAUCKEL: That is exactly what I was fighting for from the very beginning—to eliminate and combat the intricate maze of offices which, without restraint or control, recruited workers by compulsion. That was part of my job.

SAUCKEL: They were offices of all kinds. I myself heard about most of them only here.

SAUCKEL: The Todt Organization for a long time recruited and used manpower independently in all territories.

SAUCKEL: That I cannot say; that was a German military organization for training for manual work.

SAUCKEL: Workers were employed for local urgent work, of course, by army groups, by construction and fortification battalions, and so on, which I neither knew about nor was in a position to control. Road building...

SAUCKEL: The Reichsbahn repaired its tracks itself and recruited or hired the workers for its requirements whenever it needed them.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did they carry out your instructions or were they required to carry them out?

SAUCKEL: They were not obliged to carry them out; and for that very reason I sent out, and in a very emphatic form, that manifesto which was mentioned yesterday. As, however, I myself had no supervision over the executive authorities, I had to leave it to the various offices to take these instructions into consideration.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was the number of workers recruited in the various territories in that manner very large?

DR. SERVATIUS: There were also Reich offices which dealt with the question of manpower. What about the deportations carried out by Himmler? Did you have any connection with those?

SAUCKEL: With reference to the question of these deportations, I can only say that I did not have the least thing to do with them. I never agreed—I never could have agreed, in view of my own outlook, my development, and my life—I could not have agreed to the use of prisoners or convicts for work in that manner. That was absolutely foreign to my nature. I also have the firm conviction that, on account of my forcible statements and measures, I was intentionally kept uninformed about the whole matter, because it was quite contrary to my own views on work and on workers. I said very often—and it can be seen in documents here—that I wanted to win the co-operation of the foreign workers for Germany and for the German way of life, and I did not want to alienate them.

DR. SERVATIUS: These then were the various offices which, apart from you, had to do with recruitment of workers?

SAUCKEL: May I make a short statement in that respect? I heard the word “deportation” a few times in Germany and I always rejected the idea very emphatically because I knew nothing about such operations. According to the use of the word in the German language I understand “deportation” to mean the sending away of prisoners and of people who have committed some punishable act against the State. I never carried out deportations because of my own views on the ethics of work. On the contrary, I gave the workers recruited through my office—and that was the point on which I finally obtained Hitler’s consent at the beginning of my job, and it was not an easy matter—I gave all foreign workers legal contracts, whether they came voluntarily or through German labor conscription. They should and must receive the same treatment, the same pay, and the same food as the German workers. That is why I rejected the idea of deportation in my methods and my program. I can testify here with a clear conscience that I had nothing at all to do with those deportations, the terrible extent of which I learned only here.

DR. SERVATIUS: You have pointed out repeatedly that this labor had to be brought to Germany under all circumstances, that one had to proceed ruthlessly, that it was an absolute necessity to get the workers. Does that not show that you agreed with such measures?

My directives and instructions can be clearly seen in numerous documents. I could issue only these because I had no executive power and no machinery of my own. All these directives, from the very beginning, prescribe legally correct and just treatment. It is true, however, that I used the words “under all circumstances” when communicating with German offices—the Führer himself had impressed these words on me—and I used the word “ruthlessly,” not with respect to the treatment of workers but with respect to the many arguments, disputes, arbitrary acts, and individual desires which the German offices, with which I had to contend fiercely, had among themselves and against me. For the most part they did not understand the importance of the allocation of labor as an economic measure in time of war. The military authorities, the army commanders, very often told me, for instance, that it was nonsense to bring these people to Germany. There was the Vlassov Army under the Russian general of that name, and the military authorities wanted these Russian workers to join the Vlassov Army. I opposed that. I did not consider it right, nor did I consider it sufficiently reliable. These were the things against which I had to proceed ruthlessly in my dealings with the German administration in those territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were there other circumstances, too, which led to the transportation of people to Germany?

SAUCKEL: Yes, there were other circumstances which, however, were not connected directly but indirectly with the allocation of labor, and they often took me by surprise; for example, the evacuation of military zones, which frequently had to be carried through at a moment’s notice or after only a very short time of preparation. And when such an evacuation had been carried out it was the task of the local labor offices to put the evacuated population to work in areas in the rear or to bring to Germany such workers as could be used there.

This sort of labor allocation entailed, of course, considerable difficulties for me. There were families and children among the evacuated people; and they, naturally, had also to be provided with shelter. It was often the very natural wish of the Russian fathers and mothers to take their children with them. That happened, not because I wanted it, but because it was unavoidable.

SAUCKEL: To a large extent those people were used by the local authorities in those territories and put into agriculture, industry, railroads, bridge building, and so on.

SAUCKEL: I never had anything to do with resettlement. By a decree of the Führer that task was expressly delegated to the Reichsführer SS.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Rosenberg not report to you about bad conditions which existed in his sphere?

SAUCKEL: Yes. I had about four conversations with Rosenberg, at his request; and he told me about the bad conditions. There was no doubt on my part that such conditions were to be utterly condemned.

SAUCKEL: The Reichskommissariat Ukraine was mainly involved. There were considerable differences between the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Rosenberg, and Reich Commissioner Koch.

SAUCKEL: Koch was not subordinate to me either directly or indirectly. I could not give him any instructions in such matters. I let him know from the outset that I could not possibly agree with such methods as I had heard about, to some extent through Rosenberg, although I could not prove them.

Koch was of the opinion—and he explained that in his letters to Rosenberg—that in his territory he was the sole authority. He also pointed that out to me.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Rosenberg not think the cause for these conditions was that your demands were too high?

SAUCKEL: I also spoke to Herr Rosenberg about that. I personally was of the opinion that, if the demands could be divided up and orderly recruitment and conscription could take place, it was quite possible to fill the quotas. After all I had orders and instructions from the Führer and the Central Planning Board.

SAUCKEL: The methods that should be used were not only frequently discussed between us, but I published them in many very clear directives. I even went so far as to issue and distribute my manifesto over the head of this higher authority to the subordinate offices so that they could be guided by it.

I have to point out emphatically, however, that these were incidents which occurred for the most part before my directives came into effect and before my appointment.

DR. SERVATIUS: I want to refer you to Document Number 018-PS. That is in the “Slave Labor Brief,” Page 10.

DR. SERVATIUS: It is Exhibit Number USA-186. In the English “Slave Labor” Book it is Document 10. It is a letter of 21 December 1942.

If you go through that document, you will see that Rosenberg complains about the methods used by your agents and collaborators. What are these offices for which you are being made responsible here?

SAUCKEL: There is an error in this letter on the part of Herr Rosenberg, because it was not I who had offices there but the Reich Commissioner.

DR. SERVATIUS: In other words you are saying that he addressed himself to the wrong person?

SAUCKEL: Rosenberg writes on Page 2, “I empowered the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine...”

DR. SERVATIUS: You assume, therefore, that the writer of this letter did not himself know exactly who the authorities in his territory were?

SAUCKEL: Yes, that was quite possible, because I myself had only been in office a short time.

DR. SERVATIUS: What did you do as a result of the complaint which Rosenberg made? Did you do anything at all?

SAUCKEL: After receiving Rosenberg’s letter I had a discussion with him immediately. As it was shortly before Christmas, 21 December 1942, I called by telegram an official meeting at Weimar for 6 January, to which representatives of the respective offices in the East were invited. I also invited Reich Minister Rosenberg to that meeting. And at that conference these officials were again told clearly and unmistakably, that it was their duty to use correct and legal methods.

DR. SERVATIUS: In that connection I would like to refer to Document Number Sauckel-82. It is in the Sauckel Document Book Number 3, Page 207. I submit the handbook itself, which contains a number of documents for judicial notice.

I quote one sentence from the speech on the principles of recruiting which Sauckel made there before 800 people who were employed in the Allocation of Labor program.

THE PRESIDENT: I am looking at Document Number 82. I thought you said 800 men were employed. I am looking at the beginning of Document 82.

DR. SERVATIUS: It begins on Page 204. He spoke before 800 people, not 8,000. It should be 800. That is a mistake in the translation of the document.

“Principles of our recruiting:

“1) Where the voluntary method fails (and experience shows that it fails everywhere) compulsory service takes its place....”—I skip a few sentences.

“It is bitter to tear people from their homes, from their children. But we did not want the war. The German child who loses its father at the front, the German wife who mourns her husband killed in battle, suffer far more. Let us disclaim every false sentiment now.”

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I omitted some sentences and I said so. But I can read all of it.

THE PRESIDENT: I only mean on Page 206. I didn’t mean the whole document. On Page 206 you have just skipped two sentences.

“Where the voluntary method fails, compulsory service takes its place.”

“This is the iron law for the Allocation of Labor for 1943. In a few weeks from now there must no longer be any occupied territory in which compulsory service for Germany is not the most natural thing in the world.”

THE PRESIDENT: Didn’t you also leave out the words “experience shows that it fails everywhere”?

“We are going to discard the last remnants of our soft talk about humanitarian ideals. Every additional gun which we procure brings us a minute closer to victory. It is bitter to tear people from their homes, from their children. But we did not want the war. The German child who loses its father at the front, the German wife who mourns her husband killed in battle, suffer far more. Let us disclaim every false sentiment now.

“Here we must be guided by the realization that in the long run a high output can be demanded of foreign workers only if they are satisfied with their lot. I will not tolerate men being treated badly.

“3) Under no circumstances are you, as the recruiting commission abroad, permitted to promise things which according to the directives and regulations issued are not possible and cannot be carried out on account of the war. It is much better to introduce labor conscription and say, ‘You must take this upon yourselves and in return you will enjoy the rights of the workers employed in Germany.’ Anyone who works in Germany has rights in Germany, even if he is a Bolshevist. We shall watch very carefully to insure that the German name be not sullied. You can demand of me any protection in your field of work, but none for any crimes. The name of our nation is holy. For the first time in German history you must represent for the Reich the principles of German labor. Be conscious of that at all times.”

[Turning to the defendant.] Apart from the information which you received from Rosenberg, did you receive any other reports concerning recruiting methods?

SAUCKEL: Apart from the information from Rosenberg and his letters of that time, I did not receive any other direct complaints. But I had issued emphatic orders that any complaints received by my office were to be forwarded immediately to the competent Reich authorities for investigation, punishment, and the remedying of the grievances. I should like to state this: My office received a great many complaints which concerned me; but they were complaints about insufficient numbers of workers provided by me. It was my duty to correct this. For the correction of inadequacies in administration, for eliminating unjust measures in various fields or various agencies, I could not be competent, as the Reich authorities themselves were competent in that respect.

DR. SERVATIUS: But it should have been of great interest to you what happened there. Did you not hear anything of these incidents? Was nothing reported to you?

SAUCKEL: That I was interested from a humane and personal point of view can be seen from the fact that I was concerned about these things, although they did not come within my office.

DR. SERVATIUS: But you spoke here about one case in which it was reported to you that a cinema had been surrounded. Perhaps you remember that case?

SAUCKEL: When on a visit to Field Marshal Kluge, I heard from him that he had been informed that in the area of his army, or army group, a cinema had been surrounded and the people attending the cinema had been brought to Germany to work. I immediately had that case most carefully investigated, and the investigation took 3 months. Witnesses will be able to testify to that when they appear here. The result of the investigation was the following: It was not a case of labor recruitment for Germany. A construction unit near Rovno was celebrating in that cinema the end of one of its tasks; and in the middle of that celebration the order was received that this unit had to be put on a new job, a different place of work. The contractor thereupon interrupted the celebration in a very drastic way by having the immediate transport of these workers carried out by a force of police. That, of course, had nothing to do with my work and my organization; but it took me 3 months to discover the true facts of this complaint by Field Marshal Kluge. In every case where such complaints came to my attention I investigated and dealt with them and condemned them, because they did not help me.

DR. SERVATIUS: We will leave this matter of recruitment now and turn to the question of the transportation of these people to Germany. Who was responsible for their transportation?

SAUCKEL: For transportation the German Reichsbahn and the authorities designated in my Directive Number 4—regional offices and regional labor departments—were responsible. Immediately on assuming my office I had a detailed discussion with Dr. Dorpmüller, Reich Minister of Transport; his state secretary, Dr. Ganzenmüller; and before him Dr. Kleinmüller; and it was agreed that the transportation of workers to Germany should be carried out in an unobjectionable manner; that the transport trains should be supplied with food for the duration of the journey; that, if Russians were included in these transports, the cars should under no circumstances be overcrowded; and that, if at all possible, passenger coaches should be used for these transports. We agreed on this, though the Reich Minister of Transport said that he could not be expected to provide the people with better transport than the German soldiers had; still, he could at least guarantee that the cars would not be overcrowded.

DR. SERVATIUS: You have seen the Molotov report, that is Exhibit Number USSR-51. You know its contents, describing the conditions of these transports, saying that the cars were overcrowded, that the dying were thrown out and left lying on the tracks, and that newly born children died immediately. Were such conditions reported to you, or did you hear of them in your official position?

SAUCKEL: Such incidents were not reported to me in my official position, and they could not possibly have referred to worker transports of my office.

SAUCKEL: As far as I could determine from the proceedings here, they must have been transports of inmates of concentration camps who were being evacuated. I do not know for certain; but I cannot explain it otherwise because I would not tolerate such conditions under any circumstances, nor did I hear about them. Such things were of no advantage to us.

DR. SERVATIUS: USSR-51 is the official report which I received in printed form. I have a printed German copy. I assume that it has been submitted to the Tribunal already. If not, I will obtain it and submit it myself.

THE PRESIDENT: If it has got the Number USSR-51, it must have been submitted to the Tribunal. That is the exhibit number. I wonder whether it has got some other number by which we can identify it?

DR. SERVATIUS: The Prosecution handed me Document Number 054-PS: that is Exhibit Number USA-198. That is Number 13 in the English “Slave Labor” Book.

[Turning to the defendant.] There, on Page 4, mention is made of a return transport, and in connection with it very bad conditions are described and censured. Did you find it? The passage begins:

THE PRESIDENT: We haven’t had the question yet, have we? The question didn’t come through, I think.

In this document mention is made of return transports from Germany to the East, and two transports are denounced on account of the abominable conditions which are described. I quote from the document:

“Very depressing effects on the morale of the skilled workers and the population are caused above all by people returning from Germany in a condition unfit for work, or who were already unfit before they came to Germany. Several times already transports of skilled workers on their way to Germany have passed returning transports of such unfit persons, and they have stood on the tracks alongside each other for some time. On account of the insufficient care given these returning transports (sick, injured, or weak people, mostly 50 or 60 to a car, often many days without sufficient care and food, usually escorted by only 3 or 4 men), and through the frequently very unfavorable—even if exaggerated—statements of these repatriates about their treatment in Germany and en route, added to what the people could see with their own eyes, a psychosis of fear developed among the skilled workers and others being transported to Germany. Several transport leaders, especially those of the 62d and the 63d Transports, reported details in this connection. In one case the leader of the transport of skilled workers observed with his own eyes how a person who had died of hunger was unloaded on the side track from a returning transport. (1st Lt. Hofmann of the 63d Transport, Darniza Station.) On another occasion it was reported that en route three dead...”

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need read all of this to the defendant. He probably knows it and he can give his answer upon it.

DR. SERVATIUS: You see that reference is being made to a report; will you please comment on it?

SAUCKEL: Concerning this report, may I say the following: These terrible conditions had to be investigated at once by the local authorities concerned. A report on the result of the investigation did not reach me. This report here was also not made to me. I may point out that the transportation to Germany of sick people unfit for work was strictly prohibited by me, because that would have been a crime and an impossibility from the economic point of view. I could not possibly say who sent these trains back. It was also not established what kind of transports they really were. The report describes conditions which already existed before I came into office. I, personally—and I should like to emphasize this particularly—issued a decree according to which sick people or pregnant women—I personally issued orders that, if a return transport of sick people were necessary, the German Red Cross were to furnish personnel to accompany these people all the way back to their native place. These orders can be found among the codes. Such terrible cases of negligence and crime are, therefore, in contradiction to the clear regulations issued by the German labor authorities.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not equip Bad Frankenthal for sick people who could not return?

SAUCKEL: In my own Gau it was not Bad Frankenthal but Bad Frankenhausen, Kyffhäuser, which I made available for sick Soviet workers. In addition, I had a large school set aside in Edendorf near Weimar with 100 beds for typhus patients and Russian prisoners of war. So, on my own initiative, I myself did everything possible to help in dealing with cases of sickness and similar matters. It was also prohibited to return people while they were in a sick condition.

[A recess was taken.]

SAUCKEL: May I say something about Document Number 054-PS to supplement my testimony? It is very important.

SAUCKEL: On Page 5, near the center of the page, I should like to call your attention to the following sentence of the reporter—this is a report within a military authority: “These extreme incidents which took place in transports in the first few months did not, to our knowledge, repeat themselves in the summer.” In the first months of the year 1942 I was not even in office, and my program did not commence until May. In the summer of that year, as it is correctly stated here, an end was put to this state of affairs.

Furthermore, I should like to call attention in the same document, 054-PS, I believe on Page 10, to a copy of a letter of complaint which says, “As I informed you in my letter of 20 April 1942...” It is evident, therefore, that this letter deals with complaints about conditions which must have been disclosed before I assumed office.

DR. SERVATIUS: I was going to ask you about the arrival of workers in Germany. What happened when a transport arrived in Germany?

SAUCKEL: Upon their arrival in Germany the people of the transport had not only to be properly received but they also had to be medically examined again and checked at a transit camp. One examination had to be made at the time and place of recruitment, and another took place at a fixed point before the border. Thus, from the time of recruitment until being put to work three medical examinations and checks had to be made, according to my directives.

SAUCKEL: These transit camps were camps in which the people from the various transports came together at the border, and where they were examined and registered in the proper manner.

DR. SERVATIUS: I submit Document Number UK-39 to you. I have no exhibit number for it.

DR. SERVATIUS: I could not establish whether it already has an exhibit number; I shall have to check on that. At any rate, it was given to me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): The series is not a British exhibit; our exhibits are “GB.” It is an earlier series of documents that we have prepared. But we will try to find out.

DR. SERVATIUS: If you will look at this document, it is a letter of the Reich Security Main Office, dated 18 January 1943, concerning “Concentration Camp Hertogenbosch.” Then it says, “This camp will be equipped as a transit and reception camp.”

SAUCKEL: The Allocation of Labor had nothing at all to do with these camps and concentration camps. This was not a transit camp for workers but was obviously the transit camp of a concentration camp. These were not at all known to me. I never had to and never did concern myself with such transports and transit camps; and I would not have done it.

DR. SERVATIUS: A report of the French Government was submitted here; it is Document Number UK-78 and French Exhibit Number RF-87. The heading is “Third Study.” It is a very comprehensive report. I shall quote from my notes. The report contains the following, roughly: “Immediately, upon their arrival the workers were taken to these actual slave markets which were called sorting houses. The living conditions there were miserable.”

DR. SERVATIUS: How was the distribution of the workers carried out in practice? I refer once more to the Molotov report, Document Number USSR-51. The Soviet Delegation says here that this document was submitted under that exhibit number. The report says that the workers were taken to the slave market and were sold for 10 to 15 marks. What do you have to say to that?

SAUCKEL: I believe every German employer who received these workers, either in agriculture or in war industry, is a witness to the fact that a procedure of this sort never took place in any form; that it was quite inconceivable that such slave markets were instituted through the authority of the Reich Ministry of Labor; but that these workers who passed through National Socialist labor exchanges received exactly the same contracts and conditions as the German workers themselves, with some variations, and in no case were they put to work like slaves without rights or pay, without a contract, without sickness insurance, or without accident insurance. That may be seen from the numerous directives and decrees which were issued by the Reich Ministry of Labor and by me for every race involved.

DR. SERVATIUS: What were the general living conditions of foreign workers in Germany?

SAUCKEL: The general living conditions of foreign workers in Germany as far as they were recruited through the offices of the Allocation of Labor, were exactly the same as those of German workers who were accommodated in camps. Living conditions were dependent on the circumstances of war and, in contrast with peacetime, were subject to the same limitations as applied to the German population. The adjutant of Herr Von Schirach, a man unknown to me, who appeared here as a witness yesterday, described conditions in Vienna; those conditions existed in other German cities too.

SAUCKEL: The security measures were the responsibility of the Police, not mine, because the camps came under the various industries and the German Labor Front.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I submit Document Number EC-68. It contains directives issued by the Regional Food Office of Baden regarding the treatment of Poles in Germany. This is Exhibit Number USA-205, to be found in the American Document Book “Slave Labor,” the fourth document. I shall now read the beginning of this document, which you have already seen. It says there:

“The offices of the Reich Food Administration—(Regional Food Office) of Baden—have received with great satisfaction the result of the negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Leader in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941. Appropriate memoranda have already been sent to the district food offices. Below I promulgate the individual regulations as they were laid down during the conference and are now to be supplied accordingly:

“1. In principle farm workers of Polish nationality no longer have the right to complain; consequently, no complaints may be accepted by any official agency.

“2. Farm workers of Polish nationality may no longer leave the localities in which they are employed.”

Now, I shall omit some points and just confine myself to the essential parts. I turn to Point 5:

“5. Visits to theaters, cinemas, or other cultural entertainments are strictly prohibited for farm workers of Polish nationality.”

Other regulations follow, prohibiting use of the railroad, and under Number 12 there is a vital provision:

“12. Every employer of Polish farm workers has the right to administer chastisement...”

SAUCKEL: First of all, I should like to point out that this document is dated 6 March 1941—that is, more than a year before I assumed office. Such an absurd and impossible decree never came to my attention during my term of office. But since I am now being confronted with the document and am learning about it, I should like to refer to my own decrees, which I issued entirely independently of what had gone before and which automatically revoked such decrees. In order to prevent these absurd decrees of some agency in the Reich from being effective, I had my decrees collected and published in a handbook in which it says—because of the time factor and out of respect for the Tribunal, I cannot ask the Tribunal to look at all of them; but they are in direct contradiction to such views. I would like to ask that I be permitted to quote just one sentence from the manifesto already referred to, which is directed against such nonsense and against the misuse of manpower. I refer particularly to my directives for fair treatment. The sentence reads as follows:

“...these orders and directives, as well as their supplements, are to be brought very forcibly to the attention of works managers and leaders of camps for foreign nationals, as well as their personnel, at least four times a year by the regional labor offices. Actual adherence to them is to be constantly supervised.”

SAUCKEL: That is a paragraph from the manifesto which refers specifically to my orders prescribing just and humane treatment, sufficient food, leisure time, and so forth.

DR. SERVATIUS: You issued a great number of directives. Did you notice any opposition to your basic regulations; and, if so, what did you do?

SAUCKEL: As soon as I noticed opposition I made special reference to my decrees, of course, because they had been approved by the Führer, upon my recommendations, for my field of activity.

DR. SERVATIUS: As far as care and welfare were concerned, did the DAF—the German Labor Front—play a special role? What was the task of the DAF?

SAUCKEL: The task of the DAF was to care for German workers and look after their interests. In this capacity it had to concern itself, as a matter of course, with the welfare of foreign workers. That was its ordinary task; and at the same time it had a corrective influence on state labor administration, an influence similar to that exerted by the trade unions on state control, as far as it exists, in other countries.

SAUCKEL: They had the task of regulating the total production of their works; and, of course, they were fully responsible for their workmen and for the foreign workers who had been assigned to them.

SAUCKEL: The employers were primarily responsible, according to the law regulating German labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now the workers were mostly billeted in camps. Who supervised the accommodations in these camps?

SAUCKEL: The accommodations in these camps were under the final supervision of the German trade inspection office, which was under the Reich Ministry of Labor. The trade inspection office had the authority and power to enforce observance from employers who failed to comply with the orders of the Reich Minister of Labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you yourself issue any orders or decrees concerning the camps?

SAUCKEL: I personally issued orders concerning the camps, but they could be put into effect and supervised only by the Reich Minister of Labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: So much about the accommodations of the camps. Now what were the living conditions within the camps? Who was responsible for them?

SAUCKEL: In the camps themselves the camp leaders were responsible. The camp leader was appointed by agreement between the DAF and the works manager, and to my knowledge—this was not within the range of my duties—his appointment had to be confirmed and accepted by the security authorities.

DR. SERVATIUS: You speak of the security authorities. To what extent did the Police take part in the surveillance of these camps, the maintenance of discipline, and such matters?

SAUCKEL: Surveillance of the camp and maintenance of discipline was the task of the camp leader, and had nothing to do with the Police. The Police had, as I believe is the case in every country, surveillance and control rights as regards espionage and the secrecy of the plant, et cetera. Beyond that, the Police had nothing to do with the camp.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were these camps shut off from the outside world? What was the situation in that respect when you assumed office?

SAUCKEL: When I assumed office, the camps, particularly of the Eastern Workers, were very much shut off from the world and were fenced in with barbed wire. To me this was incompatible with the principle of employing productive and willing workers; and with all the personal energy I could muster, I succeeded in having the fences and barbed wire removed; and I also reduced the limits of the curfew regulations for Eastern Workers, so that the picture which was presented here yesterday could eventually be realized. Anything else would have been incompatible, technically speaking, with the workers’ willingness to work, which I wanted.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now the question of food. What was the food of these foreign workers?

SAUCKEL: The feeding of the foreign workers came under the system that was applied to the feeding of the German people, and accordingly additional rations were allotted to people doing heavy, very heavy, or overtime work.

SAUCKEL: When I assumed office and received the order from the Führer that in addition to the foreign workers who were already in the Reich I was to bring further quotas into the Reich, the first step I took was to visit the Reich Minister for Food, for it was obvious to me that bringing in foreign workers was in the first place a question of feeding; poorly fed workers, even if they want to, cannot turn out satisfactory work. I had many detailed conversations with him; and by referring to the Führer and the Reich Marshal, I succeeded in obtaining suitable food for the workers, and food quotas were legally fixed. It was not easy to do this because the food situation, even for Germans, was always strained; but without these measures it would not have been possible for me, also from a personal point of view, to carry through my task.

DR. SERVATIUS: Details with regard to the food situation were mentioned here which would justify the assumption that extremely bad conditions existed. Was nothing of this sort brought to your attention, or did you yourself not hear anything?

SAUCKEL: As far as bad feeding conditions in the work camps of civilian laborers is concerned I never had any very unfavorable reports. I personally made repeated efforts to have this matter in particular constantly looked into. The works managers themselves took the problem of food very seriously.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not, in a decree and letter to the Gau labor offices and Gauleiter, deal with the subject of good treatment of foreigners; and did you not on that occasion criticize existing conditions?

SAUCKEL: Immediately after I assumed office, when the Gauleiter were appointed as plenipotentiaries for the Allocation of Labor in their Gaue, I called their attention to the food situation and ordered them to give their attention to that question and also to the question of accommodation. I heard that in two Gaue my instructions were not being taken seriously enough. In one case I myself went immediately to Essen and remedied the situation there—it concerned the barbed wire—and in another case, in eastern Bavaria, I also intervened personally. Besides that, I made use of these two incidents to write to the Gauleiter and the governments of the German Länder and provinces and again pointed out the importance of observing these instructions.

DR. SERVATIUS: I refer to Document 19, that is in the English Book Number 1, Page 54; Document Sauckel-19.

DR. SERVATIUS: This is Document Number 19, in the first document book, Page 54. Only a portion of this is reproduced. In a circular to all the Gau labor offices and Gauleiter is the following:

“If in a Gau district the statement is still being made that ‘if anyone in the Gau has to freeze this winter, the first ones should be the Russians’ (that is, the Russian civilian laborers employed for work in the Gau), such a statement shows plainly that in that region of the Gau the contact between the administrative labor office and the competent political offices is as yet not close enough. It is one of the most important tasks of the Allocation of Labor and the collaboration between you and the Gauleiter as my deputies for the Allocation of Labor to see to it that the foreign workers recruited for the German armament industry and food economy are looked after in such a manner as to enable them to give the maximum of efficiency. There is, therefore, no question of protecting from want German fellow countrymen only and being satisfied with inadequate provisions for laborers of foreign origin. On the contrary, it is imperative to bear constantly in mind the fact that, in order to bring about victory, a maximum of efficiency must be demanded not only of German fellow countrymen but also of the foreign workers. It would be absurd to bring foreign workers into the country, at considerable expense, for work for German economy and then to allow their efficiency to be impaired or ruined through lack of proper care.”

In conclusion there follows a reminder that Sauckel’s decree must be observed.

[Turning to the defendant.] What was the situation with regard to the clothing of foreign workers?

SAUCKEL: The clothing of foreign workers from the western regions gave us relatively little trouble for these workers were well supplied and they were also compensated for their clothing. But the clothing of the Eastern Workers was a problem. On behalf of the Eastern Workers I applied to the Reich Minister of Economy for a quota of clothing and provided 1 million Eastern Workers with all necessary under and outer clothing. To supply this quota of clothing 10,000 workers were required as well as 30,000 tons of raw materials. Thus, every care was given to the question of clothing, and this clothing was actually issued.

DR. SERVATIUS: The French Delegation has submitted Document Number RF-5. It is a propaganda brochure, Work for Europe. I had also submitted this, and the Tribunal took judicial notice of it. I should like to submit it again and refer to three pictures contained therein. The essential thing about these pictures is that some of the workers coming from the East arrived barefoot, and later there are pictures where these workers are seen well dressed in Germany, and it is evident that the situation as regards the clothing of these workers had made considerable progress in Germany.

[Turning to the defendant.] What was the situation with regard to working hours? Who regulated the working hours?

SAUCKEL: The working hours were regulated on the basis of decrees by the Führer, the Ministerial Council, and later on by Reich Minister Goebbels. The carrying out of these decrees was my task.

SAUCKEL: One can hardly talk of an average working time in Germany during the war. There was the legal working time of 8 hours. For anything beyond 8 hours, overtime had to be paid.

In the year 1943 the average working time per week was at first set at 54 hours; later, as far as it was necessary, at 10 hours per day. When Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels became Reich Delegate for Total War Effort, against my objections and against the objection of other offices but on the basis of the authority which he had, he demanded and proclaimed a 10-hour working day for all offices and industries. However this could not be carried through at all, for in many industries and offices work had to be regulated according to the difficulties which were already then appearing—difficulties of raw materials, power supply, and the amount of work. But in exceptional cases, which were not infrequent, 11 and 12 hours of work were put in where production demanded it. German workers as well worked longer hours. All workers were then compensated accordingly.

DR. SERVATIUS: In the French Document Number RF-22, on Page 101 of the German text, is the following:

“From the interrogations by the agencies of the Ministère des Prisonniers of deported workers who had returned home, it can be seen that the average time of work per week was at least 72 hours.”

Then the source of this information is mentioned, but that does not interest us here.

“Sixty-four-hour weeks were not infrequent. Cases of 100-hour weeks with 30 to 38 consecutive hours were mentioned.”

SAUCKEL: I cannot comment on these reports, because I do not know whether they concern people who were being used in concentration camps or those who were used as civilian workers in the other sector for which I was responsible. It is correct that in very exceptional cases there were periods in which long hours of work were put in. That was decided by the factory and applied also to the German workers. But in such cases appropriate rest periods had to be interspersed. These long hours were worked only for the completion of important contracts. Where these people actually worked, I cannot determine from the interrogation and, therefore, I cannot give you a precise answer.

SAUCKEL: The regulation of free time was the responsibility of the DAF as far as the arrangements of details for free time were concerned.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the situation regarding the employment of children and young people?

SAUCKEL: By German Reich law children under 12 years of age are not permitted to work. Children under 14 are only permitted to work a few hours on the land.

SAUCKEL: I issued decrees or confirmed the laws which were already in existence insofar as they applied to this work.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now I shall show you Document Number 345-PS, which is a letter written by Reich Minister Rosenberg to Lammers, dated 20 July 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: Has this been put in before? Has this been offered in evidence before?

DR. SERVATIUS: This document was submitted in cross-examination. I myself have just received it. It deals with the recruitment of young people of 15 to 20 years of age for employment in the Reich during the war. Then the document refers to the transfer to the Reich of young people aged 10 to 14 years; that is the “Hay Action.” And it goes on to say:

“The object of this action is the further care of young people through the Reich Youth Leadership and the training of apprentices for German economy in a manner similar to that which has already been successfully carried out with the White Ruthenia Youth Service in co-operation with the GBA”—which means you.

SAUCKEL: No, I had nothing whatever to do with this action; and in the index of addresses my name is not mentioned. I do not know of this matter.

DR. SERVATIUS: So you did not violate your own rules by issuing special directives?

DR. SERVATIUS: Then I should like to submit another letter to you, which was also submitted by the Prosecution in connection with the Schirach case. It is Document Number 1137-PS, a letter dated 19 October 1944. On Page 3 of this document, the following appears:

“In addition to this, other labor was supplied to the German armament industry earlier—namely, first of all, 3,500 boys and 500 girls to the Junkers Works; secondly, 2,000 boys and 700 girls to the OT...

“The agency under the Hitler Youth has procured from the Occupied Eastern Territories for the armament industry”—I leave out what does not interest us—“5,500 boys and 1,200 girls.”

Did you authorize the use of this labor, or did this matter pass through your hands?

SAUCKEL: Well, I personally am unable to explain that in detail. Apparently this took place on the basis of an agreement between offices of the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories or those of Hauptbannführer Nickel. I have heard only during the proceedings here that the young people involved were of an age at which work is prohibited for them. I understood that it was more in the nature of pre-employment care, but...

SAUCKEL: Women from foreign countries were used in exactly the same way as German women. No other conditions.

DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number 025-PS has been submitted here. That is Exhibit Number USA-698, which was also submitted only now and is not contained in the books. This is the record of a conference which took place in your office and in which you spoke at length on the use of female labor. In the third paragraph it says:

“To this end, the Führer has ordered the use of 400,000 to 500,000 female Eastern Workers from the Ukraine, between the ages of 15 to 35, for domestic purposes; and the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor”—that is you—“has been charged with the carrying through of this action, which is to be concluded in approximately 3 months.”

“It is the specific wish of the Führer that as many girls as possible shall be germanized if they prove satisfactory.”

SAUCKEL: Yes, this concerns a decree of the Führer to bring 400,000 to 500,000 female Eastern Workers into the Reich for German households, but especially in order to lighten the work of the German farmers’ wives. I should like to mention, in connection with this document, that I did not compile it and that my office did not compile it either. Most likely these minutes were written on the basis of notes which somebody had taken. With reference to these proposed 400,000 to 500,000 domestic servants, it must be said that they were to be brought into the Reich only on a voluntary basis. Actually some 13,000 to 15,000 only, I believe, came into the Reich. The idea of “Germanization,” as used here, also refers only to their free will or wish to remain in Germany.

DR. SERVATIUS: What medical attention did the foreign workers receive? Various things have been mentioned here, for instance: “If the worker can no longer work, he is no longer a concern of ours,” which is supposed to have been a principle of yours. Then it is further said that work, food, and pay must be brought into relationship with each other. If the worker can no longer work, he is just a dead weight. What can you say with regard to these accusations?

DR. SERVATIUS: This is in the transcript of a court session; I have the page here, in the German transcript, 2789 (Volume V, Pages 394, 395). It says there that if the worker can no longer work, no concern should be given to his fate. Did you advocate this principle?

SAUCKEL: On the contrary; there exist hundreds of precise decrees and orders which I issued. They were published in the Reichsgesetzblatt, in special issues sent to the factories and to the labor exchanges and in special collections, in which it is set down most clearly that the foreign workers who were brought into the Reich through the Allocation of Labor had to be treated in accordance with German laws, regulations, and directives as far as medical treatment and care, including insurance, were concerned. There were also...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, were you putting to the defendant a document where it was alleged he had said that after they were unfit to work, that it is no more his concern? Was it the document you were putting to him?

DR. SERVATIUS: This document was submitted to him with regard to the female workers of whom he is alleged to have said that they were to be germanized. I am no longer dealing with that document, but have turned to the question of medical care.

DR. SERVATIUS: That document, Number 025-PS, refers only to female workers. This question has already been dealt with. I have turned to the question of medical care in general and am no longer dealing with the question of female workers.

[Turning to the defendant.] Did you receive reports about abominable conditions regarding the health and the medical care of foreign workers?

SAUCKEL: No. Not only German physicians were employed as official physicians in the factories and camps to deal with the hygiene and health of the workers, but also numerous physicians and medical assistants from the home countries of the foreign workers were engaged and assigned to these camps.

DR. SERVATIUS: How did you supervise the execution of your decrees, and what other controlling agencies existed?

DR. SERVATIUS: Just a moment. I should like to refer to Document Sauckel-2. In it I have made a survey of the control and inspection agencies concerned with supervision. I shall explain this diagram briefly:

In the center, there is the Reich Ministry of Labor, under Seldte; underneath that, the trade inspection boards, including the police department for trade and town planning. That was the only department which had police powers—that is, it could take action against any resistance on the part of those recruited for work. Besides this, several other official agencies were created to handle the difficult problem of welfare. There is, first of all, if you look at the right-hand side, the German Labor Front, an agency encompassing the interests of the employers, the industry, and the workers, and in some respects taking the place occupied in the past by the trade unions. From there matters of welfare were turned over to the factories. A special inspection board was created, the Reich Inspection Office of the German Labor Front, with a department for foreign workers which had its own liaison men in the factories to hear complaints. In the factories themselves there were also foreign workers who were able to report on conditions there.

Then, turning further to the right, is the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture which, through the regional food offices, also had direct insight into questions pertaining to food and welfare. The reports which went to the Reich Foreign Minister through diplomatic channels were eventually also passed on to Sauckel, as we shall see later.

Then there is a special department for Eastern Workers under the Rosenberg Ministry—that is the central agency for the peoples of the East—and this last letter which we had here, apparently came from one of the gentlemen in this agency. This central agency for the peoples of the East in turn also had its agents in the factories and works, and they made reports directly. All these reports were turned over to Sauckel.

Now, I turn to the left part of the diagram. Sauckel himself instituted for inspectional purposes a personal staff which was sent around to visit factories. We heard from several witnesses that these inspectors appeared and saw to it that everything was in order. Then he established a special office, the Reich Inspectorate. Complaints which came from the German Labor Front and other sources were sent to this inspectorate. When Sauckel says that he immediately passed on these complaints, they were sent first to the Reich Inspectorate, which in turn advised the necessary offices and, if need be, applied the compulsory measures of the Reich Labor Ministry. Then also the Gauleiter were given the task of supervision, and the witnesses who have appeared here—witnesses who were Gauleiter in their time—have confirmed that they exercised control as plenipotentiaries for the Allocation of Labor. Further to the left is shown the care and control exercised by the Reich Ministry for Propaganda which had taken over a supervisory function concerning the direction of the camps and the workers. Then, finally on the far left, comes the Wehrmacht which had its own supervisory machinery through its inspectors, who were entrusted with the prisoners of war and who saw to it that the conventions were observed.

The reports of all these agencies were sent to Sauckel, and he testified here that abominable conditions were not reported to him, that he could make his influence felt only through directives, and that he gave his instructions.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, will you ask the defendant whether that was a correct statement on the meaning of the chart?

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, this explanation, which I have given, and this diagram, which you have seen, are they correct?

DR. SERVATIUS: Would you comment now on the activity of the Gauleiter as plenipotentiaries? How did you supervise the Gauleiter?

SAUCKEL: I could not supervise the Gauleiter themselves, as I had no disciplinary or official control over them. But I had the Gaue visited by members of my staff at intervals of about 3 months. On the occasion of these visits the complaints of the Gauleiter were heard and then factories and camps were inspected jointly and a check was made to see how far my directives were, or were not, carried out. I should like to remark that these inspectors naturally were not allowed any control in concentration camps and the work in the concentration camps; that was a different field which was under the control of Obergruppenführer Pohl and in which I had no authority and no insight.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): I ask permission for the Defendant Von Papen to be absent from the court sessions tomorrow morning and afternoon. I need a fairly long consultation with him for the preparation of his defense which I would not be able to have otherwise. Dr. Flexner will represent him during the session.

MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal, a report is made that the Defendant Göring is absent.

THE PRESIDENT: As I said this morning, the Tribunal will rise at 4 this afternoon.

DR. SERVATIUS: This morning we got as far as the inspections, but I should like to go back to one question.

You said that the head of the factory was responsible for the workers. Did that also apply to the prisoner-of-war and concentration camps?

SAUCKEL: No. The Army, or that part of the Armed Forces under the authority of which these prisoners of war were kept, was responsible for the prisoner-of-war camps. In the same way, as far as I know, the concentration camps alone were responsible for their inmates, even if they worked.

DR. SERVATIUS: You had formed a Department 9 as a Reich inspection department in the Reich Ministry of Labor. What were the special tasks of this inspection department?

SAUCKEL: I had set up that inspection department, which had not existed before in the Ministry of Labor, because I wanted to ascertain the uniformity and execution of contracts throughout the entire area of the Reich, as well as in the occupied territories where German undertakings and German labor contracts were being carried out; also to examine and control the unified administrative regulations; and, moreover, to see whether my orders concerning food, lodging, treatment, and care were being observed and to what extent they were in need of change. All this was also contained in a directive which I gave to the inspection department.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the Central Inspection Department in the German Labor Front—the Central Inspection Department for the care of foreign workers?

SAUCKEL: The Central Inspection Department of the DAF had the task of supervising the welfare of foreign workers in the camps in Germany to see whether they were being fed, and so on, in the prescribed way.

DR. SERVATIUS: If there were any abuses, did the Inspection Department report that to you; or who received the report?

SAUCKEL: An agreement between the Führer, the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley, and myself, was added as a supplement to the decree concerning the formation of the Central Inspection Department, and it stated that where it was a question of conditions in camps the Central Inspection Department had to deal directly with the Reich offices concerned, or with the industrial inspection office in the Reich Labor Ministry, in order to remedy the conditions; whereas cases of shortage or surplus of manpower, et cetera, were to be reported to me.

DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document 1913-PS, which has been submitted. It is an agreement between Sauckel and Dr. Ley of 20 September 1943. It is Exhibit USA-227. It is Document Number 41 in the English document book. I shall only refer to it, without quoting from it.

[Turning to the defendant.] What other kinds of supervisory offices existed? I am thinking about the French.

SAUCKEL: Well, after I took office, men were appointed to act as liaison agents with the foreign workers. These men, in agreement with the German Labor Front, had the right to visit camps, talk to the workers themselves, and hear their complaints. A special agreement had been reached with the French Government in collaboration with the Reich Foreign Minister.

DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document Sauckel-31. It is on Page 79 of the English text in the Sauckel Document Book Number 1, “French Agency for the Care of the French Employed in the Reich.” That is a circular from Sauckel dated 30 April 1942. I submit the document itself, which is in this collection. I quote:

“I communicate the following letter from the Foreign Office of 10 April 1942:

“The Government of the Reich has notified the French Government that it agrees to the following regulations regarding the care of French voluntary workers in Germany:

“Besides the already existing office for prisoners of war, an agency for French civilian workers will be established in Berlin under the direction of Ambassador Scapini. The Reich Government will furnish a building to house this agency. The agency may establish branch offices in four other German cities.

“The agency is charged with the care of the French workers in Germany. It will supervise the fulfillment of the contracts made by the workers engaged. It may accept proposals from the workers and transmit them to the competent offices, and see that unsatisfactory conditions are remedied. It is entitled to issue certificates and references to the workers for submission to the French authorities.”

“Moreover, the head of the French representatives is granted the diplomatic privileges of personal immunity for the execution of his tasks, as well as exemption from German jurisdiction and from coercion by the police.”

SAUCKEL: That office actually worked with both the DAF and with me. The representative of that office took part in the negotiations in France with the French Government. The office changed later to the extent that the care of the civilian workers was taken over by M. Brunedon in the place of M. Scapini who looked after prisoners of war only.

SAUCKEL: Yes, it was only a change of personnel. I frequently talked with these gentlemen and acted according to their wishes.

DR. SERVATIUS: What did the Central Inspection Department for the peoples of the Eastern Territories do?

SAUCKEL: The Central Inspection Department for the peoples of the Eastern Territories was an office under the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories.

SAUCKEL: It worked in the same way as the French office, except that it was a German organization and Germans were in charge. It had the confidence of the Eastern Workers who worked with us as allies.

SAUCKEL: None, apart from the cases which Rosenberg reported to me and which I discussed with him. Everything was attended to there.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now I come to the question of the maintenance of labor discipline. What sort of regulations were there in order to maintain labor discipline—punctuality and good work? What kind of regulations existed?

SAUCKEL: In Germany the regulations concerning labor discipline was a matter for the factories themselves. Each factory had its regulations which in normal times were agreed to between the management, the foreman, and the workers’ council. This council could take disciplinary action in the form of fines. During the war labor discipline had become more strict, because owing to the scarcity of workers it was not possible to maintain the right of the employer or the employee to give notice. So the German worker, and German labor and industry were under wartime decrees and laws. In order to enforce these, I later issued Decree Number 13 at the suggestion of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. This decree, which has been submitted, provides, first of all, for varying degrees of punishment within the industries for infractions of labor regulations, tardiness and unexcused absence from work.

DR. SERVATIUS: That is Document Sauckel-23 in the Sauckel document book; in the English text, Number 1, Page 62. The witness has given you the essential contents. I merely refer to it now.

SAUCKEL: These measures within the industries for the maintenance of labor discipline started with a warning, and then went up to a fine, or the loss of a day’s or week’s pay.

SAUCKEL: If they could not be dealt with by the courts of honor of the Labor Front, cases of constant and obstinate bad conduct had to be reported to the police.

SAUCKEL: They also had to be reported to the police. The labor authorities had no competence in criminal and similar cases.

DR. SERVATIUS: To whom were the complaints sent if the regulations were not applied correctly; that is, if instead of fines corporal punishment had been inflicted?

SAUCKEL: Complaints of this kind were sent to the Labor Front, or to the liaison men for the foreign workers.

SAUCKEL: Those who were punished by the authorities for infractions of labor discipline which could not be dealt with by the factory regulations.

SAUCKEL: No; in my opinion, no. These labor training camps were not under the supervision of the Reich Labor Ministry, nor under mine. They were a police institution.

DR. SERVATIUS: You know from these proceedings that quite a number of workers did, in fact, come into the concentration camps. How can you explain that?

I shall hand you Document 1063-PS, Exhibit USA-219. It is a letter of 17 December 1942; in the English document book it is Number 28 of the Slave Labor Book. It is a letter marked “Secret,” sent by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD to all SS offices; at any rate, not to you. I quote:

“For reasons of war necessity which cannot be discussed further here, the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police ordered on 14 December 1942 that by the end of January 1943, at the latest, at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be sent to the concentration camps. In order to obtain this number, the following measures are required: 1. As from now (until 1 February 1943) Eastern Workers, and those foreign workers who are fugitives, or have broken their contracts ... are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps....”

DR. SERVATIUS: Then I should like to draw your attention to the decisive passage. Will you please read at the bottom of the first page. It says the following:

“In case of necessity, offices not directly involved must be given to understand that each and every one of these measures is an indispensable Security Police measure, and be told the specific reasons in individual cases, so that complaints can be prevented, or at any rate eliminated.”

SAUCKEL: Nothing was known to me about that decree. It explains many things which puzzled us. It appears to be a letter from Gruppenführer Müller and, to my surprise, it states quite clearly that other offices—and they can only refer to my offices or Speer’s—should be informed that these measures are necessary Security Police measures. That was downright fraud with the intention of misleading us.

THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document—I understood the defendant to say that workers were sent to labor camps for infraction of labor rules. That was what you said, wasn’t it?

SAUCKEL: If workers, in spite of repeated warnings and fines in the factory, did not show improvement or continued the offenses, they were reported by the factories, not by me, to a police office. As far as I know, this police office had an agreement with the Reich Minister of Justice according to which...

THE PRESIDENT: I asked you where they were sent when you said that they were sent to labor camps for infraction of labor rules, and for no other reason. Did you say that?

THE PRESIDENT: Then how do you explain the first words of Paragraph 1 of this document:

“As from now, all Eastern Workers must be sent to the nearest concentration camps...”?

“As from now, until 1 February 1943, Eastern Workers, and those foreign workers who are fugitives, or who have broken contracts, or who do not belong to allied, friendly, or neutral states, are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps, in observance of the necessary formalities as given under Figure 3.”

SAUCKEL: I heard that expression “extermination by labor” for the first time here in the courtroom. Such a concept was of necessity absolutely contrary to the interests which I stood for in my position.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have anything to do with the employment of concentration camp inmates?

SAUCKEL: I had nothing to do with the employment of concentration camp inmates, and I also told my colleagues that we would have nothing to do with the employment of that kind of labor. I had nothing to do with punitive measures of any kind.

DR. SERVATIUS: Who put the concentration camp inmates to work in the armament industries?

SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you that from personal knowledge because I had nothing to do with it, and I never participated in discussions dealing with this subject.

DR. SERVATIUS: It has been alleged here that you used the Nacht and Nebel Order to get workers to Germany.

SAUCKEL: I did not know the Nacht and Nebel Order. I only found out about it here. It had nothing to do with the allocation of labor and my duties.

SAUCKEL: I had nothing to do with the employment of Jews. That was exclusively the task of the Reichsführer of the SS.

DR. SERVATIUS: I submit the Document R-91. That is Exhibit USA-241, and Exhibit RF-347. It is not included in the document books. It is a letter from the Chief of Security Police and SD Müller to the Reichsführer SS, field headquarters, dated 16 December 1942. It says there, and I quote:

“In connection with the increased assignment of manpower to the KL”—that should probably read KZ—“which is ordered to take place before 30 January 1943, the following procedure may be applied in the Jewish sector: total number, 45,000 Jews.”

Then there is a more detailed specification, and among other things, it says at the end, “3,000 Jews from the occupied territories of the Netherlands,” and further, “The number 45,000 includes those unfit for work....”

SAUCKEL: I have just learned of that letter for the first time. I did not know of it before, and I can only emphasize that these transports and this procedure had nothing to do with my work, and that I had nothing to do with them at any time.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then we have here Document L-61, which has been submitted. That is Exhibit USA-177; in the English document book on slave labor, it is Document Number 6. The document is in the first list of documents which was made available to the Defense, and it was listed as an original letter from Sauckel which admitted the deportation of Jews.

Will you please read this letter to yourself and state your position as to how far you had anything to do with the deportation of Jews. I shall briefly state what the contents are. It says there in that letter of 26 November 1942:

“By agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, Jews who are still in employment are from now on also to be evacuated from the territory of the Reich and are to be replaced by Poles who are being deported from the Government General.”

“I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. Insofar as this affects the removal of Jews employed in your area, I request that you take the necessary measures in agreement with the competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD.”

SAUCKEL: May I say with respect to this document that it was shown to me already in the preliminary interrogations. I had it only for a short time then, and when it was presented to me again in the course of the proceedings I found that it was not an original document which I had signed. My name is typewritten at the bottom.

Secondly, it appears very peculiar to me that this letter, which I am supposed to have signed, was not dated by my office. My office, as can be seen from numerous documents, was in Berlin, in Mohrenstrasse. This letter was dated by the Saarlandstrasse office.

As far as the contents are concerned, I have to state that I at no time had a personal arrangement or agreement with the SD and Security Police in the sense of that letter; neither had I any knowledge of that letter, and I cannot remember it now either. The only thing in that letter which is correct is that I was obliged to replace the loss of manpower in German industry—whether Jews, soldiers, or others—within 2 weeks. It is possible that this letter came from the Saarlandstrasse office, from a subordinate office. I cannot say anything else about it.

DR. SERVATIUS: How is it, then, that the ending, “Signed, Fritz Sauckel” is on the letter?

SAUCKEL: I cannot understand that. If it were an authentic copy, it would have had to be signed.

DR. SERVATIUS: No, I have not got the original. It has been submitted by the Prosecution and is therefore in the files of the Tribunal as an exhibit.

SAUCKEL: The appendix deals with events which also occurred before my time in office—that is, before I came into office these happenings had practically all taken place.

SAUCKEL: No, I had no knowledge of that. It would have made my task much easier and I would have had much less difficulty if all these people, as far as they were capable of working, had been brought into the labor plan in a more reasonable manner. I knew absolutely nothing about this final solution, and it was entirely contrary to my interest.

DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the question of wages, who was responsible for the regulation of wages?

SAUCKEL: I was responsible for the regulation of wages during my term of office.

DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of wages were paid? Leave out the Eastern people for the moment.

SAUCKEL: In principle, all foreign workers were paid the wages which had been agreed upon by contract with the liaison offices and the governments, and which were in accordance with the wage scales recognized as legal in the different regions in Germany.

SAUCKEL: As far as the Eastern Workers were concerned, when I took office I found that under the existing regulations most of their wages were deducted as taxes in favor of the Reich. This was in accordance with a decree of the Ministerial Council for National Defense.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were you satisfied with that, or did you take steps to improve conditions?

SAUCKEL: It can be seen from the documents—that is to say, from the decrees which I issued during my term of office—that these regulations, which I considered intolerable, were improved step by step, as far as I was able to overcome opposition, until in 1944 the Eastern Worker stood on the same level as the German worker. The first improvement was made in June 1942 when wages were doubled, the second in 1943, and the last in March 1944, by Decree 11.

DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to the following documents, which I shall not read: Document Sauckel-50, in Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 134; Document Sauckel-17, in Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 137; Document Sauckel-52, Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 143; Document Sauckel-58, Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 156; and finally, Document Sauckel-58(a), Sauckel Document Book 2, Page 161. I submit the original in a collection, “Regulations Governing Allocation of the Eastern Workers.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I understood the defendant to say just now that that Document L-61 was drawn up before he took charge of the labor commitment.

DR. SERVATIUS: It refers to things which existed before his term of office and were almost completed at the time when that letter was drafted—that is, that state of things already existed.

DR. SERVATIUS: The appendix refers to a decree of 27 March 1942. The second appendix, if we go back further, is an appendix of 21 January 1942 which also deals with that question. What we have quoted here was only the last letter, the final letter.

[Turning to the defendant.] Regarding the wages of the Eastern Workers, did the Eastern Workers receive any remuneration besides these wages?

SAUCKEL: The Eastern Workers, as a result of my efforts, received remuneration in the form of premiums for good work, and Christmas bonuses, in the same way as the German workers; and in addition there was an agreement with the Eastern Ministry according to which the families of Eastern Workers were to receive the amount of 130 rubles per month upon request.

DR. SERVATIUS: I refer here to some documents. They are Document Sauckel-22, in the English book, Volume I, Page 9; a decree, Document Sauckel-54, concerning premiums, which is in Volume II, Page 151; and Document Sauckel-57, concerning Christmas bonuses, Volume II, Page 155.

[Turning to the defendant.] What remained for the Eastern Workers in cash wages?

SAUCKEL: When I started in office—that is before the regulations introduced by me—the Eastern Worker, after his expenses for food and lodging had been deducted, had about 4 marks 60 pfennigs per week left over, if one takes as an average example the rate of 60 pfennigs an hour for an average worker in German industry.

The same worker’s net pay, or “Freibetrag” as it was called, was increased in June 1942, after I had had an opportunity of looking into these things, by about 100 percent to 9.10 marks.

May I state that it would have been quite impossible for a German worker at the same wage level to have had more left over for saving when one considers his taxes and social contributions, his expenses for rent, heating, and food. That was the principle laid down for me by the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense for the payment of this labor. It was not my wish. However, as early as March or April 1943 the wage of the Russian worker, again due to my intervention, was increased to about 12 marks, and in the spring of 1944 it was increased to about 18 marks.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to have all this in detail. There is no particular charge against the defendant that he did not pay any of the workers, is there? I mean, he says, he paid them and we do not want the details of the number of marks.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the accusation of slave labor has been made, and this as a rule is unpaid labor. The French report, Document RF-22, has estimated a loss of 77 milliards which is supposed to have been suffered by France through the use of her workers. It is interesting to hear at least...

DR. SERVATIUS: [Turning to the defendant.] What have you to say about the facilities for transferring these wages?

SAUCKEL: I first had to create facilities for transferring wages, because the only real attraction for a foreign worker to work in Germany was that he could support his family at home by sending part of his earnings to his native country. That was done on the basis of agreements reached with the President of the German Reichsbank. He himself has testified to that.

DR. SERVATIUS: Concerning the question of wages, I refer to Document 021-PS, which has been submitted as F-44. It is not in either of the document books. It is dated 2 April 1943. It shows how rates of pay were calculated and deals with the improvement of the wages of Eastern Workers. I do not want to quote it in detail; but a study will reveal that serious attempts were made here to bring about an improvement and an equalization.

SAUCKEL: The duration of labor contracts depended on agreements which had been concluded with the governments in question. For the western and southern countries the contract was for 6 months, 9 months, or 1 year. As for the eastern countries and the Soviet workers, when I came to office, the existing regulations provided for an indefinite period. As I considered a definite period to be necessary in spite of the greater distances, here too I finally succeeded in obtaining a time limit of 2 years.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was it intended to continue to use this manpower after the war, and were these foreign workers to remain in Germany? I ask that question because the French Prosecution quoted the following passage from the book, Work for Europe, Exhibit RF-5, Page 23:

“A large percentage of foreign workers will remain in our country even after the victory, and then, having been trained for construction work, they will continue and complete the projects interrupted by the war.”

From that was it concluded that forced labor was to continue even after the war?

SAUCKEL: That was partly or entirely the opinion of the author of that article, but I believe that it was also mentioned that the workers would return home and there use, for the benefit of their own homeland, the knowledge and skill which they had gained from new work in Germany. I had absolutely no intention of keeping foreign workers in Germany after the war, and in any case I could not have done so. On the contrary, I even ordered that a card index of foreign workers, a central register, should be carefully kept on the basis of which, in case of a favorable conclusion of the war, it would be possible for me faithfully to return these workers to their native countries and have a record of them.

DR. SERVATIUS: If I understood you correctly, it was not a question of forcibly retaining the workers, but of keeping them here by recruitment?

SAUCKEL: Yes; it was not reported to me that a large number of foreign workers wanted to stay in Germany of their own accord. That is an assumption.

DR. SERVATIUS: What about the compulsory labor? What was the duration of the contracts?

SAUCKEL: There was no difference in pay or length of contract between voluntary work and compulsory work, or what we called in the language of the decree, “Dienstverpflichtungen.” This held true for all countries. If a Frenchman doing compulsory labor had a contract for 6 or 9 months, he had the same right as the voluntary worker to return after 9 months. It was possible to extend the period.

SAUCKEL: The contract was extended when the worker wanted of his own free will to continue his services, or when there was an emergency or shortage of manpower in a particular factory which justified an extension. Then that had to be arranged with the liaison officers.

DR. SERVATIUS: Besides civilian workers, were prisoners of war also used in Germany? What did you have to do with that use of manpower?

SAUCKEL: The employment of prisoners of war was quite complicated, because it had to take place in agreement with the general in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization. The so-called technique of transposition caused me difficulties. Allow me to explain this.

There existed the Geneva Convention, or the Hague Convention, according to which prisoners of war could not be used in armament or ammunition industries. When, however, we spoke of prisoners of war being engaged in the armament industry that meant that so-and-so many German women or workers were transferred to industries in which the Geneva Convention prohibited the use of prisoners of war, and that prisoners of war took their place. That was done in agreement with the offices of the general in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization.

SAUCKEL: The general in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization and we ourselves, or the “Arbeitseinsatz” administration, adhered to the rules of the Geneva Convention and several times compiled a catalog of the types of work for which prisoners of war could be used. Also during my time, in 1943 and 1944, a special edition of this catalog was published, and it can be found in the so-called Blue Book.

DR. SERVATIUS: Have you known cases where prisoners of war were used contrary to the Geneva Convention?

SAUCKEL: Certain agreements were made with the French Government, as far as volunteers were concerned, and this applied to a certain extent to Eastern Workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: Who was responsible for the housing, feeding, and care of prisoners of war?

SAUCKEL: The offices of the general in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization were solely responsible.

DR. SERVATIUS: Is it known to you that millions of prisoners of war had perished by the time you had assumed office?

SAUCKEL: It had become known to me before I assumed office that a great number of prisoners of war perished in the so-called battles of encirclement in the East. These battles lasted a long time, and owing to our enormous transport difficulties we could not move the prisoners, and they were left on the battlefield in a state of utmost exhaustion. That is all I know about that.

DR. SERVATIUS: At the beginning of your activities you had to deal with prisoners of war, had you not? What did you find out at that time, or what did you do?

SAUCKEL: I found out that some of the Russian prisoners of war were terribly undernourished.

SAUCKEL: Together with the general in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization I arranged for all these prisoners of war—as far as I know and remember there were about 70,000 in the Reich at that time—to be billeted with German farmers, in order to build up their strength. The farmers were obliged to feed these prisoners of war for at least 3 months, without putting them to work. As compensation the farmers were given the assurance that these prisoners of war would stay with them and work for them until the end of the war.

DR. SERVATIUS: During the course of the war did prisoners of war obtain the status of free laborers?

SAUCKEL: Yes. As far as French workers were concerned, I was instrumental in seeing that they were employed only by agreement with the French Government. These agreements were concluded under the sponsorship of the German Ambassador in Paris. The quotas were negotiated in accordance with instructions given me by the Führer and by the Reich Marshal. The first quota was 250,000 French laborers and 150,000 skilled workers.

As a compensation for the use of these voluntary workers—and I emphasize voluntary—50,000 French prisoners of war who were farmers were to be, and actually were, returned to the French Government in order to improve the cultivation of French farm land.

SAUCKEL: The Relève was an agreement between the French Government and my office according to which for every three French workers who came to Germany one French prisoner-of-war was released and sent home by the Führer.

SAUCKEL: This agreement was concluded on the basis of a discussion between the French Premier and myself. I was much in favor of this agreement, because I myself spent 5 years behind barbed wire during the first World War.

DR. SERVATIUS: And how did the civilian population react to that? Above all, how did the workers feel who had to go to Germany?

SAUCKEL: This was an act of comradeship, and according to the reports I received the feeling was favorable.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then in reality instead of one prisoner-of-war there were three imprisoned workers?

SAUCKEL: No. These workers could move about freely in Germany in the same way as the other French workers and the German population.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did they have to come to Germany for an indefinite period of time?

SAUCKEL: No, they stayed according to the length of their contracts, just like the other workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then the result was that after 9 months the prisoners of war, as well as the other workers, could return home?

SAUCKEL: Yes. This continual exchange necessitated new quotas and new agreements with the French Government, for there always had to be replacements.

SAUCKEL: No. I beg you to hear witnesses on this. They were conducted on a free diplomatic basis.

DR. SERVATIUS: To what extent was this Relève carried through? Was it on a very large or only on a small scale?

SAUCKEL: It was carried out on the basis of 250,000 workers who were to go to Germany.

DR. SERVATIUS: The French Prosecution in their government report said that only weak and sick people were sent back who could not work anyway. What have you to say to that?

SAUCKEL: As far as I know, French soldiers who were prisoners of war were sent back. The sending back and the selection of the soldiers was not my task but that of the general in charge of the Prisoners of War Organization. I consider it possible that sick soldiers were also sent back to their homes in this way if they wished it. But certainly it was not the intention to send back only sick or older soldiers, but soldiers in general. That was the basis of the agreement.

DR. SERVATIUS: There was a second course which was chosen—the improved status which the French called “transformation.” What kind of arrangement was that?

SAUCKEL: The improved status was a third agreement which included the provision that French prisoners of war in Germany were given the same contracts and the same status as all other French civilian workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: When a new French worker came to Germany? The ratio therefore was 1 to 1?

DR. SERVATIUS: Did these French workers have to bind themselves indefinitely, or was there a time limit here too?

DR. SERVATIUS: Was this improvement in status welcomed by the French soldiers, or did they disapprove of it?

SAUCKEL: They did not disapprove of it but welcomed it, according to the attitude of the individual soldier. A large number rejected it; others accepted it gladly, for by this measure the workers received high wages and all the liberties that were accorded outside the barbed wire, and the like. I myself saw how an entire camp accepted this new status. They had been told that the gates and barbed wire would be done away with, the prisoner regulations discontinued, and the surveillance abolished.

DR. SERVATIUS: Could these prisoners who had been turned into workers also go home?

SAUCKEL: Yes, they did. Many of them came back, and an equally large number did not.

DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to refer to Document RF-22, German text, Page 70 of the French Government report. This document shows and admits that the prisoners received leave to go home at the beginning of this transformation, and I quote, “The unfortunate men did not return, however, and therefore this procedure was discontinued.”

[Turning to the defendant.] Have you heard of the idea, “indirect forced labor”?

DR. SERVATIUS: [Turning to the Tribunal.] The French report contains the argument that those workers who worked in France in armament industries did so for the benefit of Germany. Sauckel was not connected with this in any way. This French report, which deals at length with the economic side of the Arbeitseinsatz, says that it worked according to a well-conceived and flexible system, and at first negotiations were friendly. The measures then became harsher in accordance with the circumstances.

[Turning to the defendant.] Was there a definite plan? Did you have to carry out certain instructions, or what system was adopted?

SAUCKEL: I should like to be allowed to explain this. A plan of the sort you have just outlined never existed. The only thing towards which I worked was the program which I drew up and which is in the possession of the Tribunal; a program which I admit, and for which I take all the consequences and the responsibility, even for my subordinates. This program was carried out through my decrees, which are also available in full. The development of the war did not permit me to give full consideration to the circumstances which now, post factum, appear obvious. We ourselves stood in the midst of the flow of events as the war developed and did not have time to ponder over such matters.

DR. SERVATIUS: What were the “Sperrbetriebe” and the “Ausnahmebetriebe” in France?

SAUCKEL: The Sperrbetriebe were industries which were the result of an agreement between Reich Minister Speer and, I believe, the French Minister of Economics, Bichelonne. They were industries which worked partly for German armaments and partly for German civilian requirements, and did not come under my offices.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the number of workers who were brought to Germany from foreign countries?

SAUCKEL: The number of workers brought from foreign countries to Germany, according to careful estimates and the records of the statistical department of the Reich Ministry of Labor, might be said to be about 5 million.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you determine how far these laborers were to be used, and how many were to be brought in?

SAUCKEL: No, I could not determine that, for I did not represent the German economy, and I myself could not decide the extent of the German armament and agricultural programs.

DR. SERVATIUS: Apart from the current quotas which you had to supply, there were certain so-called program orders made by the Führer. Is that true?

SAUCKEL: Yes, because the Führer drew up the armament program, as far as I know.

DR. SERVATIUS: You have told me of your programs. I shall read the figures, and perhaps you can confirm them.

The first program in April 1942: the demand was for 1.6 million workers; 1.6 million were supplied, the entire figure being made up of foreigners.

The second program in September 1942: 2 million, and 2 million were supplied, of which 1 million, that is only half, were foreigners.

In 1943: the demand was for 1 million, and 1 million were supplied, the entire figure being made up of foreign workers.

Then the last program on 4 January 1944: the Führer demanded 4 million, and the demand met with 0.9 million.

SAUCKEL: Allow me to correct you. The figure should read, demand met with 3 million.

DR. SERVATIUS: Demand 4 million; demand met with 3 million. And how many were foreigners?

DR. SERVATIUS: 0.9 million foreigners. How many workers came from the East, how many from the West, and how many from other regions?

SAUCKEL: I naturally cannot give you the exact figure here without data or statistics, but on an average I would say that the figure for each group might be about 30 percent; the percentage of workers from the East was certainly somewhat higher.

SAUCKEL: They were the Economic Ministry, the Armament Ministry, the Agricultural Ministry, the various trades, the State Railways, the mines, et cetera, all big undertakings.

SAUCKEL: Usually the demand was made simultaneously to the Führer and to me, or to the collecting agencies provided for by the Four Year Plan.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were they the reduced requirements, if their demands had to be checked, or were they the original demands?

SAUCKEL: I have just said that it varied. The demands were sent in to me, and at the same time they were almost always sent to the Führer, because the Führer had to approve these demands.

SAUCKEL: The Central Planning Board was an office where above all, as far as I know, the quotas for raw materials were fixed, but where questions of work and manpower were also discussed.

SAUCKEL: Yes, the demands which were put to me I had to consider as orders, for the Führer had laid on me the duty of meeting the demands of the war economy.

SAUCKEL: No, I was only called in when there were to be debates on the use of manpower.

SAUCKEL: Yes, he had to have that in his ministry, and he did have it. That was essential.

SAUCKEL: According to my conviction, yes; for already in 1943—and it was one of the purposes of my manifesto—I pointed out that the economic problems of the occupied countries were very serious and had to be regulated and settled so as to avoid confusion.

SAUCKEL: In Germany after 1943 there were no more really usable reserves of manpower left. Many discussions took place on this problem, but the labor most in demand was skilled labor, miners, and workers for the heavy industries.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what manpower reserves were there to be gotten out of France?

SAUCKEL: I must say that from our point of view, and according to our judgment concerning economic and labor questions, there was a great deal of manpower and very extensive reserves in the occupied territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you mean that in comparison the economic forces of Germany were far more exhausted than those of the occupied countries?

SAUCKEL: Perhaps I can show it by a comparison with the first World War. In the first World War, 10 to 12 million Germans were mobilized for labor. In this war about 25 million German men and women were used, and more than half were women. I must add that all the women who did Red Cross or other welfare work in Germany were not included in my statistics. They were included in other countries.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have a concluding question: If you view your activity as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor from today’s standpoint, what would you say about the use of foreign labor in general?

SAUCKEL: It is very hard for me to answer this question. I myself and the entire German people were of the opinion, and had to be, that this war was neither willed nor brought about by the German people—and, to be truthful, I must include the Party. Our standpoint was that we had to do our duty to our people.

DR. SERVATIUS: It is not intended that you should give an explanation in the wider sense, but that you should limit yourself to the general aspects of the question of labor allocation, and tell us whether today you consider your activity justified or not.

SAUCKEL: From the point of view of the war situation and of German economy, and as I saw and tried to carry out my allocation of labor, I considered it justified, and, above all, inevitable; for Germany and the countries we occupied were an economic whole that could not be split up. Without such an exchange of eastern and western manpower Germany could not have existed for even 1 day. The German people themselves were working to the extreme limit of their capacity.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): Witness, did the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories often try to cut down the labor quotas demanded by you?

SAUCKEL: Not only the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories tried to do that, but I myself tried very hard to do so by intervening with the Führer and all the employers of labor.

DR. THOMA: I should like to put several questions to you with regard to Document Number 054-PS, which describes the abuses in the recruiting and transporting of Eastern Workers. Did you personally take steps to put an end to the abuses which are specified here?

DR. THOMA: Did you notice that this report deals with the city and the region of Kharkov in the Ukraine, and do you know that this entire district was never under the civilian administration of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories?

SAUCKEL: Yes, I know that, and I testified that this report was not sent to me but to an Army office. This Army office had its own labor department which was directly subordinate to it.

DR. THOMA: In this report did you especially notice the following paragraph on the first page:

“a) With few exceptions, the Ukrainians who are being employed in the Reich as individual workers for example, in small trade enterprises, on farms...”

DR. THOMA: On Page 1, the last paragraph: “Judging from the discussions with the gentlemen and the reading of the reports, it can be said in general...”

DR. THOMA: I think it is the first, second, third paragraph, “d”—the second paragraph.

DR. THOMA: It says there that the Ukrainians who were being employed as individual workers in the Reich, were “very satisfied with the conditions.” But: “b. On the other hand the Ukrainians living in community camps complain a great deal...”

SAUCKEL: Yes. In my testimony I quoted the passage in which the author of the letter said that this was the case during the first few months only, for I immediately had the camps inspected and improved. I even went so far as to get the Reich Labor Minister to issue new camp regulations, all as a result of this complaint.

DR. THOMA: Did you personally visit the Occupied Eastern Territories on several occasions and speak to the administrative authorities there; for example, in Riga, Kovno, Zhitomir?

SAUCKEL: Not only did I speak to the administrative authorities there, but I compiled this manifesto in Russia and had it published there, and everything that is contained in the manifesto was communicated to these offices in the same way.

DR. THOMA: Yes. But is it correct that you emphasized the special urgency of the Führer decree?

DR. THOMA: That is not right from the legal point of view; for your actual authority came from Göring, as the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.

SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. The official channel was: Führer, Göring, Four Year Plan—that was the order.

DR. THOMA: Then, if you said it was the Führer’s order, you did so to give a special emphasis?

SAUCKEL: No, that was not my intention. The Führer commissioned me to replace the loss of German soldiers, Doctor. These were instructions which I had received directly from the Führer or Göring on the basis of the requirements of the employers of labor.

DR. THOMA: Do you recall that you made an agreement with Rosenberg to the effect that Eastern Workers in Germany, after their return to their own country, were to receive land so that they would not be at a disadvantage as compared with the people who had remained?

SAUCKEL: Just how far this was carried out, I am unable to state. That was a task for the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories. I assume that it was carried out as far as possible.

DR. THOMA: Do you recall that Rosenberg constantly advocated the doing away with the so-called Eastern Worker’s badge?

SAUCKEL: Rosenberg, as well as I myself, advocated the abolition of the Eastern Worker’s badge. There is a letter from the Reichsführer SS refusing this; but I know for certain that at the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944 we succeeded in abolishing this Eastern Worker’s badge, and it was replaced by a national emblem as worn by the other foreigners.

SAUCKEL: This Eastern Worker’s badge was to be abolished for various reasons, but above all to eliminate the demoralizing effect produced on the Eastern Workers by the wearing of a discriminating badge.

DR. THOMA: I have one last question. You said that you did not recall having received any complaints except those that you discussed with Rosenberg. Now, numerous complaints were constantly being investigated by the Central Agency for Eastern People together with the DAF. Did the DAF report to you on this?

SAUCKEL: The DAF reported that, in accordance with my directives, it had to put a stop to abuses and bad conditions wherever they were found. That was its duty. In order to remedy these abuses the DAF had not to apply to me but to the trade inspection department of the Reich Ministry of Labor, whose task it was.

DR. THOMA: Did you make sure whether this inspection department stopped these abuses?

SAUCKEL: I installed my own inspection agencies there, as mentioned by Dr. Servatius. However, the trade inspection department was the only authorized agency which had the legal authority to use compulsory measures and it was supervised by the Reich Labor Minister who had full authority.

SAUCKEL: The Eastern Worker’s emblem or badge consisted of a bluebordered square, which bore a blue inscription “Ost.” The Reichsführer SS first ordered it to be worn on the right side of the breast; later, on the sleeve. Still later I was instrumental in getting this changed to a national emblem—blue, I think, or something similar—like the Russian colors, as the people themselves wished.

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Herr Sauckel, the Defendant Keitel and the OKW are accused by the Prosecution of the deportation of civilian people for the purposes of the mobilization of labor. You were also interrogated before the start of this Trial as to whether the OKW, and Keitel as Chief of the OKW, participated in the procurement, recruitment, and conscription of people in the occupied territories.

A number of things which were not clear and which are contained in the record have been cleared up by your testimony. Especially in answering the last question of my colleague, Dr. Thoma, you made it clear that the organizational official channel was as follows: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, the Four Year Plan—Göring, and the Führer. Is that correct?

DR. NELTE: I am interested in determining whether in this official channel the OKW was included, or the Führer in some other function than Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.

SAUCKEL: I myself was not a soldier, and I am not familiar with the detailed organization of the OKW and the OKH. It was often difficult for a layman to make the distinction between these things. It is true that the OKH was competent for the recruitment of workers in occupied countries controlled by army groups. Therefore, labor regulations for the occupied countries which were under the authority of the Army had to be issued through laws or directives by the General Staff.

SAUCKEL: The Quartermaster General was, as far as I know, next to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

DR. NELTE: And by this you mean to say that the OKW and the Defendant Keitel had no competence concerning the procuring, recruiting, and conscripting of manpower in the occupied territories?

SAUCKEL: He had no competence in this respect. I came into contact with Field Marshal Keitel, because the Führer repeatedly instructed me to ask Field Marshal Keitel to transmit his orders to the army groups by telephone or through directives.

DR. NELTE: And what about the question of the allocation of workers? Did the OKW, and specifically the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, have any competence concerning the allocation of workers at home?

SAUCKEL: No, for the workers were used in those economic branches for which they had been demanded, and they had nothing at all to do with the OKW.

M. JACQUES B. HERZOG (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Defendant Sauckel, you joined the National Socialist Party in 1925, didn’t you? Is that correct?

SAUCKEL: I joined the National Socialist Party for the first time, as an ordinary member, as early as 1923. When the Party was reorganized in 1925 I again became a member.

M. HERZOG: But you had supported the policy of National Socialism since 1921, had you not?

SAUCKEL: From 1921 onwards, I supported a German policy. In 1921 I did not as yet belong to the Party. I knew about the Party, and I was in sympathy with its ideas; that is probably the right way to put it.

M. HERZOG: Did you not make speeches in favor of National Socialism from that time on?

SAUCKEL: From about the middle of 1921 I made speeches in favor of Germany, not expressly for the Party and only in a very small way, at small gatherings, and as my conscience guided me.

M. HERZOG: You were Gauleiter, member of the Landrat, Minister of the Interior, and Governor of Thuringia. Is it correct that in this capacity you brought about the Nazification of your Gau?

SAUCKEL: I was Prime Minister of Thuringia from August 1932, and I was Minister of the Interior as well.

M. HERZOG: I am asking you the question again: Is it correct that, in your capacity as Gauleiter and Governor of Thuringia, you brought about the Nazification of your Gau?

SAUCKEL: Nazification is a term with which I was neither familiar nor do I consider it correct. I recruited for the National Socialist Party and I supported it.

M. HERZOG: You were Obergruppenführer of the organization of the SS, were you not?

SAUCKEL: I already stated in my preliminary interrogation that I was an honorary Obergruppenführer of the SS. I myself never served in the SS, nor did I exercise any functions in the SS.

M. HERZOG: Among the documents which you have presented in your document book, there is Document Sauckel-95. I will read the following passage on Page 252 of the French translation:

“My dear fellow countrymen, our magnificent SA and SS, persecuted and insulted during a whole decade as the scum of the German people, have carried through, supported, and sustained this revolution with an unshakable discipline....”

M. HERZOG: From Document Sauckel-95 of the defendant’s document book; Document Sauckel-95, which was submitted yesterday by the learned counsel for the defense, Page 252 of the French translation. It is in the third document book of the defendant.

SAUCKEL: Yes, but I request that I be shown the document in cross-examination so that I can define my attitude in detail.

M. HERZOG: This document is taken from your own document book, which you yourself submitted.

M. HERZOG: Were the Nuremberg Laws concerning Jews in accordance with your convictions?

SAUCKEL: I had no influence on legislation such as culminated in the Nuremberg Laws. My conviction is that every nation and every race has the right to exist and to demand respect and protection through itself. What I demand and have demanded for my own people is exactly the same.

M. HERZOG: Did you see to it that the Nuremberg Laws were strictly applied in the Gau of Thuringia?

SAUCKEL: The Nuremberg Laws could apply to Thuringia only insofar as my authority to appoint or dismiss employees was involved; and, of course, according to German law, it was my duty to carry out the law. The carrying out of this law by me entailed neither ill-usage nor any other inhuman treatment.

SAUCKEL: The Führer wrote about living space in his book. How far I agreed or disagreed with him cannot, in my opinion, be dealt with in this Trial, for I had no influence as to how the Führer himself should interpret the word Lebensraum.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that you must answer the question, whether or not you approve of the doctrine of Lebensraum.

SAUCKEL: I am not fully acquainted with the statements made by the Führer about the doctrine of Lebensraum. I should like to emphasize that I never thought of Lebensraum in connection with the carrying out of wars, or wars of aggression; neither did I promote the idea; but the idea of Lebensraum is perhaps best brought home to us by the fact that the population of Europe in the last 100 years has increased threefold, from 150 million to 450 million.

M. HERZOG: Did you, or did you not approve of the theory of Lebensraum? Answer “yes” or “no.”

SAUCKEL: I did not agree with the theory of Lebensraum if it had to do with wars of aggression.

SAUCKEL: I could give abundant proof that I personally always refused to emphasize the idea of a master race, and said so in my speeches. I am personally much more interested in proficiency than in ideas about a master race.

M. HERZOG: Then you did not think that the foreign policy of Germany should have been conducted according to these two theories; the theory of Lebensraum on the one hand, and the theory of the master race on the other hand?

SAUCKEL: I have already stated to my counsel that I did not concern myself with foreign policy and was not informed about it, as I am not versed in matters of foreign policy.

M. HERZOG: On the contrary, did you not approve of all the measures of foreign policy, and did you not participate in them?

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better break off now, and you can repeat the question tomorrow.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 30 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]

Morning Session

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President, I should like to put a request to you. My client comes next in order and he would like to be excused, if possible, this afternoon and all day tomorrow, so that he can prepare his case.

MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendant Von Papen is absent.

M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, I was asking you yesterday whether you considered that Germany’s foreign policy was based on the Hitlerian theories concerning living space and the master race.

SAUCKEL: May I ask you to repeat the question? I did not quite understand it in German.

M. HERZOG: I was asking you yesterday if you considered that the foreign policy of Germany was based on the two Hitlerian theories, Lebensraum and the master race.

SAUCKEL: I have understood—whether German foreign policy was based on the principles of Lebensraum and the master race.

SAUCKEL: Not on the principle of a master race. I should like to be permitted to give an explanation of this.

I personally have never approved of the statements made by some of the National Socialist speakers about a superior race and a master race. I have never advocated that. As a young man I traveled about the world. I traveled in Australia and in America, and I met families who belong to the happiest memories of my life. But I loved my own people and sought, I admit, equality of rights for them; and I have always stood for that. I have never believed in the superiority of one particular race, but I always held that equality of rights was necessary.

M. HERZOG: That being so, you did not approve of the whole of the foreign policy of Hitler; and you did not collaborate with him?

SAUCKEL: In answer to the question by my counsel I stated that I never considered myself to be a politician as regards foreign policy. I entered the Party by quite a different way and for quite different motives.

M. HERZOG: Do you remember the declaration which you made on 4 September 1945 to two American officers?

[Turning to the Tribunal.] This declaration is Document Number 3057-PS. It was submitted as Exhibit Number USA-223.

“I have been a convinced National Socialist since 1921 and agreed 100 percent with the program of Adolf Hitler. I worked actively to that end; and during the period from 1921 until the assumption of power I made about 500 speeches, the sense and contents of which represented the National Socialist standpoint. It was for me a particular satisfaction to have raised the Gau of Thuringia to a predominant position with regard to its National Socialist views and convictions. Until the collapse I never doubted Adolf Hitler, but obeyed his orders blindly.”

THE PRESIDENT: You are going a little bit too fast. This has been read, M. Herzog. I do not think you need read all of it.

M. HERZOG: I would ask you then, Defendant Sauckel, if you confirm the statements which were made under oath, voluntarily and without any duress, on 4 September 1945, and which contradict those that you made yesterday and which you have just made to me.

SAUCKEL: I confirm that my signature is appended to this document. I ask the Tribunal’s permission to state how that signature came about.

This document was presented to me in its finished form. I asked to be allowed to read and study this document in my cell in Oberursel and decide whether I could sign it. That was denied me. During the conversation an officer was consulted who, I was told, belonged to the Polish or Russian army; and it was made clear to me that if I hesitated too long in signing this document I would be handed over to the Russian authorities. Then this Polish or Russian officer entered and asked, “Where is Sauckel’s family? We know Sauckel, of course we will take him with us; but his family will have to be taken into Russian territory as well.” I am the father of 10 children. I did not stop to consider; and thinking of my family, I signed this document.

When I returned to my cell, I sent a written message to the commandant of the camp and asked permission to talk with him alone on this matter. But that was not possible, because shortly afterwards I was brought to Nuremberg.

M. HERZOG: Is not your signature at the end of this document in which you declared that you “made the above declarations voluntarily and without any duress”?

THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask him whether he has read it now and whether it is true.

M. HERZOG: I asked you a few moments ago, and I ask you now: Are you ready to confirm that your statements are correct?

SAUCKEL: These statements are not correct in individual points, and I asked that I might correct these various points; but I was not given the time to do that.

On the last morning before I left I was told I could discuss this matter in Nuremberg, and when I was interrogated here I told the American officer about the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, was this document read over in the Tribunal during the prosecution?

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, as far as I recall this document was not submitted. At the time I had a conversation with the American representative of the Prosecution and told him about these objections. He did not bring it up at a later session because of these objections; and the President himself, at the conclusion, asked whether this document would not be produced, and the prosecutor said, “No. Having talked it over with the Defense, I will dispense with this document.”

DR. SERVATIUS: No, it was not read in court. At any rate I would like to object to the admissibility of this document, for it was given under duress.

THE PRESIDENT: Under these circumstances, M. Herzog, you may cross-examine in what way you like upon the document. The Tribunal was under the impression that it had already been read over. That is why they stopped you reading it.

“After the putting into effect of the Nuremberg Laws, in keeping with my convictions, I saw to it that all these laws were fully carried out in the Gau of Thuringia.”

“With regard to foreign policy I have been of the opinion that the German people has a justified claim for living space in Europe and by reason of their superior racial level have to assume a leading position.... I agreed with all the decisions taken by Hitler and the NSDAP concerning the means to be used and the measures to be taken to obtain these ends, and I collaborated actively in the execution of this plan.”

“...I agreed with all the decisions taken by Hitler and the NSDAP concerning the means to be used and the measures to be taken to obtain these ends, and I collaborated actively in the execution of this plan.”

SAUCKEL: I certainly would not have made those statements in the way I did, if I had been able to act freely and according to my own will.

M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will consider it. Is it a fact that you were appointed...

THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, the Tribunal thinks that the document is before the witness and he should be asked to point out in what way he says the document is wrong.

M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, you heard what the President has said. You say that this document does not correspond to the truth. Will you kindly tell the Tribunal in what way it does not.

SAUCKEL: May I take this document point by point? I was 100 percent in agreement with the social program, and I told my counsel that when he examined me.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, what the Tribunal wishes is that you should take the document and point out, sentence by sentence, what is wrong in it.

I became a member, as my first membership card shows, only in 1923 or 1925. Before the year 1923 I was in sympathy with the Party.

As to being 100 percent in agreement with Adolf Hitler’s program, I meant 100 percent insofar as the program appeared to me to be justified legally and constitutionally, and according to ethics and morality.

Just how many meetings I conducted I cannot say. My speeches and lectures were based mainly on my life and on my experiences. Those were the only things that I could talk about, and I wanted to reconcile the German social classes and the German professions to National Socialist ideology.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I have pointed out to you that what the Tribunal desires is for you to take the document and say what sentences in it are wrong, and not to make speeches.

SAUCKEL: In my eyes, all the sentences are wrong. I would not have put them that way if I myself had been able to formulate them. The way they stand, I dispute each and every sentence, for I did not write them and I was not consulted. These sentences were put before me as they are now.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I be permitted to give an explanation of this matter? This statement is practically a summary of all the interrogations in which the various points appear as a confession in the sense of the Indictment. The defendant could not say a word in his own defense if this were correct. Since it is a résumé and since conclusions can be drawn from it, he must have the opportunity of refuting these conclusions; and that necessitates a statement. These are not definite facts which can be answered with “yes” or “no.”

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has just said that the whole document is wrong, and he has also said that the document was obtained from him under duress.

THE PRESIDENT: And it is therefore not any use to go through it in detail. But the Tribunal would like to hear from the American Prosecution if they have anything to say about the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: You see, Mr. Dodd, M. Herzog has said that it was offered in evidence under the Exhibit Number USA-223.

MR. DODD: My recollection is that—I will check the record, Mr. President—my recollection is that in the presentation of the case on Slave Labor, we included this in our document book but did not offer it in evidence. I think I said to the Tribunal at the time that we had decided not to offer it. It had been printed and put in the document book.

My memory may be faulty, but my recollection is, Mr. President, that the President of the Tribunal asked me if I did not intend to offer it, and I then stated that we had thought it over and decided not to use it.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not understand how it gets an exhibit number if it isn’t offered in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. Mr. Dodd, do you know whether this is a résumé or a summary of a number of interrogations which were taken?

MR. DODD: My understanding is to the contrary. I think it was taken before the Defendant Sauckel was in Nuremberg and before any interrogations were conducted on the part of the interrogation division of the American Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Were you aware Dr. Servatius was objecting to the document on the ground that it was obtained under duress?

MR. DODD: My recollection is that at the time of the presentation of the Slave Labor case Dr. Servatius made some objection, and I think that is what brought the matter up at that time; and that is why we did not use it.

M. HERZOG: [Turning to the defendant.] You were appointed Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor by an ordinance of 21 March 1942?

M. HERZOG: Is it correct to say that this decree was countersigned by the Codefendant Keitel?

SAUCKEL: The decree, I believe, was countersigned three times. I believe that is right. At the moment I cannot confirm it with certainty.

M. HERZOG: Would you kindly explain to the Tribunal under what circumstances you were appointed to that office?

SAUCKEL: I answered that question when it was put to me by my counsel yesterday. It was a surprise to me.

M. HERZOG: Did Speer, the Reich Minister for Armaments, have anything to do with your appointment?

SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you that from my own knowledge. Bormann’s announcement said it was at the suggestion of Speer; but I cannot tell you that from my own knowledge.

M. HERZOG: Do you recollect having made any statement on that subject in your interrogation on 12 September 1945?

M. HERZOG: On 12 September 1945 you were interrogated by Major Monigan; and you appear to have stated the following—the Tribunal will find this on the first page of the extracts of the interrogatory which has been handed them:

“In March 1942 I was summoned rather suddenly by Minister Speer, who had been appointed a short while previously. Speer told me that it was urgent that I should assume...”

THE PRESIDENT: Could you move those papers away from the light; you cannot see the light which is constantly going on.

M. HERZOG: “...Speer told me that it was urgent that I should assume new functions in connection with the question of labor. A few days later he asked me to go with him to general headquarters, and I was introduced to the Führer who told me that I must accept this new appointment without fail.”

SAUCKEL: It is correct; only I cannot say whether that was before a decision—whether my appointment was previously arranged before these meetings through the initiative of some other gentlemen; but except for that, the facts are correct.

M. HERZOG: But you confirm that the Defendant Speer, Minister for Armament and War Production, took you to Hitler’s headquarters on the occasion of your appointment.

M. HERZOG: Yesterday your counsel submitted a chart showing the general organization of your service and how it was connected with the other organizations of the Reich. You declared that chart was correct. I would ask you to confirm, by saying “yes” or “no,” whether you think that chart is correct.

M. HERZOG: It is the document which was handed up yesterday by your counsel showing the different offices.

M. HERZOG: It is Chart Number 1, indicating how Sauckel’s department dovetailed with the other ministerial services.

[Turning to the defendant.] Will you look at Column 6 starting from the left, the column above which there is the name of the Defendant Funk? Have you found it?

M. HERZOG: Would you go down that column, the third square, representing the armament inspectors? Is it correct that the armament inspectors, as shown here, were under the Defendant Funk?

SAUCKEL: Under Funk? Which department do you mean, which division? That is not quite correct here. It should be moved a bit to the side. Later it was under Speer. It says Reichsautobahn and highway inspectors. That did not come under Funk. That is a mistake.

M. HERZOG: Do you see the square beside that one, which connects the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor with the directorate of the Reichsautobahn service. It is the square on the right-hand side, a little above the others. Should it be connected with the Reichsautobahn service? Should it not be with the square above, inspectors of armaments?

SAUCKEL: Yes; I cannot understand how this mistake could happen in this chart. I have not seen this diagram before. This is the first time I have seen it; that is a mistake. I did not know about that.

M. HERZOG: And you stated it was accurate without having examined it beforehand, is that so?

SAUCKEL: I assumed it to be the same chart as the one which was put before me as complete.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, when I presented this chart yesterday, I mentioned that there might be a few discrepancies. These discrepancies came in when it was being mimeographed. But I did not see the final...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you can ask any questions if you want to in re-examination, but there is no ground for objection to questions which have been put. The questions are perfectly proper.

M. HERZOG: Defendant, you did take part in the conferences of the Central Planning Board of the Four Year Plan?

M. HERZOG: Will you please tell the Tribunal which of your colleagues accompanied you or represented you at such conferences?

M. HERZOG: Who among the other defendants also participated in those conferences? Can you tell us?

SAUCKEL: I can recall with certainty only Herr Speer as being one who participated in these conferences. Whether Herr Funk actually participated, I really cannot remember any particular meeting. Perhaps he did, and perhaps not. I am sorry I cannot say for certain.

SAUCKEL: At the meetings of the Central Planning Board I personally never saw the Reich Marshal. I do not know whether certain conferences which were held at his place had strictly to do with the Central Planning Board. Some conferences in which he participated took place at Karinhall, but whether they dealt with matters concerning the Central Planning Board I cannot say. It was not always clear.

M. HERZOG: But when the Defendants Göring and Funk did not take part in these meetings were they not represented there?

SAUCKEL: The Reich Marshal was represented by Field Marshal Milch, but whether Reich Minister Funk was represented I cannot remember exactly. He might have been represented by Herr Kehrl or someone else. There were many gentlemen there; I did not know all of them personally.

M. HERZOG: Is it not correct to say that, at these conferences of the Central Planning Board of the Four Year Plan, the general decisions concerning the allocation of labor were made by all the people who were present or were represented?

SAUCKEL: At the Central Planning Board no general decisions were made. The demands were made known there and, as there was nearly always a dispute, the higher authorities had to decide; generally it was the Führer. That happened frequently.

M. HERZOG: The Central Planning Board had established a collaboration between you and the other defendants who were present or represented there, is that not so?

SAUCKEL: That collaboration did not originate there, as those questions had already been discussed before the formation of this Central Planning Board. The questions were also discussed there, and demands were submitted and discussed.

M. HERZOG: Will you please take Document Number R-124. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number USA-179. You will see therein a declaration which you made at the meeting of 1 March 1944. I read:

“My duty towards the Führer...”

“My duty towards the Führer, the Reich Marshal, Minister Speer, and you, gentlemen, as well as towards agriculture, is clear; and I will fulfill it. As a start we have already 262,000 new workers; and I hope and am firmly convinced that I shall obtain most of what has been asked. The labor will have to be distributed, of course, according to the needs of German armament first, and secondly, German industry as a whole; and I shall always be prepared, gentlemen, to see to it that closest contact is constantly maintained here and that closest collaboration is given by the subordinated labor exchanges, as well as by the Gau labor exchanges.”

Therefore, you do not contest the fact that the Central Planning Board did establish collaboration among the various services which recruited manpower, because you yourself asked for this collaboration.

SAUCKEL: I did not deny that there was collaboration. Collaboration is necessary in every regime and in every system. Here we were not concerned with foreign labor only, but chiefly with German labor, even at that period. I did not dispute the fact that work was being carried on; but final decisions were not always made there. That is what I wanted to say.

M. HERZOG: It is correct that you appointed delegates to represent you in the various German administrative departments?

SAUCKEL: I did not have representatives in the various administrative departments. I had liaison men, or else the administrative departments had liaison men in my office.

M. HERZOG: Did you not have such a liaison officer with the Defendant Speer, Minister for Armaments and War Production?

SAUCKEL: The man who was constantly with Speer was not a liaison officer, but the man who talked over with the Minister questions of demand, et cetera, which were pending. As far as I remember it was a Herr Berk.

SAUCKEL: I had no liaison officer with the Reich Minister of Labor. There were two departments in the Reich Ministry of Labor which concerned themselves with these problems in an administrative capacity.

M. HERZOG: In your interrogatory of 12 September 1945 you said as follows—the Tribunal will find it on Pages 6 and 7 of the interrogatory:

“ ‘I had moreover two officials who acted as intermediaries between Minister Speer and the Ministry of Labor.’

“Question: ‘Did this liaison officer establish a connection between your Ministry, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of Labor?’

“Answer: ‘Between me, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of Labor...’ ”

THE PRESIDENT: That is surely Page 6, is it not? You said Pages 4 and 5. It is Page 6, is it not?

M. HERZOG: “Between me, Minister Speer, and the Ministry of Labor there were two counsellors, Dr. Stothfang ... and Landrat Berk. They were jurists and experts in national economy. Dr. Stothfang was commissioned to act principally as liaison officer with the Ministry of Labor...”

Why did you tell me a few minutes ago that you had no liaison officer with the Ministry of Labor?

SAUCKEL: I made it quite clear that there were two departments which belonged to the Ministry of Labor, Departments 3 and 5; and this Ministerialrat Dr. Stothfang was formerly the personal assistant to State Secretary Syrup. In a few isolated cases he had discussions with State Secretary Syrup at my request, that is true; but these were not important. In general the departments themselves were in touch with the Ministry of Labor.

M. HERZOG: You confirm then, that you had a liaison officer at the Ministry of Labor and another in Minister Speer’s office?

SAUCKEL: I confirm that for occasional conferences. But these gentlemen were attached to those departments, and they came to me as my personal consultants and did not work in that Ministry. I cannot say either whether in this case the translation is correct. I do not remember exactly, but in principle it is correct.

SAUCKEL: Stabsbesprechung was a conference on technical questions in which the various ministries or industrial employers participated who needed labor and the questions which had to be considered were discussed. I could not act independently, of course, as you have heard.

M. HERZOG: Who instituted these conferences, this new arrangement, these staff conferences? Who took the initiative in instituting them?

SAUCKEL: These staff conferences were instituted by me in order to obtain a clear conception of all these important questions, because in no regime or government in the world can anything be done in the dark.

M. HERZOG: You confirm then that these various kinds of liaison imply a common responsibility as to decisions taken by each one of you in the matter of manpower?

SAUCKEL: This question is not clear to me technically or administratively, for I could not do anything with the workers. I had to give them to other people, and I had to discuss the way this was to be done. But these conferences did not take place with the idea of a conspiracy or of a criminal act; they were the same kind of conferences as formerly took place. I have been present at conferences under a parliamentary system, and matters were dealt with in exactly the same way.

M. HERZOG: That is not what I was asking you. I was asking you whether you confirmed that the existence of these liaison officers to Minister Speer and the Minister of Labor, on the one hand, and the existence of this new organization that you created, on the other hand, implied a common responsibility in the decisions regarding manpower taken by Minister Speer, the Minister of Labor, and by you?

SAUCKEL: I cannot answer this question with a definite “no,” as orders were given to me which, as a German official, I had to carry out in this case; and in order to carry them out I had to hold conferences. It was not possible to do otherwise, for it was not I personally, but German economy, that demanded and used these workers. This matter had to be settled in some way, regardless of whether German or other workers were concerned; and the same situation applied in normal times.

M. HERZOG: Is it a fact that, after you were appointed, you were authorized to be represented by special representatives in the military and civil departments of the occupied areas?

SAUCKEL: After 30 October—I cannot state the exact date—at the instigation of the Führer, I appointed representatives to the governments in the occupied countries. I mentioned this yesterday through my counsel.

M. HERZOG: The 30th of October? I think you mean the decree of 30 September 1942. It is a mistake on your part for the decree is dated 30 September.

M. HERZOG: Is it right that these representatives, appointed by that decree, were directly subordinate to you?

SAUCKEL: Insofar as they were my delegates, that is, for the passing on of orders, they were subordinate to me.

M. HERZOG: Is it true that they were authorized to give directives to the civilian and military authorities in the occupied territories?

SAUCKEL: That is correct as far as orders were concerned, but it is not true in general. It was a technical matter.

SAUCKEL: The delegate with the occupation authorities in France was, first of all, President Ritter; he was murdered in Paris. And after him, President Glatzel.

SAUCKEL: In Belgium I had a delegate by the name of Schulze; he was with the military commander.

SAUCKEL: In Holland there were various men. First of all, Herr Schmidt, and there was another man; I believe his name was Ritterbusch, or something like that, but I do not recall the exact name.

M. HERZOG: This system of representatives with the occupation authorities, was that approved of by Defendant Speer?

SAUCKEL: This was at the instigation of the Führer, and I assume that Speer agreed. He recommended it, as far as I know.

M. HERZOG: To your knowledge, did he take any initiative in the decree issued by the Führer concerning this matter?

M. HERZOG: In your interrogatory you said, when speaking about these representatives, that Speer instituted these agencies for manpower in 1941 or 1942. The Tribunal will find this statement on Page 9 of the excerpts from the interrogatory. What do you understand by that sentence?

“Question: ‘What was the mission entrusted to your representatives in the labor offices of the military commander and of the civil governor? Did they merely give technical advice to the military authorities, which could be rejected at any time by the latter, or did they have authority to give directives to the military commanders on technical questions?’ ”

“Answer: ‘In 1941 or 1942 Speer instituted this delegation for manpower.’ ”

I would merely ask you what you understand by that phrase. What did you mean when you said that Speer instituted this delegation for manpower in 1941 or 1942?

SAUCKEL: I have to say, in this connection, that I never saw the minutes again after I had been interrogated. I cannot confirm that sentence about 1941-42, and I cannot imagine that I expressed myself in that way during the interrogation.

M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will judge your answer. Is it correct that, besides your representatives with the civil and military commanders, you installed administrative offices for labor in the occupied territories?

M. HERZOG: You confirm then that besides the delegates who represented you, there were recruiting agencies for manpower in the occupied territories?

SAUCKEL: Yes. In the occupied territories, in all regional governments, either civilian or military, there were departments dealing with manpower which were a part of the administration; and they were subordinate to the administration authorities.

M. HERZOG: Can you give an indication of the size of the personnel of those various services in the occupied areas?

SAUCKEL: Do you mean the total number? I cannot tell you from memory the separate figures for the personnel of these administrative offices. I never have known these figures exactly.

M. HERZOG: Do you remember the conference which took place, with you as chairman, on 15 and 16 July 1944 at the Wartburg with the heads of the regional labor offices and the labor delegations from the European occupied territories? On 15 July 1944, in the afternoon, State Counsellor Börger gave an account of the personnel employed. It is Document Number F-810, which I submit under the Exhibit Number RF-1507. I will read on Page 20:

“State Counsellor Börger stated that outside the frontiers of the Reich there are about 4,000 people engaged in the administration of labor; Eastern area, 1,300; France, 1,016; Belgium and Northern France, 429; Netherlands, 194...”

M. HERZOG: Apart from your representatives, apart from those services that we were talking about, did you not create in France commissions composed of specialists who were entrusted with organizing the employment of labor on the German pattern? Please answer.

M. HERZOG: I shall repeat it. Apart from your representatives—apart from the services that we have been talking about—did you not create, in France particularly, commissions composed of specialists who were entrusted with organizing the employment of manpower on the German pattern?

SAUCKEL: I told my defense counsel yesterday about my collaboration with French units for...

M. HERZOG: That is not what I mean. I am talking about commissions composed of specialists. Do you not remember that in order to insure the recruiting of manpower in France you thought of the system of attaching two French départements to a German Gau?

SAUCKEL: I remember now what you mean. This was the system of adoption arranged in agreement with the French Government, according to which a German Gau adopted a French département. The main object was to inform the workers, who were to come to Germany, about conditions in Germany and to have mutual talks with the economic offices of the French départements about statistics.

M. HERZOG: I hand to the Tribunal Document Number 1293-PS, which becomes French Exhibit Number RF-1508.

[Turning to the defendant.] This is a letter bearing your signature, dated Berlin 14 August 1943, from which I shall read extracts. The Tribunal will find it in the document book which I handed to them at the beginning of this session. I shall first read the last paragraph on Page 1.

M. HERZOG: Mr. President, the documents which figure in my document book were handed to the Tribunal this morning—unless I am making a mistake, for which I apologize in advance—in the order in which I intend to use them.

M. HERZOG: I have attached a slip only to those documents which I think I shall use several times, so that the Tribunal may find them more easily. May I now begin to read?

THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry but the documents had not been handed up to me, that is all. None of them had been handed up.

“The solving of these two great manpower problems demands the immediate setting up in France of a stronger and better German labor organization possessing the necessary powers and means. This will be done by a system of sponsorship by Gaue. France has got about 80 départements. Greater Germany is divided into 42 political Gaue, and for the purposes of manpower recruitment it is divided into 42 Gau labor office districts. Each German Gau labor office district will take over and sponsor, say, two French départements. Each German Gau labor office will furnish for the départements it sponsors a commission of specialists, made up of the ablest and most reliable experts. These commissions will organize the allocations of labor in these sponsored départements according to the German pattern.”

I skip one page and continue reading at the bottom of Page 2 of the French text. That is Page 3 of the German translation:

“There is no doubt that this projected system of sponsorship by Gaue for the employment of French manpower in Germany, and especially the transformation necessary in the interest of Germany of French civilian workers for the German armament industries, will bring about enormous advantages in France herself compared with the present system.”

I am passing to the bottom of Page 3 of the French text, and I read under “d”:

“The Central German Labor Office in Paris, that is, the representative of the Plenipotentiary General and his office...”

You told me a short while ago that the German offices for the recruitment of labor in the occupied territories were not under you as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, but under the local authorities. How do you explain this sentence?

SAUCKEL: It can be explained very simply. These men were subordinate to the military commanders in the labor department. They were sent from Germany, and they were taken from the labor offices and put into the administration.

M. HERZOG: You say, “The Central German Labor Office in Paris, that is, the representative of the Plenipotentiary General and his office...” The Central German Labor Office in Paris was therefore your representative?

SAUCKEL: The Central German Labor Office in Paris was a part of the civilian administration of the military commander in France. This is not expressed in this sentence, for it was taken for granted in this letter that the Gauleiter knew this. The position as I explained it is entirely correct.

“The Central German Labor Office in Paris, that is, the representative of the Plenipotentiary General and his office, will therefore have in the whole of France a reliable apparatus which will make it a great deal easier for him to solve his problems in France, in spite of any possible or even real passive resistance on the part of the higher or lower French bureaucracy.”

“I have, therefore, charged the presidents or the provisional chiefs of the newly formed Gau labor offices to set up a corresponding organization in the départements which they are sponsoring; and I request you, in your capacity as my Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, in agreement with Reichsleiter Bormann, to promote and give your fullest support to the new task allotted to your Gau labor office. The president or the provisional chief of your Gau labor office is instructed to keep you informed of all details concerning the carrying out of these measures.”

Are not these measures an attempt to subordinate French territory to German territory as far as the organization of labor is concerned?

SAUCKEL: Yes. But I should like to ask you and the High Tribunal to allow me to say the following in explanation: On the first page, Paragraph 1—I quote from the third line—it says, “...with the full consent of the Führer I am to take far-reaching and urgent measures in France in negotiation with the head of the French Government and the competent”—now comes the important part—“German authorities;”—that is, the military commander’s department, in which these labor authorities and this delegate were incorporated and to whom they were subordinate.

And on Page 4, I should like to read about the special purpose of this system of sponsorship which should have nothing unfriendly about it. I read from Page 4 in the German text, under the letter “a”:

“Prejudice, suspicion, lack of care, failure to redress and look into complaints”—that is, complaints by the workers—“which are prejudicial to the employment of manpower in Germany, all these things can be very largely eliminated by the relations between the Gau and its sponsored département.”

“Every French worker in such a département knows exactly where and under what conditions he will have to work in Germany. German propaganda and explanatory material will tell him about the locality in which he will have to work and about all matters which are of interest to him.”

And that was the purpose of that arrangement. It was something I wanted to do for the French workers, besides looking after German interests.

M. HERZOG: Please answer me “yes” or “no.” Was this arrangement an attempt to bring about a joint administration between the French départements and the German Gaue as far as the employment of labor was concerned? Answer me “yes” or “no.”

SAUCKEL: No. I should like to give an explanation to this negative answer. The purpose of this arrangement was to clear up unsolved problems between the French Government, between the French départements, between French industrialists and factories, on the one hand, and the administrative offices in Germany where the French workers were to be employed. That was the real purpose—to settle complaints and clear away mistrust.

[A recess was taken.]

M. HERZOG: Defendant, is it true that your Codefendant Göring placed under your control all the organizations of the Four Year Plan which were concerned with the recruiting of labor?

SAUCKEL: The various organizations of the Four Year Plan which had to do with manpower were dissolved. Departments 3 and 5 of the Reich Ministry of Labor continued to deal exclusively with these matters.

M. HERZOG: Is it true that the powers of the Reich Minister of Labor concerning the employment of labor were transferred to you and that as a result of this transfer you had powers to issue regulations and laws?

SAUCKEL: Only insofar as the work of Departments 3 and 5 were connected with my own task. Otherwise the functions of the Reich Ministry of Labor remained independent under the Reich Minister of Labor.

M. HERZOG: But within these departments you exercised the powers of the Reich Minister of Labor after your appointment as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor?

SAUCKEL: Within my office as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. But I must emphasize that these departments were not under me; they were merely at my disposal. Great importance was attached to this difference at the time. The departments continued to work independently within the whole framework of the Ministry of Labor.

M. HERZOG: But as a result of this situation you exerted administrative autonomy in matters concerning labor?

SAUCKEL: Not an autonomy; it was done by vote. I could not issue decrees, but could only give instructions. In every case I had to get the agreement of the other administrative authorities and Reich ministries, and the agreement of the Führer or of my superior office.

M. HERZOG: Did you not have carte blanche from the Führer for the recruiting and the utilization of labor?

SAUCKEL: Not for recruiting and utilization, but for guiding and directing. If I may express it in this way, it was never a case of the workers’ agent—that is, of course, what allocation of labor really means—employing these workers himself. The firms employed the workers, not the agent.

M. HERZOG: For the recruiting of labor you had carte blanche from the Führer. Is that not true?

SAUCKEL: Not absolutely, and only after there had been a vote and after the agreement of the regional authorities concerned had been obtained, especially in the case of foreign countries. I never recruited workers in France without the express agreement of the French Government and with their collaboration. The French administration was used here.

M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, you have on several occasions mentioned the agreements and arrangements made in France with those whom you yourself call “the leaders of collaboration.” You know better than any other that these leaders of collaboration, imposed upon France by the enemy, bound themselves only and that their acts were never ratified by the French people as a whole. Besides, these leaders of collaboration, whose testimony cannot be suspect to you, have themselves revealed that pressure was exerted upon them, and we will discuss that now. Is it true that on 16 April 1942, that is to say, less than a month after your appointment, you stated in a letter to the Defendant Rosenberg—which states your program and which was presented to you yesterday—that you included the recruiting of foreign workers in your program for the utilization^* of labor?

SAUCKEL: I resent the term “exploitation.”^* By strictest orders from the Führer, it is true that recruitment of foreign workers had to be included in my program.

^* The word utilization used by the French prosecutor was wrongly interpreted into German as “Ausbeutung” meaning “exploitation.”

M. HERZOG: Is it true that you included the recruitment of foreign workers in your program of 16 April 1942? You admitted this yesterday, and I ask you to confirm it.

SAUCKEL: Yes, it is true. I only emphasize that I did it on the strictest orders from the Führer.

M. HERZOG: Is it true that this program of 16 April 1942, that is to say, 3 weeks after your appointment, already contained the principle of forced recruiting?

SAUCKEL: It was done by express order of the Führer, in case voluntary recruitment proved to be inadequate. I said that yesterday to my counsel.

M. HERZOG: Do you remember the decree that you issued on 29 August 1942? This decree dealt first and foremost with the employment of labor in occupied territories—Decree Number 10 of 22 August by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. It was submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-17 (Document Number RF-17). Do you remember it?

M. HERZOG: Was this decree applicable to the occupied territories which were under German administration?

SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember—I have not the exact wording and the separate paragraphs before me—it dealt with the regulation of working contracts drawn up by German firms. The purpose was to prevent a muddle.

SAUCKEL: That is possible; but I, of course, cannot remember the individual dates.

M. HERZOG: You therefore went on missions to Paris before the French authorities, the French de facto authorities, had published the legislative decrees of 4 September 1942, 16 February 1943, and 1 February 1944. Is that not true?

M. HERZOG: I asked you whether it is true, that before the French de facto authorities published the three fundamental laws on forced labor of 4 September 1942, 16 February 1943, and 1 February 1944, you went on missions to France, to Paris?

SAUCKEL: I only went on journeys to Paris for the purpose of negotiating with the French Government, and I want to add that for me and in accordance with my convictions...

M. HERZOG: Do you admit that in the course of these missions you imposed on the French authorities the laws on forced labor?

M. HERZOG: You therefore contest the fact that the laws on forced labor were issued under pressure by you?

SAUCKEL: I dispute the word “pressure.” I negotiated most correctly with the French Government before such laws were published. I expressly resent the word “pressure,” and there were plenty of witnesses during these negotiations.

M. HERZOG: Do you remember the telephone conversation that the Defendant Speer had with you from the Führer’s headquarters on 4 January 1943?

SAUCKEL: Yes, I probably had several conversations with Speer. I do not know which particular conversation you are referring to.

M. HERZOG: Do you not remember a note that you sent to your various offices as a result of this telephone conversation of 4 January 1943?

SAUCKEL: Yes. Quite probably I did make several notes. I had to make notes when I received a telephone conversation containing an instruction.

M. HERZOG: I now submit Document Number 556-PS, which has already been submitted to the Tribunal under the Exhibit Numbers USA-194 and RF-67. I will read that document, or at least its first paragraph:

“On 4 January 1943, at 2000 hours, Minister Speer telephoned from the Führer’s headquarters to inform me that according to the decision of the Führer it is no longer necessary, when engaging skilled and unskilled labor in France, to show any special consideration for the French. Emphasis or more severe measures may be used in order to recruit labor.”

I ask you, Defendant, what you mean when you say that it is not necessary to show any special consideration for the French?

SAUCKEL: This note or rather this decision did not come from me. This was a communication which came from the Führer’s headquarters, based on a decision made by the Führer. In spite of that—and I want to emphasize that particularly—my attitude towards the French Government did not change, and it does not say so in this record either. I continued to adopt the same polite attitude in my negotiations with the Government, and I ask the Tribunal to be allowed to make a short statement on how these negotiations with the French Government were conducted.

M. HERZOG: You will give it later in your examination. Do you remember the discussion that you had on 12 January 1943, at the German Embassy in Paris, with the French authorities?

SAUCKEL: As far as I know, I only talked to French ministers in the German Embassy in Paris.

M. HERZOG: That is exactly what I am asking you. Do you remember this conversation that you had with the French authorities on 12 January 1943?

SAUCKEL: Yes. Usually the French Premier, the French Minister for Labor, Minister Bichelonne, took part in such discussions. On the German side, the Ambassador; on behalf of the military commander, Dr. Fischer; and, as my representative, probably Dr. Hildebrandt or some other gentleman.

M. HERZOG: And you do not remember what Laval said to you at this meeting of 12 January 1943?

SAUCKEL: Very many matters were discussed in great detail during these conferences, and I do not know what you mean.

M. HERZOG: Well, I will submit to you the minutes of this meeting. It is Document Number F-809, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-1509.

In the course of this discussion Laval made a long statement to you; more exactly, several statements.

M. HERZOG: It is in my document book, Mr. President. It must be marked with a slip 809.

“Gauleiter Sauckel demands a further 250,000 new workers. Gauleiter Sauckel knows very well—and his offices have certainly informed him about this—the difficulties which the French Government had in carrying out the program last year. The Gauleiter must realize that as a result of the number of prisoners of war and workers who are already employed by Germany, the sending of another 250,000 workers will increase even further the difficulties of the French Government. I cannot conceal these difficulties from the Gauleiter, because they are evident; and the Germans who are in Paris know these difficulties. When the Gauleiter replies that they have had to overcome the same difficulties in Germany and when he even states that French industry must be expanded, it seems to me that I must remind him that Germany not only demands workers of France, but is also beginning to take away the machines from factories in order to transport them to Germany. France may have nothing left, but until now she still had her means of production. If these too are taken from her, France loses even her possibilities for working.

“I do everything to facilitate a German victory”—and you see Laval could hardly be suspect to you, Defendant—“but I must admit that German policy makes heavier demands on me nearly every day and these demands do not conform to a definite policy. Gauleiter Sauckel can tell the German workers that they are working for Germany. I cannot say that Frenchmen are working for France.

“I see that in many fields the French Government is not able to act. One would almost believe that on the German side they set no value on the good will of the French and that they are bent on instituting a German administration throughout France. My task is being made more difficult every day. It is true that I do not allow myself to be discouraged; but I consider, however, that it is my duty to remind the Gauleiter of the gravity of Franco-German relations and of the impossibility of continuing along this path. It is no longer a matter of a policy of collaboration; rather, it is on the French side a policy of sacrifice, and on the German side a policy of coercion.”

“The present state of mind in France, the uncertainty concerning the means which the French Government possesses, the half-freedom in which it finds itself, all these do not give me the necessary authority to furnish Gauleiter Sauckel with an immediate reply. We can do nothing. We are not free to change salaries; we are not free even to combat the black market; we cannot take any political measure without everywhere coming up against some German authority which has substituted itself in our place.

“I cannot guarantee measures which I do not take myself. I am persuaded that the Führer is unaware that the French Government cannot act. There cannot be in one country two governments on questions which do not concern directly the security of the occupation forces.”

“It is not possible for me to be a mere agent for German measures of coercion.”

That is the document which I submit to you, Defendant, and I ask you two questions concerning it.

The first question is: What did you answer to Laval when he made this statement to you?

The second one is: Do you not think that here there is proof of the pressure which you dispute?

SAUCKEL: To begin with, if the Tribunal would permit it, I should have to read my reply to Premier Laval. The document proves, and this has been confirmed to me by Premier Laval on various occasions, that I conducted my negotiations with him in a proper manner; and in spite of the fact that I had orders not to conduct political conversations but only to deal with my actual task, I always reported to the Führer about these matters. But I think that the tone of my reply was definitely beyond reproach. These negotiations which I conducted...

M. HERZOG: That is not the question that I asked you. I asked you what you answered him when he made that statement to you, when he said to you, for instance, that it was not possible for him to be a mere agent for German measures of coercion.

SAUCKEL: Premier Laval did not complain about me in this connection. He complained about general conditions in France, because this was the time of occupation. The situation was that there was a German occupation. It was war.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, regarding this document, I should like to draw your attention to an error of translation which will lead to considerable misunderstanding. According to this document it says that the recruitment could be approached with emphasis and more severe measures, and the word “emphasis” has been translated by “pressure” in the English. But that is not meant. It is not “Druck,” pressure; it is “Nachdruck,” emphasis. That means that the next in authority can be approached with energy.

THE PRESIDENT: I am told the translation is “emphasis.” No, no, the translation is “emphasis.” It is in this document, and the translation in English is “emphasis.”

M. HERZOG: No, Mr. President, it is a new document which I am submitting now, a French document which will bear Exhibit Number RF-1509 (Document Number F-809).

M. HERZOG: That document comes, Mr. President, from the archives of the Majestic Hotel in Paris, where the German offices in Paris were located. Some months ago these archives were found again in Berlin, and we have extracted the Sauckel documents.

I submit to the Tribunal the certificate of authentication for the Sauckel files, as well as for the documents which I intend to submit to the Tribunal in the course of my cross-examination. Perhaps, as the document is in French, the Tribunal would like me to read it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, read it, will you? You mean this procès-verbal? What is this procès-verbal? Who is it identified by?

M. HERZOG: This procès-verbal is identified by two persons, by Commandant Henri, French liaison officer at the American Documentation Center in Berlin, and by my colleague, M. Gerthoffer, who, with Commandant Henri, took these archives.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better read this procès-verbal so that it will go into the record.

M. HERZOG: “I, Charles Gerthoffer, Deputy Prosecutor at the Court of the Seine, on duty with the International Military Tribunal for the Major War Criminals, having gone to Berlin to the offices of the Ministerial Collecting Center, Commandant Henri, Chief of the French Mission, gave to me, with the authority of Colonel Helm of the American Army, Chief of the 6889 Berlin Collecting Center, seven files from the archives of the German military command in France concerning forced labor and registered at the M.C.C. under the following numbers: 3 DS, lumbers 1 to 213; 4 DS, Numbers 1 to 230; 5 DS, Numbers 1 to 404; and two appendices; 6 DS, Numbers 1 to 218; 7 DS, Numbers 1 to 118; and one appendix; 1 to 121; 50 DS, Numbers 1 to 55; 71 DS, Numbers 1 to 40.

“I declared to Commandant Henri that I took the said files in order to submit them to the International Military Tribunal for the Major War Criminals so that they might be used in the course of the proceedings and that they will thereafter be delivered to the French Ministry of Justice, whose property they remain.

“There are five copies of this document, one of which is to serve as an affidavit for the International Military Tribunal for the Major War Criminals.”

M. HERZOG: The place in Paris where the offices of the German military command in France and the various occupation offices were located. These documents, which had vanished at the time of the liberation, were found again at the Ministerial Collecting Center in Berlin. The document which I have just submitted to you is the certificate of authentication of these files, and I also have the certificate of authentication of the documents which I have extracted from these files and which I am now ready to read to the Tribunal, if the Tribunal so desires.

THE PRESIDENT: The Hotel Majestic was the place where the German military government was established in Paris; isn’t that right?

M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President, if I am not mistaken. Does the Tribunal desire that I should read the other certificate of authentication, that is to say at least in part—the one concerning the document itself?

M. HERZOG: No, Mr. President. I am submitting to the Tribunal two certificates of authentication. The first, the one which I have just read, is the certificate of authentication of seven files which contain a very large number of documents. From these seven files we have extracted only a certain number of documents which we are submitting to the Tribunal; and that is why, after having presented the certificate...

THE PRESIDENT: The second document only says that the documents which you are submitting are documents which came from those files?

THE PRESIDENT: And the files themselves came from the Hotel Majestic, which was the place where the German military administration was carried on. Will you put the second document on the record?

[Turning to the defendant.] Since you still deny the pressure that you exerted on the government, I will submit to you Document Number 1342-PS.

SAUCKEL: I think that an error in translation has been made here. I understood that you asked whether I denied that I was putting pressure on the Tribunal. I respect this Tribunal too highly to try to exert pressure upon it. I do not understand the question. I understood you to ask me whether I denied that I exerted pressure on the Tribunal; and, of course, that question I have to answer with “no.”

M. HERZOG: I said this to you: Since you deny that you exerted pressure on the French authorities, I will submit to you a new document. It is Document Number 1342-PS which has already been submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-63. This document represents the minutes of a meeting which you held on 11 January 1943 in Paris with various German occupation authorities. Do you remember that on that occasion you made a declaration concerning your relations with the Vichy Government? I will read this declaration to you. It is on Page 4 of the French and German texts.

“The French Government...”—It is the last paragraph but one before the end of Page 4.—“The French Government is composed of nothing but adepts at temporization. If the first 250,000 workers had arrived in Germany in time, before the autumn—the negotiations with the French Government having already been begun in the preceding spring—we might perhaps have been able to recruit key men in the Reich earlier and form new divisions; and it might then not have come to the cutting off of Stalingrad. In any case, the Führer is now absolutely decided to rule in France, if need be even without a French Government.”

When you made this declaration, did it not reflect the pressure which you were exerting on the French Government?

SAUCKEL: This is not a conference with the French Government. This is a statement of facts.

M. HERZOG: I did not say that it was a conference with the French Government. I asked you what you meant when you stated that the Führer was determined to rule in France, even without the French Government. Was that not pressure?

SAUCKEL: That was a straightforward decision and a statement from the Führer, for which I am not responsible. I merely repeated it, and in any case it was never realized.

M. HERZOG: Why did you transmit it to the occupation authorities in France in the course of a conference that you were holding with them concerning the recruitment of labor?

SAUCKEL: Because it was my duty to give a description of the situation as I saw it at the time.

M. HERZOG: But do you not think that, in expressing to them this declaration of the Führer, you were using it to exert pressure?

SAUCKEL: I could not exert any pressure by that, because this was merely transmitting a statement of the situation. I did not tell the French Government that the Führer would remove them and that therefore they would have to do such and such a thing. I merely negotiated.

M. HERZOG: But you did state, and I ask you to confirm it, you did state in the course of that conference that the Führer had decided to rule in France, if need be, even without a French Government?

M. HERZOG: Do you remember the discussion which you had on 14 January 1944 in Paris with various German personalities?

SAUCKEL: Yes; it is possible that I had a discussion there at that time, but I cannot remember at the moment what it was about.

M. HERZOG: You do not remember a discussion which you had on 14 January, and you do not remember the German personalities who were present, at this meeting?

SAUCKEL: Probably there were several conferences, but I cannot tell you now which one you are talking about. Neither do I remember, of course, what the actual subjects of the discussions were.

M. HERZOG: On 14 January 1944 you had a conference in Paris with Abetz, Von Stülpnagel, Oberg, and Blumentritt. Do you remember that in the course of that discussion you submitted to your listeners the draft of a law which you had drawn up and which you wanted to impose on the French authorities?

SAUCKEL: I was not trying to impose it. I was trying to discuss it. I was negotiating. I was not trying to impose it upon them. The wording of the minutes shows that quite clearly.

M. HERZOG: Do you dispute the fact that you yourself drafted a law which you transmitted to the French Government?

SAUCKEL: No, that I do not deny. That I submitted such a draft law and that I drafted it, I do not deny.

M. HERZOG: I submit to you Document Number F-813, which I put in under Exhibit Number RF-1512. It is the minutes of this meeting of 14 January 1944, Document Number F-813. These minutes are signed by Abetz, Oberg, Von Stülpnagel, Blumentritt, and you. I read from Paragraph III the heading: “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor”—which was you—“has drawn up a draft law for the French Government.”

Do you still dispute the fact that you yourself drew up draft laws which you submitted to the French Government?

SAUCKEL: That I do not deny; I had to submit a proposal. However, it was based on mutual negotiations.

SAUCKEL: That I imposed this law by pressure, that I do deny. I negotiated about it.

M. HERZOG: Do you not remember that you gave an account to the Führer of the mission which you carried out in Paris in January 1944?

SAUCKEL: It was my duty to report when I made such journeys for I was carrying out the Führer’s orders.

M. HERZOG: I submit to you this report, Document Number 556-PS, which was submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-67. Twice in the course of this report you speak of German demands. Do you not think that to give an account to the Führer of German demands having been accepted is to give an account to him of the success of the pressure which you exerted?

SAUCKEL: I cannot conceive in what other way a basis for negotiations could be found. The German Government made demands, and because of those demands there were negotiations with the French Government which had to be considered by me as de jure.

M. HERZOG: Do you admit, therefore, that the German Government and you, who were its agent, were making demands? Please answer “yes” or “no.”

M. HERZOG: Thank you. And those demands, did they not, at times, take the form of a veritable ultimatum?

SAUCKEL: I am, not aware of that. I can only say that I was very polite and accommodating when talking to the French Premier and that our negotiations ran very smoothly. He often mentioned that, and it is in the record.

M. HERZOG: When you took action concerning the mobilization of the 1944 class, do you not remember that you demanded this mobilization in a veritable ultimatum? Answer “yes” or “no.”

THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, I think you might put to him the last sentence in the letter of the 25th of January 1944, 556-PS.

M. HERZOG: “I have, however, allowed no doubts to remain that further and more severe measures will be taken if the demands for the transfer of workers is not met.”

SAUCKEL: Yes, I probably said that, though not in the form in which it is put down in this letter.

M. HERZOG: Do you remember that on 6 June 1944, the day of the dawn of our liberation, you addressed a letter to Ambassador Abetz?

M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to produce this letter. It is the French document, Number F-822, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-1513:

“6 June 1944. Paris.

“Your Excellency and dear Party Comrade Abetz:

“The long-expected invasion has finally begun. Thus ends also for the Allocation of Labor a period of waiting which up to now has served as an obvious, sometimes tacit, pretext for saying that the sending of workers into the Reich was impossible owing to the political atmosphere in the country.”

“Now that the German soldier must once more fight and bleed on the Channel coast, now that the struggle may extend at any hour to many other parts of France, any call or any words from Laval can have no weight whatsoever. The only language which can now be understood is that of the German soldier. I beg you, therefore, in these decisive hours to ask Premier Laval at last to do something which is obviously very difficult for him; that is to say, that he should at last sign the order for the calling up of the 1944 class. I do not wish to be kept waiting any longer. Neither do I wish to leave with an opinion which might be unjust but which at the same time is forced upon me, concerning the temporizing tactics of the French Government.

“I beg you, therefore, most urgently, to obtain by 10 o’clock tomorrow morning the signature of the French Premier to the decree for the calling up of the 1944 class, or else to inform me quite clearly if Laval should answer with a categorical ‘no.’ I will not accept any delaying excuses, as all technical preparations regarding the quotas from the départements, as well as the arrangements for transport, have either been made or are now about to be made, thanks to the joint discussions which have been going on.”

SAUCKEL: It is only an ultimatum insofar as my departure was in question and nothing else. I could not exert any pressure on Laval or use any threats.

“I beg you, therefore, most urgently to obtain by 10 o’clock tomorrow morning the signature of the French Premier to the decree for the calling up of the 1944 class, or else to inform me quite clearly if Laval should answer with a categorical ‘no.’ I will not accept any delaying excuses...”

SAUCKEL: It is only an ultimatum insofar as I could not wait any longer. I had to leave, because I had orders to leave. I was trying to get a decision, a “yes” or “no,” nothing else.

M. HERZOG: And to demand an answer “yes” or “no”—you do not consider that an ultimatum, Defendant Sauckel?

SAUCKEL: I had to leave, and I wanted a decision as to whether the French Premier would sign it or not.

Do you know how many French workers were deported to Germany as the result of your various actions?

SAUCKEL: As far as I can remember—I cannot say exactly offhand—there were 700,000 to 800,000 French workers employed in Germany. However, I cannot tell you exactly without documents.

M. HERZOG: Is it correct that in Belgium and in Northern France the deportation of workers for forced labor was regulated through laws of the army of occupation?

SAUCKEL: I do not know about it being through the laws of the army of occupation but through labor administration.

M. HERZOG: Is it correct that it was the decree of 6 October 1942 which instituted forced labor in Belgium and in Northern France?

SAUCKEL: We called it “compulsory labor service” in German law. That is correct.

M. HERZOG: Is it correct that General Von Falkenhausen, the German Military Commander in Belgium and in Northern France, who signed the order of October 1942, did so under pressure from you?

SAUCKEL: No, he did not sign it under pressure from me, because I talked to him about it and there was not any argument. This was done at the request of the Reich Government and the Führer.

M. HERZOG: I submit to you the interrogatory of General Von Falkenhausen, who testified before a French magistrate on 27 November 1945. I submitted this interrogatory under Exhibit Number RF-15 (Document Number RF-15) in the course of my presentation in January. I read from Page 1. Question 3:

“Question: ‘Will you swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?’

“Answer: ‘I swear.’

“Question: ‘On 6 October 1942 there appeared an order which instituted compulsory labor service in Belgium and in the departments of Northern France...’ ”

“Answer: ‘I was Commander for Northern France and Belgium.’

“Question: ‘Does the witness remember having promulgated this order?’

“Answer: ‘I do not remember exactly the text of this order, because it was drawn up after a long struggle with Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.’

“Question: ‘Did you have any difficulties with Sauckel?’

“Answer: ‘I was fundamentally opposed to the institution of compulsory labor service, and it was only after having received orders that I consented to promulgate the decree.’ ”

Do you still deny that General Von Falkenhausen issued this order under pressure from you?

M. HERZOG: This statement was given under oath, and your testimony today is given under oath. The Tribunal will take note of it.

SAUCKEL: I say with full consciousness that to the best of my recollection this version is not completely correct. Laws regarding labor in occupied territories were not made on my order but on the order of the Führer, and I did not have any argument about it with General Von Falkenhausen. We discussed it in a very friendly way, and he introduced the law. I do not remember having had any difficulties in this connection. And in another paragraph he states here that at that time he gave all his instructions on Hitler’s orders. I myself had neither arguments nor difficulties with him.

M. HERZOG: Is it correct that in Holland the deportation of Dutch workers for forced labor was under the jurisdiction of the Reichskommissariat?

SAUCKEL: Please, would you hear the Defendant Seyss-Inquart about that? The expression jurisdiction is entirely new to me. In France, Belgium, and Holland this matter was dealt with through the administration of the labor departments, that is to say...

M. HERZOG: Is it correct that the orders signed by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart constituted only a local application of the general program which you were charged with carrying out?

SAUCKEL: A local application in Holland? I do not quite understand it the way it is put in German.

M. HERZOG: Is it not correct that by signing the orders concerning forced labor in Holland the Defendant Seyss-Inquart was but implementing your program of forced labor?

SAUCKEL: It was a realization of the Führer’s labor program as he, the Führer, had ordered it.

M. HERZOG: Did you go to Belgium or to Holland in order to control the implementation of the laws on forced labor?

SAUCKEL: Not to control. I was in Belgium and Holland only for a very short time. I had conferences there with the leading men, and according to my recollection I visited the labor authorities in Antwerp and saw how they functioned—the German ones.

M. HERZOG: And in the course of these journeys you were preparing detailed measures for the implementation of the labor program, is that not true?

SAUCKEL: I did not draft them during those journeys; I discussed them there. Of course, I did some work while traveling.

M. HERZOG: I submit to you Document Number PS-556, Exhibit Number RF-67. It is a letter which you wrote to the Führer on 13 August 1943. In this you declare, Paragraph 1 of the letter:

“My Führer,

“I take the liberty of informing you of my return from France, Belgium, and Holland, where I went on official business. After difficult and lengthy negotiations I have imposed upon the occupied territories of the West, for the 5 last months of the year 1943, the program which is indicated below; and I have also prepared detailed measures for its implementation—in France through the military commander, the German Embassy, the French Government; in Belgium through the military commander; and in Holland through the offices of the Reich Commissioner.”

Do you still dispute, Defendant, the fact that you went to Belgium and Holland in order to prepare detailed measures there?

SAUCKEL: I have never denied that, I would like to say that I do not resent the expression, but only the way you present it now and then. It says quite clearly that they were discussed there; that is what is meant by preparation.

M. HERZOG: One last question on this matter: What is your estimate of the number of Dutch workers who were deported to Germany?

SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you exactly from memory how many Dutch workers were employed on the basis of contracts with them and on the basis of these laws. Maybe there were 200,000 or 300,000, maybe more. I cannot tell you offhand what these Dutch figures were.

M. HERZOG: Thank you. Is it correct that the forced recruitment of foreign workers was carried out with brutality?

SAUCKEL: Regarding the instructions which I issued, that was discussed adequately and clearly yesterday. My instructions are available practically in their entirety, and discountenance any brutal recruitment which...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you were not asked about your instructions, but you were asked whether brutality was shown. If you know, you can answer.

SAUCKEL: I cannot know. From time to time I heard about excesses, and I stopped them at once, and I protested against them when I heard of them.

M. HERZOG: Did you have knowledge of protests concerning the manner in which the recruitment of workers was carried out in the occupied territories?

SAUCKEL: I had those cases investigated and left any further measures to the authorities concerned. I did everything on my side to prevent and stop such occurrences, and that can and will be testified to here.

M. HERZOG: Is it correct that you appealed for the help of the Wehrmacht to insure the recruiting of foreign workers?

SAUCKEL: In those areas where the Wehrmacht exercised jurisdiction I passed on to the military commanders or commanders-in-chief, through the Quartermaster General of the Army, the instructions I received from the Führer.

M. HERZOG: Is it correct that you asked the military authorities to put troops at the disposal of your offices and services?

SAUCKEL: I have no recollection of troops, but there were labor detachments there. It is true that in areas where there were uprisings or partisan fighting I asked that order be restored, so that the administration which had been disturbed or interrupted could be resumed.

SAUCKEL: Not at my disposal. It was not my task to bring order to those areas. I explained that it was essential for the fulfillment of my own tasks and that I could only carry them out if proper administration were once more made possible by the establishment of order; it was not for recruiting purposes.

M. HERZOG: Did you not ask that those troops should participate in the tasks assigned to the service for the recruitment of labor? I submit to you Document Number F-815, which I put in under Exhibit Number RF-1514. It is a letter of 18 April 1944 from General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt and addressed to you. I read the first paragraph of it:

“On the part of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor...”—that is you, is it not?

M. HERZOG: “....the request was made that the Commander, West should be approached to the effect that in sectors where there are units belonging to the Commander, West, the commanders of these units should receive orders to support the execution of the tasks assigned to the Allocation of Labor by making troops available.”

Do you still deny that you requested that troops should be put at your disposal?

SAUCKEL: I personally did not ask for them. This appears to be the administrative office West.

M. HERZOG: Do you know whether this request was seconded by the Defendant Speer?

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

M. HERZOG: Mr. President, I believe that Mr. Dodd has a statement to make to the Tribunal.

MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendant Jodl is absent.

MR. DODD: Document Number 3057-PS, concerning which M. Herzog questioned the defendant this morning, was in the document book offered by the United States with reference to the slave-labor program, but it was not offered in evidence, and I found the reference in the record at Page 1397 of the transcript for 13 December 1945 (Volume III, Page 494) and the President of the Tribunal particularly asked why we had not read Document 3057-PS. I answered that we had intended to offer it, but that counsel for Sauckel had told me that his client maintained that he had been coerced into the making of the statement, and for that reason we preferred not to offer it, and were not offering it.

THE PRESIDENT: I want to announce that the Tribunal will rise this afternoon at half past 4 to sit in closed session.

SAUCKEL: I am referring to the letter of the Field Marshal Von Rundstedt. This document represents a letter which is addressed to me...

M. HERZOG: Yes, Mr. President. It is the document which I presented just before the recess, and the document shows that the official in charge of the recruitment and allocation of labor—that is he himself—asked that troop units should be put at his disposal.

[Turning to the defendant.] I ask you whether you recognize that this document establishes the fact that you requested troop units?

SAUCKEL: As far as this question is concerned I cannot answer precisely, for I personally did not receive this letter. Instead it was sent to Paris, to the office there. This letter is not initialed by me. But in order to clarify my position, I should like to emphasize specifically that I did not demand troops in order to recruit workers. I asked for troops when in certain areas the administrative procedure could not be carried through because of resistance activities, et cetera. In that connection there is an error in this letter of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt. But I did not receive this reply myself. It is initialed by the office of the military commander in Paris.

M. HERZOG: I submit Document F-824, which I hand to the Tribunal as Exhibit RF-1515. This Document F-824 is a letter from the Commander of the West, from his headquarters, dated 25 July 1944. I quote:

“One can conclude from this that on the order of the Führer, and after the abrogation of all contrary decrees, the desires of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor...”

This Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor is you yourself; is that not so?

“...and of Reich Minister Speer must in principle be carried out. Following my telegraphic communication, on the basis of the conference of ministers of 11 July in the Reich Chancellery, concerning which the Commander of the West will be informed by the military commander, the following directives are in force from now on:

“Without taking into account justified misgivings concerning security and order within the country, recruiting must start everywhere where the possibilities referred to in my telegram present themselves. As an only exception the Führer has decided that in the actual fighting zone no methods of coercion will be used against the population as long as the latter are helpful to the Wehrmacht. On the other hand, the recruiting of volunteers among refugees from the combat zones is to be handled energetically. Moreover, all means will be considered justified, in order to recruit as much labor as possible from elsewhere by means at the disposal of the Wehrmacht.”

Do you again deny that at your request, and at that of Reich Minister Speer, troop units carried out the recruiting of labor?

SAUCKEL: I should like to remark in this connection that I do not dispute what has just been described. At that time the commander-in-chief was under the stress of battle and the evacuation of the population. But I can testify that after the date of 25 July 1944 these things did not apply any longer, for the withdrawal of German troops was much too rapid; so that this decree, which had been issued by the Führer, was no longer in effect.

M. HERZOG: Do you remember the conference, the ministers’ conference of 11 July 1944, to which the document I have just read refers?

M. HERZOG: I submit to you the minutes of this meeting. It is Document 3819-PS, which has been handed to the Tribunal under number...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read the last passage in Document F-824—that is, not the last, but the last on that page beginning with “Afin....” It is on Page 346 of the French translation.

M. HERZOG: “In order to make the measures undertaken as effective as possible, the troops must be informed of the necessity of the Arbeitseinsatz organization so that they may put down the many acts of subversive and open resistance. The field commanders and military administration offices must give as much aid as possible to the delegates of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor and refrain from encroaching on their activities which are in conformance with instructions. I therefore ask you to give the necessary directions to this effect...”

Do you still deny that at your request the Army was used for the recruitment of workers?

THE PRESIDENT: There is a passage on the next page, too, in the supplementary note, Paragraph 1.

M. HERZOG: “Supplementary note by the Commander of the West.

“The Commander of the West reported to the Chief of the OKW on 23 July as follows:

“1) In spite of anxieties concerning internal security, I have authorized the application of the Sauckel-Laval agreement of 12 May 1944.

“2) I shall issue further instructions for the application of these measures in the combat zone in agreement with OKW/WFSt/Qu. (Verw. 1) 2 (West) Number 05201/44, Secret, of 8 July 1944.

“The Commander of the West, signed Von Kluge, Field Marshal.

“Further instructions follow. For the Commander of the West. The Chief of the General Staff,” et cetera.

I come back now to the conference of 11 July 1944. I submit to you Document Number 3819-PS, submitted under Exhibit Number GB-306. The Tribunal will find it under Document 3819-PS in the first part of my document book. It represents the minutes of the ministers’ conference which took place on 11 July 1944 in Berlin, a gathering of ministers, chiefs of the Party, and of administration.

You will find on Page 6 of the French translation the list of all the persons who were there. Do you remember who, among the defendants, were among those present? Do you recognize the signature of Defendant Funk? That of Defendant Speer?

M. HERZOG: Do you remember the proposals which, in the course of this conference, General Warlimont made to you in the name of the General Staff? Do you remember the reply that you made to these proposals?

SAUCKEL: I recall a conversation between General Warlimont and myself on that occasion, and I gave an answer; but I cannot give it to you verbatim without having some data at my disposal.

M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to read you the text. It is on Page 10. The Tribunal will find it at the bottom of the page:

“The representative of the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recent order of the Führer according to which all German forces would have to be used in the task of recruiting labor. Where troops of the Wehrmacht are stationed, whenever they are not engaged exclusively in military tasks—such as the construction of coastal fortifications—they will be available, but they cannot be detached solely for the purpose of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. General Warlimont made the following practical proposals:

“(a) Troops which are in action against partisans will, in addition, have to be used for recruiting labor in the zones held by partisan bands....”

SAUCKEL: Would you please tell me where that is. I have not this passage on this page. Will you please show me the page?

SAUCKEL: Yes, I find the place about General Warlimont, but in the German translation it sounds entirely different from what you are reading.

“(a) Troops which are in action against partisans will, in addition, be used for recruiting labor in the zones held by partisan bands. Any person who cannot give a satisfactory reason for his staying in that region will be compulsorily recruited.

“(b) If large towns are totally or partially evacuated owing to food difficulties, all the population capable of work will be recruited for labor with the aid of the Wehrmacht.

“(c) A special effort for recruiting labor among refugees from areas close to the front must be made with the aid of the Wehrmacht.

“Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these proposals with gratitude and expressed the hope that results would be obtained by these means.”

Do you still continue to claim that the Wehrmacht did not co-operate in the recruiting of labor?

SAUCKEL: I did not deny that in the combat area, and for the purpose of maintaining order in the rear areas, these measures were proposed, but they were not carried through.

M. HERZOG: Well, I am going to produce a document which refers to 3 or 4 days after this meeting of ministers. It is a telegram from Defendant Keitel, Document Number F-814, which I submit to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-1516. It is a telegram addressed by Defendant Keitel to all military commanders. I call your attention to the fact that it bears the stamp of the labor department of the military commander in France. This is dated 15 July and here is the text of it...

THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, some of these documents are not tabbed and it is quite impossible to find them unless you tell us where they are.

M. HERZOG: I have tabbed only those documents which I intend to use several times, so that the Tribunal will be able to find them easily. Otherwise, the documents must be in the order in which I use them. Document F-814 should, therefore, be immediately after Document 3819-PS, unless I am mistaken.

M. HERZOG: Actually it is after the document marked Document RF-15; it is the fourth document after Document F-814.

M. HERZOG: After 815 we have Document F-823, then F-824, and F-814, Mr. President.

M. HERZOG: This document contains the instructions which Keitel gave in connection with this meeting of leaders. I read the second paragraph:

“The present situation demands the use of all conceivable means for the procurement of additional labor, because it is the fighting men who benefit first of all by all armament measures. In view of this fact, all questions concerning internal unrest, the increase of resistance and such matters must be put in the background. We must concentrate on giving every help and support to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. I refer to my directives for the co-operation of the Wehrmacht in the procurement of workers from France.”

Do you still contend that the Wehrmacht was not used for the recruitment of labor?

SAUCKEL: I must emphasize here again that I did not dispute that these things had been planned and ordered. I did not dispute that fact, and I should like to emphasize that again. But these measures were not carried through, and I would like to emphasize that also. And besides that, I did not send this telegram.

M. HERZOG: Is it correct to say that the German Police proceeded to take steps to recruit foreign workers?

SAUCKEL: How far the Police carried through their measures in detail, I do not know, but I do know that they carried through some measures on their own accord.

M. HERZOG: But is it not true that you recommended your offices to put themselves in touch with the chiefs of the Police, the SD, and the SS?

SAUCKEL: I considered both the SD and the Police to be regular and justified institutions, and I had to ask for their help when it was necessary.

M. HERZOG: You, therefore, admit that you recommended your offices to put themselves in contact with the chiefs of the Police, the SD, and the SS for the accomplishment of their tasks?

SAUCKEL: To support me in my tasks only where an orderly participation or the use of the Police was necessary from an administrative point of view—not for the recruitment of workers as such, but only to remove difficulties or disturbances in administration.

M. HERZOG: I ask you the question again, and I ask you to answer “yes” or “no.” Did you recommend your offices to get in touch with the chiefs of the Police, the SS, and the SD?

SAUCKEL: I can only answer that question with a qualified “yes”—on occasions when it was necessary to call in police aid; not in order to carry through the task itself.

M. HERZOG: Is it true that the chiefs of the German Police assisted in the conferences which you held with the French authorities concerning the recruitment of labor?

SAUCKEL: Sometimes representatives of the Higher SS and Police Leader were present just as in the case of the French, where the Minister of the Interior or the Minister of the Police was present. I neither demanded that nor proposed it.

M. HERZOG: But you admit that the representatives of the German Police were present at these discussions? Can you give the name of one of these representatives? Do you know Standartenführer Knochen?

SAUCKEL: Standartenführer Knochen was in Paris, and on occasions he was present at these conferences.

M. HERZOG: Is it correct that the chiefs of the German Police attended the conferences which the German authorities held concerning labor problems?

SAUCKEL: To my recollection they attended various conferences, but that occurred at the proposal of the military commander, under whose direction these conferences took place.

M. HERZOG: Was there a representative of the Police at the conference of chiefs on 11 July 1944, which we mentioned just now in Document 3819-PS?

SAUCKEL: I believe Kaltenbrunner attended that conference. The meeting had been called by Reich Minister Lammers.

M. HERZOG: Did you never ask Himmler, in the presence of the Führer, for the help of the SS in the recruitment of labor?

SAUCKEL: At a discussion with the Führer in January, Reichsführer SS Himmler was present. On this occasion, as far as I recollect, I pointed out that the program for the year 1944, which had been drawn up by the Führer, could not be carried through by me if the partisan menace and obstruction in certain areas were not removed. And that, of course, could only be done by the authorities who had jurisdiction there.

M. HERZOG: You admit, therefore, that you asked Reichsführer SS Himmler to put his police forces at your disposal?

SAUCKEL: No, it is not correct to put it in that way. I have to contradict you there. Neither I nor my offices could have police forces put at our disposal. I merely asked for help in those areas where I was supposed to carry through administrative measures and where a pacification and restoration of order was first necessary. Otherwise, I could not carry out my task.

M. HERZOG: I am going to show you Document Number 1292-PS. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number USA-225. It is the minutes of a meeting held in the presence of the Führer on 4 January 1944. In my document book it is a little way after the marked document and is also marked with a tab.

“Success will depend mainly on what German executive forces are made available. My action cannot be carried through with native executive forces.”

SAUCKEL: Will you please indicate the place to me? I have not found it yet. Which page in German?

SAUCKEL: Yes, that is correct. That is a statement, a rather abbreviated statement, probably made by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers. But I should like to say emphatically that it can be interpreted only in this way: In those areas, which were very numerous at the time, I could not put into effect an administration to deal with manpower until order had been restored through executive forces. This statement, therefore, is not quite correct as presented here.

M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, you said to us only yesterday that you were formerly a worker. Did you ever consider that a worker could be taken to his work handcuffed?

SAUCKEL: No, I never thought of such a thing. I hear now for the first time that I am supposed to have sent, or had workers sent to their places of work handcuffed. I do not remember that. In any case, I never decreed anything like that; that much I can say.

M. HERZOG: On 30 August 1943, you made a speech in Paris to the Allocation of Labor staffs which you were setting up in France. I give you Document Number F-816, which I submitted to the Tribunal this morning, and I ask you to look at it again. I ask you to read...

Mr. President, I think I have made a mistake. I do not think I submitted that document, and, therefore, I submit it now, under the Exhibit Number RF-1517.

[Turning to the defendant.] Please look at Page 10 of the photostat which has been given to you—Page 38 of the French translation, the last line on the page:

“The most severe measures for recruiting labor—police action or the use of handcuffs—must be applied by us in the most unobtrusive manner.”

That is what you declared on 30 August 1943 to the Allocation of Labor staffs when they met in Paris.

M. HERZOG: And you considered that handcuffs could be used in the recruitment of labor?

SAUCKEL: It can only be a statement regarding cases of flagrant resistance to the authority of the state or to the execution of some administrative action. Experience shows us that this has been found necessary the whole world over. I merely said that everything should be done in an orderly and correct way. I did not call that a rule to be applied for the recruitment of labor. It cannot be understood in any other way.

M. HERZOG: But you said that to the Allocation of Labor officials in France. The Tribunal will judge that.

SAUCKEL: Yes, but it must be interpreted as being applied only if there were flagrant resistance to an executive authority; otherwise it was never intended.

Defendant Sauckel, have you ever created any special police for the recruitment of labor?

SAUCKEL: No, I established no special police; I explained that yesterday. That was a suggestion put forward by the French units themselves for protection. At a conference I exaggerated and called it “police,” but it was not a police force.

M. HERZOG: Have you heard a committee mentioned which was called the “League for Social Order and Justice?”

M. HERZOG: Have you ever drafted any order or sent any instructions which advised the institution of these committees?

SAUCKEL: It was proposed, yes, and it was discussed. As far as I remember that was in the spring of 1944.

M. HERZOG: And you claim that you never set up these committees, or drafted any instructions concerning the setting up of these committees?

M. HERZOG: You admit that you drafted instructions concerning the formation of these special police forces?

SAUCKEL: That was done on the basis of discussions which I had with these French units.

I submit to the Tribunal Document Number F-827, under Exhibit Number RF-1518. These are instructions of the Defendant Sauckel for the formation of these special police forces. The document consists of several sets of instructions. On Page 6, there is an order of 25 January 1944 by the Defendant Sauckel.

M. HERZOG: On Page 6, immediately after Document 1292 in my document book, you will find the instructions of the Defendant Sauckel. I read:

“Berlin, 25 January 1944. Secret.

“Subject: Formation of a protection corps for the execution of the tasks of the Allocation Of Labor in France and in Belgium during the year 1944.

To the Military Commander in France, Paris.
To the Military Commander for Belgium and Northern France, Brussels.

“In order to secure the carrying out of the necessary tasks of the Allocation of Labor in Belgium and France, especially the assignments for Germany, and to strengthen the executive, a protective corps, the Committee for Social Peace, is to be created in France and Belgium. This protective corps is to consist of indigenous forces with a nucleus of German police who will act as leaders. This protective corps will consist of approximately 5,000 men in France, and approximately 1,000 men in Belgium. I give the following provisional instructions for the formation of this protective corps and the accomplishment of its tasks:

“I. Selection of members of the Protective Corps.

“The selection shall be made in close agreement with the competent Police and SD offices, which shall approve the candidates, especially from the point of view of their loyalty. The selection shall be made especially among the members of political movements favorably disposed to collaboration with Germany.

“II. Organization of the Protective Corps.

“The Protective Corps will be directed from central offices to be set up in Paris and Brussels. The heads of these offices shall be designated by me.”—That is to say, by you, Defendant Sauckel.—“They shall take orders from my delegates in France. In purely police questions, the Protective Corps shall be directed by the Higher SS and Police Leader. The regional groups of the Protective Corps shall take orders from the commanders of German police forces, and the latter will receive technical directions from the Feldkommandantur and from the recruiting offices as to their participation in tasks concerning the Allocation of Labor. The German Police and the services of the SD will deal with instruction in police matters; technical training, as far as the Allocation of Labor is concerned, will be given insofar as is necessary by the experts of the Feldkommandantur and the recruiting offices.

“The members of the Protective Corps will not wear uniform; they will however, carry firearms.

“III. Execution of orders.

“The members of the Protective Corps assigned to the recruiting offices or to the Feldkommandantur shall be employed in such a way as to insure maximum efficiency in the execution of measures ordered. For example, they must be informed immediately if Frenchmen who have been summoned by German offices do not appear. They must find out the domiciles of these persons and bring them to report in accordance with instructions from the German police leader in collaboration with the French and German police. Furthermore, they must track down immediately all those who have refused to appear when summoned, and those who have broken their contracts. In the interests of an effective executive, it is expedient that they receive regularly lists of persons summoned and persons liable for service, to enable them to act immediately in cases where German directives have not been complied with.

“It is to be presumed that these quick methods, coupled with fitting punishment and immediate publication of the punishments, will have a more deterrent effect than that achieved by tracking down the men afterwards, as has been done up to now. Furthermore, members of the Protective Corps are to keep the German offices informed of any particular difficulties in recruitment....”

And all that, Defendant, is signed “Sauckel.” Do you still claim that you did not form a special police corps in France and Belgium?

SAUCKEL: I already told my attorney yesterday that in agreement with French organizations such a protective corps was set up, so that on the one hand people who wanted to work could be protected, and on the other hand administrative measures could be carried out. Since the Frenchmen themselves declared that they were ready and willing to collaborate, I did not see anything unfavorable in this or anything that was in any way out of order.

M. HERZOG: I ask you to answer my question “yes” or “no.” Do you admit that you set up this special police service?

SAUCKEL: I admit that I suggested this Protective Corps, and that it was set up, but only on a small scale.

M. HERZOG: Is it true that you issued instructions, or imposed measures of constraint against those who evaded the compulsory labor service?

SAUCKEL: I did not issue them myself, but rather the French Government did. That is correct; for in every occupied territory—and that is true the whole world over—the authority of the occupying power must be respected.

M. HERZOG: Is it true that you demanded that the death penalty should be applied to officials who, for instance, hindered your action?

SAUCKEL: It is true that at a conference with the French Premier Laval, I demanded, by way of negotiations, the death penalty in cases of very serious obstruction.

M. HERZOG: Then you admit that you demanded the application of the death penalty in the case of these officials?

SAUCKEL: Yes, if a serious case of sabotage was in question—according to martial law.

M. HERZOG: Is it true that your task was to procure for the German war industry the labor it required?

M. HERZOG: In this respect were you responsible to the Defendant Speer, Minister for Armaments and Munitions, for the carrying out of your task?

SAUCKEL: I was responsible to the Four Year Plan and to the Führer, and I had instructions from the Führer to meet the requirements of Reich Minister Speer as far as it was possible for me to do so.

M. HERZOG: Did the Defendant Speer approve of all the steps which you took in recruiting foreign labor?

SAUCKEL: At all events he agreed, or he demanded, that workers should be put at his disposal. Sometimes, however, we did not entirely agree as to how it should be done; for instance, we did not agree about the protected factories in France.

M. HERZOG: We will come to that later. I ask you to tell me whether you always succeeded in satisfying the demands for workers which were made to you by the different sections of German industry?

M. HERZOG: And when you failed, did the orders that were sent to you by Defendant Speer have to have priority over all others?

M. HERZOG: Were there not incidents in this respect? For instance, did it not happen that some transports of workers were diverted from their original destination on instructions from Defendant Speer?

SAUCKEL: It did happen that, contrary to my instructions, labor transports were stopped, or transferred to other regions or to other factories. But whether the order always emanated from Herr Speer, or from an armament commission, or from another office, I do not know. It was not always from the same quarter.

M. HERZOG: In your interrogatory you declared, however, that the original destination of these transports was sometimes changed in order to satisfy the demands of Speer’s offices. Do you confirm this?

SAUCKEL: Yes; but I meant by that something rather different. In that case I was informed about it. There were two kinds of changes, or deviations: those which I did not know about, and those which were agreed upon.

M. HERZOG: Will you tell the Tribunal what was understood by the “red ticket” system?

SAUCKEL: The red ticket system was applied when there was a demand for workers, mostly specialized or skilled workers, which had to take priority over all other demands because the work was necessary.

M. HERZOG: The system of the red ticket was applied to the armament industry, was it not?

M. HERZOG: And it was established by agreement between the Defendant Speer and yourself?

SAUCKEL: That was a system which, in my opinion, was always intended to meet emergencies; there were variations, such as lists or red tickets. Originally, there were only lists, and the red ticket was added by decree.

M. HERZOG: You therefore admit that by these various systems you share with the Defendant Speer the responsibility of having compelled workers to work in German factories for the needs of the war which Germany was fighting against their own native lands?

SAUCKEL: I should like to emphasize particularly that this red ticket system did not apply only to foreign workers; it applied especially to German workers too—German skilled workers.

SAUCKEL: It applied to foreign workers as well, if they were specialists and declared their willingness.

M. HERZOG: Will you tell the Tribunal what is meant by the “blocking” of factories?

SAUCKEL: A factory was “blocked” if it was manufacturing articles which were not essential for war, or if it was a question of so-called luxury articles.

M. HERZOG: I do not think you understood my question. What were, for instance, the “S” factories in France—the factories protected by Speer?

SAUCKEL: “Sperrbetriebe” known as “S” factories—is that what you mean?

SAUCKEL: Sperrbetriebe were factories which worked for Speer in France, which had been agreed to by the French Minister Bichelonne, and they were blocked as far as labor recruitment was concerned.

M. HERZOG: Did you not exert strong pressure on the Defendant Speer to get him to abandon the practice of blocking industries?

SAUCKEL: I asked him and I urged him, but I could not succeed in putting an end to the blocking of these factories.

M. HERZOG: Did you ever bring up the matter with Hitler and insist that Speer should give up his position?

M. HERZOG: In this connection did you not ask the Führer to increase your powers at the expense of the Defendant Speer?

SAUCKEL: I did not ask for a general extension of my powers, but I asked that conditions should be allowed to remain as they had been previously, for—I ask to be permitted to explain this to the Tribunal—my task was to bring workers from France to Germany—may I make this statement:

The departments under Speer demanded skilled workers from me. There were skilled workers already in the factories which Speer had blocked. Similar industries in Germany would, of course, be worse off if instead of having skilled French workers they were supplied with unskilled French workers, or men without experience in that particular trade. I had to procure workers in any case, but I considered it wiser for German economy to procure for it the right kind of workers and not workers who were unskilled.

M. HERZOG: I beg the Tribunal to turn back to Document Number 3819-PS, the second part of 3819-PS. It consists of two letters, each addressed to the Führer, by the Defendant Sauckel and by the Defendant Speer, on this subject of the blocking of industries.

First of all, I will read to the Tribunal some extracts from Sauckel’s letter, which happens to be the second.

M. HERZOG: I think they have already been read, Mr. President; I cannot affirm it, but believe so. Document Number 3819-PS has already been submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number GB-306. If the Tribunal wishes, I can limit myself to very short extracts.

THE PRESIDENT: You need not read them for the purpose of your question of the defendant.

M. HERZOG: [Turning to the defendant.] In this letter, on Page 27, you asked whether you could obtain in a general manner a free hand for the rational utilization of labor.

SAUCKEL: I have not found the place. I could never have asked for a free hand, but I did ask to be permitted to recruit as before. I cannot find the place that you are quoting.

SAUCKEL: In this German text it says: “In this situation, it is absolutely necessary that I should again have a free hand.” That means that I should have a free hand once again, as I had had before the blocked industries were instituted. That is correct, for I was interested in a rational use of labor.

M. HERZOG: That is what I asked you to confirm. Did you ask that your powers should be increased at the expense of those of your Codefendant Speer? Will you answer “yes” or “no,” if you can?

M. HERZOG: And do you not remember that on other occasions, the Defendant Speer likewise asked that his powers should be increased at the expense of yours?

M. HERZOG: You declared in your interrogatory that the very close relations between Speer and Goebbels after the fall of Stalingrad made Speer want particularly to have you under his authority. Can you confirm this?

M. HERZOG: Is it true that your general program for recruiting labor included the employment of prisoners of war?

SAUCKEL: The employment of prisoners of war as far as they should and could be put to work under the care of the Wehrmacht.

M. HERZOG: Do you remember the decree which we mentioned this morning, your Decree Number 10, which stipulated the order of priority of work and gave priority to armament? Was this order applicable to prisoners of war as well?

SAUCKEL: As I explained yesterday, this decree was applicable to prisoners of war only by way of exchange, and to the extent as set forth in the rules of work issued by the OKW and by me in a catalog of work.

M. HERZOG: But Article 8 of this decree stipulates only that it was applicable to prisoners of war.

SAUCKEL: Yes, in accordance, of course, with the other decrees which existed; that was a matter of course.

M. HERZOG: You spoke to us yesterday about inspectorates. Is it true that in September 1943 you came to an agreement with Dr. Ley concerning the setting up of a central inspectorate for foreign workers?

M. HERZOG: In consequence, you admit that you are responsible for the measures concerning the treatment of foreign workers?

SAUCKEL: I am responsible for the directives which I issued; they are all available.

M. HERZOG: Do you consider yourself responsible for the feeding of foreign workers?

SAUCKEL: I consider myself responsible for the directives which I issued regarding the feeding of foreign workers. The actual feeding of these people was not the task and responsibility of the labor authorities. That was the responsibility of the factories, or the camp leaders who had been charged by the factories to look after this.

M. HERZOG: I am going to have submitted to you Document Number 025-PS. This document was submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number USA-698. You already had it yesterday. It consists of the report of a meeting in the office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor—that is to say, you yourself—on 3 September 1942. The document is dated 4 September.

This document, Mr. President, is at the end of my document book, after Document F-827, the last page of the French translation. I read:...

THE PRESIDENT: The last page is Document F-857, is it not? The document called 857—the last page I have got. It is just in front of Document 2200-PS. Did you come across that? It is just after Document 1913-PS.

M. HERZOG: No, Mr. President, on Page 4 of the French text—that is to say, on the last page.

“The Führer cannot understand that, in the struggle for the future of Europe, the country which has to bear the brunt of this struggle is the one to suffer most from hunger; whereas in France, in Holland, in Hungary, in the Ukraine, or anywhere else, there is no talk of hunger. He desires that it should be the reverse in the future. As regards the foreign workers living in the Reich—with the exclusion of the Eastern Workers—little by little their rations must be reduced and made to correspond to their output. It is not admissible that lazy Dutchmen or Italians should receive better rations than good Eastern Workers. In principle the guiding rule of utmost output must apply equally to feeding.”

[Turning to the defendant.] I ask you what you meant when you stated that, “In principle the guiding rule of utmost output must apply equally to feeding?”

SAUCKEL: There was a standard ration in the Reich which was increased by additional rations based on output or performance. I fought for the principle that these additional rations, which the workers from the West were already largely receiving, should be granted to the workers from the East as well; and that where western workers—that is, Dutch and Belgian workers—did not keep up their output in the same way as the Eastern Workers, these additional rations should be cut down accordingly, but not the standard ration which applied to the German people as well.

M. HERZOG: You therefore consider that if the output of one worker is smaller than that of another, his food rations must be smaller. Is that what I am to understand?

SAUCKEL: No, it is not right to interpret it that way. I should like to explain the system again. In Germany each worker received his ration as fixed by the Reich Minister for Food. In addition to that there were special increases as a reward for increased output. At the beginning these additional rations were not granted to Russian workers, and it is these additional rations we are dealing with here; not with starving people, or cutting down their standard food rations—additional rations for increased output.

[A recess was taken.]

MARSHAL: If it pleases the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendant Raeder is absent.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Herzog, do you anticipate being able to conclude your cross-examination before half past 4?

M. HERZOG: Defendant Sauckel, I offered in evidence this morning Document Number F-810, which is an account of the conference which you held on 15 and 16 July 1944 at Wartburg with the heads of the regional labor offices. Do you remember?

M. HERZOG: Do you remember whether during this conference the question was raised as to the discipline to be imposed upon the workers?

SAUCKEL: It is possible that during this conference—or conferences—this question was discussed. I cannot remember exactly; I did not participate in all the sessions.

M. HERZOG: Do you remember the statements made at the conference of 15 and 16 July 1944 by Dr. Sturm?

M. HERZOG: I shall hand you once more the minutes of that meeting. It is Document Number F-810 which was presented this morning under Exhibit Number RF-1507. Will you please look at Page 25 of the German text. It is also Page 25 of the French version. There you see—I read the first line: “Sturm gave the following report from his sector on work discipline.”

I shall pass to the next page, where I read, “We are working with the Gestapo...”

THE PRESIDENT: I know it is 806, but I thought you told us that they followed on.

“Sturm gave the following report from his sector on work discipline...”

And on the following page: “We are working with the Gestapo and the concentration camps, and we are certainly on the right track.”

SAUCKEL: I did not hear that statement myself. He gave a specialized report on questions of labor legislation, as it says at the beginning. I am seeing the record for the first time in my life. There were several parallel meetings at the same time. I did not hear it myself, but it stands to reason that some sort of ruling regarding penalties had to be made, as is done in all labor legislation.

“Measures regulating the employment of labor and wages are only possible on the basis of a healthy working morale. Regulations of a disciplinary and penal character for securing such morale require unified handling, the details of which will be dealt with at a subsequent meeting of experts on penal law.”

SAUCKEL: May I read in connection with Dr. Sturm’s statement, at the end of the first page...

M. HERZOG: Will you please answer my question first? What do you think of this statement?

SAUCKEL: I did not know of this statement, as Sturm, I believe, came from some other department. I do not know whether he belonged to the Ministry of Labor itself, or to some other department; that I cannot say. I did not hear these statements...

M. HERZOG: Do you not remember that an agreement was reached between you and the Chief of the Police and SS to hand over to the Gestapo those workers who were guilty of leaving their work?

SAUCKEL: Well, there had to be an authority in Germany which dealt with workers who left their places of work without being entitled to do so. It could not have been done by any authority other than the Police; there was no other way. In connection with this document I beg to be allowed to read some more from Page 1:

“Apart from that, the number of penalties imposed by the authorities on German workers, such as reprimands, fines, concentration camps, and legal penalties, was relatively surprisingly small. In cases dealt with by the public prosecutor the penalties inflicted amounted on an average to 0.1 to 0.2 for every 1,000 workers.”

M. HERZOG: What has that to do with the question which I asked you about your relations with the Gestapo and the concentration camps?

SAUCKEL: But there was no other authority except the police who could make an arrest if it were necessary and legally justified by court rulings.

M. HERZOG: You admit, then, that it was with your agreement that the Gestapo proceeded to arrest workmen who had broken what you call their contract of work, and send them to concentration camps?

SAUCKEL: Not to concentration camps, no, but into the custody which was prescribed. The penalties were decreed in accordance with certain regulations. I made no other agreement.

M. HERZOG: I submit in evidence Document Number 2200-PS; which becomes Exhibit Number RF-1519. It is a service memorandum of the Gestapo addressed to the district police officials of the Cologne and Aachen districts. It refers to the struggle against breaches of contract on the part of foreign workers. Mr. President, it is the fourth document from the end in my document book. I read from it:

“The considerable number of refractory foreign workers ... is dangerous to the security of the Reich.... There is always danger of actual sabotage in such cases, ... the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police has reached an agreement with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor that all charges of absenteeism against foreign workers shall be dealt with by the Gestapo.

“...the district police authorities are expected to examine anything bearing on this matter. They are authorized by me to give warnings to absentees by order of the Gestapo State Police office, Cologne, and to order corrective custody up to 3 days for all cases of minor importance. The instructions concerning the attitude to be taken toward the individual groups of foreign workers are to be noted....

“In more serious cases of absenteeism the district police authorities will submit the files concerning the cases to the competent Gestapo office (Cologne, Aachen, or Bonn) for decision. The Gestapo will examine the matter and order the necessary measures—detention, sending to corrective labor camps, or concentration camps.”

[Turning to the defendant.] Do you still deny that it was with your agreement that refractory workers were first handed over to the Gestapo, and then sent to concentration camps?

SAUCKEL: I did not deny it, but as stated in the first paragraph, this only happened if public order was disturbed by punishable offenses, that is in serious cases, or when there were breaches of working contracts. There was nobody except the police to undertake the search for such people, and I consider the procedure to be perfectly correct.

M. HERZOG: You think that it is a correct manner of procedure to hand over foreign workers to the Gestapo and to concentration camps? I note your answer.

SAUCKEL: Only in the case of serious offenses. It says “in serious cases” in the document. That was the demand imposed on me.

M. HERZOG: At what period did you learn about the atrocities which were committed in concentration camps?

SAUCKEL: I can say with a good conscience that I gained knowledge here of the cruelties which were committed in the concentration camps; after the collapse of the Reich.

SAUCKEL: I cannot speak for the others. I myself did not know of such measures, which I abhor and which I only learned of here.

M. HERZOG: Do you think that the Reichsführer SS Himmler, for example, was aware of the atrocities which were committed in the concentration camps?

SAUCKEL: I cannot say whether the Reichsführer SS knew of them, whether he himself instigated them. During the whole of my career I hardly ever spoke to the Reichsführer SS because our personal relations were rather strained.

M. HERZOG: During the interrogation by your counsel yesterday you declared that you once visited the concentration camp of Buchenwald; did you not?

M. HERZOG: You declared you made this visit in the company of an Italian commission, did you not?

M. HERZOG: Do you know that there is in existence an album of official photographs of the concentration camp in Buchenwald?

M. HERZOG: I offer that album in evidence to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number RF-1520. It bears the Document Number D-565. It is a document of the British Delegation.

M. HERZOG: Thank you. And you contend that you, a Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia, visited the Buchenwald Concentration Camp in the company of the Reichsführer SS, and—I call your attention to this—in the company of the commander of the camp, without knowledge of what was happening inside the camp?

SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you when this picture was taken or whether it was taken in the camp itself. I was once outside the camp together with the Reichsführer SS—there was another large site there—but I was never inside the camp together with the Reichsführer SS. I was there only once with an Italian commission.

This picture does not show that there was an inspection. Here you see some troops lined up...

I offer in evidence under Exhibit Number RF-1521 the certificate establishing the origin of this album.

In October of 1945 you were interrogated on the expulsion of Jews from industry. You said this:

“I never had anything to do with it. I had nothing to do with the question of the eviction of Jews from industry. I had no influence in this matter. It was an enigma to me.”

SAUCKEL: That is perfectly correct. I did not say the eviction of the Jews from industry was a secret to me; I said that, to the best of my recollection, I had nothing to do with it.

M. HERZOG: Your counsel gave you a document yesterday, Document Number L-61, which you thought you had to contest.

M. HERZOG: The point that you raised against this document was that it was dated 1942, and that it dealt with questions prior to your appointment. Did I understand you correctly yesterday?

SAUCKEL: The enclosures to the document deal with questions that had already been started before I was appointed.

M. HERZOG: I offer in evidence Document Number L-156, which becomes Exhibit Number RF-1522. It is a letter written under the authority of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, which is you. It is dated 26 March 1943. It is addressed to the chiefs of the regional labor offices, and it deals with the question of the eviction of Jews. It begins thus:

“In agreement with me and the Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions, the Reichsführer SS, for reasons of state security, removed from their place of work at the end of February such Jews as were not living in camps and who were working as free workers.

“They have been formed into working units or assembled for deportation. In order not to endanger the efficacy of this measure, I have avoided issuing any notification beforehand, and I have notified only those regional labor offices in whose districts free Jewish manpower was employed in large numbers.

“So as to have a general view of the effect of those measures on the manpower position, I ask you to let me have, as from 31 March 1943, returns showing how many Jews were removed from their work, and how many it has been found necessary to replace by other workers.

“When giving the numbers of the factories and of the Jews employed by them, one should take into account the situation which existed before the evacuation. The enclosed form should be used for making reports, et cetera.”

Do you still say that you had no part in the matter of the eviction of Jews and their replacement by foreign workers?

SAUCKEL: Here again I must state emphatically that this letter was never put before me. It has no signature, and here again it comes from a subdivision in the Reich Ministry of Labor at 96 Saarlandstrasse. Some official dealt with it there. I myself have absolutely no recollection of having ever had knowledge of this letter. I did not write it, it does not come from my office, it has been written “by order,” and the signature is not mine.

“The Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.” Is not that you? You talk of a subordinate. Are you trying to throw the responsibility on one of your subordinates?

SAUCKEL: No, I do not want to do that. I merely want to say that the letterhead belongs to some office, but I have never known anything about the letter. This is the first time in my life that I have seen it, and I myself did not have it written. I can say that under oath.

M. HERZOG: With this letter is an application form for replacement for the expelled Jews. Who else but you could have anything to do with this, you who were the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor?

SAUCKEL: Yes, my department—I told my counsel yesterday that my department, of course, had to furnish replacements if workers were taken away from a concern, either by being called up for service or for some other measure. I did not always know the details.

M. HERZOG: The fact that this letter contains an application relating to the replacement of workers, is that not proof that it comes from your department, you being the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor?

SAUCKEL: Such a request could not come from my department. The evacuation of Jews was entirely the responsibility of the Reichsführer SS. I had only troubles because of such measures, as it was very difficult to replace workers. I had no interest in it.

M. HERZOG: In short, you deny that you ever proposed special working conditions for Jews?

SAUCKEL: That is just what I am denying. I had nothing to do with it. It was not my task.

M. HERZOG: Would you please refer once more to Document Number F-810, which I offered under Exhibit Number RF-1507? We will hand it to you if you have not got it. Please look at Page 16, under the heading: “Gauleiter Sauckel.” I quote...

M. HERZOG: It was passed to you about 2 minutes ago. If you have not got it, it will be handed to you again.

M. HERZOG: Document F-810, but I do not think it is marked on the photostat you have. Have you that document?

M. HERZOG: Under the heading “Gauleiter Sauckel,” I read—it is on Page 16 of the document:

“Sauckel objected very emphatically when it was said that the inmates of concentration camps and the Hungarian Jews constituted the best manpower on constructional work. This is not true to fact, because they produce on an average 65 to 70 percent of the work of a normal worker; never 100 percent. Besides, it is unworthy to put the German worker and the German moral conception of work in the same category as this pack of traitors. To an inmate of a concentration camp and to a Jew, work is not a mark of nobility. Things cannot be permitted to reach the point where inmates of concentration camps and Jews become articles in demand. It is absolutely essential that all concentration camp inmates and Jews working on building sites be kept apart from the remainder of the workers, including foreigners.

“Gauleiter Sauckel ended by pointing out that as a matter of fact he did not object to the employment of Jews and concentration camp inmates, but only to such exaggerations as mentioned above.”

I would ask you, Sauckel, you who yesterday described your own life as a workman, what you meant when you said: “To an inmate of a concentration camp and to a Jew work is not a mark of nobility.”

SAUCKEL: I want to say most emphatically that this paragraph is a very condensed and free rendering, and not a shorthand report. I raised an objection because I assumed that inmates of concentration camps would be traitors. My only object was that these people should not be taken to the same places of work as the other workers, the Jews either. But I did not employ them; that was the business of the Reichsführer SS. I was speaking at a conference of leaders and in the interests of workers with a clean record and the other foreign workers. I objected to their being put to work together.

M. HERZOG: I ask you this question again. What did you mean when you said: “To an inmate of a concentration camp and to a Jew work is not a mark of nobility?”

SAUCKEL: By that I meant that the work of men who had been found guilty of offenses should not be compared with the work of free workers with a clean record. There is a difference if I employ prisoners in custody or if I employ free workers, and I wanted to see the two categories separated.

SAUCKEL: In this case the Jews were prisoners of the Reichsführer SS. Actually, I regret the expression.

M. HERZOG: You dispute, therefore, that this phrase is an expression of the hostility which you showed to Jews for instance?

SAUCKEL: At that time I was, of course, against these Jews, but I was not concerned with their employment. I was against these workers, whose employment was the concern of the Reichsführer SS, being put with the other workers.

SAUCKEL: I conducted propaganda against the Jews with regard to their holding positions in the Reich which I considered should have been occupied by Germans.

M. HERZOG: I will submit to you an article which you wrote in June 1944, a time when I think in your Germany there were not very many Jews still occupying important posts. This article appeared in a newspaper, Die Pflicht, which you published in the Gau of Thuringia. It is Document Number 857 which I offer to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-1523. I shall read extracts from this article.

“The old and finest virtues of the sailors, airmen, and soldiers of Great Britain can no longer stop the Jewish plague of corruption which is making such rapid ravages in the body of their country.”

“There is no example in the history of the world to show that anything of lasting value has been created in the course of centuries by the Jews and their foolish followers who were bound to them and corrupted by their customs and their women.”

I ask you, Defendant Sauckel, what did you mean by the “Jewish plague of corruption”?

SAUCKEL: I meant that it was the outward sign of disintegration within the nations.

M. HERZOG: I ask you again my question. What do you mean by the “Jewish plague of corruption”?

SAUCKEL: It was my opinion that disintegration had set in among the nations owing to certain Jewish circles. That was my view.

M. HERZOG: The Tribunal will draw its own conclusions. Mr. President, I have no further questions.

MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I would like to make a general summary of your activities in your function of Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.

Tell me how many foreign workers were employed in German economy and industry at the end of the war?

SAUCKEL: As far as I can tell you without documents, not counting prisoners of war, there were about 5 million foreign workers in Germany at the end of the war.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You already quoted that number during your direct interrogation by our counsel. I believe that number applies not to the moment of the capitulation of Germany but to the date of 24 July 1942. I shall quote somewhat different data on that subject and will use your own documents. You were nominated Plenipotentiary General on 21 March 1942. On 27 July 1942,—that is to say, 3 months later—you submitted to Hitler and Göring your first report. In this report you stated that from 1 April to 24 July 1942 the requested mobilization quota of 1,600,000 persons was even surpassed by you. Do you confirm this figure?

SAUCKEL: I quoted that figure, and as far as I can remember that did not include only foreigners but also German workers.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In the final part of your report you state that the total number of the population of the occupied territories evacuated to Germany, up to 24 July 1942, numbered 5,124,000 persons. Is that number exact? Do you confirm it?

SAUCKEL: Yes, but I believe that figure at the time included prisoners of war who had been employed in industry. Then I must say in this connection that in the case of all neutral, allied, and western countries there was a continuous exchange, because these workers worked either 6 months, 9 months, or 1 year in Germany, and at the end of the period agreed on they returned to their own countries. That is why this figure may have been correct. Toward the end of the year, however, they could not have increased very much because this continuous exchange has to be taken into consideration.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the fact remains that, according to your figures, the population evacuated to Germany numbered 5,124,000 persons up to 24 July 1942; is that not so?

SAUCKEL: If it says so in the document, then it may be true. It is possible, or rather it is probable, that this takes into account the prisoners of war employed. I cannot say that without any records.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will show you later another document referring to this matter. On 1 December 1942, you compiled a summarized report on the utilization of manpower up to 30 November 1942. In this summary you quote a figure referring to the number of workers assigned to German war industries from 1 April to 30 November 1942, and these workers number 2,749,652. On Page 8 of your report you state that by 30 November 1942, in the territory of the Reich, 7 million workers were employed. Do you confirm these figures?

SAUCKEL: I cannot confirm the figures without records. Again, I assume that French and other prisoners of war were once more included.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: But the figure 7 million employed in German industry—foreign workers employed, even if you include the prisoners of war—is that figure exact? Will you now say how many workers were brought to Germany from occupied territories during the year 1943? Tell me that figure.

SAUCKEL: The number of foreign workers brought to Germany during the year of 1943 may have amounted to 1½ or 2 million. Various programs had been made in that connection which were being continually changed.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am now interested to know approximately how many workers were brought to Germany in 1943. You need not give an exact figure. Approximately.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I understand. Do you remember what task was assigned to you for the year 1944?

SAUCKEL: In 1944 a total of 4 million, including Germans, was demanded. But of these 4 million only 3 million were supplied, and of these approximately 2,100,000 were Germans and 900,000 foreigners.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now can you give us at least a general summary of your activities? How many persons were brought to Germany from the occupied territories during the war, and how many were employed in agriculture and industry at the end of the war?

SAUCKEL: As far as I know and remember there were 5 million foreign workers in Germany at the end of the war. Several million workers returned to neutral and allied and western countries during the war, and they had to be replaced again and again, which was the cause of those new programs which were constantly being made. That is the explanation. Those workers who were already there before my time, and those who were brought in, probably might have reached a figure of 7 million, but during the war there were several millions who returned to their home countries.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: And also, a large number perished as a result of hard slave labor! That is not what I have in mind at the moment. In your documents you probably meant actual manpower and not those who perished or those who were absent. Could you tell us how many were brought to Germany from occupied territories during the war?

SAUCKEL: Yes, I maintain that at the end of the war there were, according to my statistical department and as far as I can remember, 5 million workers in Germany, because millions of workers continuously returned. The experts can give you a better answer than I. The contracts with the others were only 6 and 9 months, you see.

THE PRESIDENT: Your question is, is it not, how many were brought into Germany, how many foreign workers, during the whole of the war? Is that the question you are asking?

SAUCKEL: I have already stated that, including the workers who were there before my time, before I came into office, and including those who were there at the end, there may have been about 7 million. In accordance with my records, there were 5 million at the end, because the others had gone back.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that is not what you are being asked. You are being asked: How many persons were brought to Germany from foreign countries during the whole of the war? You say there were 5 million at the end of the war, and there were constant changes in the preceding years. It follows that there must have been more than 5 million people brought to Germany in the course of a year.

SAUCKEL: I would estimate 7 million, but I cannot give you the exact figures because I am not sure about the figures before my time. At any rate, there must have been millions who returned home.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Up to 30 November 1942 you quoted the figure of imported labor at 7 million...

SAUCKEL: Workers employed in Germany, and that includes prisoners of war, in 1942.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: All right, including prisoners of war, 7 million. Is that right, 7 million by 30 November?

SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you for certain. It may be correct, but I cannot tell you without documentary evidence.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will show you the document tomorrow. Today, please answer my question. You said that during 1943 approximately 2 million additional workers were imported.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is to say, 7 million plus 2 million make 9 million in all. Is that correct?

SAUCKEL: No. I said expressly that some were going back all the time, and I did not add the prisoners of war to the new imported labor.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You do not seem to understand me. I am speaking of those who were brought to Germany from the occupied territories, who passed through your hands. To answer this it is of absolutely no importance how many of them perished in Germany, or how many left. That does not change the total number of workers brought to German territory from abroad.

If, therefore, by 30 November 1942 there were 7 million workers in Germany, and, according to you, in 1943 a further 2 million were brought in, and in 1944, as you just said, 900,000 were again brought in; then, according to you, the total number of workers imported into Germany during the war must have amounted to 10 million. Is that right?

SAUCKEL: I can say that only with the reservation that I do not know how many were actually there before my time. That may be correct as a guess, and including all prisoners of war who were assigned for work. You have, however, to deduct the prisoners of war from the civilian workers who were brought into the country.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 31 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]

Morning Session

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, I did not get a satisfactory answer yesterday to my question as to how many foreign workers were imported into Germany from the occupied territories. You will now be handed Document Number 1296-PS. It is your report of 27 July 1942. In addition, Document Number 1739-PS will also be handed to you. It is your survey of conditions as of 30 November 1942. I wish to explain to you that in this case we are dealing with the number of foreign workers imported into Germany, including prisoners of war. The loss of this manpower in this case is of no importance, since it will not change the number of persons imported into Germany. They were brought to Germany, but later perished either as a result of work beyond their strength, or else were returned as incapable of work. Did you receive these documents?

SAUCKEL: Yes. Please let us have a look at the documents, as we are dealing with figures.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not essential for you to acquaint yourself with the contents of all the documents. In Document Number 1296-PS, on the last page of the report, at the end, you will find Section V. It is entitled, “General Summary...” Have you found it?

SAUCKEL: In connection with this document I must state emphatically that the figure here is indicated as 5,124,000. It includes 1,576,000 prisoners of war, but the latter do not rank with the civilian workers. The prisoners were the responsibility of the Armed Forces and during their employment, or during their employment by the generals in charge of the prisoner-of-war camps, they were housed and cared for in the individual military areas.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: They were employed in the German industries. Please read after me Subparagraph V: “General Summary of Foreign Workers ... at present employed in Germany.”

SAUCKEL: Please, have I your permission to explain that these prisoners of war were not housed and cared for in the factories or by the DAF (German Workers’ Front) but were billeted in the camps which were under the jurisdiction of the generals in charge of prisoners of war in the military areas, and they were consequently not included with the civilian workers in my statistics.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: As far as the number of prisoners of war working in your organization is concerned, a supplementary question will be asked later on. Actually, I am interested to know how many civilians and how many prisoners of war were employed in the German industries. Do you confirm this figure of 5,124,000? Is this figure correct or not?

SAUCKEL: That is a correct figure for this particular time. But in order that the Tribunal may get an exact picture of the procedure I should like to be allowed to refer to a very accurate document. That would be Document Number 1764-PS. It deals with the exact enumeration of individual workers from individual countries, and of prisoners of war about 6 months later. I submitted it to the main Reich offices, and to the Party offices in Posen. It was also submitted to the Führer and to the Reich offices...

SAUCKEL: I beg you to allow me to complete my explanation. I must completely clarify these matters here and now. My conscience demands that I do so before the entire world.

For February 1943, that is half a year later, there appears on Page 7 of Document Number 1764-PS another exact enumeration with a figure of 4,014,000 civilian workers and 1,658,000 prisoners of war. The sum total—this figure was very accurate—was 5,672,000. That in spite of the inclusion of more foreign civilian workers this figure was not materially increased has been proved by the fact—as I already stated yesterday—that civilian workers from western, southern, and southeastern territories for the most part had labor contracts binding them for 6 months only. Whenever possible, when under my charge, these contracts were observed; for otherwise, had I failed to keep to the contracts, that is, if I had not insisted on doing so, I would never have obtained any more workers.

If I employed several hundred thousand workers in half a year and then sent them back again, this figure would always disappear again because they went home. Therefore, far more civilian workers entered Germany than officially stated at any one time—than appeared in the total amount—for the number of those returning would always have to be deducted, and there were very many of them.

A French document has been presented which is a report from the Envoy Hemmen in Paris. My counsel will be good enough to tell me the PS number later. It shows that French workers, about 800,000 of them came to Germany; but these figures are not in accordance with those issued by my department, but in accordance with a statement from the French Embassy. In 1944 there were only 400,000 left in Germany as, owing to the time limits of their contracts, these contracts were expiring every day and thousands were returning home daily. Roughly 50 percent of the contracts would expire while another 50 percent would still be working. That is an exact explanation of this statement, made in all conscience.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: As to what these labor contracts actually were, those so-called labor contracts, I shall mention at a later date. My French colleague, during his examination, sufficiently proved the criminal methods used in the mobilization of workers in the West. How this was done in the East I will tell you a little later on. I should now like you to confirm the figures of your report—5,124,000 persons. Is this an exact figure, or is it not? I am not asking for any superfluous explanations. You are asked to state only whether this figure is correct or not.

SAUCKEL: It is correct for the time this statement was made, but it changed constantly for the reason I have mentioned.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: This figure is dated 24 July 1942; that is quite clear to everybody. Now, take the second document, 1739-PS. The last page of 1739-PS, where you will find the following sentence:

“Only then can we be sure that the immense number of foreign workers, both men and women, in the territory of the Reich—which has now reached 7 million, including all working prisoners of war—will furnish the greatest possible assistance to the German war industry.”

SAUCKEL: The figure of 7 million is quoted here and includes all prisoners of war employed as labor at that particular time...

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know what is written there. I am asking you: Is this figure of 7 million contained in the document or not?

SAUCKEL: It is the correct figure, and I am asking the Tribunal that I be allowed to read the two following sentences as well because you are accusing me of resorting to criminal methods. I, on my part, did all I could, and used all the influence I had, to prevent the use of criminal methods. This is proved by the two following sentences which I shall now read, and which state...

SAUCKEL: Please, may I add to the explanation I have already given, in accordance with the possibilities granted to me by the Tribunal, two more sentences in support of my declaration: “...undernourished half...”

GEN. ALEXANDROV: They have absolutely nothing to do with the question of the number of workers imported into Germany...

THE PRESIDENT: I have not got the translation of the document, so I cannot tell. I want to hear him read the sentences...

SAUCKEL: “...half-desperate Eastern Workers would be more of a hindrance than a help to the war economy.

“It is essential that all the government offices, right down to the factories concerned”—for these, I must add, I was not responsible—“should be quite clear on the subject, and that is my constant endeavor.”

I merely wanted to show my conscientiousness by those two sentences, and how sincerely I endeavored to carry out my task which was an extremely difficult one for me.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Defendant, will you kindly answer the questions and only give explanations when it is necessary to explain the answer. All you were asked was whether the figure of 5,124,000 in the first document was correct and whether the figure of 7 million in the second document is correct, and you said both of them were.

SAUCKEL: I have already answered that it is correct, that the figure of 7 million is given in this document...

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I can understand perfectly well that you are not interested in increasing these appalling figures even by a single point, let alone by several millions.

Yesterday you stated that in 1943, 2 million more foreign workers came to Germany, and in 1944 a further 900,000 persons.

SAUCKEL: I must definitely correct that. I did not say that, but it is true that from July 1942 until the end of 1943 about 2 million foreign workers came to Germany, not in 1943 only. From February 1943, for instance, until the end of 1943 only 1 million came to Germany because we were experiencing considerable difficulties at the time. But from July 1942 until the end of 1942 about 1½ million arrived, so that in 1½ years 2 more million were added to the first number which I mentioned yesterday.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is already known how many you received in 1942. Yesterday you stated quite definitely that in 1943 about 2 million workers came to Germany. Is that correct? I am talking of 1943.

SAUCKEL: If I am supposed to have said that yesterday I do not remember it, for it is not true; but the truth is that from about July 1942 until the end of 1943 about 2 million foreign workers were sent to Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: General, the Tribunal is not really interested in the exact number of foreign workers who came to Germany. It does not seem to us to make very much difference whether 5 million or 6 million or 7 million came there. It is extremely difficult to follow the figures.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not intend to determine the numbers of workers brought to Germany with mathematical precision. I do, however, consider it quite indispensable to realize the scale on which these crimes were committed. I would like the Defendant Sauckel to state definitely how many workers were brought to Germany during the war.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I just told you we do not consider it important. You say that you do not want to ascertain with mathematical accuracy, but we have spent a considerable time in attempting to do so.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: This can be explained by the fact that the Defendant Sauckel does not give a precise reply to the questions put to him.

[Turning to the defendant.] Tell me, do you consider such methods of warfare, the mass driving into slavery of millions of people from the occupied territories, to be in accordance with the laws and customs of war and human morality in general?

SAUCKEL: I do not consider slavery and deportation admissible. Please allow me to add the following explanation to this clear reply. Personally, I was firmly convinced that it is no crime...

SAUCKEL: I am not evading the question, but I may and I have the right to give an explanation of my reply; I have already given the answer.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not think it is necessary. Answer directly: Do you consider these methods criminal or do you not?

THE PRESIDENT: One moment, General, you asked the defendant whether he considered it honorable. Let him answer it in his own way. It is not a question whether a thing is honorable. He is entitled to answer it freely.

SAUCKEL: Now that I have given a clear reply to the effect that I could not be convinced in all conscience that I was committing a crime, I ask permission to read out the relevant sentences from Document Sauckel-86 in Document Book 3. They contain the instructions which I gave to my department and to the industrial concerns:

“We are not concerned”—I quote—“with material things but, and I would emphasize this again very definitely, with human beings, with many millions of human beings, every single one of whom—whether we want it or not—makes his criticism from his own point of view, be he a German or a foreign worker.

“On the other hand, the output of the individual, be he a Volksgenosse”—that means a German—“or not a Volksgenosse”—that means an alien—“be he a friend or an enemy of Germany, will always depend on whether he admits to himself that he is being treated justly, or whether he comes to the conclusion that he has been exposed to injustice.

“Be just”—I may add that this was my order to my departments—“Be just! There are many questions which you cannot always answer by merely studying my instructions, or the Gesetzblatt, or the Reichsarbeitsblatt....”

THE PRESIDENT: We do not want to go into a very long speech, you know, about a question like that. I mean, you do not want to read all your instructions to your subordinates again.

“The worker’s life is so rich that it cannot be comprised even in many thick volumes. But every human breast harbors a feeling which says to him, ‘Have you been treated with kindness and justice...’ ”

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, in July 1944 a conference was held at Hitler’s headquarters to deal with the question of the treatment of foreign workers in case of a further successful advance of the Allied armies. Do you know anything of this conference or not?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am asking you about the conference which was held at Hitler’s headquarters in July 1944. Do you know anything about this conference or do you not?

SAUCKEL: I cannot remember for certain. I must ask you to place some document before me. I cannot remember any meeting in July because from 20 June 1944, or thereabout, I was no longer admitted to the Führer for any discussions.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is enough for me. That means that you do not know anything at all about this conference?

Tell me, for what purpose, for what kind of work were the foreign laborers employed who had been imported into Germany? Is it correct to state that they were primarily employed in the armament and munitions industries?

SAUCKEL: Workers were brought to Germany for employment in the armament industry. The armament industry is a very wide term, and is not identical with the manufacture of arms and munitions. The armament industry includes all products—from matches to cannons—that have anything to do with supply for the army. It is, therefore, necessary, within this broad, far-reaching term, to limit or isolate the manufacture of arms and munitions.

Moreover, workers were brought to Germany for all other branches of civil economy essential to the war effort, such as agriculture, mining, skilled trades, and so forth. We made three distinctions: War economy, which meant the entire German economy in wartime; armament economy meant...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Defendant, we do not want a lecture upon that, you know. All you were asked was whether they were brought there for work in the armament industry.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I should like you to answer whether the workers brought to Germany were primarily employed in Germany’s war industries and for military purposes? Is that right or not? I mean in the broad sense of the word.

SAUCKEL: In the broad sense of the word, yes, including the entire economy in wartime.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then the utilization of imported manpower was subordinated entirely and fully to the conduct of the war of aggression by Germany? Do you admit that?

SAUCKEL: That is stretching the idea too far. My own views, according to which I acted and could only act at the time, excluded the word “aggressive.”

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please answer briefly if it appears to go too far. Tell me do you admit it or do you not?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your part as organizer of the mass drive into slavery of the peaceful population of the occupied territories is sufficiently clear. I should now like to pass over to the elucidation of the part played by the individual ministries in this matter. Please enumerate the ministries and other government organizations which directly participated in carrying out the requisite measures for the mobilization and utilization of foreign manpower. Mention has already been made of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, of the War Ministry and of the OKW, so that it is not necessary to speak about them again. Kindly enumerate the others.

SAUCKEL: On the plan, which has also been submitted to your delegation, Mr. Prosecutor, there are some small inaccuracies, inaccuracies made by the draftsman. I have not seen the completed drawing, but I took it for granted that the original drawing, as submitted to me, was correctly made by the draftsman. These small inaccuracies and deviations can be rectified, and the plan will then be unmistakably clear and offer the soundest explanation.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel has stated here that this plan is not sufficiently accurate. It is precisely for that reason that I ask you this question and request you to explain which ministries and other government offices played an immediate part in the mobilization and utilization of foreign manpower, over and above those which I have already indicated.

THE PRESIDENT: General, he says that it is substantially correct, and that there was only one minor alteration suggested in it. Surely that is sufficient for us.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, Sauckel’s defense counsel has himself stated that there are a number of inaccuracies in the plan. I will, however, endeavor to facilitate this task.

[Turning to the defendant.] Please tell me how the Foreign Office was connected with this matter.

SAUCKEL: The Foreign Office was connected with this matter in the following way:

It had to establish connections with countries where embassies, legations, or German delegations were acting. Negotiations would then take place under the chairmanship of the head of an embassy or delegation. The Foreign Office always made every effort to conduct these negotiations in a suitable way and in a proper manner.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 4 January 1944 a meeting was held with Hitler. This is Document 1292-PS. It is written in Subparagraph 4 of the minutes of this meeting, “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor must, before taking measures, contact the Minister for Foreign Affairs.” What did that mean in this particular case?

SAUCKEL: In this case it meant that if I had to negotiate with the French or the Italian Government, I would first have to get in touch with the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: After this meeting, which was held with Hitler on 4 January 1944—on 5 January 1944 you sent a letter to Lammers in which you related the question regarding the necessity for issuing a special directive as a result of this meeting, in order that all aid should be given you by the following authorities—I will enumerate them: The Reichsführer SS, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Field Marshal Keitel, the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Rosenberg, the Reich Commissioners, the Governor General, and others. Do you remember this letter?

SAUCKEL: I remember that letter; will you be kind enough to put it before me. I cannot, of course, remember the contents in detail.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: This means you considered that all these organizations were to participate fully, one way or the other, in the execution of measures for the recruitment and utilization of manpower. Is that correct?

SAUCKEL: That is correct and I ask permission in this connection to give the following explanation: It is obvious that I myself, in my office, could not do certain things without informing the high-ranking authorities of the Reich. It merely proves that I was attempting to work correctly, and not to interfere wildly within the Reich, or in other administrative departments.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I would like you to explain the following: When the Hitlerite government resorted to these criminal measures for driving off into slavery the population of the occupied territories, did practically all the government organizations of Hitlerite Germany—besides yourself—and the Party machinery of the NSDAP participate in these activities? Would it be correct to say so?

SAUCKEL: I protest against the words “driving off.” Please hear my defense counsel on the subject in rebuttal.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not a question of the words used. Answer me—is it correct or not?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the entire machinery of the German State participate in this matter or not?

SAUCKEL: In the—I might explain this. For the recruiting of manpower, that is in the registration according to German orders, it was the chief, duly authorized and appointed for this purpose at the time, of a territorial government, a Reich commissariat, or the like, who participated—for I emphasize that I was unable to issue any laws in that field and was not allowed to do so. I could not interfere in any government department; that is impossible in any government system in the world.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes. But you were obliged to co-ordinate the activities of all these representative organizations in Germany. That was the task assigned to you?

SAUCKEL: Not to co-ordinate, but to instruct them: and to ask for their co-operation where the case arose, if it came within their jurisdiction.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is not quite so. I did not wish to touch on this question, but I must revert to it now as you have somewhat minimized your part in this matter.

SAUCKEL: I request permission to reply to the word “minimize.” The distribution and direction of manpower in the Reich was my principal task. It included, with the German workers, 30 million persons. I do not wish to minimize this task, for I did my best to introduce order into this mass of workers, as dictated by my sense of duty. I do not wish to minimize anything. It was my task and my duty towards my people.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: We need not argue on this subject. It would be much simpler to consult the document. An order by Göring will be handed to you in a moment.

SAUCKEL: I wish—I must apologize to you if you have misunderstood me. I—I have no intention of arguing. I am only asking for permission to clarify my conception of duty with regard to this task, for it was the most personal task I had.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is quite apparent in this order by Göring of 27 March 1942. It is Document Exhibit Number USSR-365. It will be handed to you in a minute. I will read a brief excerpt from it, showing the powers you were endowed with.

“The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor for the execution of his tasks is given authority through power assigned to me by the Führer to issue instructions to the highest authorities of the Reich and to their subordinate offices, as well as to the offices of the Party and to its organizations and affiliated organizations, to the Reich Protector, the Governor General, the military commanders, and the heads of civil administration.”

That is what we read in Subparagraph 4 of this order. I believe, therefore, that on the strength of this order you were appointed Plenipotentiary General, with extraordinary powers, for the Allocation of Labor. Is that correct or not?

SAUCKEL: That is correct. I should like to add that this authority was limited to my own special sphere, and I take the liberty of reading the following sentence: “Orders and directives of fundamental importance are to be submitted to me in advance.”

Also I might point out that a restriction was imposed on my deputies later in the autumn. There is a witness who can make a statement to that effect.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not talking about your deputies. Your powers are only too clearly defined in Subparagraph 4 of Göring’s order.

Now, will you enumerate which of the defendants, at the same time as yourself, directly and in his own sphere of action participated in the execution of measures for the mass deportation into slavery of the population of the occupied territories and their employment in Germany. Name them in succession. Did Defendant Göring participate in all these crimes, as your immediate chief and leader?

SAUCKEL: I want to point out most emphatically that I could not possibly have been aware that entire populations had been carried off by means of lawful recruitment and service engagements based on legal decrees. I deny this. I had nothing to do with measures concerning prisoners, et cetera, but...

THE PRESIDENT: The question was, did the Defendant Göring participate with you in the bringing of foreign workers into Germany? You do not seem to me really to be answering it at all.

SAUCKEL: I was directly subordinate to the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich in the question of the introduction of foreign manpower.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: So the Defendant Göring participated in the execution of these criminal measures?

THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, when you want to ask a question of that sort I think it would be much better that you should not allege the fact that it is a crime. If you want to know whether the Defendant Göring took part with this defendant in the work that he was doing you can refer to that without calling it a crime; and then he perhaps will answer you more easily.

[Turning to the defendant.] Did the Defendant Von Ribbentrop participate in carrying out these measures on diplomatic lines, and did he sanction the violation of international treaties and conventions where the utilization of foreign workers and prisoners of war in the German industries was concerned?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, there again, these defendants are saying that there was no violation of international law; so the question you should put to him is: Did Von Ribbentrop participate with him in these measures as far as diplomacy was concerned?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am now asking what was the connection between the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and the allocation of labor, and I would like to receive an answer to this question from the Defendant Sauckel.

SAUCKEL: The part played by Defendant Ribbentrop consisted in holding conferences with foreign statesmen or foreign government offices in the occupied territories as well as in neutral and friendly foreign countries; and he considered it highly important that these conferences should be conducted in a correct manner and that the aim should be to obtain the best possible conditions for foreign workers.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I will question you about that a little later, when the question arises concerning the employment of prisoners of war in the German industries.

Please tell me now, what was the attitude of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner regarding these measures?

SAUCKEL: In this connection I met the Defendant Kaltenbrunner on one single occasion during a conference—the date of which I cannot at present remember—at the Reich Chancellery with Minister Lammers. I believe it was in 1944. Apart from that, I had no interview of any kind with Kaltenbrunner, nor did I reach any agreements with him on questions concerning the employment of labor.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yet the Defendant Kaltenbrunner placed police forces at your disposal for carrying out the recruitment of labor, did he not?

SAUCKEL: I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the recruitment of workers was no concern of the Police. I must ask my defense counsel to submit the relevant regulations, of which there are numerous specimens available. They prove quite clearly and unequivocally and irrefutably the division of tasks between the Police and my department.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the Police participate in the execution of these measures or did it not? I am not reproaching you now.

SAUCKEL: In my opinion the Police participated only in cases where the execution of administrative duties was rendered impossible in partisan areas. In White Ruthenia alone 1,500 local mayors were murdered by the partisans. This is seen from the document.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: But was recruitment, even in normal circumstances, not carried out by police methods? Did you know nothing at all about that?

SAUCKEL: I will tell you exactly what I know about it. There were in the occupied territories of Europe about 1,500 districts—here I mean areas or departments, the Feldkommandanturen, which we in German administration would describe as being the size of a Kreis (district)—and these 1,500 districts contained 1,500 administrative centers staffed partly by local and partly by German personnel. In addition to this personnel, in the territories of the Soviet Union alone, 1,000 Russian workers who were previously employed in Germany were acting as recruiting officers. Now if each of these administrative centers, which would correspond to a German Landkreis and have a population of 40,000 to 70,000 inhabitants, selected in a proper way, examined, and tested five persons daily, that alone would amount to 2 million people a year; a perfectly clear method of administration, such as I ordered, organized, and carried out to the best of my administrative possibilities.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You are giving needlessly detailed explanations in reply to these questions, and under such conditions the interrogation is being greatly prolonged. I consider it necessary that you answer briefly. You are perfectly able to do this, for I am putting the questions to you clearly.

SAUCKEL: I am trying to answer as briefly as possible. I regret that a specialized field is always difficult to understand and calls for explanations; I found it very difficult myself.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please answer: What part did the Defendant Kaltenbrunner play in the execution of measures on the allocation of labor? Did he participate in this or did he not?

THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. He said that he only met Kaltenbrunner on one occasion and that the task of the recruitment of labor was not one for Police. That is what he said.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is not necessary to multiply the number of meetings in order for Kaltenbrunner to have participated in the execution of these measures. He did not have to meet Defendant Sauckel frequently.

THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, I do not want you to argue with me. I have told you what his answer was. It seemed to be an answer to your question.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am not arguing. I am merely explaining the reason for this question.

[Turning to the defendant.] As far as the participation of Defendant Rosenberg is concerned, I shall not ask you any questions, as Defendant Rosenberg gave sufficiently clear answers when questioned by my American colleague, Prosecutor Dodd. Now tell me, what part did Defendant Frick play in the execution of these measures?

SAUCKEL: Defendant Frick, as Reich Minister of the Interior—I do not know how long he remained in office—scarcely participated at all. As far as I can remember I had discussions with his Reich Ministry of the Interior concerning the most necessary laws to be promulgated within Germany for German workers and the validity of those laws. Apart from that, he had no further part in this task; his work was quite different.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: We are discussing the question of foreign manpower. It was not merely by accident that you mentioned, in a letter to Lammers written after a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters on the 4 January 1944, that the Ministry of the Interior was among the government offices detailed to operate with you. That is why I ask you, what part did Defendant Frick play in the execution of these measures for the recruitment of labor? You yourself asked for the co-operation of the Ministry of the Interior. Then how was this co-operation to be expressed?

SAUCKEL: To my very great personal sorrow Frick was at that time no longer Reich Minister of the Interior, but Himmler—if I remember correctly.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What co-operation did you expect from the Ministry of the Interior?

SAUCKEL: It is, I believe only natural that in every form of government the internal and the general administration should be kept informed of events occurring and should participate as well, and so important a sphere as the employment of human beings calls for many ordinances. I could not possibly issue legal decrees, nor had I authority to do so. I had to submit them to the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich. I could only issue technical directions, and that is quite a different thing altogether.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were Defendant Funk, as Minister of Economics, and Defendant Speer, as Minister for Armaments, the principal intermediaries between the industrialists and yourself as suppliers of manpower? Is that correct?

SAUCKEL: The end of your sentence contains a very erroneous conclusion. They were not middlemen between myself and the industries, but the industries were responsible to the Ministry for Armaments. Of course there were personal instructions issued about this in the course of years. I did not negotiate with the industries. The industries asked for workers and they got them, as did the agricultural industries.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please tell me, what part did the Defendants Funk and Speer play in the execution of these measures? I do not want any long drawn-out explanations. Answer me briefly.

SAUCKEL: Those two ministers were heads of the various business enterprises inside German economy which came within the jurisdiction of their ministries. They received their workers, and that was the end of my task.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the Defendants Frank, Seyss-Inquart, and Neurath participate in the execution of these measures for the allocation of labor in such territories as were under their jurisdiction? I mean the territories of Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, and Holland. Is that correct?

SAUCKEL: These gentlemen, within the framework of their duties inside their own territories, supported me in issuing decrees and laws, and they themselves attached great importance to the proper and humane drafting of these laws and decrees.

SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you. I only met Dr. Fritzsche in Germany on one occasion—and that a very brief one—in, I believe, 1945, the beginning of 1945. I never spoke to him at all about my work, nor do I know whether he had anything to do with it. I can only state that I made repeated applications to the Reich Ministry for Propaganda to have my instructions and directives—as contained in the document books submitted by my defense counsel—widely circulated, particularly to the industries and other circles which received these workers.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: But one defendant is left—Bormann—and he is missing. What part did he play? He placed at your disposal the entire Party machinery of the NSDAP, did he not?

SAUCKEL: No, he did not. He placed the Gauleiter at my disposal. The instructions which I issued to the Gauleiter and the letters which I addressed to them—three of which are available here, and there never were many more of them—were to the effect that I was entitled to call on the Party for assistance in insuring the welfare, feeding, and clothing of the workers, and to see that they received everything that was humanly necessary and all we could possibly supply in view of existing wartime conditions. That was the role played by the Party, to the extent that it was asked to do so for me. Thus it was a form of control for the benefit of the foreign and German workers employed in Germany. Otherwise the Party had nothing to do with it. Incidentally, I did not much like interference on the part of outside offices.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is incorrect. I would remind you of your program for the allocation of labor which was issued in 1942. This is Document Number USSR-365 which states that the Gauleiter are appointed as your plenipotentiaries where the question of manpower is concerned, and that they will utilize this manpower.

SAUCKEL: Where does it say that? I could not appoint my plenipotentiaries myself.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You will be shown the document in one moment. I do not quote the paragraph, I merely mention the contents, the gist of the paragraph, where it states that the Gauleiter will use the Party organizations in the districts subordinate to them. I therefore assume that the Party machinery as a whole participated in the execution of these measures.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you found it: “The plenipotentiaries ... make use of their...”?

SAUCKEL: Yes, and I did this only for the purpose I have described. Will you be good enough to read on?

“The leaders of the highest departments of the state and of economy which are competent in their respective Gaue shall advise and instruct the Gauleiter on all important questions dealing with the allocation of labor.”

That means within the scope of their spheres of duty; and then the latter are specified:

“The president of the Regional Labor Office”—that is not a Party but a government department—“the Trustee for Labor”—not a Party but a government department—“the Regional Peasant Leader”—not a Party but a government department—“the Gau Economic Adviser”—now, that is a Party department...

THE PRESIDENT: Please observe the light, to be sure the interpreters are getting it.

“...the Gau representative of the Labor Front”—a department of the Labor Front—“the Regional Leaders of the Women’s League...”

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Everything is perfectly clear, you need not enumerate. I should like to draw your attention to Subparagraph VI. It clearly states that the Gauleiter, functioning as plenipotentiaries for the allocation of labor, will, in their own Gaue, make use of the Party organizations under them. Is it written there?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It next enumerates the methods by which this task was executed, also through what institutions and what authorities. I conclude from this subparagraph, which states that they will utilize the Party institutions under their control, that the entire organization of the NSDAP participated in the execution of these measures, and I wish you to answer “yes” or “no.”

SAUCKEL: No. May I supplement this reply of “no.” You, in your first reply, told me that my description was not quite correct. My description is absolutely correct, that the Party was employed to deal with the welfare of German and foreign workers and to see to it that they were properly cared for and supplied. The Party organizations here mentioned were only entrusted with this kind of task, and could have had no other; and I, a former workman myself, was eager that these workers, both German and foreign, should be cared for as well as wartime conditions allowed. Hence this employment of Party organizations and no others. Therefore, my reply was absolutely correct.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did the district leaders of the Hitler Youth also participate in the execution of these measures?

SAUCKEL: The district leaders of the Hitler Youth participated in order to protect and care for the young people as expressly required by Reichsleiter Schirach and later by Reich Youth Leader Axmann. Protection had to be provided for the young people against any danger. The Hitler Youth did this, including young people employed from foreign countries. I must expressly emphasize this.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you personally approve of the policy of the Hitlerite Government with regard to the deportation into slavery of the population of the occupied territories in order to insure the waging of a war of aggression? Did you approve of that policy?

I personally have said over and over again that I had nothing to do with either foreign or domestic politics; nor was I a soldier, I meant to say. I received a task and I received orders. As a German, I tried to carry out that task correctly for the sake of my people and its government and to carry it out to the best of my ability, for it was made perfectly clear to me that the fate of my people depended on the accomplishment of this task. I worked with this in mind, and I admit that I did my utmost to accomplish that task in the manner which I have pointed out here. I conceived this to be my duty and must acknowledge this fact here.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order to define your personal attitude to these crimes, I would like to remind you of a few of your own statements. These are taken from Document Number USSR-365. This document is a program for the utilization of labor in 1942, Page 9. You will now be shown the passage which I am about to quote: “I beg you to believe me, as an old and fanatical National Socialist Gauleiter...” Is it written there?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now we will go on to Document Number 566-PS. It is your telegram to Hitler dated 20 April 1943 which you sent during your flight to Riga. This telegram will now be handed to you and you will be shown the excerpt which I am about to read:

“I shall devote my entire strength with fanatical determination to the accomplishment of my task, and to justify your confidence.”

SAUCKEL: It is correct. I saw in Hitler, whom at that time I revered, a man who was the leader of the German people, who had been chosen by the German people; and I, as a German citizen and a member of a German government department, considered it my duty to justify by my work in my own sphere the confidence placed in me by the head of the State. I might say regarding this telegram...

GEN. ALEXANDROV: No explanations are needed about this telegram. I am not interested in your attitude towards Hitler. I am only interested in your personal attitude to those measures for compulsory labor which were carried out by you. It is essential to keep all questions within these limits. Now follows Document Number 1292-PS. This is a record of the meeting at Hitler’s headquarters on 4 January 1944...

SAUCKEL: I request the permission of the Tribunal to add a few words to your last statement, Mr. Prosecutor. I was unable to see a criminal in Hitler at that time, and I never felt he was one; but I did feel obliged to do my duty, nothing else. As a human being and as the result of my upbringing I would never have supported crime.

THE PRESIDENT: What was your question, General? Simply whether this was a telegram sent to Hitler?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I asked about the telegram, from which I have read one sentence into the record, in order to obtain a confirmation from the Defendant Sauckel that this telegram had been sent. I was not interested in anything else.

[Turning to the defendant.] The next document is 1292-PS. Have you got this document?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have already been shown the passage I am about to read. Your statement reads as follows: “GBA Sauckel declared that with fanatical determination he would attempt to secure this manpower.”

You were, at that time, speaking of the mobilization of 4 million workers. It says further: “He would do everything in his power to obtain the manpower desired for 1944.”

Did you say that? Is the statement correctly rendered in the minutes of the report?

SAUCKEL: I did say that, and I ask to be allowed to add the following to my affirmative reply. I knew that the German people, and they were my people, were in dire—may I add an explanation to my clear reply, stating why I answered as I did? I am entitled to do so.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, you accompany every answer you give with lengthy supplementary explanations. You are merely delaying the interrogation. I am quite satisfied with your reply; what you have told me is perfectly sufficient.

THE PRESIDENT: General, he has given a perfectly clear answer that he did say it, and I think he is entitled to give some word of explanation. It is perfectly true that his explanations are intolerably long, but he is entitled to give some explanation.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, if every answer is to be accompanied by such extensive explanations...

THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, I have said that he is entitled to give some explanation.

SAUCKEL: I knew that the German people were engaged in their most bitter struggle. It was my duty to carry on with my task with all my strength—that is what I meant by “fanatical.” I further explained, in another sentence, that I could not accomplish my task that year. As far as I was able to accomplish it in 1944 two-thirds were German workers, not mainly aliens but more than two-thirds Germans; and I was trying my utmost to put all German women to work, as far as they were capable of working, and in 1944 there were over 2 million of them.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In April 1943 in order to accelerate the deportation of manpower to Germany from the occupied territories you visited Rovno, Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhe, Simferopol, Minsk, and Riga. In June of the same year you visited Prague, Kiev, Kraków, Zaporozhe, and Melitopol. Is that correct?

SAUCKEL: That is true, and during those journeys I personally satisfied myself that my departments were working properly. That was the object of my journey.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you personally organized the deportation into slavery of the peaceful population of the occupied territories. Is that correct too?

SAUCKEL: I must protest against that statement in the most vehement and passionate way. I did not do that.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then why did you go to all these towns and inhabited places? Did you not do so in order to enforce the deportation of the people in the occupied territories?

SAUCKEL: I visited these areas to satisfy myself personally as to how my offices in these cities—I should not say “my,” but the labor offices of the local administrations—were working; whether they were conscientiously carrying out their obligations towards the workers; whether they were attending to medical examinations, card indexing, et cetera, according to my instructions. That is why I went to those towns. I negotiated with the chiefs in the matter of quotas, that is quite true, since it was my task to recruit workers and to check the quotas, but during my visits to these cities I inspected the offices personally to satisfy myself that they were functioning properly.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: And also to insure the speedy deportation of compulsory labor to Germany? Is that correct?

SAUCKEL: To employ the best possible methods for the purpose in view. That is indisputably stated in my orders, and the manifesto which has been submitted to the Tribunal was written on this very journey which you have just mentioned.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You specially visited these cities in order to improve the methods of compulsory recruitment? Have I understood you correctly?

SAUCKEL: I went to these towns to see for myself whether the methods were correct or not, and to discuss them with the departments. That is true, for it was not necessary for me to visit Kharkov, Kiev, or any other town to discuss my task in terms of figures. For that I would only have to talk to the reporter for the East, whose office was in Berlin, or with the Reich Commissioner—whom I did not contact as he was sometimes in Rovno.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In your statements to your defense counsel you declared that no cases of criminal or illegal methods of compulsory recruitment had ever come to your knowledge. Then what was the reason for such extensive trips to the occupied territories? Does it mean that some indication had already reached you that large-scale, illegal practices were taking place in the process of labor recruitment? Was that the reason for your journeys? You visited over 10 cities.

SAUCKEL: May I inform you, Mr. Prosecutor, while we are on this subject, that my defense counsel has already asked me that question and that I answered it with “yes,” and that, generally speaking, whenever complaints reached me I discussed them with Rosenberg, and that wherever a wrong could be righted it was righted. Please hear my defense counsel and my witnesses in this connection...

GEN. ALEXANDROV: The witnesses will be called on the decision of the Tribunal. I should now like to ascertain that you took those trips in order to improve methods of recruitment. I have come to the logical conclusion that in all these towns, prior to your arrival, a certain lawlessness had prevailed and crimes had been committed during the recruiting of manpower. That is what I am speaking about. And now will you give me a definite answer as to why you visited these places?

SAUCKEL: I have already answered that question in every respect. However, I would add that I assume that you, Mr. Prosecutor, have yourself had sufficient administrative experience to realize that in every department, anywhere in every country of the world, it is a matter of course that administrative orders should be checked. One does not need to know that mistakes are made in human life and in every human organization; a control must be exercised all the same.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: If you deny that you went there in order to improve conditions and to suppress the crimes perpetrated in the course of labor recruitment, then you must have gone there to accelerate the deportation of manpower into Germany. It is one thing or the other. Choose for yourself.

SAUCKEL: No, I must emphatically deny that. I undertook these journeys in order to satisfy myself, within the scope of my duties, how this task was being carried out, and to stop defects which were reported to me, as for instance—as I once told my defense counsel during my interrogation—I had also been asked to do so by Field Marshal Kluge. But I also wanted to look into matters carefully and myself give appropriate admonitions and instructions to the departments. My best evidence of this is the manifesto produced during this journey.

THE PRESIDENT: General Alexandrov, can you tell the Tribunal how much longer you will be?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am afraid to make an exact statement, but I should imagine about 2 more hours.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not losing sight of the fact, are you, that we have already had a thorough cross-examination by the French Prosecutor?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopes that you will try to make your cross-examination as short as possible, and the Tribunal will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, tell us what attitude you, as Plenipotentiary General, adopted toward the employment of Soviet prisoners of war in the German industries?

SAUCKEL: I must reply to your question by saying that I had no collaborators in the employment of prisoners of war, for I did not employ prisoners of war.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: And you never saw to their mobilization; you never registered them?

SAUCKEL: As the authorized mediating agency I had to have the administrative measures carried out through the labor offices, or the Gau labor offices, which served as intermediaries between the factories and the Stalags or the generals in charge of prisoner-of-war affairs, who in their turn supplied prisoners of war for the industries.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: And what were these organizations? What kind of organizations were they?

SAUCKEL: They were either the generals in charge of prisoner-of-war establishments in the military administrative districts, or the organizations of the industries, or the factories themselves. These worked through the respective ministries, such as the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, in which case the majority of the prisoners were billeted with farmers for work on the land or in war industries.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, you had nothing to do with it? I would remind you...

SAUCKEL: I had to include the labor offices and the Gau labor offices to the extent that they had undertaken to act officially as intermediaries, but only if they did not act directly between the factories and the Stalags.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote an excerpt from your report to Hitler on 27 July 1942. It is Document Number 1296-PS. In this report, Part III, there is a particular section. It is entitled...

GEN. ALEX ANDROV: III. It is entitled: “Employment of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War.” You write there:

“In addition to the employment of civilian manpower, I have increased the employment of Soviet prisoners of war, according to plan, in co-operation with the Prisoners of War Organization of the OKW.”

“I particularly stress the importance of a further increased and expedited deportation of the maximum number of prisoners of war possible from the front to work within the Reich.”

SAUCKEL: That is correct, and it corresponds exactly to what I have stated before.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You mentioned that you did not have anything to do with the employment of prisoners of war in the German industries and now, in your report, you give perfectly different data. So I am asking you, in connection with what I have read into the record: Did you not plan in advance the employment of Soviet prisoners of war as workers in the industries? That was provided for in your plans and your report covers that. Was that so, or was it not?

SAUCKEL: I must point out one fundamental error on your part. Labor procurement, the whole world over, whether operated by the state or by private individuals, is not an organization or institution which exploits workers, but rather which procures workers. I must establish this fundamental error. It was my duty to provide the necessary connection, so that prisoners of war in Stalags in the occupied territories—let us say in the Government General—could be registered by local generals in charge of prisoner-of-war establishments, for work contemplated in Germany in certain agricultural or other sectors, and then allotted accordingly. Employment of labor in factories was not under my supervision and had nothing to do with me.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, you participated in supplying Soviet prisoners of war for utilization in German industry. Is that correct?

SAUCKEL: That is not correct, according to my use of the German language, as I understand you. Rather, to act as agent is quite a different thing from utilization; concerning this, other gentlemen would have to comment. I can only speak as far as agency is concerned. In Germany this was managed by the State. In other countries it is managed privately. That is the difference, but I have never exploited anybody. As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor I did not employ a single worker.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know that the Soviet prisoners of war were being employed in the armament industries in Germany?

SAUCKEL: It was known to me that Soviet prisoners of war were being employed in the German war industry for this industry was vast and widespread, and covered the most varied branches.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted, in particular, with the directive of Defendant Keitel regarding the employment of Soviet prisoners of war in the mining industry? This directive is dated 8 January 1943. Do you know anything at all about this directive?

SAUCKEL: I cannot recollect it in detail. I have not got it. Will you be good enough to put it before me?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It clearly mentions the employment of Soviet prisoners of war in the mining industry for military purposes. Is that correct?

SAUCKEL: It refers to the employment of prisoners of war in the mining industry in Germany.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: But for what purpose? What purpose was it to serve? It is clearly stated here.

SAUCKEL: Well, as a matter of fact, the German mining industry did not only work in the interest of the war; Germany also supplied quite a lot of coal to neutral countries. It varied according to circumstances.

“For the execution of the expanded iron and steel program the Führer ordered on 7 July the absolute guarantee...”

GEN. ALEXANDROV: “For the execution of the expanded iron and steel program the Führer ordered on 7 July the absolute guarantee of the coal and means of production needed. For this purpose he has also ordered that the necessary manpower be supplied by prisoners of war.”

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus the Soviet prisoners of war were to be employed in the mining industry for the purposes of the war. Is that right? The fact is definitely established by this document.

SAUCKEL: Yes; it says so—I might remark that this document is not addressed to me.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I asked you whether you knew of this document. You said “yes,” did you not?

SAUCKEL: I am not acquainted with it—no; I do not know it now. I did not know it previously as it was not addressed to me.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You said that, broadly speaking, you did know about this directive and you asked me to allow you to acquaint yourself with it in detail. This is how it was translated to me.

SAUCKEL: No; I told you—and I should like to emphasize this—that I did not remember; I only asked that this document might perhaps be placed before me. The document is not addressed to me. The office to which it is addressed is clearly indicated and according to that it never came into my hands nor reached my office.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In order that you may fully understand this question, I shall give you Exhibit USA-206. That is your directive of the 22 August 1942 with regard to supplying manpower by means of importation from the occupied territories. Do you know about this directive?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: One minute, please. Unfortunately I have no information about the PS number. All I have is the USA Exhibit Number, which is 206. Defendant Sauckel...

THE PRESIDENT: Have the United States prosecutors got the corresponding number to USA-206?

MR. DODD: I could have it in a few minutes, Mr. President. I do not have it right at my fingertips, but I will obtain it.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Defendant Sauckel, Subparagraph. 8 of this order states: “This order applies also to prisoners of war.” Does it contain a reference of this description?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Therefore, you yourself did not differentiate between prisoners of war and the civilian population as far as their utilization in the German war industries was concerned. Do you admit that?

SAUCKEL: Yes, and I have already replied to my defense counsel, I think it was yesterday, that a catalog was given to me and the Ministry of Labor in general showing how prisoners of war might be employed. But this Paragraph 8 has nothing to do with this document, for that was an agreement or an order which did not come to me and was also not addressed to me.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, Exhibit USA-206 bears the following number: 3044-PS.

[Turning to the defendant.] In addition to those statements to your defense counsel which you have just mentioned, you also declared that, although employing prisoners of war in the German war industries, the requirements of the Geneva and Hague Conventions were nevertheless observed. Do you remember saying that?

SAUCKEL: Yes, and it is also proved by documentary evidence that in the Reich Ministry of Labor, and in my offices, the directive was issued and circulated that the Geneva Convention was also to be observed with regard to Soviet prisoners of war.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You did not differentiate at all between Soviet prisoners of war and civilian workers? Does that result from the foregoing?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In other words, a violation of these conventions occurred in the utilization of manpower, inasmuch as they, the prisoners of war, were treated by you in the same way as the civilians, and were utilized in industries for the purpose of waging war.

SAUCKEL: In that case, I must have misunderstood you, or you may have misunderstood me. I particularly declared that I did attach importance to it, and that it was printed and that during the time I was in office a special copy was published for the factories and the interested parties in which it was stipulated that the Geneva Convention was to be observed. I could do no more than that.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel questioned you in connection with the operation known under the code name of “Hay.” You answered his question as follows and I quote from the transcript: “Sauckel: No, I had nothing to do with these particular measures.”

I shall now hand you a letter from Alfred Meyer dated 11 July 1944. This is Document Number 199-PS. It is a letter addressed to you. Will you please study Subparagraph 1; it reads:

“Army recruiting staff ‘Mitte,’ hitherto stationed in Minsk, must continue its activities with regard to the recruitment of young White Ruthenian and Russian workers for military employment within the Reich. The staff has the additional task of bringing into the Reich young folk from 10 to 14 years of age.”

SAUCKEL: I have read the passage and my reply is that the letter, to be sure, is addressed to me, but only for my information, and I had nothing to do with those proceedings either in my office or personally. I have—that was—it has been mentioned already in the case of the Defendant Schirach—that was carried out within those offices, and the Allocation of Labor, as an office was not involved in it. I personally do not remember it.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What were your relations with the army recruiting staff Mitte? Was that your staff?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: The staff referred to in Alfred Meyer’s letter, staff Mitte, dealing with the employment of labor.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Right in the beginning of the sentence: “It is imperative that the army recruiting staff...”

SAUCKEL: The army recruiting staff Mitte is a term completely unknown to me. I do not know what it was, or whether it was a military or a civil office. It had nothing to do with me. I do not know it.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have testified here that the Reich Security Office had introduced special identification badges for people brought in from the occupied territories. For the Soviet citizens the badge was—can you not hear me?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You have testified before the Tribunal that for people brought in from the occupied territories special identification badges were introduced. For the Soviet citizens the marking was “Ost,” for Polish citizens it was the letter “P.” You testified that you were not in agreement with the marking. What did you do to stop this insult?

SAUCKEL: I persistently tried to avoid the identification markings altogether. But the Reichsführer SS categorically demanded—to the best of my knowledge there is a letter from him to that effect—that these foreign workers who, at my request, were free to move about Germany, should bear a distinguishing mark when they went out of their camps. It was no insult. I should like to emphasize expressly that I did not look on this as an insult.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: That is your point of view. Did you discuss the matter at all with your immediate superior, the Defendant Göring?

SAUCKEL: I can no longer remember today whether I spoke directly to Göring or not. I can only declare that I made repeated efforts to stop the practice, and that in the spring of 1944, in March I believe, my efforts were actually crowned with success and the small badge “Ost” was changed to a national badge on the sleeve, as had been suggested by liaison officers for the various peoples in the East.

SAUCKEL: I cannot remember. Perhaps I did; perhaps not. It was frequently discussed.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In reply to questions by your defense counsel and by my French colleague in regard to Speer’s attitude to your appointment as Plenipotentiary General, you mentioned that you did not know anything at all about it. You will now be handed an article from the newspaper, Völkischer Beobachter. This is Exhibit Number USSR-467 and I am submitting it to the Tribunal. This article was published on 28 March 1942 in connection with your appointment as Plenipotentiary General. It has even got your photograph, as you can see for yourself. Have you found the passage with the following statement:

“The appointment, at the wish of Reich Minister Speer, of Gauleiter Sauckel was also due to the extraordinary importance of labor allocation in the armament industry.”

SAUCKEL: I really cannot say so positively at this moment. It is however possible or probable. I did not have much time to read the papers then. But I should like to tell you very definitely, Mr. Prosecutor, that during my term of office I transferred over 5 million German workers from the most widely different branches of German industry to the armament industry. Therefore, it was a task which dealt principally with German workers and their transfer.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I was interested in something else: Why was Defendant Speer interested in your personal appointment as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor? That is what I wanted to ascertain. Can you tell me anything in this respect?

SAUCKEL: I cannot tell you why Reich Minister Speer was interested in my appointment. I have already told my defense counsel that I myself was surprised at the time.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Your defense counsel acquainted you with Document EC-68 during the session of May 29. This document deals with the treatment of foreign workers of Polish nationality. I shall not dwell upon the subject, since your defense counsel has already quoted the document in detail, and I will limit myself to your reply intended for your defense counsel, as it appears in the transcript of that session.

“Sauckel: First of all, I should like to point out that this document is dated 6 March 1941—that is more than one year before I assumed office.... Since this document, Number 4, has been submitted to the Tribunal, I must add supplementary documents to my case which confirm that I automatically destroyed all such unnecessary directives.... In such a case I could not have issued orders of this description to any government office in the Reich.”

Do you remember these depositions given at the session of the 29th of May the current year?

THE PRESIDENT: General, I am told that this is an incorrect translation. It was “revoked” and not “destroyed.” You said “destroyed,” did you not?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am reading from the Russian transcript and perhaps there are certain inaccuracies in it, but I do not object to replacing “destroy” by “revoke.” The meaning remains the same.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: No, I do not want to revert to Document EC-68. All I want is to establish what you said in reply to your defense counsel in connection with this document. You do not contradict your testimony which I have just read into the record? Does it correspond to the statement you made here on the 29th of May?

SAUCKEL: No. But I do not understand what the term “destroyed” has to do with it.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: We should not read “destroy,” but should use the word “revoke.”

GEN. ALEXANDROV: So you confirm the testimony which I have just read into the record from the transcript.

Now, tell us, do you remember the living conditions you imposed on the Ukrainian women and girls from the occupied territories, on those who had been mobilized for work in German agriculture?

[Turning to the defendant.] There is an addendum, Number 2, to your directive dated 8 September 1942. This addendum is entitled, “Memorandum for housewives concerning the employment of domestic workers from the East in urban and rural households.” Do you know this document? This memorandum?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote a few excerpts in order to describe the conditions which you imposed on those Ukrainian women and girls who had been sent to work on agricultural tasks in Germany. Please find Section B, “Registration with the Police, Identification, Supervision.” Have you found that section?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Section B, “Registration with the Police, Identification, Supervision,” contains the following instructions:

“The Eastern female worker is obliged to wear the identification badge ‘Ost’ on the right breast of each of her outer garments.”

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now Paragraph 4. It is entitled “Labor Conditions.” It is written there:

“Women domestic workers from the East employed in the Reich are under special working conditions.”

We shall see later on what these special conditions were. Please find Paragraph 9, Sentence 1, “Free Time.” The opening sentence states:

“No claim to free time exists.”

SAUCKEL: Yes, but I must ask you to read on. It says exactly the same as in the case of the German household staff, who also...

THE PRESIDENT: General, I do not think you should interrupt him when he is making a legitimate explanation. You should wait until he has made his explanation, and then draw attention to anything in the rest of the document that you wish to. Now, what did you wish to say, Defendant?

SAUCKEL: I asked for a further part to be read. There is a sentence in which it is stated a weekly outing can nevertheless be granted. May I read the sentence once more:

“Women domestic workers from the East may, as a matter of principle, only go outside the confines of the household when attending to household matters. However, on a probationary basis, as a reward, the opportunity may be given them once a week to remain outside the household for 3 hours without having work to do.”

The same also held good for German domestic workers at that time. Free time amounts to the same thing.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is written differently here. No free time was allowed them. It says:

“...as a reward, the opportunity may be given them to remain outside the household once a week 3 hours without having work to do. This outing must end before darkness falls, but by 2000 hours at the latest.”

So there is no mention here of a day off, but of 3 hours off. Now find Paragraph 10.

SAUCKEL: But I did not say that. Because of the blackout, this curfew applied also to German employees during the war.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Now find Paragraph 10: “Leave and return home.” That is the heading of this particular passage. Have you found it? It is written:

“For the time being no leave shall be granted. Women domestic workers from the East are recruited for an indefinite time.”

THE PRESIDENT: General, I think you can pass on from this. You know—this is not a matter of very great importance.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I should like Defendant Sauckel to explain the discrepancies which have arisen in his testimony with regard to Document EC-68, and with regard to what was written in his directive concerning the employment of Ukrainian women for domestic service in Germany. I wish to receive this reply in order to eliminate the discrepancies which have arisen.

SAUCKEL: This directive was not composed by me alone. Quite a large number of paragraphs were introduced at that time by the Reichsführer SS. Already as far back as the spring of 1943 I succeeded in having these paragraphs altered and the indefinite time of employment for the Eastern Workers was limited to 2 years. Furthermore, in a document which I believe my defense counsel will also submit to the Tribunal, it is proved that the removal of the restrictions applied to the Eastern Workers was the result of my endeavors. I tried to remove these restrictions in the very beginning, as I correctly stated in my first answer, so that the Eastern Workers stood on equal footing to other foreign workers and to the German workers.

That was my aim and my conception of my duty as I performed it. I was particularly glad to do this for the Eastern Workers as they were the best workers we had in Germany.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I now go on to the next question. On 18 August 1942 you had a meeting with Defendant Frank in Kraków. I shall read out what has been written about this meeting in Frank’s diary. That is Document Number USSR-223. In the diary for 1942, Volume III, Page 918, is written:

“I am happy to be able to inform you officially that we have so far transported more than 800,000 workers into the Reich.

“A short time ago you applied for 140,000 more workers.

“Over and above this figure of 140,000, however, you can next year count on a further number of workers from the Government General, for we shall employ the Police for recruiting purposes.”

Does that tally with the actual facts? Did such a conversation between you and Frank take place? Has it been correctly entered in his diary?

SAUCKEL: I cannot possibly confirm an entry which I have never seen before, and details of which I cannot possibly recollect. I therefore cannot say that all of it is correct. Those were future possibilities visualized by Herr Frank. I can, however, on the strength of the documents before me, say that the employment of Polish civilian workers...

GEN. ALEXANDROV: But did he speak to you about resorting to police methods in the recruitment of manpower, or did he not mention it? Do you remember this, or do you not?

SAUCKEL: I cannot possibly remember this communication which took place in 1942. Conditions at that time were so utterly different.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In his activities, where the recruiting of manpower was concerned, did Defendant Funk resort to police measures or not? Do you know about it?

SAUCKEL: I cannot, from my own knowledge, tell you whether the Governor General solved this problem by the employment of police forces or not. Please ask him himself.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am submitting a document to the Tribunal, Document Number USSR-469, which describes the methods of labor recruitment as applied in the territory of Poland. This document is an official directive, printed by the Kreishauptmann of the Minsk and Warsaw district. It is dated 2 February 1943. This directive was handed to Kazimir Navak, who was born on the 6 May 1926, and resided in Dyzin in the Kolbey community. It reads:

“Pursuant to the compulsory service decree dated 13 May 1942 Verordnungsblatt, GG, Page 255, I direct you to labor service in the Reich.”

“In case of insubordination...”

THE PRESIDENT: Is this a document you are putting in evidence now for the first time?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, it should have been handed to you. The document, Mr. President, is not included in the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you offering it now for the first time, or is it already in evidence?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Yes, I hear you, Mr. President. This document is being presented for the first time.

THE PRESIDENT: We do not seem to have it anyhow. I mean, I have not a copy of it.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: The original document has just been handed to the defendant, and he has got it. The copies in German were handed to the Tribunal.

“Should you disobey this compulsory service decree, the members of your family (parents, wife, brothers, sisters, and children) will be placed in a punitive camp and will be liberated only after you have presented yourself. Moreover, I reserve for myself the right to confiscate your personal and real property as well as the personal and real property of the members of your family. Moreover you, in accordance with Paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned decree, will be punished with confinement in prison, or with penal servitude, or with internment in a concentration camp.

“Kreishauptmann Dr. Bittrich.”

Did you know anything about the application of such methods for the recruitment of manpower in the territory of Poland and of the existence of Defendant Frank’s decrees?

SAUCKEL: I can openly and clearly answer that the threat of such penalties in this form was completely unknown to me and that I would never have mentioned it. If I had learned of it, I would have stopped it immediately. I must, however, beg permission to tell the Tribunal that this appendix at the end of the document, regarded as coming from my office, is incorrect, and was not sanctioned by me. The first paragraph of this document reads correctly and I request permission to quote it. It is in keeping with German labor legislation and runs:

“Pursuant to the compulsory service decree, Verordnungsblatt, GG, Page 255, dated 13 May 1942, I direct you to labor service in the Reich.

“Your employment in the Reich will be under properly regulated working conditions and your wages will be paid according to a regular scale. Wage savings can be transmitted regularly by you to your home. Close relatives, to whose support you have hitherto been substantially contributing, may apply to the labor office for special allowances.”

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I want to remind you now of certain directives which were issued with regard to the so-called recruitment of labor, directives which were issued by your government organizations in Germany, and personally by yourself in your own famous program. The document is Document Number USSR-365, and you wrote the following...

“It is therefore unavoidably necessary to exhaust completely the manpower reserves now available in the conquered Soviet territories. If it is not possible to obtain required workers on a voluntary basis then steps must be taken immediately to conscript them or bring in compulsion.”

SAUCKEL: I have not found these passages so far. They have not been pointed out to me properly.

SAUCKEL: I myself was not able to issue orders for compulsory service in the occupied territories; that had to be done by the district authorities. But by compulsion I did not understand that penalties would be threatened to the extent as stated in that one document signed by Bittrich, but that they would be in keeping with German regulations. That is a very substantial difference.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Was that which I have just read out to you included in your program or not?

SAUCKEL: It is in my program—but I have expressly stated that I was directed to do that by the Führer.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Let us proceed. In the letter of 3 October 1942 addressed to Gauleiter Meyer you wrote—this document, Number 017-PS will be handed to you in a moment. Please follow me when I read:

“I do not underestimate the difficulties connected with the execution of the new task, but I am convinced that with the ruthless employment of all means”—I should like to underline that ‘all means’—“and with the absolute devotion of all concerned, the new quota can be filled by the date fixed.”

SAUCKEL: I wrote that, yes. But I want you to let me give you an explicit explanation: In all my directives I invariably demanded the most considerate treatment for the workers; that has already been proved in the Trial. When I refer here to the ruthless use of all means, I only mean the ruthless use of all technical means and propaganda, because I had been told from different sources that such means were not available there to a sufficient degree. This is an explanation of what led up to this letter.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 31 March 1942 you addressed a letter to the Reich commissioners. This letter will be presented to you in a few minutes. It is Document Number USSR-137. Here you wrote as follows:

“I request that the recruitment, for which you together with the commissioners are responsible to me, be speeded up on your part by adequate measures, if necessary by the application of compulsory labor in the severest form, so that the recruitment figures may be trebled in the shortest possible time.”

SAUCKEL: That is my directive and I issued it. By the severest use of compulsory labor I meant no wicked or criminal measures, but rather, if it was necessary that it should be used, it was with reference to the number, the number to be made up.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote a few excerpts from the documents of other people. I shall begin by reading an excerpt from a speech by Defendant Rosenberg, Document Number USSR-170, which was delivered at the conference of the German Labor Front in November 1942. I shall quote a brief excerpt from this speech:

“...millions of Russians, trembling with fright, react in the same way...”

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

DR. NELTE: I should like to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the following fact: General Alexandrov this morning referred to Document Number 744-PS. First of all a document was given me which was described as a German translation. That translation contains things which are obviously impossible.

THE PRESIDENT: I haven’t got any note that he referred to that document. I don’t know whether he—did you refer to 744-PS this morning, General Alexandrov?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I referred this morning to the document in question. It was a directive of the Defendant Keitel, dated 8 July 1943, referring to the employment of prisoners of war in the mining industry.

DR. NELTE: Then the Russian Prosecution presented me with the original, that is the photostatic copy of a letter dated 8 July 1943, signed by Keitel. I now have two German versions before me. Not only do they differ greatly as far as the contents are concerned, but also the translation contains something additional which is not in the original, namely that to the heading of the letter, “Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht,” is added “Army General Staff.”

I do not want to delay you by reading the other incorrect translations, but I must assume that you have before you the texts in the foreign languages, which, as I see from the translation back into German, are incorrect. As this document, the original, is the evidence and is not being objected to, I should like to ask you to order that the translations in the foreign languages, which you have before you, be checked in order to find out to what extent they differ from the original document.

THE PRESIDENT: Had the document been put in evidence before? Had it been offered in evidence? Was it an exhibit?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that does not mean that it has been put in evidence. That only means that it is identified in that way. Had it been offered in evidence before?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I do not know the U.S.A. number of this document, but according to the data at my disposal I am able to state that it was submitted in evidence to the Tribunal. In the German copy, presented in the German language, it is written that the German translation was made on 26 November 1945 by Second Lieutenant of the U. S. Infantry, Fred Niebergall. As Dr. Nelte has discovered certain inaccuracies in the translation, I consider that the Translation Division should be asked to check these divergencies.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is the best thing to do, to have it checked by the Translation Division. We will order that that shall be done at once.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: [Turning to the defendant.] The transcript of Defendant Rosenberg’s speech will be handed over to you immediately. I shall limit myself to a very short excerpt from this transcript. Please read after me:

“Part of them imagine that the road to Germany is somewhat similar to the road to Siberia.”

“I know that if 1½ million people are brought here, they cannot be given the best accommodations. The fact that thousands of people are badly housed or badly treated is obvious. It is not worth while worrying about that. However, this is a very reasonable question, and I believe that Gauleiter Sauckel has already discussed it, or will do so. These people from the East are being brought to Germany in order to work and to endeavor to reach as high a level of production as possible. This is quite a reasonable transaction. In order to reach this production capacity one should naturally not bring them over three-quarters frozen or let them stand for 10 hours. One must rather give them enough to eat that they will have reserve strength.”

Does Defendant Rosenberg correctly describe the conditions in which the workers you brought from the occupied territories found themselves, or do you consider that Defendant Rosenberg has not described them correctly?

SAUCKEL: I cannot say and do not know when Rosenberg made this speech. I myself did not hear it or receive a copy of it. I can, however, definitely state that as soon as I came into office I made most extensive arrangements, so that the conditions which Rosenberg discusses here—and which can have nothing to do with my term of office—might be avoided under all circumstances. It was for that purpose that I issued those most comprehensive orders. To prevent such conditions I planned hundreds of valid and binding instructions of a legal nature, affecting every nationality working in Germany, which would make such conditions impossible. That is what I have to say to that. It cannot refer to conditions during my term of office.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I shall limit myself to this one single excerpt from the speech of the Defendant Rosenberg, and I shall not avail myself of the numerous documents already presented to the Tribunal, documents which confirm beyond all manner of doubt the criminal methods applied—with the full cognizance of the Defendant Sauckel—for the mobilization of manpower in the occupied territories and for the exploitation of the workers as slaves in Germany.

I shall only submit to the Tribunal one single new document, listed as Document Number USSR-468. This document is a worker’s identity card issued by the German authorities in Breslau to a Polish citizen, Maria Atler. This card is characterized by the fact that it is stamped on the reverse side with the image of a pig. Maria Atler has stated on oath that such worker’s identity cards were issued to all foreign workers in 1944 by the German authorities in Breslau. Together with this original document I am submitting a certificate of the Polish State Commission which quotes the testimony of the witness Maria Atler.

[Turning to the defendant.] Defendant Sauckel, have you looked at that worker’s identity card? Have you found the image of a pig on that card?

GEN. ALEX ANDROV: Did you know of the existence of such workers’ cards, stamped with the image of a pig as an insult to human dignity?

SAUCKEL: I did not have cards like that, and I knew nothing about it. I cannot quite make out what this image is meant to be. I have nothing at all to do with this. I am not familiar with such an identification mark on a card and do not know what I am to say about it. I do not know whether it was possible for some labor administration office to use such identification marks or not. I should like permission to see the original.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know of the existence of such cards and of their utilization?

SAUCKEL: No, I had no idea of the existence of such cards with images like that. It was not to my advantage, and I had no reason at all to offend such people who were working in Germany. I had no idea of that, and I do not know what this was meant to be.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall now quote a brief excerpt from Document Number USSR-170. This is a transcript of the minutes of a conference held with Reich Marshal Göring on 6 August 1942. I shall quote that part of the statement in which the Defendant Göring expresses his appreciation of your activities. I quote:

“To that I must say that I do not wish to praise Gauleiter Sauckel; he does not need it. But what he has done in this brief time to collect workers from all over Europe and bring them to our factories with such rapidity is a unique feat. I will say this to you all: If everybody in his own sphere would apply a tenth of the energy which Gauleiter Sauckel has applied, then indeed the tasks which have been assigned to you would be easily fulfilled. That is my inner conviction and not mere words.”

Did you hear such an appreciation of your activities from the lips of Reich Marshal Göring?

SAUCKEL: It is possible that the Reich Marshal said that. I cannot remember the details of a meeting that took place so long ago. What is correct is that I, as a human being and as a member of my nation, was obliged to do my duty. My documents prove that I tried to do my duty decently and humanely. I did my utmost to do that.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I now submit to the Tribunal a document listed as Document Number USSR-462. It is an article by Dr. Friedrich Didier, published in the Reichsarbeitsblatt of 1944. This is an official publication of the Reich Ministry of Labor and of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The article is entitled “Fritz Sauckel on his Fiftieth Birthday.”

I do not intend to quote this article as it is written entirely in praise of Sauckel’s activities, and there is no reason to dwell on it. I only wish to ask you, Defendant Sauckel, are you acquainted with this article?

SAUCKEL: I do not know this article. I cannot say what is in it. I was not always able to read through the Reichsarbeitsblatt—it wasn’t published by me. It is an old institution of the Labor Ministry which contains all the decrees published by that Ministry and also my decrees. The decrees in the Reichsarbeitsblatt all testify to my concern for foreign and for German workers.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then you will have to acquaint yourself very rapidly with the contents of this article. It will be handed to you immediately.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: It is an article in the Reichsarbeitsblatt entitled “Fritz Sauckel on his Fiftieth Birthday.” We are submitting this document for the first time as Document Number USSR-462.

[Turning to the defendant.] Are you now conversant with it? Tell us, does this article correctly characterize your political and governmental activity?

SAUCKEL: The author of this article is not an expert. I cannot make any further comments on the contents of a birthday article. It contains a very cursory description of my career and my sphere of work.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: And now, one last question. In your speech at the first meeting of the staffs for the Allocation of Labor, held in Weimar on 6 January 1943, you stated—and I quote from the third document book of your defense counsel, Document Number Sauckel-82:

“Now, where the foundations of our work are concerned...”—I skip the first paragraph and pass directly to the second—“We are true to our Führer and to our people. This loyalty justifies us in the execution of the harshest measures.”—And then, at the end—“In this respect I will assume ever-increasing responsibility.”

Tell us now, are you assuming responsibility for the enforced mass deportation into slavery of the population of the occupied territories, for the suffering and misery of the millions you drove into slavery, for the grim period of slaveholding which you revived in the twentieth century?

SAUCKEL: I am most grateful to you that you quoted this document at this very moment. Would you show me this document so that I can give the correct explanation of my views as contained therein?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: If necessary, your defense counsel will acquaint you with this document.

DR. THOMA: Witness, what was Rosenberg’s role, as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, in the execution of the Allocation of Labor?

SAUCKEL: The Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, in carrying out the Allocation of Labor, had to pass on my wishes and demands to the offices under him in that Ministry insofar as they related to my tasks. I cannot, of course, comment on the other departments in the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which I do not know.

DR. THOMA: Did not Rosenberg tell you repeatedly that he would give Reich Commissioner Koch directions to make use of his authority?

SAUCKEL: That is correct. It was one of Rosenberg’s tasks to give orders to Reich Commissioner Koch, who was under him, in every field of administration there.

DR. THOMA: So that the way you understood it was that he was to give him instructions. In what way?

SAUCKEL: Rosenberg did and should—as we had expressly agreed—give instructions to Koch to put a stop to any wild and objectionable methods which were contrary to my instructions; and that Rosenberg did, as far as I know.

DR. THOMA: Rosenberg, by referring to the authority of the Reich Commissioner, meant that he was to prohibit your recruiting methods and no longer permit your recruiting units to bring away Eastern Workers?

SAUCKEL: Rosenberg never said that to me, rather he denied it; for these commissions, while they were in the Ukraine, were subordinate to and part of the labor allocation department of Reich Commissioner Koch. Koch was the supervising authority and the administrative authority for such matters. Those are the undeniable facts.

DR. THOMA: May I point out to the Tribunal that a Document, Rosenberg-10, shows that Sauckel did not understand this statement of Rosenberg’s.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the re-examination of the witness by the defense counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg must limit itself to new matters which have been brought up and are the subject of argument. There was every opportunity, when his client was in the witness stand, to clarify these questions. At the time I wanted to clear up this question on my own initiative, but I was informed that I ought to ask Sauckel. He made a clear statement here, and in my opinion there is no cause once more to come back in this connection to documents which belong to a previous period of the defense. I object to such questioning.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, I think you had better go on and ask your next question. I have not got the document before me yet that you are putting to the witness, or referring to. What is your next question?

DR. THOMA: Witness, did you not in your program assume full responsibility for the Allocation of Labor?

SAUCKEL: I assumed responsibility, and I acknowledge it, for what came within the limits of my power—I cannot do more than that—and for what I ordered and for what I caused to be done. This collection of decrees, Dr. Thoma, has been submitted and was shown to Herr Rosenberg...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the defendant has been over this all before. He has been all through this before—about his responsibility.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I point out that regarding the question of responsibility, there is a certain paragraph—the decisive paragraph—which has not yet been read. It is Document 016-PS concerning the labor allocation program, and it says on Page 21, Figure 1...

“All technical and administrative procedure of labor allocation is subject exclusively to the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, the regional labor offices and the labor offices...”

SAUCKEL: Inside Germany, Doctor. Outside Germany I was, of course, subject to the competent chiefs of the areas in question. That is quite obvious.

DR. THOMA: In reply to that answer I draw the attention of the Tribunal to Page 15 of this labor program. This Figure 1, which I have just read, comes under the paragraph, “Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers.”

SAUCKEL: And may I point out that it was not possible for me to interfere with Reich Commissioner Koch’s authority. He had said expressly that he would not permit that.

DR. THOMA: Witness, the Delegate for the Four Year Plan gave you special powers concerning conscription in dealings with all authorities and, in my opinion, it is not right that you should now deny these methods of recruitment and pass responsibility for them on to the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the defense counsel for Defendant Rosenberg may engage in cross-questioning, but it does not appear to me to be the right moment for him to make a speech of accusation against my client.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am well aware of the facts that there have been two cross-examinations, and I have no desire to go on with another one. However, we do have one document that we think is of some importance and which was turned over to General Alexandrov, but I think there must have been some language difficulty. The translation of it was not presented. I would like the permission of the Tribunal to ask one or two questions of this defendant about it and to present it. I think it is rather important that it be presented.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal does not think that this ought to create a precedent, but in view of your statement that the document was supplied to General Alexandrov and that, for some reason, he did not deal with it, we will allow you to cross-examine upon it.

Witness, do you remember an occasion in 1942, just after your appointment, when you met with some officials of the Ministry of Labor and you discussed with them the program which you were about to institute and for which you were about to take responsibility? Do you recall it?

SAUCKEL: I cannot, of course, remember details of that discussion. Various points of the program were discussed, and I might also say in connection with the comments made by the defense counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg since what he has been quoting is...

MR. DODD: Just a minute, just a minute. I simply asked you if you remembered this meeting, and you said you did not, and now there is the document.

MR. DODD: I am now offering it. I was waiting to get the number from the secretary.

I will have to get the number a little later, Mr. President. I had not made preparations to submit this document, so I did not have the number in advance.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, I want to call your attention particularly to a few passages. You start out by telling the officials who were gathered there that you want to co-operate closely with them; and then, moving along, you give some idea of the number of workers whom you intend to recruit. You say there is an estimated requirement of 1 million; and you also made perfectly clear that day that you were to get most of your people, most of these workers, from the East and particularly from Soviet Russia.

You told these officials that you had talked for several hours with the Führer and for 8 hours with the Reich Marshal, and that you all agreed that the most important problem was the exploitation of the manpower in the East.

MR. DODD: Well, do you find where you say you had discussed your task with the Führer in a conversation that had lasted for several hours? Do you find that?

SAUCKEL: Mr. Prosecutor, I want particularly to point out to you the difference in German between the words “Ausnutzung” and “Ausbeutung.” “Ausbeutung” (exploitation) is a word which, in the language of the workers, has a rather bad implication, but “Ausnutzung” (use of) is quite an ordinary concept; to use something means making it useful. That is a great difference in meaning in the German language.

MR. DODD: Well, we will stand by ours and you may stand by yours, and the Tribunal will ascertain between the two of us who has the correct translation.

In any event, whether you said “use of” or “exploit,” you did say that the most important solution was either the use of or the exploitation...

SAUCKEL: But that is not the same thing, Mr. Prosecutor. In German there is a fundamental difference in meaning. I must point out that the word exploitation is a word which I did not use and did not want to use.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, would you speak a little bit lower. You quite drown the interpreter’s voice.

MR. DODD: I am not concerned with whether or not you agree with the word “exploit.” That is a very unimportant part of this document, as I think you probably already recognize.

SAUCKEL: I beg to contradict you. That word is most important from the humane point of view.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal is perfectly well able to understand the difference between the use of the words, and you have told us the translation you say is right.

MR. DODD: Now, if you move down a little bit, do you recall having said that 1 million Russians would have to be brought into Germany as rapidly as possible, to become available even prior to the offensive?

It is the next sentence or two there in your text. You won’t see it by looking at me. Do you read the next sentence?

“The necessary condition for taking on the task would be the assurance that Russians would be given approximately the same rations as have been in force for the German civilian population.”

MR. DODD: You have skipped the sentence that I want you to read. I know that one comes along, but I want you to read the one where you say you would have to bring 1 million Russians into the Reich as rapidly as possible, and that is the very next or almost the next sentence after the one you have been discussing, about the word “exploit” or “use of.”

SAUCKEL: Yes, I said that. I must say in connection with this that this is a record which I have never seen before or checked. Someone made it, but the record itself I was not familiar with, and it was never submitted to me.

MR. DODD: Well, I suppose it could be truthful even though you didn’t make it.

Let us move on here to the next to the last paragraph, and you will find a sentence which says or suggests:

“They”—referring to the Russians—“will have to be handled so roughly by the German administration in the East that they will prefer to go to Germany rather than stay in Russia.”

MR. DODD: Well, it is right after the sentence where you talk about your negotiations with Himmler. Maybe that will help you.

Do you find where you say you had negotiations with the Reichsführer SS? You succeeded in getting him to remove the barbed wire. Surely you have read that.

“They would have to be handled so roughly by the German administration in the East that they would prefer to go to Germany rather than stay in Russia.”

SAUCKEL: I cannot say that I used these specific words in speaking to him, for, as I have already stated, it is a record of statements of a problematical nature which I myself did not check, and I cannot be sure how a third person came to write this record from memory. These are not shorthand minutes; it is merely a record which is not signed by anyone and in which...

MR. DODD: I don’t think you need to give us any long dissertation on the fact that it is somebody else’s minutes. It is not offered to you as being your own.

MR. DODD: I wish you would wait a minute and let me put a question to you once in a while. I have not suggested that these are your minutes. I have merely put it to you for the purpose of determining whether or not on seeing it you remember it. And do you, or do you not remember it?

SAUCKEL: I certainly do not remember that passage. I can merely read here something written by a third person, and I do not know who it was. This person may quite well have misunderstood me; that is possible...

MR. DODD: Well, you also find you did have some conversations with the Reichsführer SS. Do you remember having said that, in the course of this conversation or speech or whatever it was that you were making?

SAUCKEL: The Reichsführer SS put me off on several occasions, and I had to insist to get the Reichsführer SS to remove the barbed wire fences. I did that. From the very beginning of my term of office I moderated the orders of the Reichsführer SS; and that, of course, caused vigorous arguments between us.

MR. DODD: Then that part of the minutes of this meeting is correct, isn’t it? The reporter, or whoever it was that took this down, correctly reported what you said about your negotiations with the Reichsführer SS, did he? You find no fault with that?

SAUCKEL: What he wrote down in detail about what I am supposed to have said I have not yet read.

MR. DODD: Now, listen. You read back and look at that paper at which you have just been looking. You find fault with the sentence that reports that you said they were to be handled roughly in the East, but you do not find any fault with the sentence ahead of it which says you had the barbed wire taken down, isn’t that so?

You seem to be complaining about the fact that this was somebody else’s report and not yours. Have you read it?

MR. DODD: Well, it is the sentence just before the one we have just been talking about.

MR. DODD: All I have asked you, Witness, is whether or not the sentence about your meeting with Himmler is a fairly accurate report of what you said. Is it?

SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you from memory. I very seldom spoke to Himmler and then only cursorily. It may have been negotiations carried out by my office on my order. That I cannot tell you.

MR. DODD: Well, your answer to all of this is, then, that you don’t remember what you said there; this doesn’t help you any to remember.

SAUCKEL: You cannot possibly expect me to remember exactly events which lasted very briefly and took place so long ago.

MR. DODD: I am perfectly willing to let it rest there. There is the written record against your failure of memory, and I will leave that with the Tribunal...

THE PRESIDENT: I think you should put to him the next paragraph, “Thirdly...” which follows after the sentence about handling them so roughly.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, if you will keep your finger on that place that you have there, you won’t lose it, and you will find the next sentence is—begins:

“Thirdly, he termed intolerable the wage rates previously decreed by the Reich Marshal, and has persuaded the Reich Marshal that Russians should have the possibility of earning up to one half of the wages of German workers.”

With reference to that statement, what had the Reich Marshal suggested, by the way?

SAUCKEL: Before I took up my office—and I have talked about that at length with my defense counsel—there existed decrees of the Ministerial Council regarding wage regulations, and I continually improved those wages—four times, in fact, as far as I could manage it, during my term in office.

THE PRESIDENT: That is not an answer to the question. The question you were asked was: What had the Reich Marshal suggested as wages for these workers? You can answer that.

SAUCKEL: The Reich Marshal did not make any suggestions to me. When I entered office I found regulations in existence which I considered insufficient.

MR. DODD: Well, tell us a little more about it. What do you mean insufficient? You used here the word intolerable. What was the situation when you came into the office with respect to wages?

SAUCKEL: I already explained that yesterday, during the examination by my defense counsel, and I gave as an example the fact that an Eastern Worker, when I came into office, drew wages of about 60 pfennigs per hour, which, after deductions for food and lodging, would leave him about 4½ marks in cash. I altered that after I came into office and doubled the cash payments. The purpose of the instructions which existed before my service was probably to prevent too great a circulation of money for reasons concerning currency. I do not know the details.

DR. WALTER BALLAS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): I am replacing Dr. Horn for Defendant Von Ribbentrop.

Yesterday in cross-examination you spoke about a French diplomatic organization, formed under the French Ambassador Scapini, for Frenchmen in Germany. Is it true that it was at Defendant Ribbentrop’s wish that this organization was formed?

SAUCKEL: At our mutual wish and agreement. We both had the same interests. That is correct.

DR. BALLAS: Can you tell me the reasons which caused Von Ribbentrop to create this organization?

SAUCKEL: The reason for this was, in my opinion, to bring about an understanding between the French and German populations by giving assurance that particular care would be taken of Frenchmen working in Germany.

DR. BALLAS: This diplomatic organization was also responsible for the treatment of French prisoners of war? Can you tell me for what reasons the German Foreign Office decided on so unusual an arrangement at a time when a state of war still existed between France and Germany?

SAUCKEL: There were conferences between the French Government of Marshal Pétain and the German Government, and both nations tried conscientiously to bring about an understanding.

DR. BALLAS: And because of that came these unusual measures concerning prisoners of war?

SAUCKEL: Not only because of that; I considered it a particular necessity, and I might mention in this connection that this organization was later divided or supplemented. In addition to M. Scapini, who took care of French prisoners of war in particular, a M. Broehne took special charge of French civilian workers.

DR. BALLAS: Is it true that Defendant Von Ribbentrop in the Foreign Office created an organization to bring into Germany from occupied countries artists, lecturers, newspapers, books, et cetera, for foreign workers so that these workers would return home well inclined toward an understanding with Germany?

SAUCKEL: It was the purpose of an agreement established by the Reich Foreign Minister in collaboration with the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, the German Labor Front, and my office, to improve the leisure time of the foreign workers by means of foreign artists and lecturers. Many Russian artists were in Germany for this purpose. It also had the purpose of bringing libraries and periodicals to these people from their home countries.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, in order to rectify an error in a chart in Document Sauckel-1, I just want to have the witness’ confirmation.

Witness, among the employers of labor you mentioned the departments of Minister Funk, did you not?

DR. SERVATIUS: And going down you find written in the third square “armament inspectorate,” and under that, “Reichsautobahn.” These two squares have been incorrectly put in. They do not belong there. Is it true that these two squares should be crossed out?

DR. SERVATIUS: I therefore ask that the chart be rectified by having these two squares crossed out. They belong to Speer’s Ministry, but I have not given any close attention to that side, and I do not wish to discuss it here.

Then, from the Buchenwald photograph album there were a number of pictures submitted which show the defendant together with Himmler.

Witness, can you tell from the picture the approximate time of that meeting? There are certain indications which you discussed with me yesterday. Will you briefly describe these?

SAUCKEL: Yes. The left-hand top picture shows that construction is still going on; I can see unfinished roadbeds and the like. This may therefore be during the construction period.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what can you say about the time from the dress of the various people?

SAUCKEL: The dress shows quite clearly that this is at a time before the war, for Himmler is wearing a black uniform which he never wore during the war. Apart from that he is wearing a sword, which was forbidden during the war. It is quite clear that this meeting took place before the war.

DR. SERVATIUS: And so I can conclude that this picture was taken sometime before the war?

SAUCKEL: Quite definitely sometime before the war, because I myself did not wear an SS uniform during the war.

DR. SERVATIUS: Document Number F-810 was submitted yesterday. That is a report about the meeting at the Wartburg. Beginning on Page 25 of the German text there is a report by Dr. Sturm, which was shown you and in which it is said among other things that there was collaboration between the Gestapo and the concentration camps and that that was the right road to take. You were asked whether that was your view too, and whether such collaboration was correct.

What did you understand by that? Do you mean that you agreed to the methods used in concentration camps, as practiced by Himmler?

SAUCKEL: Under no circumstances, I wanted to indicate that it was correct, as the document shows, that workers’ discipline should be enforced step by step, as provided for in cases of disobedience: First a reprimand, then small fines imposed by the factory, as laid down, in fact, in my Decree Number 13, which I want to submit as documentary evidence. Only then, after reprimands and small disciplinary penalties at the factory had proved inadequate, should there be further treatment of these cases, as is mentioned in the document, by having them brought to court by the public prosecutor. I called a proper penal procedure correct. By no means did I want thereby to characterize methods in concentration camps as correct. I was not at all familiar with these methods at that time.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I have a document, Number 1764-PS, before me. I have not been able to ascertain when and if it has already been submitted. I have just received it in the form of a photostatic copy. It is the so-called Hemmen report, a report which Envoy Hemmen made about a sector of the labor allocation in France. I want to read a short passage to the defendant which deals with the number of Frenchmen employed in Germany, and I want him to confirm it.

[Turning to the defendant.] Witness, I shall read you a passage and ask you to...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, it is not usual to allow documents to be put in re-examination. Why was this not used in examination-in-chief?

DR. SERVATIUS: The figures were questioned during the cross-examination, not before. I attach no great importance to finding out in detail how many hundred thousands came or went. I can omit this question and come back to it in the final pleadings.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal was not saying you could not use it now. As it arose out of the cross-examination, I think you may be able to use it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I should like briefly to read to you the relevant passage; and I want you to tell me whether the views presented there are correct.

Envoy Hemmen reports here, in a letter received at the Foreign Office on 6 February 1944, under Paragraph III as follows:

“Allocation of Labor in Germany:

“It started with the voluntary recruitment of workers which, up to the end of 1942, produced 400,000 men. During the first half of 1943 two further voluntary recruitments of 250,000 men each were effected. The first, by granting the privileges of the relève—which allowed leave for prisoners of war at a ratio of 1 prisoner to 3 recruits—or the granting of worker status, produced some 200,000; whereas the second could be carried out only by using the new compulsory service law, that is to say, coercion, and produced only 122,000 men.”

“As the total result of the Sauckel Action 818,000 persons all told, mostly men, went to Germany; 168,000 of them owing to the compulsory service law. Of all these there were only 420,000 still there at the end of January 1944.”

SAUCKEL: May I remark in this connection that the Envoy Hemmen at the Embassy in Paris dealt with these questions there, and they are given correctly. Finally, you meant to say 420,000 and not 420, did you not?

SAUCKEL: The decisive point is that because of the short term of the contracts, the French workers were changed every 6 months, thus only one half could be here at a time.

SAUCKEL: As an explanation I should like permission to tell the Tribunal that while there was a ratio of 1 to 3—meaning that Germany gave back 1 prisoner-of-war in return for 3 workers—both the prisoner-of-war and the French civilian workers who had replaced him for the most part had returned to their own country after 1½ years, as each stayed for only 6 months.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear some supplementary applications for witnesses and documents at 2 o’clock on Monday.

M. HERZOG: Mr. President, I should like to come back briefly to Document D-565, that is to say, to the photographs showing, the Defendant Sauckel at the Concentration Camp of Buchenwald.

The Prosecution has never claimed, and does not claim now, that these photographs date from a period during the war. Quite the contrary, the original, which has been shown to you, has the date of these photographs and the year is 1938.

The defendant, when he was examined by his counsel, told us that he visited Buchenwald in the company of Italian officers. I do not see a single Italian officer in these photographs; I simply see the Reichsführer SS Himmler.

However, I do not dispute, and I never claimed that these photographs dated from a year other than 1938.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I have one last question in connection with Exhibit Sauckel-82 from Document Book Sauckel 3, Page 206 and following. On Page 207 we find a statement under Number 3 which I should like to put to the defendant again, because the prosecutor for the Soviet Union has stated that Sauckel declared here that he gave no protection against crime. I should like to read the sentence to the defendant again and ask him for an explanation. I myself have already quoted it once before; apparently there is a misunderstanding. It is a very short sentence; it reads: “You can demand of me every protection in your labor area, but no protection for crimes.”

SAUCKEL: On the contrary, it can be seen very clearly from that document that I did not tolerate any crime. I would not protect these people, who were not subordinate to me, if they committed crimes there. They were not to do that; that was what I prohibited...

DR. SERVATIUS: I believe that the German shows very clearly that this explanation, as the defendant has just given it, is correct.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Sauckel, I want to ask you a number of questions. And will you try to speak a little more quietly, and will you listen carefully to the questions and try to make your answers responsive to the questions?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, first, I am going to ask you a little bit about your personnel. You had one large central office, I take it, did you not—one large central office?

SAUCKEL: In this personnel office, Your Honor, there were two personnel experts; a Ministerialrat, Dr. Stothfang; a Landrat Dr....

SAUCKEL: Two higher officials and about eight middle and lower officials as assistants and registrars.

SAUCKEL: The inspectors belonged to Department 9 of the Reich Ministry of Labor which had been installed there. That was a special department which was established in the Reich Ministry of Labor at my request, with higher officials who...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now the inspectors worked, I suppose, under your instructions and reported to you, did they?

SAUCKEL: The inspectors reported first to Department 5 in the Reich Ministry of Labor. I was informed in important cases. The inspectors had the right and the duty to correct bad conditions on the spot when they were confirmed in the labor administration.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): One moment, Defendant. Just listen to the question. I said how many inspectors in all the inspection offices were there?

SAUCKEL: From my own knowledge I cannot say how many there were in the Labor Front. The extent of inspection offices in the Labor Front would have been a matter for Dr. Ley to explain. That I do not know in detail.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, do you know about how many inspectors were working to inspect the labor work. You must know about how many were there, don’t you?

SAUCKEL: I cannot give you accurate figures, but it may have been approximately 60 or 70, if you take all of them together including those of the German Labor Front.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, did they go outside of Germany, or did they work only in Germany?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And they would inspect such matters as food and travel and conditions of the camps, and so on, would they not?

SAUCKEL: No. According to an agreement the reports had to be sent to the highest competent Reich authorities for bad conditions to be corrected. For bad conditions in industry and in camps the competent authority was the Industrial Inspectorate under Reich Minister of Labor Seldte. That was the highest...

SAUCKEL: Complaints were also brought to me, but I could do nothing but send them back to the competent offices and ask that everything be done to remedy the conditions; and that is what I did.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did the inspectors’ reports come to you, any of the inspectors’ reports?

SAUCKEL: The reports did not come to me directly; they went through channels to those offices which were concerned with correcting such abuses.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, I am asking you not whether they came directly; but did they come to you eventually? Did you get them? Did you see them?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So you do not know what the conditions were then, since you did not get the inspectors’ reports, is that right?

SAUCKEL: Four times or twice a year I also sent my assistants and these inspectors in person to the Gauleiter in the German Gaue, and I received reports on what they discussed during these private conferences with the regional offices and on what they inspected and observed. There was nothing of a catastrophic nature, merely shortcomings in the execution of the directives which I had issued. I was informed about things of that sort...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So you are telling us that you never got any reports or complaints of a catastrophic nature; is that right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You never got any reports or complaints of what you call a catastrophic nature; is that right?

SAUCKEL: Within Germany—I received reports and complaints such as I described to my counsel from Field Marshal Kluge, or else they were made known to me in discussions with Rosenberg. Immediately I took the necessary measures. But that was not frequently the case...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, if you would listen to the question and try to answer it, I think we would get along much faster. You used the expression “catastrophic nature”; those were your words. Did you get any reports of a catastrophic nature?

SAUCKEL: I learned through Field Marshal Kluge, and through reports, which have been mentioned here, from Rosenberg, about a few cases which I considered catastrophic and tried to correct.

SAUCKEL: There was the case in the East which Field Marshal Kluge reported to me, where motion picture houses were surrounded by recruiting agents. I considered that catastrophic. The second case was the case of the returning transport, where according to the report—it is called the later report, but I do not remember the number of the document—children are said to have died on the way and been placed outside the train. I considered that catastrophic. But there could...

SAUCKEL: I received complaints about Koch at times from the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Rosenberg, and also from another source. Koch, of course, always defended himself very vehemently.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then you had complaints from several people about Koch?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the complaints said what Koch was doing, did they?

SAUCKEL: I did not receive complaints from many sides about Koch, but rather from one side...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait. Won’t you answer the question? I did not ask you if you have received many complaints. I said, “The complaints said what Koch was doing.” Is that right?

SAUCKEL: As far as my field of work was concerned, when I received complaints such as have been discussed here, I called a conference in my office. That was the case immediately after the complaints from Rosenberg, and on that occasion I adopted the attitude which my defense counsel cited and pointed out with respect to the conference of 6 January 1943.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And the Koch matter ended after the conference, I take it? That was all you did?

SAUCKEL: As far as I was concerned, I personally pointed out to the Führer on several occasions that I considered it quite out of the question to treat the Eastern Workers and the people in the East badly; and by means of the decrees which I issued continually, and which are contained in my documents, I did whatever I could to protect them. I ask...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I have asked you about your central office. Did you have any branch offices?

SAUCKEL: No, I had no branch offices. Two departments of the Ministry of Labor, 5 and 6, were put at my disposal for the carrying out of my tasks of an administrative and technical nature.

SAUCKEL: There business matters of an administrative nature were carried on. I ask...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. Now, were the recruitment offices in the Ministry of Labor?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. But under what office? What administration? What department?

SAUCKEL: The departments for labor were themselves incorporated in the administration of these territories. That can be seen very clearly from my Decree 4, for that had been done in the same manner before I came into office. They were integral parts of the local administration.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of the local administration? When you mentioned the 1,500 district offices, were those the recruitment offices?

SAUCKEL: Those were the offices in all the various territories which represented these various administrations on the lowest level, as I have just mentioned.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You do not answer the question. I asked you whether they were recruiting offices. Were they recruiting offices?

SAUCKEL: They were not only recruiting offices, they were the offices of the territorial labor administration on the lowest level.

SAUCKEL: I understand that that was one and the same thing. The recruitment was carried on according to German principles as part of the administration. Outside the administration recruitment could not be carried on.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): They were recruiting offices, then? The answer is “yes,” is it not? They were recruiting offices?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. You should have said that in the beginning. That is what I wanted to know. Now, I want to know the relation of your offices to the Party offices. The Gaue and the Gauleiter worked in co-operation with you as plenipotentiaries, working with you, did they not?

SAUCKEL: No, Your Honor, that is a mistake. The Gauleiter had nothing to do with recruiting, that was...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, wait. I said nothing about recruiting. I asked you the relation of your offices to the Gauleiter. The Gauleiter co-operated with you in the general program, did they not?

SAUCKEL: Not in the general program, Your Honor; only in the program of caring for German and foreign workers.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see. The Gauleiter, then, had nothing to do with recruiting; is that right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right? They looked after the care and comfort of the men who were recruited, is that right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did the Gaue outside the Reich in the occupied territories also work for you, or do you consider that they were part of the Reich?

Let me ask the question again. I do not think it is very clear. Certain of the occupied territories had been incorporated into the Reich, had they not?

SAUCKEL: In the East only the territories Wartheland and West Prussia were incorporated into the Reich...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now again I am not asking you the number that was incorporated; I just said certain of the occupied territories, certain parts of them, were incorporated into the Reich. Is that right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, and when you say the Gauleiter in the Reich, that includes, does it not, the Gauleiter in those territories which had been incorporated into the Reich; is that right?

SAUCKEL: Yes, but in this case they could not function in their capacity as Gauleiter, but only if they were Reichsstatthalter, that is, only if they had a state administration under them. These were two entirely separate institutions with different personnel.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Did each Gauleiter have a labor office connected with his Gau, in his Gau?

SAUCKEL: May I ask if you mean all German Gaue, or only those Gaue of which we have just spoken, Your Honor?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I mean only the Gaue of which we have spoken. They each had a labor office, had they not?

SAUCKEL: They had a labor administration at the head of which there was a Gau labor president.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That’s right. That is enough. Now, do you know the organization of the Gau in the labor administration? Did they also have a Kreisleiter who attended to the labor work?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I take it there were no Ortsgruppenleiter that worked on the labor program, then?

SAUCKEL: No, that was not the case; rather that was a strictly separate administrative concept...

Now I would like to know a little bit about what you call this private recruitment. Who appointed the agents who were to do private recruiting? Who appointed them? Did the employers hire agents to get workmen for them?

SAUCKEL: Only in one case: In the year 1944 in France and in part in Belgium, by way of exception, I permitted agents to act on the basis of agreements with these French organizations.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Again, Witness, I did not ask you that at all. You do not listen. I said: Who appointed these agents that worked as private recruiting agents? Who appointed them?

SAUCKEL: In those countries, the commissioner for labor allocation appointed them—I myself could not appoint them—together with the French organizations. That was an understanding, not a set appointment...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see. And they would be paid on, I think you said, a commission basis; is that right? They would be paid, in other words, so much per workman? Every workman they brought in, they would get a fee for that; is that right?

SAUCKEL: Yes. I do not know the details myself any more, but for the most part that is correct.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, I take it when you used the word shanghai, which you referred to and explained, that simply means private recruiting with force. That is all it means, is it not?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, wait a minute. Can you shanghai a man without using force? You do not mean that you shanghaied them by persuasion? Did you?

SAUCKEL: Yes, for I wanted to recruit these French associations in just this voluntary, friendly way, over a glass of beer or wine in a café, and not in the official offices. I don’t mean shanghai in the bad sense as I recall its being used from my sailor days. This was a rather drastic expression, but not a concrete representation of the actual procedure. Never, Your Honor, in France or anywhere else, did I order men to be shanghaied, but rather...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I know you did not order it. That was not my question. You mean that “shanghai” just meant that you had a friendly glass of wine with a workman and then he joined up? Was that what you meant?

SAUCKEL: I understood it in that way. I described it to the Central Planning Board in a somewhat drastic form in order to answer the demands made of me with some plausible counterarguments as to the efforts I was making.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why did you object to this private recruitment? What was the objection to it?

SAUCKEL: In this case I did not object, but it was contrary to German ideas concerning the procurement of labor. According to German principles and...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you that. I am not interested for the moment in your convictions. I said: Was it contrary to German law? It was, wasn’t it, against law?

SAUCKEL: It was in general contrary to the German labor laws. As far as possible no private recruitment was to take place. But may I say as an explanation, Your Honor, that after the workman had been won over, he nevertheless entered into an obligation on the basis of a state contract. Thus it must not be understood to mean that the worker in question came into the Reich without a contract approved by the state; a contract was granted to him just as it was to all others.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean, a laborer that was shanghaied by private agents had the same rights, once he was in the employment, as anyone else; is that what you mean?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right. Now I am going to come to another subject for a moment. I simply want to understand your defense and what your point of view is. Now see if this is correct. You did no recruiting yourself. The Police did no recruiting. Your main job was, in the first place, to see that everything was done lawfully and legally. Was not that right, that was your important function?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In order to do that you had to arrange to have the proper laws passed so as to have the recruiting done under the law; that is right, isn’t it? That was your job?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes. And very often those laws—by the way, those laws were simply decrees, of course. They were just orders that were signed by the Führer, or by you, or by some of the ministers. When you say laws, you mean, of course, decrees?

SAUCKEL: The laws in the occupied territories for the recruitment of manpower had to be decreed by the Führer and issued by the chiefs in the territories.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What I mean is, in order to make this use of foreign labor lawful, you simply had to get certain decrees signed; that was part of your duty, to get them signed? Now...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I understand that. I did not say you signed them. I understand that. You have explained that in great detail. Now let us see where the Police came in. They had nothing to do with the recruiting. Once a decree was signed, it became law, did it not? When a decree was signed, it was law?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And if any man resisted being brought in as a workman, or did not register, or did not live up to his contract, he became a criminal. That is right, isn’t it?

SAUCKEL: In this case he violated the law. We did not call it a crime, but rather an offense.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You mean he did not commit a crime? Did he or did he not commit a crime? Supposing a man failed to register when he was told to register for work, was that a crime?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And then when he committed this, he was then turned over to the Police. Is that right?

SAUCKEL: Not immediately; in the preliminary proceedings he was told by the local labor office to appear and to report and...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, you explained all that. He got 3 or 4 days, and then if he did not finally register, for the offense he was turned over to the Police? Is that right?

SAUCKEL: How that was actually handled in the various territories I cannot say. It differed greatly, and was in part very lax.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You told us already in your cross-examination that if a man broke the law that was when the Police came in. The Police were there simply to see that the law was not broken. That is right, isn’t it? That was their function?

SAUCKEL: No, that was not my task; that was the task of the service authorities.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, why do you always say, “it was not my task”? I did not ask you if it was your task. I am just talking about the Police; I am not talking about you. Now when those labor decrees were violated, then it was, at a certain time, that the Police began to function. Isn’t that right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Good. Or after the men—let us say in Paris—were rounded up, if they offered physical resistance, then the Police had to be called in, had they not? If there was physical resistance you had to call in the Police, had you not?

SAUCKEL: Yes, but I can say that that was hardly ever reported to me. In most cases the men were then released. It can be clearly seen from the lists of the workers’ transports—for instance, in the year 1944—that of a large program not even 10 percent came to Germany. Then there was nothing else for us to do but to shanghai.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Please don’t go on. You have given all that evidence before. I just want to get a picture of the whole system. Now the Army. I think you said the role the Army played was where there had been sabotage or resistance in the occupied territories the Army would have to clean that out, so that the labor administration could work. That would be right, wouldn’t it?

SAUCKEL: In so-called resistance areas in which the administration was handicapped by resistance movements, not only in the field of labor allocation but also in other directions, and the public safety of German troops could no longer be guaranteed.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am not interested in other functions. I am interested particularly in the field of manpower at this time. So that, for instance, in Poland or Russia, where it was impossible to recruit people on account of the resistance to the recruiting or the resistance to the Army, the Army would go in and help with the recruiting. It would not be unfair to say that, would it?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right. Now, by the way, did any of these workmen who resisted or who broke the law or who did not register after 3 days, were they ever tried by a court, or were they simply handled by the Police if necessary? They were never tried by court, were they?

SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you in detail or in general. Probably there were various ways of handling that. I do not know the details.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, let us get that in particular. Did any of your decrees provide for trial by a court of such persons?

SAUCKEL: No, my decrees did not do that. I was not authorized to issue such decrees within the territories with regard to court proceedings, because I was not the competent regional authority.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. I am not very clear on this picture of camps. Let us look at that for a moment. There were what you called, I think, distribution or transition camps, were there not?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, of course not; but do you think there were more than a hundred?

SAUCKEL: I assume that perhaps in the Reich there were 30 or 40 transition camps.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And were those transition camps also in the occupied territories, or in France?

SAUCKEL: In the occupied territories? Whether there were any transition camps in France and, if so, how many, that I cannot say. In the West, along the border, there were reception stations; and in the East, along the border, there were transition camps which had as their purpose an additional physical examination, delousing of clothing, and...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think that is enough. I think you have answered that enough. Now there were also what you called the labor training camps. Do you remember, you said there were also labor training camps?

SAUCKEL: No. I cannot tell you even approximately how many because I have never received a list. They were not under me.

SAUCKEL: They were subordinate exclusively to the Police, that is, as far as I know, to Gruppenführer Müller.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And I presume that they were staffed and officered by the SS, as were the other concentration camps?

SAUCKEL: I have to assume that also, but I cannot say definitely because I have never seen any such camps.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): To the Police. Now who went to the labor training camps? Who was sent to them?

SAUCKEL: As far as I know—I heard very little about that—people were sent there who in a number of cases had committed violations of the labor regulations, or of discipline in the factories, and so on.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right. That is fine. Thank you very much. That is all I want to know about that point. In other words, people who did not turn up for registration, or who broke their contracts, were sent for training. Now what was the training? What does that mean, “training”? How are you trained?

SAUCKEL: That I cannot tell you. I assume that they had to work. A period of time was provided of from about 8 days to 56 days, I believe; I cannot say exactly. I also heard about that in this courtroom for the first time.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, let us get a little more light on that subject. You see, you were after all, were you not, Plenipotentiary, so you must have known something about these matters. There were labor camps as well as labor training camps, were there not?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I will distinguish. Let me ask you the question. The labor camps were camps where workmen were sent and housed who were working in industry; isn’t that right? They were simply camps where workmen were housed and lived. Is that right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is right; and labor training camps were different from the labor camps, weren’t they?

SAUCKEL: They were basically different. The labor training camps were an institution of the Reichsführer SS; the labor camps, in which they lived, were set up by the factory or group of factories where the workers were employed.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So when a man was sent to a labor training camp, he was not sent simply to labor; he was being punished, wasn’t he, for having broken the law? That must be right, is it not?

SAUCKEL: To my knowledge, he came to a labor training camp in order to be trained to be punctual at work, and at the same time it was a punishment for his offenses at the factory.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were there any decrees with respect to the labor training camps, any regulations?

SAUCKEL: I know of no regulations. They had to be issued by the Reichsführer SS, by the Chief of Police. I issued no regulations.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So, although part of your duty was to look after the foreign laborers who were brought over here, that stopped after they were turned over to the Police, and you had no more jurisdiction; is that right?

SAUCKEL: That is right; but in one respect I have to correct that. I did not have the task of looking after the workers; I merely had the task of getting workers for the industries. The supervision of the camps and the care of the workers was in no way my task. I have...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Stop, Defendant, we clearly understand that. You had practically no executive functions, but you repeatedly said that you passed decrees—by the hundreds, you said—for improving the condition of the men. Now, we know that you didn’t have the job to feed them or to house them; but you did have one of your main jobs—one of your main jobs was to try to keep them in as good condition as possible, and that was the reason you were interested in any complaints. We all understand that, don’t we? That is correct? One of your functions was to do that, wasn’t it?

SAUCKEL: I had taken over this task; it was not one of the duties with which I had been entrusted. The complaints with which I was confronted every day were to the effect that there were not enough workers available. My task was the direction and the acquisition of workers, but in my own interest I pointed out the necessity of caring for the workers and keeping them in good condition.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see, that was a voluntary job on your part. It was not part of your duty, but nevertheless you did it. But, now, let me come a little bit to the workers themselves. I think we are very clear, or comparatively so, as to the numbers that were brought in. I want to know how many were voluntary and how many were involuntary. Now, before you answer that, I mean those workers who were brought in, not under law, but simply who volunteered for work of their own accord. There were not very many of those, I suppose, were there?

SAUCKEL: Yes, there were a great many workers who volunteered without legal compulsion, as the result of propaganda and recruitment and because of the fact that in Germany wages and such things were comparatively high and regulated. There were a great many workers...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, let us take a look at that. There came a time when the laws applying to German workers were applied to workers for foreign countries; is that not true?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I mean, every German had to work, had he not, under the law? Right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And that law was finally applied to foreign workers as well, as you just said. Right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. For everyone alike. So that after that law was introduced, there was no such thing as voluntary work because after that law was introduced everyone had to work, had they not?

SAUCKEL: Yes, as far as demands were made for them in the occupied territories and elsewhere, according to need.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): So when you were talking about involuntary work, that must have applied to the time before that law was passed? Right?

SAUCKEL: That law was introduced at various dates in the late autumn of 1942. I cannot tell the exact dates in the various territories, but I should like to say that under this law, as well, voluntary workers still came voluntarily, to Germany. They...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You are right. If they had not, they would have gone involuntarily, wouldn’t they?

SAUCKEL: Only certain quotas were raised but not all the workers were demanded for Germany.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, then those certain quotas that were requested would have to have gone involuntarily; right?

SAUCKEL: No. There was also voluntary recruitment carried out, and that means that among the workers...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait, wait, Defendant. Don’t let us fool over this. It is quite simple. If there was a law which made it necessary for men to work when their quotas had been called up, they had to work, had they not? Right?

SAUCKEL: Yes, they had to work, in their own countries first of all, but they also could volunteer to work in Germany instead of working in their own country. And we attached great importance to this.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): In other words, a man had a choice of forced labor in an industry in France or in Germany, so in that sense it was voluntary; is that right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, just two or three more questions. You have answered clearly, I think. I just want to ask you about three documents. I think that is all. I am not going into detail. Do you remember the document known as R-124, which was the conference on March 1st of 1944? You remember that conference?

[Turning to the defendant.] Do you remember the conference? Have you looked at the notes?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do they tell about what took place in substance? In substance, there was an account of the conference, wasn’t there?

SAUCKEL: Yes, at this moment—I beg to be excused—I cannot remember the concrete topic of discussion at that conference.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, did you find anything in the notes, as you read them, over, which you thought in substance was a great mistake?

SAUCKEL: I did not read all the notes about the Central Planning Board. At that time the notes about the Central Planning Board were not available to me. Therefore I did not know that notes were taken about the Central Planning Board.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Don’t go on with all this talk. I simply asked whether you read them and you said you had not read them all. That is all we need.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Of the portion that you read, did you find any mistakes?

SAUCKEL: Inaccuracies. For instance, the report of my interpolation “200,000 to 5,000,000”; that is an utterly impossible proportion.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Quite. Now, you used one expression in those notes which I did not understand; and I am going to ask you what you meant by it. You spoke of your special labor supply executives. Was that the committee for social peace that you spoke about yesterday—about a thousand people in it? Do you remember?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is the same thing? That was the committee that you said had to be specially trained by the SS, I think, and by the police in France, or wherever they were used?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): By the way, you spoke of them being armed. Why were they armed? Why did they carry arms?

SAUCKEL: For their own protection and for the protection of those whom they recruited; they had to have some means of defense against attacks.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You did not usually have anything to do with the Police, did you? Why did you organize this police corps? Why did you help organize this police corps, an armed police corps? Why did you do it?

SAUCKEL: That was not an armed police corps in the usual sense, rather it was...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Never mind describing it. We know what it was. Why did you organize it? I thought you kept away from police measures.

SAUCKEL: In order to have protection for these people and for these places which frequently were raided, demolished, or harassed by the resistance movement.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see what you mean. This was an organization to protect the recruiting that was going on; is that right?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I see. Now, I just want to ask one question about another manuscript, 016-PS, dated 20 April 1944, which was the labor mobilization program. That is the program which you issued and signed, is it not? You look at it. That is the program you signed?

SAUCKEL: I have not understood you correctly, I believe. I understood 1944. It was...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): No, no, on 20 April 1942. You issued the labor mobilization program. Is that the program signed by you, shown in the Document 016-PS? That is the program, is it not?

SAUCKEL: The program—may I say the following in this connection: It was a program which did not become effective immediately...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant, please answer the question. All I want to know is, first, you did issue a mobilization program, did you not?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. And that is the one shown in that exhibit, is it not? I am simply identifying it.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. I wanted to ask you a little bit about bringing the youths of the occupied territories into the Reich. Certain of the youths were brought in, were they not?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Against your desire, you said. How many were brought in?

SAUCKEL: That I cannot possibly say from my own knowledge. I do not know. There were youths...

SAUCKEL: That I cannot say either—what age the youths were—because they were with their families who came into the Reich as a result of refugee measures or the evacuation of other localities. Then another time, in connection with the so-called “Hay Action” in 1944, youths came to the Reich, but without my having anything to do with it.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You know there were young adolescents, of course, young adolescent children, do you not? You know that, do you not?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was the purpose of bringing them in? Were they recruited for labor, or were they to be trained in the Reich and educated?

SAUCKEL: There are various explanations for the fact that youths were brought into the Reich. Some of these youths were not recruited or brought in by agents; rather they came with their families, at the latter’s wish, when refugee and evacuation measures were carried out. Others came...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. We will leave out the ones that came with the families. Some were recruited for labor, were they not? Some for work, were they not?

SAUCKEL: Youths under the legal age of 14 years could not be brought in for work. By agreements, such as can be found in the documents, other offices brought youths in to train and care for them.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You just do not answer the questions. I asked you whether some were brought in for work. Children over 14, who were still under 20, were brought in for work, were they not—recruited for work?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You did not recruit any youth involuntarily; you mean that?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I do not mean you personally; I mean the administration.

SAUCKEL: No, the labor administration was not supposed to bring in any youths, especially girls, by compulsion; only voluntarily. Domestic servants were only volunteers.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Some were brought in to be educated in Germany and to become German citizens, were they not?

SAUCKEL: That I found out from the documents; but I was not responsible for that.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You did not know about that before? Did anyone advise you that it was in accordance with international law to force people in occupied countries to come to Germany to work?

SAUCKEL: I was expressly urged by the Führer to take that measure, and it was described to me as admissible. No office raised any objections to or had any misgivings about this measure; rather it met with the requirements of all offices.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you that. I asked you whether anybody advised you that it was in accordance with international law.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You knew, did you not, that the Foreign Office had to consider such matters?

SAUCKEL: I spoke with the Foreign Office on various occasions and this was found to be in order, because we were convinced that in these territories, on the basis of the terms of surrender, the introduction of German regulations was permissible and possible under the conditions prevailing and in view of existing agreements. That was my belief.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you say that you were advised by the Foreign Office that you were entitled under international law to force people to come from Russia to work in Germany?

SAUCKEL: The Foreign Office never told me anything to the contrary; but the Foreign Office, I believe, was not competent for questions concerning the East: I do not know.

SAUCKEL: I found these regulations in existence before I took office. These regulations had already been issued. The Führer expressly charged me to carry them out.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then, the answer is that you asked nobody? Is that right?

SAUCKEL: I did not ask anybody. I could not ask anybody, because all offices wanted these measures and accepted them. There was never any discussion to the contrary.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And did you say that it was not the task of the Police to enforce recruiting for labor?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, why did you say at the conference on 4 January 1944, which is reported in the Document 1292-PS, that you would do everything in your power to furnish the requested manpower in 1944; but whether it would succeed depended primarily on what German enforcement agents would be made available, and that your project could not be carried out with domestic enforcement agents? Does that not mean that the Police would have to enforce your recruitment programs?

SAUCKEL: No, it means—the reproduction of these minutes is not very exact—I explained to the Führer that I probably would not be able to carry out his program because there were very large partisan areas; and as long as these partisan areas were not cleared up, so that a regular administration could be established there, no recruitment could take place there either. First of all, therefore, normal administrative conditions would have to be established again. That could be done only by those organs whose task it was.

SAUCKEL: By German enforcement agencies I meant the normal administration as such, but in some territories that was too weak.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, then, why was it that the Reichsführer SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his disposal were extremely few, if those enforcement agents were not police agents?

SAUCKEL: I did not understand the question correctly in the first place. The Reichsführer, I believe, said—according to my recollection—that for the pacification of these areas he did not have troops enough because they were all at the front. That did not refer to the recruitment and management of compulsory labor, but to the re-establishment of normal conditions in these areas.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well then, are you saying that it was not the task of the Police to help you in recruitment, but that it was the task of the military?

SAUCKEL: That differed greatly depending on the various regulations in the territories. There were areas in which the military commanders had the sole executive power, and there were areas in which civilian authorities had the executive power on the German side. There was a third kind of area, military operational zones with rear areas, in which the commanders of the armies had the executive power.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, then, either it was the Police, or it was the military, or it was some other force which was going to carry out your forcible recruiting; is that right?

SAUCKEL: Yes, but in these areas as well, the machinery of the civilian administration was available, which was not identical with the military or with the Police, but represented within these Wehrmacht organizations separate branches of the administration under a special administrative chief.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, I don’t understand then what you meant by saying that your project could not be carried out with domestic enforcement agents.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I am asking the Tribunal to look at Document Sauckel-3, which is a list of Sauckel’s offices, to see the position of the witness whom I am about to call.

Under Sauckel in the Reich Ministry of Labor there were various departments, one of which, the department of the witness Timm, was the so-called Europe Office, which had three subdepartments—one for the West, one for the East, and the third for the South and Southwest.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you worked in the Reich Labor Ministry in the Allocation of Labor department?

TIMM: Yes, and I had been in the labor administration for some years before that.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the impression you had of your new superior when Sauckel took over the office?

TIMM: When Sauckel assumed office, I had the impression of a very energetic, hard-working man, who was inclined to get excited at times, even angry no doubt, and who demanded much of his co-workers, but also made great demands on himself.

TIMM: When he assumed office there was a good deal of confusion in the field of labor allocation. Everybody had something to do with labor allocation.

TIMM: The previous chiefs had not had enough force to push their program through against the opposition of various offices; and Sauckel was the strong man, and particularly the strong political figure, who was to put things in order.

DR. SERVATIUS: How did Sauckel approach this new task? Did he adhere to the administrative regulations, or did he do it in his own way, in—as one says—an unrestrained new manner?

TIMM: He considered his task very much a political task, but he always did his best to handle administrative matters in an orderly way. He was known generally as a Gauleiter who was friendly to the civil servants. Also, in order to instruct all the offices under his administration, he held so-called staff meetings at regular intervals in which the most important things were discussed.

TIMM: In the Allocation of Labor department I had first a subdepartment and later a department.

TIMM: That department had to deal with all questions concerning the assignment of labor, particularly the classification of skilled workers, training of workers, vocational advice, and employment agencies for apprentices.

TIMM: Not completely, owing to the fact that Gauleiter Sauckel at the same time remained Gauleiter in Thuringia and he worked in Berlin in Thuringia House, whereas the special departments put at his disposal remained in the Ministry of Labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: No, you did not understand my question. The question was whether you, from your office, had an over-all view of what went on in the field of labor allocation without regard to Sauckel’s activity.

TIMM: Yes, but not entirely, because we were not informed about all events, due to the separation of the offices.

DR. SERVATIUS: What were the staff meetings? Who took part in them and of what kind of people were they composed?

TIMM: For the most part the liaison men of the various branches were called to staff conferences.

TIMM: There were various kinds of people, civil servants but also economists, and the like.

DR. SERVATIUS: But you should tell us from what offices these people came, or were they people who were in Sauckel’s office?

TIMM: They were mostly people from other branches, as, for instance, a representative of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the representatives of the Ministry for Armament and War Production, of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and of other departments.

DR. SERVATIUS: Besides that, Sauckel had a personal labor staff. What kind of people were in that?

TIMM: The personal labor staff consisted mostly of men whom Sauckel had brought with him from Weimar, men of his own immediate circle.

TIMM: He had two personal consultants, Landrat Berch and Ministerialrat Dr. Stothfang.

TIMM: At those staff meetings all matters of labor allocation, that is the entire German labor allocation program, were discussed; and the sessions were generally opened with a complete report by Herr Sauckel, in which he explained his plans for the future.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were questions of recruitment in occupied territories also discussed; and what is of importance here, the difficulties which existed then, and the methods of which we have heard? What was said about that?

TIMM: Questions of recruitment were generally not discussed there so much but rather questions concerning the Reich.

DR. SERVATIUS: I asked you first about the occupied territories. Was, for instance, that case discussed which has been brought up here, the surrounding of a motion picture house and the seizing of people there, and similar cases?

TIMM: Sauckel at once instructed several gentlemen—I don’t remember whom—to make all possible investigations in order to clarify the case.

TIMM: There were no other cases which could be compared in seriousness with that case which has just been described.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was there also discussion about the question of labor conditions in Germany for foreign workers?

DR. SERVATIUS: And was it not reported there that conditions existed in individual camps or industries which were objectionable?

TIMM: Cases of that kind were discussed. In general they concerned clothing, nutrition, and similar things.

DR. SERVATIUS: How did these reports come to the staff conferences? Who reported them? From what source did one find out about them?

TIMM: Herr Sauckel always attached importance to having these things examined on the spot, and he maintained an extensive system of inspection in order to get an accurate picture of these questions; and these inspection reports were then discussed in detail at the staff conferences.

Upon consideration of the motion of the Prosecution, dated the 21st of May, and the memorandum of the Defense Counsel in reply thereto, dated the 29th of May, the Tribunal makes the following order:

The motion of the Prosecution that arguments as to the guilt or innocence of the individual defendants be heard at the conclusion of the evidence relating to the individual defendants and before the introduction of evidence relating to the accused organizations is granted. The Tribunal, however, will not decide the question of the guilt or innocence of any defendant until after all the evidence has been heard; and, if any of the evidence relating to the accused organizations is thought by counsel for any defendant to support his defense, he may ask to be heard further with regard thereto. The Tribunal, at the conclusion of the evidence relating to the individual defendants, will accordingly hear first the argument in their behalf, and then the summing up of the Prosecution. The statements of each of the defendants in his own behalf will be heard at the conclusion of the Trial before judgment.

The Tribunal is of opinion that the argument relating to the guilt or innocence of the individual defendants will be more helpful if heard immediately at the conclusion of the evidence bearing thereon, and before the Tribunal has departed from this and goes into the branch of the case relating to the organizations. This arrangement, furthermore, will give the commissioners, who are taking the evidence as to the organizations, further time in which to complete their work. The defendants will not be prejudiced in any way by this arrangement; for, apart from the fact that their cases are essentially different from the cases of the organizations, they will be allowed to call to the attention of the Tribunal any circumstance developed on the hearing of the organizations which is thought to be helpful to their defense. The Tribunal finds nothing in the Charter which forbids this procedure, and Article 9 leaves to the discretion of the Tribunal the manner of hearing evidence on behalf of the accused organizations.

Counsel for the individual defendants will not be permitted to cross-examine the witnesses called by counsel on behalf of the organizations, or to take part in such proceedings save when specially authorized to do so by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal will sit tomorrow at 10 o’clock in open session until 1 o’clock.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 1 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

Morning Session

DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I ask permission for the Defendant Von Papen to be absent on Monday and Tuesday to prepare his case.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, yesterday we were speaking, at the end, of the staff conferences. I should like to leave this question now, but we will come back to it later when we talk about controls. First, I should like you to explain the relationship of Sauckel’s office to the higher authorities. Whom did Sauckel come under?

TIMM: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was under the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.

TIMM: The Plenipotentiary General kept in the closest touch with Hitler, and as far as possible he presented his plans to Hitler at personal discussions.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was there a constant connection with the Four Year Plan through a liaison man, or how was that done?

TIMM: There were various ways of keeping the contact active. There were liaison men on both sides. The Plenipotentiary General sent men from his select staff to the office of the Four Year Plan for a preliminary co-ordination of his plans, and on the other hand, as far as I can recall, there were almost constantly delegates from the office of the Four Year Plan who took part in the staff conferences.

In addition, the Plenipotentiary General frequently had personal talks with the Delegate for the Four Year Plan.

DR. SERVATIUS: How was the co-operation with the other ministries conducted? With Goebbels, to begin with?

TIMM: The Plenipotentiary General felt in principle that it was important to keep as close a contact as possible with the other departments and to have his plans and intentions co-ordinated beforehand. Co-operation with the Ministry of Propaganda was no longer so good, especially at the time when the Minister, Dr. Goebbels, was Delegate for Total War Effort.

DR. SERVATIUS: After the proclamation of total war was Sauckel subordinate to Goebbels?

TIMM: The relationship was never quite clear. In my opinion it had to be looked at this way: The Delegate for Total War Effort received comprehensive powers for all tasks, and was therefore in fact superior to the GBA (Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor).

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the relation with the other authorities, for instance with the Reich Ministry for Food?

TIMM: The co-operation with the Reich Ministry for Food was very good. The relations with State Secretary Backe especially were always very good as far as I could judge. There were also continual conferences between the experts of both offices on questions of feeding in general.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, what was the date of the proclamation of total war?

DR. SERVATIUS: It was after the fall of Stalingrad. I cannot give you the exact date.

DR. SERVATIUS: As to relations with Himmler, what co-operation was there with that office?

TIMM: I know nothing of any close personal relations between the GBA and Himmler. On Sauckel’s labor staff there was a liaison man from the Reichsführer SS, especially for any general police questions that might arise concerning the allocation of labor.

TIMM: All kinds of questions; especially the question of badges in connection with the employment of foreigners.

TIMM: Yes; questions concerning barbed wire, and all the questions which arose in police spheres.

TIMM: As I was not an expert on those questions I cannot remember very well, and I do not know whether there were any detailed conferences about them.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I should like to pass on to the connection of the authorities with the occupied territories.

With whom were negotiations carried on and to whom did one apply when making demands on the occupied territories?

TIMM: One had to apply to the respective district governments at the time—military commanders, Reich commissioners or something similar.

TIMM: The deputies were organized and intended to be men who were to exert a direct and vigorous influence on the execution of Sauckel’s plans, instructions and orders.

This goal, however, was not reached as they were not able to succeed. I remember that the Plenipotentiary General therefore intended to ask Hitler for more comprehensive instructions and more comprehensive powers.

I seem to recall that the Plenipotentiary General once announced that he had learned from Hitler himself, or from his entourage, that Hitler was not inclined to extend these powers as he could not release the local governments, especially the military commanders, from their comprehensive responsibility and powers; so the Plenipotentiary General had only one recourse, that of putting forward his wishes through the channel of direct negotiations.

TIMM: The deputies could only try to consult with the existing regional governments, but the opposition was so strong that they could not carry any weight.

TIMM: As they could not attain an independent position, the deputies were generally incorporated into the existing local administration by way of negotiations. With few exceptions they were entrusted with the management of the labor section, or were incorporated into the section for economy and labor.

Generally they were placed within the staffs of the military commanders as administrative officials and that was the position which they held ostensibly.

DR. SERVATIUS: So it was a combination of two or more positions held by one person?

TIMM: It was, to a certain extent, a combination of different positions held by one person, of which, without doubt, the most important was the position of section chief in the existing regional government.

TIMM: As far as I know, it resulted from talks with the regional governments on the question of the position of the deputies. The regional governments wanted on no account to have any men in their districts who were independent of their administration and had special powers.

TIMM: The authority to issue instructions to the offices abroad was generally exercised by means of sending instructions, directives, and decrees through normal administrative channels via the central offices.

DR. SERVATIUS: Could he issue instructions to cover everything that happened there, or were there other offices which dealt with the recruitment of labor?

TIMM: At that time, unfortunately, the situation was such that even after the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor other agencies there repeatedly interfered in labor matters or carried on recruiting too—that is, agencies which had neither the power nor the authority to do so.

THE PRESIDENT: I say what time. He said “at that time.” At what time? What time is he speaking about?

TIMM: It was at the time when the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was appointed.

DR. SERVATIUS: How was the recruiting carried out? Was it voluntary? How would you differentiate between the types?

TIMM: In principle, recruiting was carried out on a voluntary basis because from the technical point of view—that is, from the point of view of the utilization of the labor recruited—only voluntary recruiting could lead to success. That is to say only voluntary recruiting could bring people who were happy and willing to work, and who could achieve the output necessary for production.

TIMM: During the whole time that I worked with Sauckel in the Ministry of Labor I never heard of any events which indicated any other point of view. He repeatedly emphasized that the basis of recruiting must be voluntary.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. He issued many directives and held many speeches. But did he not within the select circle...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, and Witness, will you try and pause between the sentences, and between the questions and the answers? The witness’ sentences seem to me to be running on, whereas if he would pause it would give the interpreter some chance.

[Turning to the witness.] Sauckel issued a number of directives and made speeches to that effect. Did he not give you more precise instructions for the guidance of the department?

TIMM: The instructions which we received always agreed in principle with the instructions which he issued to larger circles at presidential or similar conferences.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the result of voluntary recruiting? Did the workers come solely on the basis of that recruiting, that is on the basis of the conditions as described to them?

TIMM: It is, of course, not possible for me to give exact figures. Thinking it over I believe I can say that about 2 to 3 million workers might be considered voluntary workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: Other workers came by virtue of the compulsory service laws which were introduced in those countries?

TIMM: I can hardly give an estimate. As about 2 to 3 million may be considered volunteers, the rest must reach this figure too.

DR. SERVATIUS: People were deported too. Do you understand what is meant by deportation?

TIMM: If I may ask, does that mean the people who were transported for military or similar reasons? I am not quite clear as to what you mean by that.

TIMM; You mean forcible deportations, do you not? I cannot remember and do not know anything about such measures in connection with the activity of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: In connection with the obtaining, recruiting, and conscription of labor, there are quite a number of serious charges concerning abuses which occurred. To what extent did you learn of them?

TIMM: I have no practical knowledge of the recruiting itself. As far as I had a general view of the situation, serious abuses, such as you mention in your question, were not reported to the GBA. Yesterday in an answer I pointed out that I knew of the case of the surrounded cinema, and that I could recall no events surpassing that case in gravity.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now I come to conditions in Germany. Did you hear anything about conditions of the worst kind there? You probably read the papers and know what these charges mean. You were one of the people most closely involved there, so what did you learn?

TIMM: Complaints about the treatment of foreigners came through various channels to the GBA too. They referred in general to questions of clothing and food, and that of barbed wire which came up repeatedly, and the question of badges, the marking of foreign workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the Prosecution is speaking here of Crimes against Humanity.

DR. SERVATIUS: Are those only things which happened daily in a normal administration, or are they, so to say, things which were reported?

TIMM: Such things as you call catastrophic, Doctor, did not come to my knowledge, because if they had, I should still remember them now.

DR. SERVATIUS: Who supervised the execution of the orders, and how did that come to your knowledge, or how should that have come to your knowledge?

TIMM: Various authorities were concerned with supervising the work of foreign workers. These were five or six different offices. There was in particular the German Labor Front, which, on the basis of a so-called Führer decision, claimed for itself the question of the treatment and care of foreign workers. And I may mention in this connection that it repeatedly said this assignment went beyond the order given by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to the German Labor Front, and that to a certain extent it was bound by a higher authority to carry out this task of welfare and control of treatment, et cetera. On this fundamental question there were repeated conferences between the office of the GBA and the German Labor Front, and these later led to an agreement according to which the GBA also transferred this question to the German Labor Front. To settle these matters, the German Labor Front established a central inspectorate whose mission it was to look after foreign workers throughout the whole Reich. In addition to this central inspectorate, the Office for the Allocation of Labor within the German Labor Front was still functioning.

DR. SERVATIUS: What connection was there between Sauckel’s office and this inspectorate of the Labor Front? How were contacts maintained?

TIMM: In the first place, a man from the German Labor Front worked as liaison man on Sauckel’s technical staff...

TIMM: That was Herr Hoffmann. And secondly, the central inspectorate of the German Labor Front constantly had conferences on their inspection activities to which an official of the GBA was invited.

DR. SERVATIUS: This liaison man, Hoffmann, presumably reported on what he heard from the Labor Front?

TIMM: The things which he reported covered the same ground as I have already told you about.

DR. SERVATIUS: The German Labor Front already had this task before Sauckel’s office was set up?

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you must answer me. The German Labor Front had this task before Sauckel came?

DR. SERVATIUS: Did it consider that its authority was restricted by the fact that Sauckel was appointed?

TIMM: I was just about to explain that it considered its task a general, comprehensive one; and when the newly appointed Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor occupied himself so intensively with these matters, it did see in this a certain encroachment on its task.

TIMM: As far as I can recall the suggestion was the outcome of a wish of the German Labor Front.

TIMM: Of course, I can give only my personal opinion. I believe that the aim was in any case to express the fact that the German Labor Front was generally competent for these questions.

THE PRESIDENT: If we have it, we do not want to have his personal recollection of it, do we?

DR. SERVATIUS: The witness goes back too far. I would like to know who suggested it and drew it up, and when it was signed. There are two dates at the foot of this document as far as I remember today.

M. HERZOG: Mr. President, the document which is being mentioned now was submitted to the Tribunal. It is Document Number 1913-PS.

DR. SERVATIUS: It is in my document book, in the first document book, Page 79. In the English book it is Page 74. Here in the first text may be found...

THE PRESIDENT: What are you after? There is no use in getting the evidence of a witness, who said he does not remember in detail about it, about a document which we have got before us. It does not seem to me to be in the least bit useful to know who suggested that the agreement should be entered into.

DR. SERVATIUS: [Turning to the witness.] There were still other inspectorates. For example, the Gauleiter was an authorized agent for the Allocation of Labor Department. To what extent did the Gauleiter report things which occurred in their Gaue during the allocation of labor?

TIMM: The Gauleiter were appointed by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor by virtue of his Decree Number 1, to be his authorized agents, with the task of applying themselves precisely to this question.

TIMM: I do not know of any written reports from the Gauleiter on this question; at least, not to any extent worth mentioning. Hardly any written reports from the Gauleiter came in on this question; at least, not to our office.

DR. SERVATIUS: At this opportunity I should like to clear up the question of the position held by the Gauleiter as authorized agents for the Allocation of Labor in relation to the Gau labor offices. Was the Gauleiter president of the Gau labor offices, or in what relation did they stand to each other?

TIMM: In administration and matters of personnel, the president of the Gau labor offices was undoubtedly subordinate to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, or to the Reich Minister for Labor. But the Plenipotentiary General had made it the duty of these presidents to keep in closest contact with the Gauleiter and to make constant reports on the things which occurred in their sphere of work. In particular, if there were any tension or difficulties in the Gau, they were to apply to the Gauleiter for aid.

DR. SERVATIUS: If I understand you correctly, the Party as such had nothing to do with the actual utilization of labor itself?

TIMM: I believe that is so. If the question is to be considered in that way, I would say that the institution of a Plenipotentiary General emphasized the political aspect of the Allocation of Labor, and that the Gauleiter, according to their varying personal opinions, concerned themselves to a greater or lesser extent with the Allocation of Labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you will understand that your testimony concerning your knowledge of the events submitted by the Prosecution is received with great skepticism. Did you not unofficially hear and see things which, if they did not come to your attention officially, certainly should have given you cause to investigate them more thoroughly?

TIMM: Of course, one heard here and there of cases where foreign workers were allegedly ill-treated in some way. As far as such things came to my attention I always considered them official matters, and made out a report accordingly or had them attended to. In such cases, the necessary investigations were made immediately and everything necessary was done to clear up the matter.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were these individual cases not symptoms of conditions as a whole?

TIMM: I do not believe so. At any rate, events which one might call catastrophic never came to my attention. As I have already said, they were nearly always only things which were connected with the question of treatment—that is to say, questions of accommodations in camps, clothing, and so forth.

TIMM: The output achieved by foreign workers varied. The output of the Eastern Workers was especially good. In general, because of this output, the demand for Eastern Workers was great. The output was also very good in particular of the skilled French workers...

DR. SERVATIUS: That is enough. Now, I must come back again to your connections with the occupied territories. Did you take part in negotiations with authorities in the occupied territories?

TIMM: Not in the East. A few times I went on journeys in the West with the Plenipotentiary General and took part in negotiations.

DR. SERVATIUS: Of what nature were these negotiations, as far as the atmosphere was concerned? Were they tense, were they friendly, or what were they like?

TIMM: The conferences with General Falkenhausen at which I was present were generally comparatively short. I had the feeling that the two gentlemen did not care for each other...

THE PRESIDENT: What does it matter whether they were tense or friendly or short?

DR. SERVATIUS: General Falkenhausen made an affidavit, which was submitted here, in which he said that Sauckel gave him orders and negotiated with him in a manner which caused him to offer the strongest opposition.

THE PRESIDENT: If you want to contradict Falkenhausen’s affidavit you can put it to the witness, if that’s what you are trying to do.

DR. SERVATIUS: I do not have it here at the moment. I will forego that question.

TIMM: One can certainly say that the negotiations were carried on in a very friendly manner.

TIMM: Individual complaints were made. I remember that the complaints were especially about the question of the transfer of wages.

DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to ask you whether complaints about treatment, the methods of recruitment, coercive measures, and so on—whether complaints were made about those things?

TIMM: No, I do not remember any complaints of that sort. I should certainly remember them if there had been any.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have a few more questions concerning Sauckel’s relations with the Central Planning Board and with Speer. You yourself repeatedly represented Sauckel at the Central Planning Board. Is that correct?

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the Central Planning Board as far as Sauckel was concerned?

TIMM: The Central Planning Board was a branch of the Four Year Plan. Its task, as far as the GBA was concerned, was to collect the demands for workers made by the big employers, and to adjust these demands at regular sessions. As the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor could not judge himself the importance of the use made of workers by the various industries, this question was decided in the Central Planning Board. An attempt was made, for certain periods of time, for as long a time as possible, to work out a balance of workers, I might say, and in connection...

DR. SERVATIUS: What was Speer’s position in relation to Sauckel and vice versa? Could Speer give orders to Sauckel in particular?

TIMM: Speer was Plenipotentiary General for Armament while Sauckel was Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, and Speer held the point of view that he, as Armament Minister, should have decisive authority in all matters pertaining to the production of armaments, that is raw materials, coal and consequently also the allocation of labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: Could Speer give Sauckel orders and instructions, or did he actually give them?

TIMM: Yes, as a matter of form. As I have just said, the question was not quite clear, and the two conceptions were opposed. In reality there was always a certain tension between the two men because the Armament Ministry wanted more or less to claim the power to issue instructions. This tension was generally cleared up through talks, or the exchange of letters between the two men. Sometimes it led to what one might call “agreement conferences,” headed by Reichsminister Lammers, as he was at that time.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the result of these conferences, these agreement conferences?

TIMM: These conferences led to agreements which, as far as I remember, were several times taken down in writing, and in my opinion they led to an increasingly strong influence by the Armament Ministry on questions concerning the allocation of labor.

DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Witness, in connection with your last statement, I should like to ask one question. You have testified to tension between the Defendants Sauckel and Speer because Speer claimed the right to give instructions. Do I understand you correctly if I assume that the tension arose from the fact that Sauckel energetically disputed this right to issue instructions?

TIMM: As I wanted to express in my last answer, the difficulties consisted in the fact that Speer, as Plenipotentiary General for Armaments said: “I must have control of all the things which belong to actual manufacture. So it is essential for me as regards the direction of labor allocation...”

DR. FLÄCHSNER: I understood that, Witness; my question is only, did this tension arise from the fact that Sauckel emphatically refused to recognize this right to issue instructions which you say was assumed by Speer?

TIMM: As Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor Sauckel felt himself competent and responsible for all questions concerning it.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: With regard to the demands of the Armament Ministry which he did not feel he could consider justified, did Sauckel not hold the point of view that he was responsible only to the Führer?

TIMM: I do not remember anything so definite. He was Plenipotentiary General for...

THE PRESIDENT: Surely this is very far removed from anything we have got to deal with. He says that the tension was cleared up by conferences. What more is there to discuss?

Witness, you spoke of conferences which are supposed to have taken place with Minister Lammers. In the minutes of the session of 11 July 1944 and of 4 January 1944, which have been previously submitted here, there is no mention at all of such differences. I would be grateful to you, if you could tell me what session with Lammers you have in mind?

TIMM: Unfortunately, I cannot give the dates of the sessions exactly. I know only that the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor several times wished to report these circumstances to the Führer, and that the two men, as far as I can remember, agreed that these questions should be discussed with the Führer. Then, however, in order to avoid always taking things to the Führer they agreed to have matters talked over with Reichsminister Lammers.

TIMM: Only if—I remember, for example, that the question of the blocked industries in France was discussed.

TIMM: In 1933 I applied for admission. My application was at first refused, and as far as I remember it was approved in 1934 or 1935.

TIMM: I was a member of the SA for a short time. I left the SA when proceedings for my expulsion were instituted against me in the SA, and I resigned.

M. HERZOG: What were your functions up to the time you entered Sauckel’s office?

TIMM: I was employed in that branch of the Reich Ministry of Labor which had the employment agency, the office for vocational guidance, and the training agency.

TIMM: As far as I can remember, I saw Sauckel for the first time when he visited State Secretary Syrup in the Reich Ministry of Labor, and the individual officials were invited to meet him.

TIMM: I cannot give the date exactly. I believe it was about a few weeks after the appointment of Sauckel as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.

M. HERZOG: What was your position at the time when Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor?

TIMM: I was in the department for employment and unemployment relief—the employment department...

TIMM: In Berlin, Sauckel himself worked in Thuringia House, while the special sections made available by the Reich Ministry of Labor were in the building of the Reich Ministry of Labor at Saarlandstrasse 96, and some, after a part of the building had been destroyed, were in alternative quarters near Berlin.

M. HERZOG: Thank you. The offices at Saarlandstrasse 96 therefore came under Sauckel’s administration? Is that right?

TIMM: The office at Saarlandstrasse 96 was not a new office; it was the Reich Ministry of Labor. The two sections had been made available by a Führer decree to carry out the tasks of the GBA.

M. HERZOG: A document headed “Delegate for the Four Year Plan, Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, Berlin SW 11, Saarlandstrasse 96” therefore comes from Sauckel’s office?

M. HERZOG: A document which has the following heading: “Delegate for the Four Year Plan, Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor...”

M. HERZOG: I show you Document Number L-61, which was submitted to the Tribunal in the course of the last few sessions. This document bears, as you see, the following heading at the top on the left: “The Delegate for the Four Year Plan, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.” On the top in the right-hand corner, “Berlin SW 11, Saarlandstrasse 96.” It is dated 26 November 1942, and comes, therefore, from Sauckel’s offices. Is that right?

M. HERZOG: Thank you. Did you represent Sauckel at the conferences of the Central Planning Board for the Four Year Plan?

TIMM: I either represented him, or I went with the GBA to take part in the sessions. Not always, but frequently.

M. HERZOG: When you represented him there, you received instructions before going there, did you not?

TIMM: When we had to go to larger and more important conferences, we were informed by Thuringia House that there were to be sessions, and we received our instructions as to how we were to represent the GBA at these sessions.

M. HERZOG: And when you came back from these meetings, you gave Sauckel a report on them, did you not?

TIMM: After the sessions we either reported the results of the conference to him personally, or through his personal advisers.

M. HERZOG: Sauckel then had to take the responsibility for the declarations you made at the various meetings? Is that right?

TIMM: As an official, it was always my duty to make sure when I made reports in a session and to ascertain...

M. HERZOG: That is not what I asked. Will you answer my question? You received instructions before the conferences began. You reported to Sauckel afterwards what was discussed at these conferences. Consequently Sauckel was responsible for what was discussed there, was he not?

[Turning to the witness.] You declared a short while ago that the conversations at which you had been present in Paris were of a friendly nature. Do you remember taking part in the conference of 12 January 1943?

TIMM: At the moment I cannot remember just from the date whether I took part, but I could tell from the subject of the discussion whether I was present or not.

M. HERZOG: I have already submitted Document Number F-809 to the Tribunal. It contains the minutes of this conference. In the course of the conference, Laval, among other things, said to Sauckel:

“It is no longer a matter of a policy of collaboration; it is rather, on the French side, a policy of sacrifice, and on the German side a policy of coercion...

“We cannot take any political measure without everywhere coming up against some German authority which has substituted itself in our place.

“I cannot guarantee measures which I do not take myself...

“It is not possible for me to be a mere agent for German measures of coercion.”

M. HERZOG: “...friendly remarks.” You said that these conversations were friendly. I have given you an extract from the contents of these conversations. Do you still say that they were friendly?

TIMM: I can only confirm the spirit of the negotiations in which I took part. I do not recognize these statements in the form you give them to me.

M. HERZOG: If you had known them, would you still have said that they were friendly conversations?

THE PRESIDENT: He was not there. He just said that he did not know about it. We can judge for ourselves whether the tone of it is friendly.

M. HERZOG: Witness, you stated earlier that you had no knowledge of forced deportations.

TIMM: I said that I knew of no forced deportations under the authority of the GBA; and I do not know of any deportations.

M. HERZOG: Do you remember a conference held on 15 and 16 July 1944 at Wartburg, which you attended, and at which Sauckel, a number of chiefs of Gau labor offices, and people who worked with Sauckel were also gathered?

TIMM: At Wartburg there was a conference of the presidents of the Gau labor offices. I was there for that conference.

M. HERZOG: I will now show you Document Number F-810, which I submitted to the Tribunal under the Exhibit Number RF-1507. The Tribunal will find the extract I want to submit to the witness on Page 10.

You were speaking of the conferences which the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor was having with the Wehrmacht about its co-operation in compulsory recruiting, and you said: “The Führer has approved the use of measures of coercion to the fullest extent.”

Do you deny that you knew that workers were being recruited for forced deportations?

TIMM: I ask for a moment’s time. I have not yet found the place. It was not shown me before.

These are notes made by some one present, presumably the Military Commander in Paris. I have not my statements on this question at hand, but I should imagine that the GBA, in view of the difficult...

“As regards the employment of European labor and the problems, methods, and means for the same, Timm made the following remarks: 1) Northern Europe; 2) Southeast; 3) Italy; 4) France.”

Then we come to the passage about which I am asking you for an explanation, because you made this statement. Will you answer that? Do you still deny your knowledge of the fact that these deportations were forced?

TIMM: I have no intention of denying anything. I can only say that Sauckel probably had powers from the Führer to use all reasonable means to speed up the procurement of workers.

Measures were introduced and carried out in France which, even if they were approved by Laval, the Premier at the time, might nevertheless be termed compulsory.

M. HERZOG: Thank you. I have one last question to ask you. In this quotation you say, “The Führer has approved....” If the Führer approved something, it means, that something was suggested to him. Is that not a fact?

TIMM: As far as I can remember, Gauleiter Sauckel always reported the results of his talks in Paris to the Führer. It is possible that he reported to the Führer the question of recruiting methods which he had discussed with Laval; and it was customary for him, as I have already said in my testimony, always to make sure of the Führer’s approval, so that he did not work against the Führer’s ideas.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the document which was last submitted to you, L-61, from Saarlandstrasse, is not in the original, but it contains the words: “Signed, Sauckel.” The Defendant Sauckel has informed me that it is possible he did not sign it himself, but that he may have been informed, in a general way only, that there were letters about one thing and another—routine office correspondence—and he might have given authority for them to be signed. Is that possible?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, did Sauckel state that in evidence, or are you telling us simply what he said to you? Do you remember?

TIMM: Yes. As Sauckel continued to exercise his functions as Gauleiter in Weimar, it sometimes happened that things did not reach him. The sections in Saarlandstrasse submitted their drafts to the personal adviser in Thuringia House, and it is quite possible—as I know from my own knowledge of conditions—that the contents of the drafts were transmitted by telephone, and that the personal advisers were authorized to sign the name of the Plenipotentiary General.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was the mail so extensive that he did not take exact cognizance of individual letters?

DR. SERVATIUS: That is enough. One more question: Führer—Sauckel—Speer. Is it true that the Defendant Sauckel told you that the Führer had ordered him to fulfill all Speer’s demands?

DR. SERVATIUS: We have shown you the document in which Laval complains about the conduct of the German authorities. Did this complaint refer to Sauckel’s activities, or was it not that he had told Sauckel of these complaints and was thanking him personally for his attitude?

TIMM: I recall from the talks with Laval, that Laval repeatedly expressed his gratitude to Sauckel for having put into effect measures and means for facilitating matters which he had suggested. Laval attached special importance—to use his own expression—to putting the climate and the atmosphere in order, and to having talks with Hitler himself as soon as possible; and he asked Sauckel to pave the way for him. As far as I know, Sauckel did actually arrange for talks of this kind and Laval thanked him for doing so.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): The job of the GBA was to get workmen to replace the men who had been taken into the Army out of industry. That was largely your work, was it not?

TIMM: The task of the GBA was much more comprehensive, as previously all the tasks...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Well, I understand, but that was part of your work, was it not?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. Now, you were therefore told beforehand the number of people that the Army was taking out of industry, weren’t you, so you could make up your estimates?

TIMM: The numbers were adjusted in the Central Planning Board. It was precisely the task of the Central Planning Board, that the plans made in the OKW...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Wait a minute. I don’t care who examined the figures, but your organization certainly had knowledge of the needs of the Army, of the number of people the Army was taking out of industry. You had to have that information, had you not?

TIMM: The number of men to be drafted was reported to the Central Planning Board.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right, reported to the Central Planning Board. Now then, they were taking people out of industry also who were not needed for the Army, weren’t they? I mean Jews. They were taking Jewish people out of industry, were they not? Sauckel said yesterday that Jewish people were being taken out of industry. You admit that, don’t you?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right; and I suppose the Central Planning Board was given the number of Jewish people that were taken out of industry, were they not?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not assume that that must have been the case, if they had to find the number of replacements. It must have been so, mustn’t it?

TIMM: I cannot judge as to that because I learned only the total number of men to be drafted, independently of the Jewish question. I will not venture an opinion; I do not know.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you not know that Himmler and the SS told the Central Planning Board the number of Jews that were being taken out of industry for whom replacements were needed? You know that as a fact, don’t you?

TIMM: No. I know only that we received certain statements from the Reichsführer SS that people were being taken out of industry, and owing to the objections of the Plenipotentiary General, who had to supply the replacements—I remember that this measure was partly withdrawn.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And you do know that one of the duties of the Reichsführer SS was to withdraw Jews from industry? You know that?

TIMM: I know from statements in reports that Jews were to be withdrawn from industry.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were working in the office of Sauckel, is that correct?

HILDEBRANDT: In the Reich Ministry of Labor from 1930 I dealt with questions concerning labor for the iron and metal industry, the chemical industry, and the textile industry. After 1940 I also dealt with questions concerning workers in the West.

DR. SERVATIUS: You must remember to pause before you answer. Did you have any general idea about what happened in Sauckel’s office?

DR. SERVATIUS: And in that way you found out, to a certain extent, about what happened in other offices?

DR. SERVATIUS: I want to ask you especially about conditions in France. What was the position of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in France?

HILDEBRANDT: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor in France, just as in other occupied countries, had appointed special deputies who transmitted his wishes, and helped to carry out these wishes and these tasks. The organization of the entire labor strength from the occupied western territories remained in the hands of the German military or civil administrative offices there.

HILDEBRANDT: The first deputy in France tried to establish an organization of his own, but after a short time he met with the opposition of the German administrative offices, and the offices which he had established in the meantime were taken over by the military commander.

HILDEBRANDT: The military commander was and remained responsible for the entire allocation of the labor in his district, and also for the labor sent from his district to Germany.

HILDEBRANDT: The German Embassy took the leading part in all negotiations which were to be carried out by the Plenipotentiary General or his deputies, with French Government offices.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the position of the French Government as regards the allocation of labor?

HILDEBRANDT: The French Government made agreements with the Plenipotentiary General concerning the carrying out of his programs, and ordered its own offices to carry out certain tasks, especially when compulsory labor was introduced in France. It published the necessary decrees and gave the necessary directives to the subordinate offices.

DR. SERVATIUS: And who had the executive power to recruit labor? Was that done by the French or the Germans?

HILDEBRANDT: One must distinguish between two periods. When it was still a question of recruiting volunteers, until the fall of 1942 these volunteers could report to German offices as well as to French offices; and also to recruiting offices which had been established by German firms, and some by branches of the Wehrmacht. After the introduction of compulsory labor, the administrative executive for the carrying out of the decrees rested solely with the French authorities.

HILDEBRANDT: Then a first summons to appear was received from the French authorities, and then repeated summonses, and if these proved to be unsuccessful the French authorities called in the French police.

HILDEBRANDT: I assume that that may have happened sometimes. I do not know for certain.

DR. SERVATIUS: What would be your estimate of the number of voluntary workers who came from France to Germany?

HILDEBRANDT: The number of voluntary workers from France, until the middle of 1942—but I can only give approximate figures from memory...

HILDEBRANDT: Something over 200,000. After the compulsory labor decree had been introduced in the course of 1942, there were still voluntary recruitments as well on a fairly large scale. The number of volunteers was, at times, considerably larger than the number of conscripts, so that altogether more than half of all the labor recruited in France consisted of volunteers. It is noticeable that women were only recruited if they volunteered. There was no compulsory service for them. With regard to the compulsory labor assignments moreover, it must be pointed out that a number of them were only formal. In reality these people had come voluntarily, but for economic reasons, or out of consideration for their relatives and friends in their home towns, they attached importance to being conscripted. We had compulsory labor assignments which were only put on an official basis afterwards. Such requests reached the German labor offices especially during the last months before the end of the war; and the Foreign Office requested the Plenipotentiary General to approve such demands, and that was done.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you hear anything in your department about recruiting measures such as the surrounding of churches, cinemas, and similar places in France?

HILDEBRANDT: No; I do not know of any such recruiting measure. I know that in France, as well as in Belgium, identity papers were controlled among members of the age groups which had been called up to register.

DR. SERVATIUS: You were also probably in Paris, and you spoke to the German authorities there; is that right?

HILDEBRANDT: Yes. Every time I was in Paris I took the opportunity to talk to members of the offices about current events.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did they not tell you about things which must have surprised you?

HILDEBRANDT: With each major task we carried out we had some difficulties, of course, and certain excesses. Once it was reported to me, among other things, that there were impossible conditions in the “Pépinière”—a camp, a kind of transit camp for people who had to leave. These conditions were reported immediately to the Town Major of Paris who remedied matters. Then there were irregularities in the recruiting in Marseille, where recruiting agents used blackmail. This was also stopped immediately.

Beyond that, a fairly large number of individual cases were brought to me. These were minor difficulties about vacations, salaries, and so forth, which I transmitted each time to the competent offices for further action.

HILDEBRANDT: As far as they came within my sphere, I took the necessary steps immediately. As far as it was the business of other departments I immediately transferred them to those departments for further attention.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I did not ask what you did, but whether it was your official duty to look after these things.

HILDEBRANDT: The general problems of recruiting and statistical checking of programs came within my field of duty. Questions of housing, pay, and transport were dealt with by other departments. Of course, when I found out about bad conditions it was my duty to investigate them at once, if only in the interests of further recruiting.

We considered it of the greatest importance that every abuse should be stopped immediately, because it was only in this way that further recruiting of volunteers could be guaranteed. Labor conscription was therefore looked on as a last resort.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I would like to know whether it was your official duty, or your moral duty to look after these things?

DR. SERVATIUS: As regards the way transports were effected, I have one question. Mention has been made of irregularities on transports. That is why I would like you to tell us what steps you took to have the transports that came from France supervised and directed. Can you describe that briefly?

HILDEBRANDT: A special department was created in the office of the military commander in France for the carrying out of transports. For each man who went to Germany, it was already settled to what firm he was to be sent. The recruiting was effected on the basis of planned contracts and definite working conditions, so that it was known what route could be chosen for the journey. Transports were assembled to include as many as possible, so that a definite number of workers would go in the same direction and to the same firm.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, these details are of less interest to me than the question of how you conducted these transports and kept a check on them when something irregular happened on the way.

HILDEBRANDT: In giving a few details, I only wanted to indicate that there was a detailed check made of every person intended for Germany. For each transport there was an exact list of the persons and of the firms to which they were sent. The transports were given guides who brought them to their destination, and there they were turned over to the presidents of the regional labor offices whose duty it was to take further care of them.

DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to put a concrete case to you. A case has been reported here of a transport train which was left in the Saar district, and when it was opened, after a few days, most of the people had been frozen to death. Did you have control of such trains? Should that have been reported to you? Could that train have been sent upon your orders? How do you explain that?

HILDEBRANDT: Such an incident would have become known to us immediately. As the coming of transports was reported beforehand to the presidents of the regional labor offices, we were informed immediately when they did not arrive. That happened frequently, namely, when difficulties arose because of some emergency on the way, and a transport was held up—for instance, in the last days of the war, when traffic obstructions caused by bomb damage had to be cleared away, and so on. We could then immediately have inquiries made concerning the transports, which was always done. I know nothing of the case which you have just mentioned.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you must speak more slowly. The interpreters cannot possibly follow.

Will you state your opinion as to the incident, which I have described, of the train with the people who froze to death in the Saar district.

HILDEBRANDT: The incident could not possibly have occurred on transports of labor recruits. The transports were well prepared.

HILDEBRANDT: I learned for the first time through the press during the last few months that the SS also conducted transports to Germany, and that conditions such as you have just described are said to have been present.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, were you present during the negotiations between Sauckel and Laval?

HILDEBRANDT: These negotiations were conducted in a friendly manner; but occasionally, especially when promises on the part of the French Government had not been kept, quite violent disputes occurred. Any real difficulties, however, did not as a rule arise during these negotiations. Arrangements were made concerning the number of people who were to be sent to Germany. As a matter of principle, Laval was always willing to put manpower at the disposal of Germany.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what, in particular, were the relations between Laval and Sauckel? Did Laval speak well of Sauckel or not?

HILDEBRANDT: M. Laval expressed his gratitude from time to time for the way in which things had been made easier for France, too. For instance, as regards the status of French prisoners of war, the permission given to the wives of French workmen to visit their husbands, and the taking over of welfare work for the relatives of the French workmen in Germany. All these things, as I have said, took the form of agreements whereby one party put labor at the disposal of the other party, and that party in return gave back manpower or granted other advantages. Laval certainly expressed repeatedly his urgent wish to do more for Germany if he could only be given political advantages for it. Therefore, he asked the Plenipotentiary General repeatedly to make it possible for him to have discussions with the Führer in order to create a favorable atmosphere in France for further efforts.

HILDEBRANDT: Until the last negotiation, which I think took place at the end of 1944.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I believe the question of relève and “transformation” has been clarified sufficiently, so that I need not question the witness about it again.

[Turning to the witness.] Witness, in what manner did the negotiations with the German military commander take place? Did Sauckel give orders there? Was he the highest authority, or was it the military commander?

HILDEBRANDT: The negotiations were never carried out in the form of a transmission of orders. The Plenipotentiary General described the situation in Germany and what needs...

HILDEBRANDT: I only want to say the following: Of course, the military commander, as was the case with the civil administration in Holland, was more interested in receiving orders to be filled than in sending manpower to Germany, and that led to conflict. The authorities, however, had to be convinced in each instance that manpower must be sent to Germany—for agricultural work, for example, which could not be done in Holland, and also for a number of branches of the German armaments industry.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, a few questions now concerning Belgium and Northern France: Was the position of Sauckel as regards the chief authorities there the same as in France on the whole; and was everything conducted similarly, or were there any differences?

HILDEBRANDT: No, the conditions were the same as in France, only that the deputies of the Plenipotentiary General were, from the very beginning, incorporated into the military administration.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any reports or discover anything yourself about irregularities in that territory?

HILDEBRANDT: Yes. There were isolated cases of irregularities. For instance, I was informed one day that reprisals were to be taken against relatives of members of age groups who had not appeared when they were called up. We stopped that immediately by discussing the matter with the representatives of the military commander.

HILDEBRANDT: He also told him what he wanted. Von Falkenhausen was, of course, also interested in the first place in having orders for the German armaments industry carried out in Belgium; but it was also agreed that manpower should be sent to Germany. He certainly made frequent efforts to protect students, school children, and members of younger age groups.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I will show you the minutes of an interrogation of General Von Falkenhausen on 27 November 1945. I want you to look at a few sentences. If you take Page 2, you will find there in the middle of the page, in answer to the question: “Is the witness in a position...”

“Is the witness in a position to define to us the limitations of his powers and the competence of the administration for the Allocation of Labor?”

“Up to a certain time there was a labor office in my territory which was concerned with the recruiting of voluntary workers. I cannot remember the exact date any longer—it may have been in the fall of 1942—when the labor office was put under Sauckel; and from then on I had only to carry out the orders I received from him.”

HILDEBRANDT: It is not quite correct in several points. In Belgium there was not just one labor office, but a number of labor offices which dealt with the recruiting of volunteers, and also a number of recruiting offices which worked with them. But from the very beginning these labor organizations worked under the supervision of the Feldkommandanturen in Belgium. These Feldkommandanturen were offices of the military commander. There was no question of the Plenipotentiary General taking over the work. Before he appointed his deputies he could only send his requests directly to the military administration, to General Von Falkenhausen, but not directly to a labor office.

DR. SERVATIUS: What were the conditions in Holland? Who was the competent district head there?

HILDEBRANDT: Yes, a deputy was appointed there too, who was a member of the administration of the Reich Commissioner.

HILDEBRANDT: As far as I remember there were Dutch labor offices. The heads of these labor offices were Germans; the rest of the personnel was mainly Dutch. These offices took the necessary steps for the allocation of labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I have one more question concerning Germany. The metal industries came into your field, did they not?

DR. SERVATIUS: What kind of reports did you receive about conditions in the Krupp works as far as the welfare of the workmen was concerned?

HILDEBRANDT: I had no unfavorable reports about Krupp. The personal adviser of the Plenipotentiary General, Landrat Berk, visited the Krupp works frequently and informed me of the requests made by the firm and of the impressions he had received, but he never said that proper care was not taken of foreign workmen. I myself never visited the Krupp firm during the war.

M. HERZOG: Mr. President, we have the same problems here. The Tribunal has already heard explanations on these points. The Tribunal is in possession of the documents which I have submitted, and I have, therefore, no questions to put to the witness.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the witness Stothfang.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat these words after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

STOTHFANG: I was personal adviser to the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.

STOTHFANG: One year after the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor had assumed office; that was on 19 April 1943.

STOTHFANG: The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor did not give any special personal directives because his general principles could be clearly seen in his decrees and in his program, and I only started work 1 year later.

STOTHFANG: Yes, I had been connected with that type of work since 1926; and for the last 8 years I was the personal assistant of State Secretary Dr. Syrup in the Ministry of Labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: What did your colleagues in the office tell you about the whole work, and Sauckel’s attitude to the work?

STOTHFANG: The work, as such, was carried out according to principles and decrees which were not essentially different to previous ones. In practice of course, they were much more far reaching than anything hitherto.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you work very closely with Sauckel in your sphere? You were his personal assistant.

STOTHFANG: As far as that was necessary for carrying out the task of the Plenipotentiary General for the war effort. Sauckel was not only Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, but at the same time he had remained Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter in Thuringia. Besides that, during the last 1½ years of his activities, he was very much occupied with the construction of an underground factory in Kahle, in Thuringia; so that he...

STOTHFANG: ...could only be in Berlin from time to time; at the most 1 day a week, and often only half a day.

STOTHFANG: We had to receive incoming mail, sort out what had to be reported, and pass on the rest to the competent departments. We also had to submit newly arrived drafts to the Plenipotentiary General.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you participate in conferences to which individual members returned from so-called inspection trips and made their reports?

STOTHFANG: Later that no longer happened or only very seldom. It was only in the beginning.

DR. SERVATIUS: During the period when you were present, did you learn of anything particularly shocking as regards irregularities in Germany? We will include transports to Germany, transit camps, the work shops themselves, the camps, and the factories.

STOTHFANG: I myself found out about some irregularities on the occasion of inspection trips which I made on orders, but these were at once discussed with the competent offices and steps were taken to put a stop to them.

DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel had to work with a number of offices. Was there any special opposition to overcome here?

STOTHFANG: One was the Party Chancellery; and the other was the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the Secret State Police.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know of specific instances in the case of the Reichsführer SS?

STOTHFANG: The general treatment of foreign workers—particularly of those coming from the East—as far as it was determined by the Reichsführer SS or the principles laid down by the Reichsführer SS, was contrary to the ideas of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The Reichsführer SS was not inclined to meet the far-reaching, definite demands of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The same thing happened, in other directions, in the case of the head of the Party Chancellery.

STOTHFANG: For example, where social insurance was concerned. In this case the Party Chancellery was of the opinion that equality with German workers was not justified on either practical or political grounds; nor was as high a rate of pay.

STOTHFANG: He tried, again and again, to regulate all these matters according to his principles. In some things he was definitely unsuccessful, and in others he was successful only after great efforts. I would remind you of the equal status given to the Eastern Workers which was actually only put into effect in March 1945 through a decree.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive any special reports from the Gauleiter who were appointed deputies for the Allocation of Labor, or did you speak to the Gauleiter?

STOTHFANG: There were instructions that on inspection trips the competent Gauleiter of the district visited had to be seen, so that any relevant questions could be discussed with him.

STOTHFANG: I went to one single meeting of the Central Planning Board with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have just mentioned March 1945 as the date when the Eastern Workers were given equality with the rest of the workers. Are you not mistaken in the year—1944? I will show you the decree.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I will have it shown to the witness in a moment; we are looking for it.

STOTHFANG: Apparently the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was due to a suggestion which Minister Speer had made to the Führer.

DR. SERVATIUS: I refer to Document 58, in Document Book Number 2, Page 167 of the German text, and Page 156 of the English text. That is the decree concerning the conditions of employment of Eastern Workers, of 25 March 1944, and I read Paragraph 2:

“Wages.

“For Eastern Workers the same conditions apply for wages and salary as for other foreign workers. Eastern Workers are paid wages only for work they actually do.”

STOTHFANG: It was a fundamental rule that they must be based on the German wages for the same type of work, in order to avoid additional profits for the industries which employed Eastern Workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you remember a conference at which Goebbels stated his opinion to Sauckel as regards the latter’s policy concerning social questions and questions of wages?

STOTHFANG: I myself did not take part in that conference. I only knew about it from the description given by my colleague Dr. Hildebrandt, who was present at the meeting with Gauleiter Sauckel.

It was the first discussion between the two gentlemen after Reich Minister Goebbels had become Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War Effort. At this conference Minister Speer was also present, and in the course of the conference Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels reproached the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor with the fact his previous measures...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Hildebrandt has been in the witness box and he has not been asked about it.

DR. SERVATIUS: There has been confusion of the two witnesses. They arrived only a short time ago. I ask permission for this witness to say what Hildebrandt told him. It can be explained by the fact that the witness was here for only a very short time.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, the Tribunal does not think that you ought to be allowed to ask him that question.

STOTHFANG: Not at the beginning. In the course of years difficulties arose because of the fundamentally different ideas of the two men.

THE PRESIDENT: We have had the relationships between Sauckel and Speer gone into elaborately.

[Turning to the witness.] What did the offices have to do with the employment of concentration camp prisoners? Did they deal with that?

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not receive reports that manpower was disappearing from other industries, and in this way became concentration camp workers?

DR. SERVATIUS: Are you aware that concentration camp workers were employed in large numbers for work?

STOTHFANG: No. An effort was made to gain influence to the extent of having reports sent to the offices of the labor administration concerning the employment of concentration camp prisoners, so that they could be considered in the general planning of labor allocation. But these reports were not received by the labor offices.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now I have only a few more questions concerning the control offices, and other control agencies, which had been established in order to investigate conditions among the workers in Germany. Do you know how far foreign workers themselves were included in that control system? I am thinking first of all of the office of Ambassador Scapini. How did this office work? Did you hear anything about it?

STOTHFANG: I do not know many details about the office of Scapini. I know of its existence, but to the best of my knowledge Scapini’s office was chiefly occupied with the welfare of French prisoners of war rather than with the welfare of French civilian workers, because for the latter a special office existed under M. Brunedon. But generally the foreign workers were represented by the German Labor Front. So-called Reich liaison offices were set up everywhere, from the central office via the Gaue to the small districts, and each employed several people who visited the camps, listened to complaints and negotiated with the offices of the German Labor Front, or with other offices of the labor administration.

STOTHFANG: No; they were foreign employees from countries abroad, in fact from almost every country.

DR. SERVATIUS: In the factories themselves, did the workmen have any representatives who had contact, as liaison men, with the supervisory offices of the German Labor Front?

DR. SERVATIUS: For the Eastern Workers there was also a control office. Do you know that office?

STOTHFANG: In Rosenberg’s department there was a special one for that purpose.

STOTHFANG: Yes. It had regular contact with the technically competent offices of the labor administration.

DR. SERVATIUS: And whom had this office to contact if it received complaints? The Labor Front, Sauckel’s office, or the Minister of Labor? To whom did they have to go?

STOTHFANG: That depended on the nature of the irregularities, or the complaints which were made.

STOTHFANG: In that case one had to go first to the competent local labor office in order to have detailed inquiries made into the case, and to see about the general conditions, or the actual conditions.

DR. SERVATIUS: And if it was a matter of housing and nutrition, to whom did one go?

STOTHFANG: First to the offices of the German Labor Front, which, by a decree of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor—I believe it was Decree Number 4—was given the general task of looking after the foreign workers.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then the Labor Front itself, in fact, was the highest authority for questions of complaints about the welfare of workers?

DR. SERVATIUS: Who supervised the treatment of prisoners of war? Did the complaints come to Sauckel?

DR. SERVATIUS: The Reich Inspection Board was also a control office. What did Sauckel have to do with the Reich Inspection Board?

STOTHFANG: That must be an incorrect designation. I do not know what you mean by the Reich Inspection Board.

DR. SERVATIUS: I mean the Trade Inspection Board, the Reich Trade Inspection Board.

STOTHFANG: In Germany the trade inspection boards in principle were competent for labor protection in factories. As far as labor protection in factories was concerned, they had to see that the decrees which had been issued, and were in force, were carried out and obeyed. Therefore in case of complaints they were the competent authorities.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was Sauckel accused by other offices of looking after the workmen too well? And was there not, in some cases, even envy of the situation of certain foreign workers?

STOTHFANG: Yes. Such accusations came from three places. First, from the two offices I mentioned before, which offered general objections and resistance to the far-reaching demands of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. Then Bormann’s office, and Himmler’s office. It went so far that the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was even suspected of being pro-Bolshevik.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I do not know whether the witness Jäger has arrived yet.

DR. SERVATIUS: I assume that he will be here by Monday, and I would suggest that I be permitted to submit some documents now, or perhaps an interrogation of the witness Goetz, which is in the document book. Perhaps I may refer to several passages. It is a very long affidavit, and it throws some light on the matter in this connection and will make it easier to understand.

THE PRESIDENT: You probably have some remarks to make about your documents, have you not, which will take you up until 1 o’clock?

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the document books contain primarily the decrees which Sauckel issued, and they cover what has been said here by the witnesses and by the defendant himself as a witness. As far as possible, the book is divided up into sections dealing with special subjects, but as the decrees which were issued frequently applied to several subjects at the same time, the separate divisions overlap in this book.

I refer principally to Volume I, to all the decrees included there, which I do not want to read individually. I should like only to call special attention to the decrees about police matters. That is Document 6, which is on Page 16; Document 10, on Page 20; and Document 15, on Page 25. These documents...

THE PRESIDENT: You understand that you must offer in evidence each document or number of documents that you want to put in evidence? It is not sufficient to put it in your document book. So please state the document which you wish to put in evidence.

DR. SERVATIUS: These documents are included in a collection of laws which has already been submitted.

DR. SERVATIUS: It has, as far as I know. That is Document Number 3044-PS: “Enactments, Decrees, Announcements.”

THE PRESIDENT: Well, probably only a small part of 3044-PS has been read and, therefore, unless it is translated into the four languages, it does not form part of the record. Dr. Servatius, if you will go into the matter and offer what you want to offer in evidence on Monday morning, that will be quite satisfactory.

DR. SERVATIUS: But may I refer to them now, and then submit the documents on Monday?

DR. SERVATIUS: These three decrees and enactments of the Reichsführer SS I have submitted in order to show how efforts were made at improvement even in this difficult field. Decree Number 6 was issued shortly before Sauckel came into office, and one must assume that this was done in order to produce a fait accompli.

The next decree, Document Number 10, already shows an improvement. It deals with the barbed wire and the workers’ outings, and this is even more relaxed in the next document. Document Number 15, that is Decree Number 4, which has already been submitted, is probably the most important first decree, which describes the fundamental authority and directives, as well as recruiting methods, transportation, and treatment in Germany.

Decree Number 16 deals with the employment of Eastern Workers and gives the first basic regulations, because until then there was no definite legal regulation of a uniform type.

Then I come to Document Number 19, which is on Page 54 in the English text. This is a decree and a letter from Sauckel to the Gau labor offices and the Gauleiter, of 14 October 1942, concerning good treatment for foreign workers. This letter is an intervention on the part of Sauckel to remove poor conditions and to correct certain abuses of which he had been informed. I quote here in the German text on Page 59 the following...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that document has been quoted already I think, hasn’t it?

DR. SERVATIUS: Heading: “Decree and letter of Sauckel dated 14 October 1942,” and on the next page the text begins. The first page contains only the title of the decree.

THE PRESIDENT: But Page 55 in the English text, the beginning of the document has already been read.

DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to read the whole thing in order to show how far Sauckel...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you see, beginning with the words, “If in a Gau district the statement was recently still made,” that has been read already, down to the bottom of that paragraph.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have here only a short note. If it has already been read, then I need not read it again. I will dispense with the reading.

Document Number 20 on Page 56 in the English document book deals with compulsory labor service for foreign female domestic help and shows the regulations in force at that time...

DR. SERVATIUS: ...whereby it is pointed out particularly that a forced transfer of foreign women for domestic help would not be carried out; and the statement made by Sauckel emphasizes that only voluntary workers should be taken for domestic employment.

Decree Number 21 introduces the labor book. That is in the English text on Page 57. The purpose of the labor book was, as Sauckel has stated here, to facilitate a registration of manpower, so that one could review it and not lose control. Above all, in connection with this, there was to be an allocation of land to the Eastern Workers, as the Defendant Sauckel has explained. A central file was to be compiled, and with the help of this the regular transportation of the workers home again was to be arranged at a later date. That was the preparatory measure of the labor book.

Then we come to Document Number 22, of 23 July 1943, which deals with the limitation of the duration of employment of Eastern Workers. It is said in this connection that the duration of employment should be for 2 years, with certain modifications, and that there should be facilities for leave, and premiums should be given for the work done. There was to be leave in Germany, and, under certain conditions, home leave. For vacations in Germany, as can be seen here, special leave camps were set up for Eastern Workers. The reason was that, on account of transport conditions and other circumstances, these workers could not go home, especially if they came from territories which in the meantime were no longer occupied by Germans.

Then there follows Decree Number 13. That is Document Number 23, Page 62 in the English document book. This decree deals with the keeping of order in factories and works. It is the decree on the basis of which measures could be taken for the maintenance of discipline. I have submitted it in order to show that it was valid both for German and for foreign workers, and is not a decree which discriminates against Eastern Workers.

Now I will refer to Document Number 26. That is Page 66 in the English document book. This is a decree of 25 July 1944 according to which the position of female domestic workers from the East was in principle to be equal to that of the German domestic help. Working hours are regulated and also time off. It reads: “Every week the female Eastern Worker is to have an adequate amount of free time.”

The question of vacations is regulated in Paragraph 7, to the effect that they will be granted leave after 12 months’ work in Reich territory.

THE PRESIDENT: Are those figures right in Document 26, Page 67 in the English document book? Working hours to fall between 6 o’clock in the morning and 9 o’clock at night?

DR. SERVATIUS: It says there: “The regular working hours, including rest periods and preparation for work, are to fall between 0600 and 2100 hours, unless special conditions call for other arrangements.” That does not mean that the work is to be done from 6 o’clock in the morning until 9 o’clock at night. It means that between these two time limits these people have to work. They cannot work before 6 o’clock in the morning, and these girls cannot work after 9 o’clock at night. It cannot...

Document 27 deals with the position of foreign workers in factories. It is a decree of the German Labor Front and there are one or two basic statements made in it. Here for example:

“The pleasure they take in their work and the willingness of German workers must in no circumstances be endangered by preferential treatment for foreign workers.

“As regards the treatment of foreign workers, it must be taken into consideration that they came to Germany voluntarily and are giving us their services for the carrying out of tasks of military importance. In order to maintain their pleasure in their work, the conditions of their contracts must be respected, and absolutely fair treatment and comprehensive care and attention must be given them.”

Document 28 is the agreement between Ley and Sauckel instituting the supervision by the Central Inspectorate. It has already been submitted by the Prosecution.

“The Reich Inspectorate, with regard to allocation of labor, affairs of the Reich Trustee, and administration, is entrusted with the following tasks:

“The supervision of the execution of my regulations and decrees. On the basis of the practical knowledge gained, the Reich Inspectorate is to make suggestions, propose improvements and foster mutual exchange of experiences.”

The last document in this book deals with the establishment of French offices. It is in the English document book on Page 79, and is entitled, “French agencies for the care of the French workers employed in the Reich.”

I believe I have already read the document here. With that, I have finished Document Book 1.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 3 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

Morning Session

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the witness Jäger is to appear in about half an hour. I shall read some other documents from my document book, if it please the Tribunal.

In the last session I had read all the documents from the first document book with the exception of Document Sauckel-16, which I left out by mistake. It is a leaflet for Eastern Workers. I need not read it, but I shall refer to it.

I have submitted as Exhibit Sauckel-1 the Handbuch für die Dienststellen ... (Manual for Labor Employment), and in this exhibit we find the following documents which I have read in part, and shall read some now: Documents Sauckel-12, 13, 15, 22, 28, 58(a), 67(a), 82, 83, 85, 86, and 88.

Then, I have submitted Exhibit Sauckel-2, Sonderveröffentlichung des Reichsarbeitsblattes (Special Publication of the Reichsarbeitsblatt)—namely, Einsatzbedingungen der Ostarbeiter, sowie der sowjetrussischen Kriegsgefangenen (Conditions for the Employment of Eastern Workers and Soviet Russian Prisoners of War), which contains the following documents: Documents Sauckel-6, 32, 36, 39, 47, and 52.

Then, as Exhibit Sauckel-3, I have submitted the Manifest des Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz (Manifesto of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor), Document Sauckel-84.

Then, as Exhibit Sauckel-4, Arbeitsgesetze: Textsammlung des Deutschen Arbeitsrechtes (Labor Laws: Collection of German Laws), which contains Documents Sauckel-16, 31, and 49.

As Exhibit Sauckel-5, I have submitted a book, Fritz Sauckels Kampfreden (Fritz Sauckel’s Battle Speeches). That is Document Sauckel-95.

As Exhibit Sauckel-6, Nationalsozialistische Regierungstätigkeit in Thüringen, 1932-33 (National Socialist Governmental Activity in Thuringia, 1932-33), has been submitted. It is contained in Document Sauckel-96.

Exhibit Sauckel-7, Nationalsozialistische Regierungstätigkeit in Thüringen, 1933-34 (National Socialist Governmental Activity in Thuringia, 1933-34), is contained in Document Sauckel-97.

I have once more submitted as Exhibit Sauckel-8 the publication entitled Europa arbeitet in Deutschland (Europe Works in Germany), which has already been submitted as Document RF-5.

Then I shall submit an affidavit of Sauckel’s son, Dieter Sauckel, which is very short. It refers to the evacuation of the Buchenwald Camp which Sauckel is said to have ordered. I shall read the eight lines of the affidavit:

“Between 4 and 7 April 1945, approximately, I was present when my father, Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel, had a conference in his study. On this occasion the question of the Buchenwald Camp was discussed, and the following was decided: A certain number of guards should remain in the camp until the arrival of the enemy in order to hand the camp prisoners over to them.”—This is Sauckel Document Book 3, Document Sauckel-94, Page 247.

“I swear to the truth of the preceding statement for the purpose of having it submitted to the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg.

“I am ready to swear upon oath to the truth of my statement. Schönau, 22 March 1946. Dieter Sauckel.”

In Exhibit USA-206, Document 3044-PS, which has been submitted already, the following documents of Volume II are contained, which I shall read later: Sauckel-7, 10, 14, 18, 19, 27, and 41.

The documents which have not been read yet are in the official collections of laws. I have had the individual laws laid aside in the library. I do not know whether it is necessary to submit them individually, or whether it is sufficient for me to state here in what volume of the Reichsgesetzblatt they can be found.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. They are short excerpts from the official legal gazettes. In each case the relevant passages have been extracted.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I think it would be convenient if you gave their exhibit numbers, if they are in your book; but I do not quite understand how you are arranging these. You told us that Number 1 contained a great number of other numbers. Now is Number 1 the exhibit number?

DR. SERVATIUS: Number 1 is the exhibit number, and this exhibit contains these documents with the numbers they have in the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I understand. So that you are only submitting—up to the present you have only got as far as nine exhibits.

THE PRESIDENT: And then you are going to give these various laws which you have in your books additional exhibit numbers. They will be 10 to...

DR. SERVATIUS: I did not know whether it was necessary to submit these Reich legal gazettes as exhibits. As far as I know they have already been submitted because they are an official collection of laws from the Reichsgesetzblatt of 1942 and 1940. Of course, I can take out these individual issues and submit them here.

THE PRESIDENT: Would it not be best if you submitted them as, say, Exhibit 10, and then told us the numbers in your books which are contained in Number 10?

DR. SERVATIUS: Then it would be necessary to submit the original text of the collection of laws. I wanted to avoid that.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them. I shall point out in what volumes these documents can be found. That will be Reichsgesetzblatt 1942 in which Documents Sauckel-8, 11, and 17 are contained; Reichsgesetzblatt 1940 which contains Document Sauckel-45; Reichsgesetzblatt 1943, which contains Document Sauckel-21...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Which was the first Reichsgesetzblatt? The one which contained 8, 11, and 17?

DR. SERVATIUS: The second was Reichsgesetzblatt 1940, with Document Sauckel-45. The third was Reichsgesetzblatt 1943, with Document Sauckel-21. The fourth is Reichsarbeitsblatt 1940, Document Sauckel-33...

DR. SERVATIUS: 1940. Reichsarbeitsblatt, Document Sauckel-33. The fifth is Reichsarbeitsblatt 1942, which contains Documents Sauckel-9, 35, 40, 46, 50, 51, 64(a). The sixth, Reichsarbeitsblatt 1943, contains Documents Sauckel-20, 23, 37, 42, 43, 44, 48, 54, 55, 57, 60, 60(a), 61, 62, 64, and 68.

And the last, Reichsarbeitsblatt 1944, has Documents Sauckel-26, 30, 38, 58, 59, 65, 67, and 89.

I shall now go briefly through the document book. I begin with Sauckel Document Book 2, Document Sauckel-32, “Orders and Decrees Concerning the Employment of Prisoners of War.” That is the agreement of 27 July 1939. This is an excerpt concerning the work of prisoners of war, and in Article 31 prohibited labor is listed.

In the next document, Sauckel-33, there is a decree of the Reich Minister of Labor, “Use of Prisoners of War in Places of Work.” There the types of work for which these prisoners of war are being used are listed in detail. Among the types of work not included is the manufacture of arms; but included is work in factories, agriculture, forestry, work on roads, canals, and dams of importance to the war, work in brickyards, and so forth, as can be read in detail.

In Document Sauckel-35 we can see how the employment of prisoners of war took place, namely by co-operation between the prisoner-of-war camp and the contractors, and how a contract regulated in detail the conditions under which the employment of prisoners of war took place. It can be seen from this that Sauckel’s labor recruitment had nothing to do with that.

In Document Sauckel-36 we find a circular decree concerning the treatment of prisoners of war—a memorandum concerning the treatment of prisoners of war—which was drawn up jointly by the OKW and the Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda:

“Treatment of prisoners of war: Prisoners of war must be treated in such a way that their full production capacity may benefit industry and food economy. To insure this, sufficient nourishment is necessary.”

Document Sauckel-37 deals with the question of an improved status, namely the conversion of prisoners of war into civilian workers for work of importance to the war in Germany. It shows that in this case they get special allowances, such as an allowance of money for maintaining a separate household—a so-called compassionate pay. It shows that these workers were treated like civilian workers.

The next document, Sauckel-38, is along the same lines and deals with the visits of relatives to French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of war and to Italian military internees in the Reich. It says there:

“Visits to French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of war as well as to Italian military internees are permitted only for wives, parents, children, and brothers and sisters, who work in Germany or have their homes in Alsace or Lorraine, and then only on Sundays and holidays.”

Document Sauckel-39 is a memorandum with respect to general conditions valid for the employment of prisoners of war. It deals with the working hours: “The daily working hours, including the time of marching to and from work, should not be excessive.” And in another passage it says, “The prisoners of war have a right to a continuous rest period of 24 hours, to be granted on Sundays when possible...”

Under Paragraph 7 it is stated that neither the employer, nor his relatives, nor his employees are entitled to carry out any punitive measures against prisoners of war.

Then there follows an excerpt about housing and other accommodation in camps. It is Document Sauckel-40, which decrees—on the basis of Sauckel’s Order Number 9—the inspection of housing, food, heating, and upkeep of the camps by workmen employed at the camps. It is dated 14 July 1942. It says:

“By 10 August 1942 an inspection of all industrial establishments employing foreign labor must be made by all labor offices in their respective districts to determine whether they have duly carried out regulations and decrees governing housing, feeding, and treatment of all foreign male and female workers and prisoners of war. It is my desire that the offices of the NSDAP and the DAF should participate in this inspection to a proportionate extent. Where shortcomings are discovered, the manager of the works is to be given a time limit within which such shortcomings are to be remedied.”

Further on, under 2(a) it is stated that provision should be made for feeding in winter. And finally: “All factories are to make provision for camps and billets to be heated when cold weather sets in and to see that the necessary fuel is ordered in time.” The decree states at the end that workmen, paid by the factories, are to be employed in the camps to see to the upkeep of the camps.

Then there is Document Sauckel-18, a memorandum for works managers and Eastern Workers, which contains camp rules. The introduction says:

“In response to a wish of the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, I recommend that the officials satisfy themselves from time to time that the regulations issued with respect to the employment of Eastern Workers are being adhered to within the establishments.”

“Eastern Workers, you are finding in Germany wages and bread, and by your work you are safeguarding the maintenance of your families....”

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Could you not summarize these documents more shortly?

DR. SERVATIUS: Document Sauckel-41 shows that caring for the Eastern Workers was especially the task of the German Labor Front, which is explained here in detail.

Document Sauckel-42 deals with the same subject. It stresses above all the importance of trade inspection and says that all necessary measures for the welfare of foreign workers must be taken immediately and all shortcomings remedied at once. The inspection officials and the local authorities have to arrange matters together with the Labor Front. It is issued by Reich Minister of Labor Seldte, not by Sauckel, which makes it evident that Sauckel had not become the Reich Minister of Labor.

In Document Sauckel-43 there are explanations of the camp regulations to which I shall refer in detail later. But in Document Sauckel-43 I should like to stress again the position of the Trade Inspection Board. Here the question of responsibility for hygienic conditions and for the extermination of vermin is regulated; and it says at the end: “The supervisory authority in accordance with the new regulations is the Trade Inspection Board....”

Document Sauckel-44 contains specifications about sleeping quarters: Their size, the number of beds, and the administration of medical care. This again is signed by the Reich Minister of Labor, Franz Seldte, and not by Sauckel.

The next group of documents deals with food. Document Sauckel-45 is the meat inspection law which deals with the question of how far meat of inferior quality is fit for consumption. That law too has a certain importance with regard to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, about the inspection of meat, we do not require any further information about it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Document Sauckel-46 shows merely that the foreign workers received their food ration cards when away from the camp.

Document Sauckel-47 is a decree by the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, and shows that he was responsible for determining the food quotas. The document also gives the rations. I mention only a few: For the ordinary workers, 2,600 grams of bread per week. That increases, and it may be read here, if questions of importance...

THE PRESIDENT: Page 128 shows that prisoners of war are employed in the armament industry, does it not? Page 128.

DR. SERVATIUS: It says there: “Food rations of Soviet prisoners of war working in the armament industry or in trade industries, if they are accommodated in camps...” and then follows a list of rations. I cannot see how far that shows...

THE PRESIDENT: 128 in English, Page 128, Lines 4 to 12: “Treatment of the sick. All prisoners of war and Eastern Workers, male and female, who are employed in the armament industry...”

DR. SERVATIUS: It says there, “All prisoners of war or Eastern Workers ... who are employed in the armament industry...” Armament industry is not the manufacture of weapons.

Document Sauckel-48 only refers to a law—I see the translation department has left out a short paragraph, but I can do without that. The heading indicates the subject. It refers to taking food for the journey home. It thus concerns supplies for the return journey.

Document Sauckel-49 shows a regulation whereby additional food could also be given; and special diets in the hospitals were also provided.

In the next group, questions of wages are dealt with. The first decree is Document Sauckel-50.

THE PRESIDENT: How far you go—it seems to me sufficient if you give us a group, and then tell us what it deals with.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. That is from Documents Sauckel-50 to 59, omitting Document Sauckel-56. The questions of wages and scales of wages are included here. One will have to look at these more carefully if these questions become crucial. Therefore, I shall not make any further specific statements about that now.

Sauckel Document Book Number 3 is a group of documents containing legal orders. Documents Sauckel-60 to 68 refer to medical care. I believe here also I need not go through the individual documents, because they become of interest only when the subject is dealt with.

THE PRESIDENT: Give us a group and tell us what it is about, and then we can look at it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. It deals with medical care; and as I said, the details become of interest only when the question becomes important. There is no point in speaking of them now.

The next group is speeches made by Sauckel on the subject of labor allocation, and they are contained in the manual. I should like to refer to one in particular—a speech of 6 January 1943 which was made after the conference between Sauckel and Rosenberg. It says there at the beginning: “The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor on 5 and 6 January...”

DR. SERVATIUS: It is 204 in my book, and in the English text it should also be Page 204.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, it should be 800. I have also mentioned that document already, and read the main parts.

Documents Sauckel-82 and 83 have also been mentioned already in their essential parts.

Document Sauckel-85 shows the generally valid and binding principles followed by Sauckel, all of them well-known principles. The main fact is that after 1943 they showed the same tendency as they had before.

Document Sauckel-86 is a later speech—a speech of 24 August 1943—to the presidents of the Gau labor offices. Here again in his speech to the responsible Gau labor presidents Sauckel stresses his basic attitude, as he has often stated it here. He adheres to the same attitude on 17 January 1944—that is, Document Sauckel-88—when he again emphasizes to these presidents, that:

“The foreign workers must be treated better. The reception camps are not to be primitive; rather they must be a recommendation for us.”

“The more I do for the foreign laborers working in Germany, the better I treat them, the more I influence them—the greater the extent of their available production capacity.”

And that was shortly—2 months—before he succeeded in putting the other foreign workers on an equal footing with the German workers.

THE PRESIDENT: ...that the work was carried on. And will you tell us where the group of speeches—how far does the group go?

Document Sauckel-94 I have read already. Documents Sauckel-95, 96, 97 I have already read to the extent necessary. And that brings me to the end of the presentation of documents.

Now, comes an affidavit of the witness Karl Goetz, which is included in the document book. I submit it as Exhibit Number 10, the affidavit by Karl Goetz. This is an interrogatory which was submitted very early and was therefore considered in a very abridged form, as the details had not become apparent at that time. Consequently, the witness answered very shortly and could say nothing specific to a number of questions. Where he did answer the questions, he refers to an introduction which he wrote, and in answering the questions raised by the Prosecution he also refers to that introduction. Therefore, I believe that I might also read this introduction as far as is necessary.

The affidavit is of 20 March 1946. In this introduction, on the second page, I should like to call attention to a conference in Paris. This witness Goetz was a bank expert in Weimar. He had known Sauckel before and had worked on his staff of experts. He had been with him in Paris and had taken part in the negotiations with Laval. He says here:

“The negotiations led to an extensive talk, which was conducted in a proper and polite manner as far as I could judge. Laval took note of Sauckel’s proposals and agreed to accede to his request. But he made counterproposals...”

I do not think I need go into detail, because what was then negotiated is of minor significance. He says on the third page:

“During a later conference in Paris the proceedings were similar. Laval assumed a stiffer attitude, and he pointed out the great difficulties which would impede the recruitment of additional workers. He emphasized in particular the necessity of not stripping the French labor market of its best forces.”

“My last mission, at Sauckel’s request, was to ascertain whether it was possible by means of using our banking connections to purchase an additional amount of grain in Romania and Hungary—about 50,000 to 100,000 tons was the figure given. This grain was to be used as additional food for foreign laborers in the form of a light afternoon meal.”

Then he says that that project failed due to circumstances. He gives a general impression of Sauckel, and says briefly:

“Sauckel approached that task with the energy and vigor peculiar to him. He pointed out repeatedly what conditions were necessary for the success of the task and repeatedly emphasized that it was the major duty of all authorities to see that correct treatment was given to workers at their places of employment.”

“Above all, he demanded that foreign workers should not be given the feeling of being imprisoned in their camps. He demanded the removal of all barbed wire fences.”

“...Sauckel said that the workers must return to their native countries as propaganda agents.”

Then the witness gives an important statement concerning information as to atrocities and bad conditions. I should like to read something from Page 6 to show what kind of person this witness Goetz is. He says...

DR. SERVATIUS: Page 6, or Page 266 of the document book, at the top of the page.

“I feel also that I should mention that following my arrest by the Gestapo, after the affair of 20 July 1944, Sauckel spoke on my behalf to the RSHA (Kaltenbrunner). I cannot say to what extent my release from the Ravensbrück Concentration Camp was brought about by this.

“I wish to state further that I did not receive from Sauckel any material remuneration, awards, or decorations.

“I found it expedient to conceal from him my own inner political convictions and my connections with Goerdeler and Popitz. In his blind obedience to Hitler—and in spite of our old friendship—he would otherwise no doubt have handed me over to that Gestapo from which he endeavored to free me in November 1944.”

I have read this in advance and I return now to Page 265, because the witness, who was then working on Sauckel’s staff, states his attitude to that question which is of great interest to all of us. He says:

“Now that the extent of atrocities in concentration camps has become known to me from publications, I ponder and rack my brains as to how the picture drawn above can be made to tally with the events now brought to light. Although I have thought it over for weeks, I can find no explanation for this.”

DR. SERVATIUS: Page 265. It is near the top of the page. Where it is in the English text, I cannot say; but it should be Page 265.

DR. SERVATIUS: “On one side I see the foreign workers, men and women who move freely about in great numbers and associate with the German population. Frenchmen and Belgians, with whom I spoke out of personal interest, were usually happy to hear their native tongue, conversed freely, hoped the war would soon end, and criticized their work, but rarely sharply. On the other side appears the totally unbearable sight of the recently revealed mass atrocities. One had heard that foreign workers were tried and sentenced—they were certainly subject to the same arbitrariness and the same methods of punishment as were the natives—but not that mass sentences were passed. But that really had nothing to do with the Allocation of Labor. I find it impossible to reconcile what I heard and what I saw in those days with the present revelations. Either this was a development which took place in the last year and a half, when I was not able to observe the situation because of my arrest and my retirement to the country, or else there existed, besides the regular Allocation of Labor, an employment of concentration camp inmates on a vast scale. It is also possible that Sauckel was not able to supervise things and was not informed or that he deceived himself with his general orders and oral statements, which I could not comprehend.”

I considered these statements of particular importance, because the witness stood on the side of the men of 20 July 1944 and certainly observed carefully, and great importance has to be attached to his judgment.

As to the questions themselves, Question Number 1 and its answer I consider irrelevant; also, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. All of these are answers which are of minor importance.

“Who was responsible for the billeting, treatment, and feeding of foreign workers after they had arrived at the place of work?”

“The only thing I heard was that from the moment work was started responsibility for that rested with the factory managers, and in most cases with special employees under them.”

“What kind of orders did Sauckel issue for the treatment of workers in the factories?”

“Did Sauckel receive reports about irregular conditions? What measures did he take? Do you know of any individual cases?”

“I remember only one case. Sauckel was informed that the workers of a certain factory were still housed in a camp surrounded by barbed wire. I cannot recollect the name of the place or the factory concerned. I heard that he ordered the immediate removal of the fence.”

Then we come to the questions which are put by the Prosecution. I consider that Question Number 1 is not relevant because it deals with personal, unofficial relations with Sauckel, and how he became acquainted with him. He made his acquaintance when a prisoner of war.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, Mr. Biddle thinks that the Prosecution ought to be asked to read anything they wish to out of those interrogatories.

M. HERZOG: The Prosecution, Mr. President, does not wish to read any excerpts from this interrogatory.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you know that the witness Jäger is present, do you not?

DR. SERVATIUS: Then, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the witness Jäger.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, during the war you worked as a doctor with the firm of Krupp, in Essen, and were entrusted with the medical care of the camps of foreign workers? Is that true?

JÄGER: I was appointed by the firm of Krupp which employed me when a change in the care of foreign workers was brought about through the public health administration having to take it over.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were you not also appointed to this post by the German Labor Front?

JÄGER: No. The contract which the firm of Krupp made with me was made through the German Labor Front.

DR. SERVATIUS: If I understand you correctly, you did not conclude the contract directly with the Labor Front; but you were under obligations to the German Labor Front, were you not?

JÄGER: I have never felt that I had anything to do with the Labor Front in that respect.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, did you not continuously send reports to the German Labor Front about the conditions in the camps?

JÄGER: That happened only in a few cases, as far as I can remember. I generally sent these reports to the public health authorities and to the firm of Krupp.

JÄGER: Not always. I reported just a few cases to the health office of the city of Essen, but only in individual cases when it appeared important to me that the health office should be informed.

DR. SERVATIUS: I do not mean the locality, but with what office was it connected? Was it not with the German Labor Front?

JÄGER: I cannot say that precisely. I know only that it was a subdepartment of the public health administration in Essen.

DR. SERVATIUS: Is it known to you that the foreign workers were under the care and control of the German Labor Front?

JÄGER: On only one occasion did I meet a commission from the Labor Front in my camp.

JÄGER: An institution of that kind was to have been created in Essen, but it did not happen. At that time, when we had just had a typhus epidemic, I suggested to the health officer—who was then Dr. Heinz Bühler of Mühlheim—that something of the sort should be instituted. Then also at a meeting I spoke about my idea, but I did not hear anything more about this Gau office for camp doctors.

JÄGER: That varied. First, there may have been 5 or 6, then later maybe 17 or 18, and later again it fell to a lower figure. But I am not able at this moment to give you the exact figure.

JÄGER: Above all, I was supposed to assure the medical care of foreign workers.

JÄGER: Only when they were brought to me and when I was in the camps. I always concerned myself personally with individual cases in the camps whenever I inspected them.

DR. SERVATIUS: You had not only a supervisory capacity, but you also gave treatment yourself?

JÄGER: Whenever I was in a camp I would be consulted by the camp doctors and I would advise them.

JÄGER: The camp doctors had their daily duty in the infirmary and the care of the patients in general.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the Prosecution has repeatedly interrogated you outside this courtroom?

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you make an affidavit about the conditions in the Krupp camps?

DR. SERVATIUS: I will put this affidavit to you. This is an affidavit of 15 October 1945. Did you give that affidavit as a witness for the Prosecution?

DR. SERVATIUS: Now I ask you to state whether you still stand by the statements which you made at that time?

DR. SERVATIUS: I shall read the statements to you: “My name is Dr. Wilhelm Jäger. I am a physician in Essen...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, we cannot have the whole document read to him. You can put to him anything you want to challenge him upon.

“I began my work with a thorough inspection of the camps. At that time, in October 1942, I found the following conditions...”—and you go on to say—“The Eastern Workers were housed in the following camps: Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Spendlerstrasse, Hoegstrasse, Germaniastrasse, Dechenschule...”

[Turning to the witness.] Did these camps exist at the time, and were they occupied?

JÄGER: As far as I can remember. One has to take into consideration that until I started my work I did not know at all what camps existed. At a meeting which had been called, where there were doctors of the various nationalities, I asked first of all what camps there were. They did not know; and then a list was procured in which the camps were given. Then...

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have mentioned the camps here by name, and yet you are not certain that these camps existed at that time, in October 1942?

JÄGER: I have given the camps which existed at the beginning of my activities, as far as I could remember. I had to go to each one of these camps personally, and I had to depend entirely upon myself.

DR. SERVATIUS: Further, concerning the food of the Eastern Workers—if you will look at the second page of the document—you state the following:

“The food for the Eastern Workers was completely inadequate. They received 1,000 calories less per day than the minimum for Germans....”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, below the names of the camps he says: “...all surrounded by barbed wire and were closely guarded.” I understand you are challenging that?

DR. SERVATIUS: Were the camps surrounded by barbed wire and closely guarded, as it says here?

DR. SERVATIUS: But you do not know whether that was the same case in all camps, do you?

JÄGER: The camps which I visited, where I was as yet unknown, for instance, Krämerplatz and Dechenschule, were closely guarded, and I had to show my credentials in order to get in.

DR. SERVATIUS: I repeat the question concerning the food. You said the Eastern Workers received 1,000 calories less per day than the minimum for Germans. Whereas German workers who did hard work received 5,000 calories per day, the Eastern Workers who performed the same kind of work received only 2,000 calories per day. Is that true?

JÄGER: That was true at the beginning of my activities. The food for Eastern Workers—as could be seen from the posted lists—had been determined as to quantity, and there was a difference between that for Eastern Workers and that for German workers. The 5,000 calories mentioned here were given to specific categories of German workers who did the hardest type of work. That was not given to everybody.

I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this chart. That is an exact table of the calories to which the individual categories of workers were entitled. It begins with 9 February 1942 and shows the individual quotas for the various types of workers; and on the last page there is a summary of the average quotas of calories which were allotted.

It is shown there in the summary, Group 1. Eastern Workers and Soviet prisoners of war: Average workers, 2,156 calories; heavy workers, 2,615; very heavy workers, 2,909; for long hours and night workers, 2,244. Are you familiar with these figures?

DR. SERVATIUS: Will you compare that with what the German workers received: The normal consumer, 2,846 calories; heavy workers, 3,159; very heavy workers, 3,839; for long hours and night workers, 2,846 calories. Is that in accordance with your statement, according to which you said that German workers doing the heaviest work received 5,000 calories, whereas the Eastern Workers received only 2,000 calories?

THE PRESIDENT: It is very hard to follow these figures unless you give us the exact page. Are you on the last page?

DR. SERVATIUS: On the last page, the last sheet on the right side. First, there are the food groups 1, 2, 3 on different pages; and then on the last page, on the right side next to Group 3, which concerns the Poles, there is a summary of calories for Eastern Workers, for Germans, and for Poles. If you compare the amounts of calories here in the columns, that should tally with what the witness has stated. He singled out the very heavy workers and said that the Germans received 5,000 calories; the table shows that they received only 3,839. He also says the Eastern Workers received 2,000 calories; whereas, according to the table, they received 2,900—that is, instead of a proportion of 5,000 to 2,000, it is from 2,900 to 3,800—in round figures about 1,000 calories and not, as the witness has said here, 3,000 calories. Is that correct? Do you stand on your statement? A distinction has to be made...

MR. DODD: I think it would be more helpful to the Tribunal, and certainly to the Prosecution, if it were established who made up this chart, and whether or not the figures given here cover the camps where this witness had jurisdiction. From looking it over I cannot tell where it was made up, except on the front page it says:

“According to the food table by Dr. Hermann Schall, Medical Superintendent of the ‘Westend’ Sanatorium. Calculations of controlled foodstuffs for the camps of the firm of Krupp...”

And so on.

But these things can be made up by the bale and presented to witnesses. Unless there is some foundation laid, I think it is an improper way to cross-examine.

DR. SERVATIUS: The witness has the original. It is attached. May I ask the witness to return the document to me?

At the beginning of my activity the Eastern Workers’ food definitely differed from that of the German people, and also from that of the so-called western workers—the French, the Belgians, and so on. It can be seen from the figures that, even though it may not be stated exactly, at least there is a difference of 700 to 800 calories. In the beginning until, I believe, February or March 1943, the Eastern Workers received no additional rations for long hours, heavy work, or very heavy work. These additional quotas were given only after Sauckel had ordered it; and that was, if I remember correctly, at the beginning of 1943. At that time, as far as I remember, the Eastern Workers were put on an equal footing with the German workers as far as food was concerned; and they received additional rations for long hours, heavy work, and very heavy work, which they had not received at all before.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, if I understand you correctly, you want to say that this chart may be right but that in reality the workers did not receive what is listed on the chart. Did I understand you correctly?

DR. SERVATIUS: It was a difference of 3,000 calories which you mentioned, whereas the table shows a difference of about 1,000 calories.

JÄGER: I said before that there were individual categories of workers doing the heaviest type of work—such as stokers and miners—and that they received up to 5,200 calories. That, however, was not the rule. Only very special workers received up to 5,200 calories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then what you say here is not correct, because you did not mention that. You say generally that, whereas the German worker who did the heaviest type of work received 5,000 calories, the Eastern Workers who did the same type of work received only 2,000 calories per day. That is, however, a general statement; and it does not show that you are referring to exceptional cases of individual groups of workers. Is that correct?

JÄGER: That is the way I saw it, and I believe that you understand it as it appears here.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, where does this chart come from, and are you putting it in? Will you put it in?

DR. SERVATIUS: In the affidavit this assertion is made, and the witness said clearly at that time that the workers doing the heaviest type of work received 5,000 calories if they were German, and if they were Eastern Workers, they received only 2,000. That is a very clear statement in the affidavit, which is not in accordance with the chart.

THE PRESIDENT: No, I asked whether the affidavit refers to and identifies the chart, the chart which the witness has just had in his hand.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, you have put in an affidavit by Walter Hahn. Does that affidavit mention the chart and say where the chart comes from and by whom it was made up and to what it refers?

DR. SERVATIUS: The affidavit which is here as Document Number D-288 does not mention the chart, but only the affidavit which I have submitted. Now I understand it is the affidavit by the witness Hahn, and the chart is attached; and it is covered by the affidavit made by the witness. That document I submit in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: I said the affidavit by Walter Hahn—does it identify and is it attached to the chart? What page? There are seven pages, you know. We cannot find it unless you tell us.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you mean where it says, “The amount of calories contained in this food can be seen from the calorie table made by me which covers the whole period of the war”? Is that what you mean? That is on Page 4 of our copy. It is under the heading “C”: “Food Supply of French Prisoners of War and Italian Military Internees.”

DR. SERVATIUS: It is there, as I have said before, on Page 4 of the German text, where it says that the rations were based on calories; and that the caloric content of the food can be seen from the calculations made which cover the entire duration of the war. That is the document attached.

THE PRESIDENT: But it is all right to say that the document is attached, but it does not refer to it by any name.

DR. SERVATIUS: But the document is attached, so that it is obvious that it must belong to it.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I do not want to be contentious about this, but—maybe I do not understand—I think we ought to know when this schedule was made; by whom. This affidavit says it is an appendix. Maybe it was made by the man Hahn, but we do not know it yet; and this witness has not testified to it, and counsel has not told us.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the position is this, is it not: The man named Walter Hahn made an affidavit annexed to this chart. That affidavit is dated, I imagine...

THE PRESIDENT: ...after the affidavit had been made by this witness, and replies in detail to the evidence given by this witness.

MR. DODD: Yes. What I wanted to understand fully was that this schedule, concerning which this witness is being cross-examined, was apparently not made up at the time when he had responsibility for these camps; and so far it does not appear from the examination that that is so, and I think it would have great bearing on the weight of the evidence adduced through the cross-examination.

I would like to point out that it was the defense of Sauckel that he had nothing to do with the feeding and care of these workers after they came into Germany, but that it was the responsibility of the DAF. I think it might be more helpful if counsel cleared that up, so that we would know whether he does admit responsibility after they came in and whether that is the purpose of this cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The Tribunal does not think that you need interrupt your cross-examination. You can go on.

DR. SERVATIUS: The Prosecution has just made that assertion as an accusation against Sauckel. If the Prosecution today is of the opinion that Sauckel was not responsible for the happenings in the factories but rather the works manager was responsible and that he was not responsible for prisoners of war but that the Armed Forces were responsible for them, then I do not need this witness.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you have made some statements concerning the clothing of Eastern Workers. You said that they slept in the same clothes in which they had come from the East and that almost all of them had no overcoats and were therefore forced to use their blankets—even in cold and rainy weather—to carry their blankets in the place of coats.

Was it always like that, or only for a time? Was that a general occurrence or only an individual case?

JÄGER: In order to avoid another misunderstanding I have to state again: At the beginning of my activity I depended entirely on myself. There was no camp command. There was nobody else to work with me. The calorie tables as were as the clothing charts were not made until later.

The camp management which existed, according to Hahn—if I remember correctly—was only until February or April 1943. The phase which I intended to describe, and have described here, refers strictly to the time when I started my work. At that time the conditions were actually as I have described them, and I had to go by that. That also included clothing, as I have confirmed. These people remained in the same condition as on arrival, as far as clothing was concerned, for quite a while; and as far as I know they did not receive anything at that time.

JÄGER: I reported these conditions as soon as possible. I do not remember when. As far as I could see, the intention was to establish tailor shops, shoe repair shops, and other work shops in the camps; and some of them were actually established.

DR. SERVATIUS: One question. Did things generally get much better in the course of your activities, or did they become worse?

JÄGER: They did not become worse after 1943. After, the first heavy air raids, of course, the confusion was always very great. A great deal was destroyed by fire. I recall that during one night 19,000 persons became homeless; and, of course, clothes and underwear were destroyed also. It naturally took quite some time to make up these losses.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were these conditions caused by the firm of Krupp, or by lack of supervision on the part of the Labor Front?

JÄGER: As I have said, I saw members of the Labor Front only once in a camp. Then that commission did actually criticize conditions. It was in the camp at Krämerplatz, and the firm of Krupp was fined at that time, because of the conditions. But that was the only time that I got in touch at all with the Labor Front.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the firm of Krupp object in any way to the improvements, so that the Labor Front had to intervene?

JÄGER: That I cannot say. I had no influence in that respect and did not know anything about it, because I had to deal only with medical affairs, and did not participate in meetings of the firm of Krupp or the Labor Front. I could only make reports.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you also made statements concerning the conditions of health; and you said that the supply of medical instruments, bandages, medicines, and other medical equipment was completely inadequate in these camps. Is that true, or were those exceptional cases; or was it a condition which existed all the time?

JÄGER: That was how I found the camps in October 1942, and slowly I had to clear up these conditions. Later, of course, there was an improvement.

DR. SERVATIUS: You say here that the number of Eastern Workers who fell sick was twice as high as the number of German workers; that tuberculosis was especially prevalent; and that the percentage was four times as high among the Eastern Workers as among the Germans. Is that correct?

JÄGER: That was the case at the beginning when we received workers who had not had any medical examination at all. When I went through the camps, I heard from the camp doctors—and saw for myself on the occasion of inspections—that very many people were sick. The figure was considerably higher than among the Germans, as far as I could see at that time.

JÄGER: After we had found out that it was tuberculosis we had to deal with, we made examinations in large numbers, even X-ray examinations. Then those affected with tuberculosis were separated from the others and put into the Krupp hospital for medical treatment.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then you mentioned typhus, and said that that was also widespread among the workers.

JÄGER: Well, if I remember correctly, there may have been 23,000 or 24,000; there may have been more. Later, there were about 9,000. But these figures varied.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you consider it correct, if 150 people out of such a large number are affected by typhus over such a long period of time, to say that it was very widespread among the workers?

JÄGER: Yes, for we had no typhus at all among the German population. So that statement may be justified. If among a population of 400,000 or 500,000—such as there was in Essen at that time—there was no typhus at all, and if one then takes an average of 20,000, with 150 cases among the 20,000, then that statement can quite well be made.

DR. SERVATIUS: In other words, you maintain your statement, that it is a correct statement that typhus was widespread. You say, furthermore, that carriers of these diseases were fleas, lice, bedbugs, and other vermin which tortured the inhabitants of those camps. Was that true of all the camps?

JÄGER: It was the case in almost all the camps when I began my work. Then a disinfection station was set up by the firm of Krupp, which was hit in an air attack immediately. It was then rebuilt, and then destroyed a second time.

DR. SERVATIUS: You say that in cases of illness the workers had to go to work until a camp doctor certified that they were unfit for work. In the camps at Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germaniastrasse, and Kapitän-Lehmannstrasse there were no daily consultation hours, and that at these camps the camp doctors appeared only every second or third day. Consequently workers were forced to go to work despite illness, until a doctor appeared. Is that correct?

JÄGER: Naturally a worker had to work unless a camp doctor certified he was unfit. It was the same with the German population. I am a panel doctor myself and I know that in many cases a man had to go to work if he did not report himself sick; there was no difference in that respect.

DR. SERVATIUS: And you say that that was the case in the camps mentioned; that there was no real consultation hour, which meant that a man could not possibly report sick?

JÄGER: But he could go to a doctor. Because there were no doctors there, I purposely arranged that whenever possible people should come to me during my consultation—to me personally.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you just said that the workers could report ill even when there was no doctor present, that there was some other provision for them. Here you say that these camps were visited only every second or third day by the competent camp doctors; that as a consequence the workers, despite illness, had to report for work until a doctor was actually there. Is that correct?

JÄGER: That is wrongly expressed. If anyone reported ill he had to be taken to a doctor, or the doctor was notified.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I should like to return once more to the subject of the spreading of typhus. How many deaths resulted?

JÄGER: Only about three or four cases of death resulted, and they occurred only because the case was diagnosed too late. I always took personal charge of the typhus cases and had them brought to the hospital immediately, for I was responsible for this.

“The plan of supplies prescribed a little meat each week. Only Freibankfleisch could be used for this purpose, which was horse meat, meat infected with tuberculosis, or meat condemned by the veterinary.”

JÄGER: One must define the expression “Freibankfleisch.” That was meat which was not released for general consumption by the veterinary but which, after being treated in a certain way, was quite fit for human food. Even in times of peace and afterwards, the German population bought this meat. During the war the German population received in return for their coupons a double quantity of Freibankfleisch.

JÄGER: Meat which had been condemned at first was released for human consumption after it had been treated in a certain manner and was then not harmful.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then the expression “condemned by the veterinary” means that it was first condemned and then allowed?

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, regarding the French prisoner-of-war camp in Nöggerathstrasse you said the following:

“This camp was destroyed in a bombing attack; and the inmates for almost half a year were housed in dog kennels, latrines, and old baking ovens.”

JÄGER: I was there only on three occasions. It was described to me in that way, and I found the camp in that condition. As far as I could determine at the time, it had been in that condition for about 4 months; then it was rebuilt.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, I am interested in the dog kennels. How many dog kennels were there? Were they really dog kennels, or was that only a derogatory remark about some other kind of billets?

JÄGER: It was an expression of mine, because the inmates built and hammered these huts together themselves.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a former latrine, or was it a latrine that was being used as such?

DR. SERVATIUS: Then you say that there were no tables, chairs, or cupboards in this camp.

DR. SERVATIUS: Are you sure it is that testimony which you have just had in your hands?

JÄGER: In my home in Chemnitz I crossed out various things in the record of the interrogatory which was submitted to me, and initialed these corrections...

DR. SERVATIUS: Can you not determine which passages you crossed out? Were there many passages like that, or was it just single words?

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this statement was in the Krupp files at the beginning of the proceedings, and that it was considerably shorter, and that a number of sentences which the witness has sworn to here were lacking in that statement. I would suggest, therefore, that the Prosecution should submit the original, which the witness states he has altered, so that it can be seen just what he did write. As far as I know, he struck out at the time a few of those very statements which he has just repeated here.

As an example, I mention that he stated that in this camp there were no chairs, tables, or cupboards. That is a sentence which was struck out. The witness thus had doubts at the time, and did not swear to these facts.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you are talking about. We have before us what is called a sworn statement, which was put in evidence and which is signed by the witness. The witness is now saying that that statement is correct, subject to any alterations which you have extracted from him in cross-examination.

DR. SERVATIUS: He said it might be entire sentences. I should like to ask the Prosecution to produce the original document with the passages crossed out, because I have seen two statements: a brief one in which these passages are apparently left out, and a complete one, such as we have before us, and which the witness says had been cut short.

THE PRESIDENT: All that the witness is saying, is it not, is that it was originally submitted to him in a certain form? He made certain alterations in it. Then, when those alterations had been made—I do not know whether it was fair-copied or not—he then signed it and swore to it, and that is the document that we have.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, my contention is this: The document which we have before us does not show these crossings out. The words which were struck out are still contained in the document.

JÄGER: I crossed the passages out with ink and put my name next to the alterations. It is difficult, of course, and today I am not able to say what I did strike out at that time, as I did not retain a copy.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, if this document which we have before us were reproduced correctly these crossed-out passages would have to be shown, especially as the witness says that he put his initials in the margin.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you sign the document after it had been fair-copied? Witness, did you sign the document after it had been fair-copied? You know what a fair copy is, do you not?

The document was submitted to me. I made the alterations, and then I signed three or four of these statements. Then these records were taken away; and on the same day or the following day, I was in Essen and swore to this record. Then I received a record which I read before the court.

JÄGER: The record came about in this way. Captain Harris came to me and interrogated me on these matters. Notes were taken; and then Captain Harris, I think, compiled this record and asked me to sign it.

JÄGER: Because I could not swear to those things—the things that I struck out I could not swear to.

JÄGER: In part it went too far, I think I can put it that way; and in part it was incorrect—unintentionally, of course. But I had to make those changes, and I did make them.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, if I show you a document in which I mark in red the passages that you struck out, would you recognize those passages?

MR. DODD: I am not clear on this. I do not know whether counsel is claiming that we have another document, one which we have not submitted. I do not know of any such. We submitted the only one that came into our possession...

MR. DODD: There were a number of these made up, and they were all signed as originals. The first was the copy made with the typewriter, the others carbon copies. It was a joint British-American team that interrogated the witness, and this one copy was turned over to us, and we submitted it. That is the only one we have ever seen.

THE PRESIDENT: I see in the certificate of translation it refers to a certificate dated 14 October 1945, signed by Captain N. Webb...

DR. BALLAS: As former counsel for Herr Krupp Von Bohlen, I wish to make a statement about this.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What have you got to do with it? We are now considering the suggestion made by Dr. Servatius that this document, which we are now considering...

THE PRESIDENT: We are now considering the Document Number D-288. You haven’t anything to do with that document.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What right have you to speak about it? You are only a former counsel to Krupp.

DR. BALLAS: I want to help explain the matter. At present I am appearing for Dr. Siemers, counsel for Admiral Raeder.

THE PRESIDENT: But how can you help us about the framing of the affidavit of this witness by the Prosecution? You cannot do anything about that.

In the Krupp file there is a Document D-288 which is considerably shorter than this Document D-288 which has been submitted by the Prosecution in the case of Sauckel. At the time I called Dr. Servatius’ attention to this difference, and we checked point by point just how far the deviations went. There are thus two documents—the one original Document D-288 and the one in the Krupp file which differs from the document presented in the case of Sauckel.

THE PRESIDENT: But this document was signed by this witness. There may have been some other document signed which was put in the Krupp file, but this witness has said that he signed this document. Therefore, it does not seem to me that it is material.

DR. BALLAS: I just wanted to call your attention to the fact that there are two different documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; thank you. Is there any other member of the Defense that wants to ask questions of this witness?

MR. DODD: No, Sir—except that I would like to say, with respect to the Tribunal’s question concerning this certificate of translation where the name Captain N. Webb appears, that I am informed that refers to a certificate which is attached to all British documents and that is a certificate which goes along for the purpose of the translators. Undoubtedly, that is what it is. However, I will have a search made in the document room and clear it up. It is better that way. But my British friends say that is so—they do send a certificate; and the only possible explanation is that it is the certificate with a mistake in the date. But in any event, I will look into it.

MR. DODD: I believe he has. I understood he had the one which is before the Tribunal.

MR. DODD: As a matter of fact, I talked to you personally on this matter; and you told me that this was a statement you gave. Do you remember that? Do you recall when you and I talked, and you told me this was your statement? You looked it over and read it.

MR. DODD: You read English as well as German, do you not? You have some knowledge of English.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, the document is being handed to you. It is in German, is it not?

MR. DODD: While the witness is reading the document, I should like to inform the Tribunal that we made a call to the document room and have been told by the officer there that there is only one Document D-288, and this is it; there is no duplicate signed, as counsel for Krupp stated.

JÄGER: Yes, here there is an alteration which is written in pencil, on Page 2. I crossed that out, but that was not written by me.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, may I submit the document which I received from the counsel for Krupp at the beginning? I also have here an English document, Document Number 288 and the passages which allegedly were crossed out at the time have been marked by me in red. I should like to submit this document for the information of the Court; I believe it will help in clarifying this matter. There are many passages struck out.

THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Servatius, that is a different document, as I understand it.

THE PRESIDENT: We do not need that. We have this document before us, signed by the witness; and we have asked him whether he has anything in it which he thinks did not form part of the original document which he signed.

JÄGER: On Page 1 it says, “Conditions in all these camps were extremely bad.” I would have probably limited this statement, because I...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Witness, we do not want to know whether you think you expressed yourself too strongly. We only want to know whether the document represents the document which you signed—accurately represents the document which you signed. If there is anything which you want to change now, you can say what it is.

THE PRESIDENT: Just one or two questions I want to ask you. Were prisoners of war employed at Krupp’s during the time you were supervising these camps?

JÄGER: I did not supervise the prisoner-of-war camps. That is a wrong expression. I received the permission to visit the prisoner-of-war camps which were under the sole jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht, and I was told that these prisoners of war were all working for Krupp.

THE PRESIDENT: Were any of the people who were working at the camps, which you mentioned in this, prisoners of war?

JÄGER: These things were not under my jurisdiction. It depended on their trade—locksmiths probably worked in the locksmith shop. But there were also many unskilled laborers. But I am naturally not able to give you all the details; these matters were not under my jurisdiction. I was concerned with these people only in my capacity as a physician.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have found that certificate; and it is as I described it for the Tribunal. It is a certificate by Captain Weber of the British Army service that he received a copy of this document from the American team; and it is signed by him, Captain H. Weber, IMT Corps, British Army, European Sector.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes. There are two more witnesses, Biedermann and Mitschke. I can dispense with both of these witnesses.

Then we still do not have the sworn affidavits, the interrogatories from Dr. Voss, Dr. Scharmann, a witness by the name of Marenbach, and the witness Letsch, who was an expert in Sauckel’s office. We have received interrogatories from the witnesses Darré and Seldte, but these have not been translated as yet. I shall submit them as soon as they have been translated.

DR. EXNER: Your Honors, with your kind permission I shall present my case in the following manner. First of all, I shall call the Defendant Jodl to the stand and use all documents, with a single exception, during his examination, and submit them to the Court.

I do not need to bore the Tribunal with lengthy readings. I have three document books which are numerically arranged, Jodl 1, Jodl 2, and so forth—and I shall in each case quote the page which is found in the upper left-hand corner on every page of the translation. The numbering is the same as in the original; they correspond. I am sorry to say that the documents are not exactly in the order in which I shall read them, and this is due partly to the fact that they were received too late and partly to other factors. I still do not have several interrogatories, particularly one which is very important to me. I hope that I shall be able to submit them later. I was granted five witnesses, but I can dispense with one of them. The four remaining witnesses will take up little time.

Now, with the kind permission of the Tribunal, I should like to call the Defendant Jodl to the witness box.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

DR. EXNER: Generaloberst Jodl, in the English-American trial brief it says that you are 60 years old. That is a mistake. You became 56 recently. You were born when?

DR. EXNER: You were born in Bavaria, and both of your parents are descended from old Bavarian families. You chose the military profession; what was the chief reason for your choice?

JODL: A great-grandfather of mine was an officer; my father was an officer; an uncle was an officer; my brother became an officer; my father-in-law was an officer—I can well say that the military profession was in my blood.

DR. EXNER: And now I should like to hear something about your political attitude. To which of the political parties which existed in Germany before 1933 were you closest in spirit?

JODL: As an officer all party politics were entirely remote to me; and especially the offshoots of the post-war period. If I look at the background from which I come, the attitude of my parents, I must say that I would have been closest to the National Liberal Party and its ideas. In any event, my parents never voted anything but National Liberal.

DR. EXNER: Tell us in a few words what your attitude was to the Weimar Republic.

JODL: True to my oath I served the Weimar Republic honestly and without reserve. If I could not have done that, I would have resigned. Moreover, a democratic system and a democratic constitution was not at all a foreign idea to us southern Germans, for our monarchy was also democratic.

JODL: I knew Hindenburg. I was assigned to him after his first election to the Reich Presidency when he spent his first vacation in Dietramszell. Then I spent a day with the Hindenburg family at their Neudeck estate together with Field Marshal Von Manstein. I can only say that I admired him; and when he was elected Reich President for the first time, I considered that the first symptom of the German people’s return to self-respect.

JODL: The National Socialist Party I hardly knew and hardly noticed before the Munich Putsch. It was this Putsch which dragged the Reichswehr into this internal political development. At that time, with few exceptions, it met this test of obedience. But after this Putsch there was a certain cleavage in the views of the officers’ corps. Opinions varied as to Hitler’s worth or worthlessness. I was still extremely skeptical and unconvinced. I was not impressed until Hitler, during the Leipzig trial, gave the assurance that he was opposed to any undermining of the Reichswehr.

JODL: I knew only those who had previously been officers: for example, Epp, Hühnlein, and Röhm. But I no longer had any connection or contact with them after they had left the Reichswehr.

JODL: I was not anti-Semitic. I am of the opinion that no party, no state, no people, and no race—not even cannibals—are good or bad in themselves, but only the single individual. Of course I knew that Jewry, after the war and in the moral disintegration that appeared after the first World War, came to the fore in Germany in a most provocative fashion. That was not anti-Semitic propaganda; those were facts, which were regretted very much by Jews themselves. Nevertheless, I was most sharply opposed to any outlawing by the state, any generalization, and any excesses.

DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that all the defendants cried, “Germany awake; death to the Jew.”

JODL: As far as I am concerned, that assertion is wrong. At every period of my life I associated with individual Jews. I have been a guest of Jews, and certain Jews have visited my home. But those were Jews who recognized their fatherland. They were Jews whose human worth was undisputed.

DR. EXNER: Did you know that the Reich Government in the year 1932 counted on the possibility of attempts to overthrow it and sought to save itself in this direction?

JODL: I certainly knew that, for when I came to Berlin at that time I did not find in the later operational division any preparations for war; but I found preparations for the use of the Reichswehr in the interior of the country, against the extreme leftists as well as the extreme rightists. There were plans for maneuvers of some sort in that connection in which I myself participated.

DR. EXNER: What was your attitude to the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor in the year 1933?

JODL: The appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor was a complete surprise to me. That evening when I was returning home with a comrade, through the excited crowds, I said to him, “This is more than a change of government; it is a revolution. Just how far it will lead us we do not know.” But the name of Hindenburg, who had legalized this revolution, and the names of such men as Von Papen, Von Neurath, Schwerin-Krosigk exerted a reassuring influence on me and gave me a certain guarantee that there would be no revolutionary excesses.

DR. EXNER: At this point I should like to read a part of General Vormann’s interrogatory. This is Page 208 of the third volume of my document book. I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that Page 208 in the upper left hand corner—I submit the original—refers to the period from 1933 on. Jodl was then at the group headquarters (Gruppenamt), and Vormann was in his group. I read under Figure 2:

“Jodl, who at that time was a major on the General Staff, was my group (Gruppe) leader in 1933. He shared completely the view of the Chief of the Army Command at that time, General Von Hammerstein, and was thoroughly opposed to Hitler and the Party.”

I shall now skip a few lines; they are not so important. Then in the center of the page, I continue:

“When on 30 January 1933 Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor, Jodl was dismayed and astonished. I clearly recall that on 30 or 31 of January, at his request, I had to call together the officers of his group for a conference. At this conference he explained that Hitler had been called to be the head of the Reich according to the existing constitution and the laws in force. It was not for us to criticize this, particularly the behavior of Reich President and Field Marshal Von Hindenburg. We must obey and do our duty as soldiers. The kind of criticisms made hitherto, of the new measures initiated by the new chancellor, were not to be made in future for they were inconsistent with his and our own position.

“His entire speech showed great worry and apprehension with regard to the coming development of the situation...” and so forth.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

I wonder if I might leave, for the moment, Number 1, which my friend General Rudenko will deal with, because he will deal with another one; and if I might deal with the ones which I have?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The second one is on behalf of Defendant Kaltenbrunner and is an application to cross-examine three witnesses whose affidavits were used by the Prosecution. The first is Tiefenbacher, and he dealt with conditions at Mauthausen; the second, Kandruth, who dealt with the same subject; the third, Stroop, dealt with the reception of orders from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner by Stroop as SS and Polizeiführer in Warsaw. The Prosecution submits that in these cases cross-examination by way of interrogatories would be sufficient. Next, I do not know if...

THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories are all they asked for, certainly in the case of—in all three.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will have no objection to cross-interrogatories as long as they are not brought here as witnesses.

My Lord, the next application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath to use M. François-Poncet as witness. The Prosecution will be grateful if the Tribunal would allow that to stand over for a day or two, as my French colleagues are awaiting instructions from Paris at the moment and they have not got a reply yet. I do not think it will prejudice the Defendant Von Neurath’s case. It will be time for a reply before there is any difficulty as to time.

Then, My Lord, the next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach. I think that all that is now wanted is to use an affidavit from Dr. Otto Wilhelm von Vacano. The affidavit is 12 pages long and is a highly academic statement on the educational philosophy underlying the Adolf Hitler Schools. The Prosecution feel that the matter has been thoroughly covered by the Defendant Von Schirach himself and also by his witnesses Hoepken and Lauterbacher, and they feel that the affidavit would be cumulative and repetitive. But, of course, it is an affidavit; it is not a question of an oral witness, and if the Tribunal feel that they ought to have it, the Prosecution do not wish to press their objection unreasonably.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I have certainly got an English—I have read the English translation of it, My Lord, so I assume that it has been translated into the other languages.

The next, applications from the Defendants Hess and Frank to put an interrogatory to General Donovan. If I may put the objection quite shortly, that raises the same point as the application on 2 May 1946 for Mr. Patterson of the United States War Department. The objection of the Prosecution is the same as I made on that occasion, that when you are cross-examining a witness as to credibility you are bound by his answer, and should not, in the opinion of the Prosecution, be allowed to call evidence to contradict him. So it is on exactly the same point, the relationship between the witness Gisevius and the United States Office of Strategic Services.

The next application is on behalf of the Defendant Speer for the approval of certain documents which are in his possession. The Prosecution have no objection to the application. They reserve the right to make any individual objection when the documents are produced at the Trial.

My Lord, the next is a purely formal application on behalf of the Defendant Jodl, whose case is now before the Tribunal, to use an affidavit of Dr. Lehmann. There is no objection to that.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, that application we have already heard. We have heard the arguments for that in full and the Tribunal will consider that.

Then I think that only leaves an application of the Defendant Keitel for the use of a decree of Hitler of 20 July 1944, and the Prosecution has no objection to that.

My Lord, I think I have dealt with every one except the first one, which my friend General Rudenko will deal with—the application of the Defendant Göring.

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Members of the Tribunal, the Soviet Prosecution have several times expressed their view respecting the application of Defense Counsel to call witnesses with regard to the mass shooting of Polish officers by the Fascist criminals in Katyn Forest. Our position is that this episode of criminal activity on the part of the Hitlerites has been fully established by the evidence presented by the Soviet Prosecution, which was a communication of the special Extraordinary State Commission investigating the circumstances of the mass shooting of Polish officer prisoners of war by the German Fascist aggressors in Katyn Forest. This document was presented by the Soviet Prosecution under the Document Number USSR-54 on 14 February 1946, and was admitted by the Tribunal; and, as provided by Article 21 of the Charter, it is not subject to argument.

Now the Defense once again are putting in an application for the calling of three supplementary witnesses—a psychiatrist, Stockert; a former adjutant of the Engineer Corps, Böhmert; and a special expert of the staff of the Army Group Center, Eichborn.

The calling of the psychiatrist Stockert as a witness must be considered completely pointless as the Tribunal cannot be interested in the question of how the commission drew its conclusion—a conclusion which was published in a Hitlerite White Book. No matter how this conclusion was drawn, the fact of the mass shooting of Poles by Germans in Katyn Forest has been unequivocally established by the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission.

Stockert himself is not a doctor of forensic medicine but a psychiatrist—at that time a member of the Hitlerite commission, not on the basis of his competence in the field of forensic medicine, but as a representative of the German Fascist military command.

The former adjutant, Captain Böhmert, is himself a participant in the crimes of Katyn Forest, having been a member of the Engineer Corps which carried out the executions. As he is an interested party, he cannot give any useful testimony for clarifying the circumstances of this matter.

Third, the expert of the staff of the Army Group Center also cannot be admitted as a witness because he, in general, knew nothing at all about the camp of the Polish prisoners of war, and could not have known all that pertained to the matter. The same reasons apply to his potential testimony to the fact that the Germans never perpetrated any mass shooting of Poles in the district of Katyn. Moreover, Eichborn cannot be considered an unprejudiced witness.

Regardless of these objections which express the opinion of all the prosecutors, the Soviet Prosecution especially emphasize the fact that these bestial crimes of the Germans in Katyn were investigated by the special authoritative State Investigating Committee, which went with great precision into all the details. The result of this investigation has established the fact that the crimes in Katyn were perpetrated by Germans, and are but a link in the chain of many bestial crimes perpetrated by the Hitlerites, a great many proofs of which have previously been submitted to the Tribunal.

For these reasons the Soviet Prosecution categorically insists on the rejection of the application of the Defense Counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for Kaltenbrunner, Sir David was right, was he not, in saying that you were only asking for cross-interrogatories, which the Prosecution do not object to?

DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I have no objection to questionnaires, but I would then ask that these witnesses be heard in my presence outside this courtroom; and then, on the basis of this interrogation, questionnaires can later be submitted to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: We granted interrogatories, and you now ask for cross-interrogatories; that is all you ask for, and that does not involve bringing the witnesses here at all. The cross-interrogatories will be sent to them; they will answer them. If, for any reason, on the cross-interrogatories being answered, you want to make further application, you can always do so.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The rule of the Court so far was, as I understood it, that I have the right to cross-examine in this courtroom if the Prosecution submits affidavits of these witnesses here. That has, so far, been the ruling of the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it depends on what the substance of the affidavit is. If it is a matter of importance, no doubt we—we have never made any general rule, but we have generally allowed the witness to be brought here for cross-examination if the matter is of importance; but if the matter is of less importance, then we have very frequently directed that there should be cross-interrogatories.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add to this last sentence? I consider this testimony extremely important. The Court will probably know the contents.

THE PRESIDENT: Again in your application you say that three interrogatories were used by the Prosecution on the understanding that the deponents would be subject to cross-interrogation. That means, I suppose, cross-interrogatories. It does not say cross-examination; it says cross-interrogation. Do you want to have them brought here for cross-examination?

DR. KAUFFMANN: That is what I had intended, unless my first suggestion is accepted. My first suggestion is simpler, in my opinion, and it would save time. It proposes that I be allowed to be present at the questioning of the witnesses outside this courtroom.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we understand your point of view, Dr. Kauffmann, and we will consider it.

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I make a brief statement with reference to General Rudenko’s motion?

General Rudenko wishes to reject my application for evidence, referring to Article 21, I believe, of the Charter. I do not believe that this regulation opposes my application. It is true of course, that government reports are evidence...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think the Tribunal has already ruled that that article does not prevent the calling of witnesses; but General Rudenko, in addition to an argument based upon Article 21, also gave particular reasons why he said that these particular witnesses were not witnesses who ought to be called. He said that one of them was a psychiatrist, and the other one could not give any evidence of any value. We should like to hear you upon that.

DR. STAHMER: In the report submitted by the Soviet Union, the charge is made that members of the engineer staff which was stationed near Katyn carried out the execution of these Polish officers. They are mentioned by name, and I am bringing counterevidence—namely members of the same staff—to prove that during the whole time that this staff was stationed there no killings of Polish officers occurred. I consider this is a pertinent assertion and a presentation of relevant evidence. One cannot eliminate a witness by saying that he was involved in the act. With reference to these people, that is not yet settled, and it is not mentioned at all in the record. Neither are these people, whom I have now named, listed in the Russian record as having taken part in the deed. Apart from that, I consider it out of the question to eliminate a witness by saying that he committed the deed. That is what has to be proved by hearing him.

THE PRESIDENT: About the psychiatrist, was he a member of the German commission?

DR. STAHMER: Yes. He was present at the unloading, and he ascertained from the condition of the corpses that the executions must have been carried out at some time before the occupation by the German Army.

THE PRESIDENT: But he does not actually say in the application that he was a member. He said he was present during the visit of the military commission; he knows how the resolution of the commission was produced.

DR. STAHMER: I do not think he was an appointed member, but he took part in this inspection and in the duties connected with it. As far as I know, he was a regimental doctor in some regiment near—he was a regimental doctor of a regimental staff in the vicinity.

Then, is the counsel for Von Neurath agreeable that that matter should stand over? Is counsel for Von Neurath here? He is not here? Very well then, we will consider that.

Then, Counsel for the Defendant Schirach, do you wish to say anything in answer to what Sir David said?

DR. NELTE: My colleague Dr. Sauter asked me, if necessary, to represent the interests of the Defendant Von Schirach.

As to the statement of Sir David, I have only to say that, according to the opinion of the Defendant Von Schirach, the witness Von Vacano, who made and signed this affidavit, makes statements on a number of points on which Herr Von Schirach did not speak when he was examined as a witness. I therefore ask the Court to examine this affidavit to determine whether it does not contain individual points which would be important in connection with the charges against Von Schirach, and then to decide whether to admit it.

THE PRESIDENT: Then does counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank want to say anything about the application for an interrogatory to General Donovan? Dr. Seidl, we have already heard the argument about it.

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): I have nothing to add to the arguments which I have already offered on the application to obtain official information from the War Department. I have also withdrawn my request for a decision on my first application, which was to obtain information from the War Department. It has not yet been decided, however, whether a questionnaire is to be submitted to Secretary of War Patterson.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the matter will be considered. There was no objection to the other three applications, so it is unnecessary to hear argument. Then the Tribunal will consider all these matters.

Now, Dr. Exner. Dr. Exner, if it is convenient to you personally, the Tribunal thinks that you might go a little bit faster in your speech through the earphones.

DR. EXNER: Before the recess, we heard what you told your officers when Adolf Hitler entered the government. Now I should like to hear what you felt about the appointment of Hitler as head of the State in 1934.

JODL: The union of the two offices in one person gave me much concern. When we lost Hindenburg, we lost the Field Marshal loved by the Wehrmacht and by the whole German people. What we should get with Hitler, we did not know. It is true, the result of the plebiscite was so overwhelming that one could say that a higher law than this popular will could not possibly exist. Thus we soldiers were quite justified in taking the oath to Adolf Hitler.

DR. EXNER: The Prosecution speak of your close relationship with Hitler. When did you learn to know Adolf Hitler personally?

JODL: I was presented to the Führer by Field Marshal Keitel in the command train on 3 September 1939 when we were going to the Polish Eastern Front. At any rate that was the day I first exchanged words with him.

JODL: That came about very gradually. The Führer had a certain distrust of all General Staff officers, especially of the Army, as at that time he was still very skeptical toward the Wehrmacht as a whole.

I may, perhaps, quote a statement of his which was often heard: “I have a reactionary Army, a Christian”—sometimes he said too—“an imperial Navy, and a National Socialist Air Force.”

The relations between us varied a great deal. At first, until about the end of the campaign in the West, there was considerable reserve. Then his confidence in me increased more and more until August 1942. Then the great crisis arose, and his attitude to me was severely caustic and unfriendly. That lasted until 30 January 1943. Then relations improved and were particularly good, sincere, after the Italian betrayal in 1943 had been warded off. The last year was characterized by numerous sharp altercations.

DR. EXNER: To what extent did the Führer confide in you regarding his political intentions?

JODL: Only as far as we needed to know them for our military work. Of course, for the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff political plans are somewhat more necessary than for a battalion commander, for politics is part of strategy.

DR. EXNER: Did he permit discussions of political questions between himself and you?

JODL: Discussion of political questions was generally not admissible for us soldiers. One example is especially characteristic. When I reported to the Führer in September 1943 that Fascism was dead in Italy, for party emblems were scattered all over, this is what he said: “Such nonsense could only be reported by an officer. Once again it is obvious that generals do not understand politics.”

It can be easily understood that after such remarks the desire for any political discussions was slight.

DR. EXNER: Were political and military questions therefore kept strictly separate?

JODL: Consultation on military questions depended entirely on the circumstances of the moment. At a time when he himself was filled with doubts, he often discussed military problems for weeks or months, but if things were clear in his own mind, or if he had formed a spontaneous decision, all discussion came to an end.

DR. EXNER: The system of maintaining secrecy has often been discussed here. Were you also subject to this secrecy?

JODL: Yes, and to an extent which I really first realized during this Trial. The Führer informed us of events and occurrences at the beginning of the war—that is, the efforts of other countries to prevent this war, and even to put an end to it after it had already begun—only to the extent that these events were published in the press. He spoke to the politicians and to the Party quite otherwise than to the Wehrmacht; and to the SS differently again.

The secrecy concerning the annihilation of the Jews, and the events in the concentration camps, was a masterpiece of secrecy. It was also a masterpiece of deception by Himmler, who showed us soldiers faked photographs about these things in particular, and told us stories about the gardens and plantations in Dachau, about the ghettos in Warsaw and Theresienstadt, which gave us the impression that they were highly humane establishments.

JODL: The Führer’s headquarters was a cross between a cloister and a concentration camp. There were numerous wire fences and much barbed wire surrounding it. There were outposts on the roads leading to it to safeguard it. In the middle was the so-called Security Ring Number 1.

Permanent passes to enter this security ring were not given even to my staff, only to General Warlimont. Every guard had to check on each officer whom he did not know. Apart from reports on the situation, only very little news from the outer world penetrated into this holy of holies.

JODL: Among foreign papers we studied very carefully the illustrated American and English papers, for they gave us very good information on new weapons. The foreign news itself was received and censored by the headquarters civilian press section. I was given only what was of military interest. Reports concerning internal politics, police, or the present situation were forbidden.

JODL: It took place as follows: Every day I made at least two reports on the situation. Some time ago it was asserted, rather indignantly, that I took part in 119 conferences. I took part in far more than 5,000 conferences. This discussion of the situation and reporting on the military position was at the same time an issuing of orders. On the basis of the reports on events, the Führer decided immediately what orders were to be given for the next few days.

I worked in this way: When my report was finished, I went into an adjoining room. There I immediately drew up the teletype messages and orders for the next few days, and while the reports on the situation were still going on, I read these drafts to the Führer for his approval. Warlimont then took them along to my staff where they were sent off.

JODL: May I add—to complete the picture it should be said that I did not hear many things which were discussed during these reports on the situation. The same is true of Field Marshal Keitel, who worked in a similar manner.

DR. EXNER: Were political matters also brought up at the discussions of the situation, and to what extent were you present at discussions of a political nature?

JODL: As I have already said at the beginning, political problems were discussed only to the extent that was necessary for our military measures. Also on occasions when political and military leaders came together, when the Reich Foreign Minister was present, problems were discussed which lay on the borderline between politics and the conduct of the war. I did not take part in the exclusively political talks with foreign politicians, neutral or allied, or with the Reich Foreign Minister. I did not even take part in the discussions on the organization, armament, and administration of the occupied territories, for the purely military discussions of the situation in which I had to take part often lasted or required as much as 6 or 8 hours a day. I really needed the time I then had left for my own work.

DR. EXNER: It has often been stated here that it was impossible to contradict the Führer. Did you have any success with remonstrances?

JODL: One cannot say it was really impossible to contradict the Führer. Very many times I contradicted him most emphatically, but there were moments when one actually could not answer a word. Also by my objections I induced the Führer to desist from many things.

JODL: There were a great number of operational questions which do not interest the Court; but in the sphere of interest to the Court, there was, for example, Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva Convention. I prevented that because I objected.

JODL: If it was not possible by open contradiction to prevent something which according to my innermost convictions I should prevent, there was still the means I often employed of using delaying tactics, a kind of passive resistance. I delayed work on the matter and waited for a psychologically favorable moment to bring the question up again.

This procedure, too, was occasionally successful, for example, in the case of the intention to turn certain low-level fliers over to lynch justice. It had no success in the case of the Commando Order.

DR. EXNER: We will speak about that later. The Führer therefore ordered that himself.

The witness Gisevius in answer to questions by the Prosecution, said that “Jodl had a key position with Hitler.”

Did you know this witness by sight, or by hearing about him, or in any other way?

JODL: I did not have that honor. I heard the name of this witness for the first time here, and I saw him for the first time here in Court.

JODL: Obviously, I could give the Führer only an extract of events. In view of his inclination to make emotional decisions I naturally was particularly cautious in presenting unverified reports made by agents. If the witness meant this by his general term of “key position,” he was not wrong. But if he intended it to mean that I kept from the Führer atrocities committed by our own Wehrmacht, or atrocities committed by the SS, then that is absolutely untrue. Besides, how was that witness to know about it?

On the contrary, I immediately reported any news of that kind to the Führer, and no one could have stopped me from doing so. I will give examples: An affidavit by Rittmeister Scheidt was read here. He testified that Obergruppenführer Fegelein told the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Guderian, and Generaloberst Jodl of atrocities committed by the SS Brigade Keminski in Warsaw. That is absolutely true. Ten minutes later I reported this fact to the Führer and he immediately ordered the dissolution of this brigade. When I heard through the American radio, through my press chief, of the shooting of 120 American prisoners near Malmédy, I immediately, on my own initiative, had an investigation started through the Commander, West so as to report the result to the Führer. When unimaginable horrors committed by an Ustashi company in Croatia came to my knowledge, I reported this to the Führer immediately.

DR. EXNER: I should like to interrupt you a moment. In your diary Document Number 1807-PS, you write, on 12 June 1942—Page 119, second document book:

“The German field police disarmed and arrested a Ustashi company because of atrocities committed against the civilian population in Eastern Bosnia.”

I should like to add here that this is noteworthy because this Ustashi company was something like an SS troop in Croatia and was fighting on the German side. Because of the atrocities, the German field police arrested this Ustashi company.

“The Führer did not approve of this measure, which was carried out by order of the commander of the 708th Division, as it undermined the authority of the Ustashi on which the whole Croatian State rests. This is bound to have a more harmful effect on peace and order in Croatia than the unrest of the population caused by the atrocities.”

JODL: After the issuing of the Commando Order, I reported enemy violations of international law to the Führer only when he would be certain to have heard of them through other channels. I reported cases of Commando undertakings and capture of Commandos only when I could be quite sure that he would hear of them through other channels. In this respect I did try to hold back any new spontaneous emotional decisions.

JODL: I can only say, unfortunately not. There were endless ways through which the Führer was informed about military matters. Every individual and every office could hand in reports direct to the adjutant’s department. The photographer sent out by the Führer to take pictures at the front, found it expedient to use this opportunity to report to the Führer on military matters also. When I objected to this, the Führer answered, “I do not care from whom I hear the truth; the main thing is that I hear it.” These reports, however, were not reports of atrocities, but just the opposite. Unfortunately, through many channels hostile to the Wehrmacht, inciting reports against the correct and chivalrous attitude of the Wehrmacht reached the Führer. It was these reports which brought about these decisions which led to brutal proceedings. A tremendous amount of damage would have been avoided if we soldiers had been in a position to hold the Führer back.

JODL: Canaris saw the Führer dozens of times. Canaris could report to him what he wanted and whatever he knew. It seems to me that he knew far more than I, for I was concerned exclusively with the operational conduct of the war. But he never said a word. He never said one word to me, and it is quite clear why; this witness was on the best of terms—this man, who is now dead, was on the very best of terms with Himmler and with Heydrich. It was necessary that he should be so that they would not become suspicious of this nest of conspirators.

DR. EXNER: The witness Gisevius said a great deal about revolts and intentions to carry out a Putsch. Did you personally ever learn anything about such plans?

JODL: I never heard a single word or intimation about any revolt or about any intentions to carry out a Putsch.

DR. EXNER: At any time, before or during the war, would you have considered a revolt possible or promising?

JODL: The witness spoke of revolts as casually as of washing his hands. That alone proves to me that he never thought about it seriously. The results of the Kapp Putsch in 1921, of the Hitler Putsch of 1923, are well known. If more proof is necessary, there is the result of 20 July 1944. At that time no one any longer hoped for victory in the true sense of the word. Nevertheless, in this revolt, in this attempt, not one soldier, not a single arm of the Wehrmacht, not one worker, rose up. All the perpetrators and all the members of the Putsch were alone. To overthrow this system a revolution would have been necessary, a mightier, a more powerful revolution than the National Socialist one had been. And behind such a revolution there would have had to be the mass of the workers and the majority of the Wehrmacht as a whole, and not simply the commander of the Potsdam garrison of whom the witness spoke.

But how one could wage a war for life or death with other countries and at the same time carry on a revolution and expect to gain anything positive for the German people, I do not know. Only geniuses who lived in Switzerland can judge that. The German Wehrmacht and the German officers were not trained for revolution. Once the Prussian officers struck the ground with their swords—that was the only revolutionary deed of the German Armed Forces that I know of. That was in the year 1848. If today people who co-operated actively to bring Hitler to power, who had a part in the laws which we soldiers with our oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler were bound to support, if these people demanded revolution and mutiny of the Wehrmacht when they no longer liked the man, or when reverses occurred, then I can only call that wicked.

DR. EXNER: Did tension and crises arise in your relations with Hitler? You have already intimated something in that connection.

JODL: I could write a book about that more easily than give a brief answer. I should like to say only that, apart from many exalting moments, our life in the Führer’s headquarters was in the long run a martyrdom for us soldiers; for it was not a military headquarters, it was a civilian one, and we soldiers were guests there. It is not easy to be a guest anywhere for 5½ years. I should like to add just one thing. Among the few officers who dared to look the Führer squarely in the face, and to speak in a tone and manner that made listeners hold their breath because they feared a catastrophe—among these few officers, I myself belonged.

JODL: The worst crisis was in August 1942, in Vinnitza, when I defended Generaloberst Halder against unjustified criticism. It was my operational problem, the details of which will not interest the Court. Never in my life did I experience such an outbreak of rage from any human being. From that day on he never came to dinner.

JODL: No, he never came to the mess during the remainder of the war. The report on the situation was no longer given in my map room but in the Führer’s quarters. At every report on the situation from that day on an SS officer took part. Eight stenographers were ordered to be there, and from then on they took down every word. The Führer refused to shake hands with me any more. He did not greet me any more, or rarely. This situation lasted until 30 January 1943. He told me, through Field Marshal Keitel, that he could no longer work with me and that I would be replaced by General Paulus as soon as Paulus had taken Stalingrad.

DR. EXNER: Did you yourself not try during this time to be released from the OKW?

JODL: During all this time, every other day I asked General Schmundt to see to it that I should be sent at last to a position at the front with the mountain troops in Finland. I wanted to go there. But nothing happened.

DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has asserted that you enjoyed the good graces of the Führer and that the Führer lavished his favor on you. How much of that is true?

JODL: I need not waste many words on that. What I said is the actual truth. I am afraid that what the Prosecution said is imagination.

DR. EXNER: It was also said that you were ambitious in your military career. How about that?

JODL: If the Prosecution mean that as a so-called political soldier I was promoted especially quickly, they are mistaken. I became a general in my fiftieth year. That is quite normal. In July 1940, when I was appointed general of Artillery it is true I skipped the grade of lieutenant general, but that was only an accident. A much younger general in the Air Force, Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, was to be promoted to Air Chief Marshal. Then Schmundt said to the Führer: “Jodl could perhaps do that too.” Thereupon, shortly before the Reichstag session, the Führer decided to promote me also—to general of Artillery. This Jeschonnek, who is much younger than I am, became Generaloberst much sooner than I. Zeitzler, who was formerly my subordinate, became Generaloberst at the same time as I did.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. EXNER: We were discussing to what extent you enjoyed the favor of the Führer, that is with regard to—

JODL: To my surprise, when the Vinnitza crisis was over, on 30 January 1943, I received from the Führer the Golden Party Badge. That was the only decoration I received from the Führer.

JODL: Not a single cent. If I am to conceal nothing I must mention the fact that at headquarters we received a package of coffee from the Führer each Christmas.

DR. EXNER: Did you acquire any property in the territories occupied by us, or receive any as a gift or as a token of remembrance?

JODL: Nothing at all. When in the Indictment the sentence is found to the effect that the defendants enriched themselves from the occupied territories, as far as I am concerned I have only one word for that, and I must be frank—it is a libel against a decent German officer.

DR. EXNER: During the war you saved some of your pay as a Generaloberst. How did you invest this money?

THE PRESIDENT: He said that he could not save a penny. He has not yet been cross-examined about it.

DR. EXNER: During the entire period of the war you were with Hitler and therefore you must really know him best. So I should like to ask you in detail about the personality of the Führer, but the Court is not very fond of repetition. Therefore tell us quite briefly what particularly influenced you in Hitler’s behavior, what impressed you particularly? What were the things you disliked?

JODL: Hitler was a leader to an exceptional degree. His knowledge and his intellect, his rhetoric, and his will power triumphed in the end in every spiritual conflict over everyone. He combined to an unusual extent logic and clarity of thought, skepticism and excess of imagination, which very frequently foresaw what would happen, but also very often went astray. I really marveled at him when in the winter of 1941-42, by his faith and his energy, he established the wavering Eastern Front; for at that time, as in 1812, a catastrophe was imminent. His life in the Führer headquarters was nothing but duty and work. The modesty in his mode of life was impressive. There was not one day during this war...

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. As you said, Dr. Exner, the Tribunal has had to listen to this sort of thing over and over again already. We are not interested in that.

DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can tell the Tribunal something which they have heard less frequently, namely what you disliked in the personality of Hitler.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that, put in that general way, it is of any interest to the Tribunal, what he disliked in Hitler. I mean, can he not get on with his own case?

JODL: Yes, purely official. I did not belong to his private circle, and he did not know any more about me than that my name was Jodl, and that therefore, presumably, I came from Bavaria.

JODL: Chiefly all the old guard from the time when the Party was in its developing stage: Bormann first of all, the original women secretaries, his personal physician, and the political or SS adjutants.

DR. EXNER: Your Gauleiter speech was used by the Prosecution to prove that you were an unconditional follower of the Führer and his enthusiastic adherent. Tell us, how did you come to make that speech?

JODL: Bormann proposed this speech to the Führer, and the Führer ordered it, though I undertook this speech very reluctantly, chiefly because of lack of time. But it was generally the wish in this period of crisis...

JODL: In November 1943. The Italian defection had preceded it. It was the time of the heavy air attacks. At that moment it was naturally necessary to give the political leaders at home a completely unembroidered picture of the whole military situation, but at the same time to fill them with a certain amount of confidence in the supreme leadership. This speech, which had the title, “The strategic situation of Germany at the beginning of the fifth year of the war,” could obviously not be made by a Blockleiter, it could only be made by an officer of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and so I came to deliver this speech.

JODL: The contents, as I have already said, were an over-all picture of the strategic situation. Here, before the Tribunal naturally only the introduction was read. This introduction painted a picture of what lay behind us, but not from the political point of view, rather from the strategic angle. I described the operational necessity for all the operations of the so-called wars of aggression. In no way did I identify myself with the National Socialist Party, but, as is only natural for a General Staff officer, with my Supreme Commander; for at that time it was no longer a question of National Socialism or democracy. The question was the “to be or not to be” of the German people. And there were patriots in Germany too, not only in the neighboring states; and I shall count myself among these patriots while I have breath. Moreover, it is not important to whom one speaks, but it is important what one says and what one speaks about. Besides, I may also state that I delivered that same speech to the military district commanders and to the senior officers of the reserve army.

DR. EXNER: The beginning and the end of the speech contain a eulogy of the Party and the Führer that is incontestable. Why did you include that in a purely objective military speech?

JODL: It was impossible for me to begin a speech of that kind with a critical controversy about the Party or about my Supreme Commander. It was necessary to create confidence between the officer and the Party leader; for this confidence was not only necessary in order that the speech would serve its purpose; this confidence was the prerequisite for victory. Moreover, I should like to make an important point; that which the Prosecution submitted as Document Number L-172...

JODL: That is not the Gauleiter speech at all; it is not the speech which I delivered. That is nothing else but the “wastepaper basket” version of this speech. It is the first rough draft which was completely revised and altered because it contained many things which were not important. The entire nucleus of the speech, namely the section about the situation at the time, the part dealing with the enemy and the means at his disposal and his intentions, all that is missing. The things contained in this document are many hundreds of notes for the speech which were sent to me by my staff. I compiled my speech from these notes, and then I returned all this material to my staff.

DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different point. Which leaders of the Party did you get to know from the time of the seizure of power until the outbreak of the war?

JODL: Not mentioning the soldiers, Reich Minister Frick alone. I was with him twice when the questions of Reich reform were to be discussed.

DR. EXNER: And which of the defendants here present did you know before 1939, or before the beginning of the war?

JODL: Of the defendants here, I knew only the Reich Marshal, Grossadmiral Raeder, Field Marshal Keitel, and Minister Frick; no one else.

DR. EXNER: In the meantime, had you concerned yourself at all with the literature of National Socialism?

JODL: In the year 1937, in my official capacity, I participated the last 3 days in Nuremberg, when the Labor Service, the SA, and the Wehrmacht were reviewed.

DR. EXNER: Did you participate in the commemorations at Munich, that is, every year on 9 November?

DR. EXNER: Can you tell us what your position was with respect to the semimilitary units of the Party?

JODL: These semimilitary organizations sprang up like mushrooms after the seizure of power; but only the SA under Röhm tried to seize complete power. The witness Gisevius said here that there was no Röhm Putsch. That is correct, but it was just about to happen. At that time in the Reich War Ministry we were armed to the teeth, and Röhm was a real revolutionary, not a frock coat insurgent. When the Führer intervened in June 1934, from that moment there were no more conflicts between the Wehrmacht and the SA. The Wehrmacht became all the more suspicious of the units of the SS, which from that moment multiplied in an extraordinary fashion. The Army, one can very well say, was never reconciled to this dualism of two armed organizations within the country.

DR. EXNER: Now I should like to quote various excerpts from your diary—Document Number 1780-PS, Page 2 of the first volume of the document book—in order to show that Jodl again and again concerned himself with this infiltration of the SS into the Army. On 19 April—that is the second paragraph—or before that, on 22 March, there is an entry to this effect. Then on the 19th of April: “H. visits chief of the Armed Forces Department; tells him his misgivings concerning development of the SS.”

In the French translation this “H” is replaced by “Heydrich.” That, of course, has no sense, for Heydrich certainly had no misgivings concerning the development of the SS; but the “H” quite obviously stands for “Halder,” who was Quartermaster General. I do not know whether this correction was made in the French document book. I am sorry to say that I noted quite a few mistakes in translation in the English and French document books and have applied to the General Secretary in this connection to have corrections made. I must certainly say that this large number of errors in translation makes a doubtful impression, especially if for an “H” the word “Heydrich” is substituted, and the chief of the Armed Forces is connected with one of the most unpleasant figures in the SS. I must say that I am filled with misgivings—I must emphasize this—because in the course of the last few months hundreds of documents have been submitted to the Tribunal, the translation of which we could not check. When we did make a check on one occasion we found quite a few defects, as did Dr. Siemers recently.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you are supposed to be asking the questions. You are making some long statements now.

DR. EXNER: I should like to refer to the next to the last point of 3 February, on the same page...

THE PRESIDENT: Professor Exner, we cannot have counsel making long statements which are not in evidence. You cannot make statements of that sort. If there is any mistranslation you can draw our attention to it; but that is not the way to do it, making general statements about the translation of the documents.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to give any more explanations now, but I should like to quote passages from my document book referring to 3 February...

THE PRESIDENT: You have corrected one apparent mistranslation or misinterpretation of the letter “H.” Well, you can do so again, if necessary, in other places. You cannot make general statements about it.

DR. EXNER: I will only read what is permissible. I will read extracts from the document book without making any criticism. I have nothing further to say about that.

“General Thomas reports that the liaison officer to the Ministry of Economy ... Lieutenant Colonel Drews, visited him by order of Schacht. He was of the opinion that the SS would employ all means to cast suspicion on the Wehrmacht and to force it to the wall in its present weak state.”

“Himmler is said to be distressed that senior officers of the Wehrmacht had made unheard of accusations against him.”

Then perhaps one other passage; from the next document, on Page 4 of the document book, again the same diary, Document Number 1809-PS, the entry of 25 May 1940:

“The plan for the unlimited expansion of the SS sounds generally suspicious.”

Did you, even at that time, have misgivings about the dangers of this dualism that you just mentioned?

JODL: As a man very well versed in history, I had many misgivings about this. Not only did I have misgivings, but even during the war I quite openly expressed these misgivings to Himmler and Bormann.

DR. EXNER: How did it come about that Himmler acquired more and more influence in military spheres?

JODL: That can be explained by the fact that the Führer had the feeling—which perhaps on the whole was right—that a large section of the officer corps opposed his ideas. He saw in this attitude not only an inner political danger but also saw in it a danger to victory, which he believed was to be attained only through ruthless methods.

JODL: The practical results were these: The SS units were multiplied tremendously; the Police received authority which extended even into the operational sphere of the Army, and later, the Higher SS and Police Leaders were created; the intelligence service was transferred to the SS—where, by the way, it was organized by Kaltenbrunner far better than before—the reserve army was put under the jurisdiction of Himmler, and, in the end, also the entire Prisoners of War Organization.

DR. EXNER: In your diary you express satisfaction at the appointment by the Führer of General Von Brauchitsch as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. At that time there was a choice between him and General Reichenau. Why were you glad that Brauchitsch was chosen?

JODL: General Von Reichenau was known as a truly political general, and I was afraid that he might perhaps have no scruples in sacrificing all the good old tradition of the Army to the new regime.

DR. EXNER: I should like to refer in this connection to Jodl’s diary, Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6, first volume, with the entry of 2 February 1938, second paragraph, and again to the entry of 3 February 1938 to be found on Page 7, where he appears particularly happy:

“The chief of the Armed Forces Department informs me that the battle has been won. The Führer has decided that General Von Brauchitsch should be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army.”

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need read this. It simply says that he is in favor of Von Brauchitsch.

DR. EXNER: You thought about the particular consequences for the generals concerned in case Von Reichenau were appointed?

JODL: Yes. There was no doubt that the senior generals, such as Rundstedt, Bock, Adam, List, Halder, and so on, would never have subordinated themselves to Von Reichenau.

DR. EXNER: After this introduction, let us turn to the crimes against the laws of war and humanity which have been charged against you. There is very little time left. Therefore, I should like to clarify your participation in the Commissar Decree. A draft by the High Command of the Army on the treatment of Soviet commissars was submitted to you, and you put a notation in the margin of this draft on the grounds of which the Prosecution has accused you...

DR. EXNER: The number of the document is 884-PS, Exhibit Number USSR-351, Page 152, second volume of my document book. The whole is a set of notes on a report.

[Turning to the defendant.] Perhaps you can tell us this first of all: What connection did you have with this matter, that is, with the treatment of commissars?

JODL: I did not participate in preparing this draft. I was not concerned with prisoners of war nor with questions of martial law at that time. But the draft was submitted to me before it was transmitted to Field Marshal Keitel.

DR. EXNER: All right. Now you added: “We must count on retaliation against German fliers. It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action as retaliation.”

JODL: The intention of the Führer which was set forth in this draft was rejected unanimously by all soldiers. Very heated discussions took place about this also with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. This resistance ended with the characteristic sentence by the Führer: “I cannot demand that my generals should understand my orders, but I do demand that they follow them.” Now, in this case, by my notation I wanted to indicate to Field Marshal Keitel a new way by which one might possibly still circumvent this order which had been demanded.

DR. EXNER: The Prosecution, as you probably remember, have made this order the subject of such a serious charge against the German military authorities because it was drafted before the beginning of the war. These notes are dated 12 May 1941, and there you say: “It is best to brand the entire action as retaliation.” What did you mean by that?

JODL: It is correct that, because of his ideological opposition to Bolshevism, the Führer counted on the possible authorization of the commissars (decree) as a certainty. He was confirmed in this belief, and gave his reasons by saying: “I have carried on the war against Communism for 20 years. I know Communism, but you do not know it.” I must add that we as well were, of course, to a certain extent under the influence of what had been written in the literature of the entire world about Bolshevism since 1917. We also had had some experiences, for example, the Räte Republic in Munich. Despite that, I was of the opinion that first of all we should wait and see whether the commissars would actually act as the Führer expected them to act; and if his suspicions were confirmed, we could then make use of reprisals. That was what I meant by my notation in the margin.

DR. EXNER: That is to say, you wanted to wait until the beginning of the war; then you wanted to wait until you had had experiences in this war; and then you wanted to propose measures which, if necessary, could be considered as reprisals against the methods of fighting used by the enemy. Was that what you meant when you said: “It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action as retaliation”? What do you mean by “Man zieht auf”? These words were translated by the Prosecution as...

MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, in the examination of my learned friend, Dr. Exner, he has for several minutes now been asking the defendant very long leading questions as to what was the meaning of the passage in that letter. In my submission, that is not evidence at all by the witness; it is a speech by Dr. Exner, and I would ask him not to make another one now.

DR. EXNER: I still think that it is necessary in the presentation of evidence to determine what the defendant thought when he wrote those words.

THE PRESIDENT: You have heard me say on several occasions that when counsel ask leading questions, which put the answer into the mouth of the witness, it carries very little weight with the Tribunal. It is perfectly obvious that if you wanted to ask what the witness meant by his note he could have answered; and that is the proper way to put the question, and not to suggest the answer to him.

DR. EXNER: First of all I put the question, and then I believe I was summarizing the main points of what the witness said.

There is also a difficulty here with translation which I should like to overcome; that is, I am not sure about it. “Es wird aufgezogen” or “man zieht es am besten auf als Repressalie” is translated as, “It is best therefore to brand” in English, and in French as stigmatiser. It seems to me as though this were not quite correct, and as though one should say, “It is best to handle it as a reprisal,” and in French to say traiter.

JODL: I believe one should further explain the expression “aufziehen.” The German word “aufziehen” also has something doubtful about it. It has been said that that was a typical military expression used by the Defendant Jodl at that time. That does not mean, as is assumed by the Prosecution, “to camouflage.” Rather, I would say literally: “I believe we must handle this operation quite differently,” that is, tackle it in a different way. We would say that we would handle the demonstration to the Führer of new weapons in a different way; that means, for instance, “in a different sequence; in a different manner.” Among us soldiers “aufziehen,” to handle, meant exactly the same as “to tackle” or “to arrange” something. But it did not mean “to deceive.”

DR. EXNER: You mean that the word “aufziehen” has no secondary meaning indicating deception?

[The Tribunal adjourned until 4 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

Morning Session

DR. EXNER: General, yesterday afternoon we started dealing with war crimes, but today I should like first of all to put a few preliminary questions to you. What position and what tasks were yours during the period of the war?

JODL: I had to deal with the entire general staff work concerning the strategic operational conduct of the war. Then, subordinate to me was the military propaganda department, whose duty it was to co-operate with the press; and thirdly, I was head of an office which, speaking broadly, had to distribute means of communication to the various branches of the Wehrmacht. The whole of this sphere of work took up my time to such an extent that as a rule I worked night after night, until 3 o’clock in the morning. I had no time at all to concern myself with other things. I already had to delegate to my personal adjutant almost all my work with the press, which had to receive daily information.

DR. EXNER: These tasks, which you have just named, were all tasks connected with your office, and that was the Armed Forces Operations Staff, of which you were chief, is that not so?

DR. EXNER: And one department of the Operations Staff, the main and most important one, was the operations department?

DR. EXNER: And most of your tasks were concerned with this department. The Prosecution say you were Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Keitel. Do you agree?

JODL: That is not correct as has already been shown by the organization which was explained here during Field Marshal Keitel’s case. There is a great difference. As Chief of Staff, I would have been Field Marshal Keitel’s assistant, concerned with all of his duties. I was, however, only the chief of one of the many departments subordinate to Field Marshal Keitel.

Beginning with the year 1941 it became the practice for me and my operational branch to report to the Führer direct on all matters concerned with strategics, while Field Marshal Keitel, using my quartermaster department as a sort of personal working staff, took over all other tasks.

DR. EXNER: Did you, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, have authority to issue orders?

JODL: No—or rather only through my working staff. I was subordinate to Field Marshal Keitel, and even Keitel himself was not a commander but only the chief of a staff. But in the course of this war I naturally decided many operational details myself and signed them myself. There was no disagreement of any sort in these matters with the commanders-in-chief for I had their confidence, and I worked on the best possible terms with them.

DR. EXNER: For someone on the outside it is not quite easy to understand that even though you had no authority to issue orders, so many orders have been submitted here which were, in fact, signed by you, and signed in different ways—sometimes with your full name, sometimes with a “J,” the first letter of your name. Please explain these differences.

JODL: One must differentiate as follows: The decrees which the Führer himself signed, if they were of an operational nature, bear my initial at the end, on the lower right; and that means that I at least assisted in the formulation of that order. Then there were orders which also came from the Führer, though they were not signed by him personally, but were signed “by order, Jodl”; but they always had at the beginning the sentence, “The Führer has decreed,” or that sentence was found somewhere in the course of the order. There would be a preamble, usually giving reasons for the order, and then, it would read: “The Führer has therefore decreed.”

DR. EXNER: And what was the difference between these two groups of orders? Why was one group of orders signed by the Führer, and the other only by you?

JODL: The difference was merely that the orders signed by me were of less importance.

DR. EXNER: Now, there were other orders which did not begin with “The Führer has decreed,” but were signed by you nevertheless. What about these?

JODL: These orders were as a rule signed: “The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.” These were orders which emanated from me, that is, I or my staff formulated them. The Führer himself and Field Marshal Keitel had perhaps been informed of these orders, but not in every case.

Then there were other orders, which bear my initial on the first page, in the upper right-hand corner. Those were orders issued by other departments. My initial “J” on the first page was merely an office notation to show that the order had been submitted to me. But it did not mean that I had read it for if, on perusing the first page, I saw that the decree dealt with a matter not connected with my sphere of work, then I initialed it and put it aside, because I had to save time.

DR. EXNER: Now, there is another large volume of documents, of which some are being used as very incriminating evidence against you; they are not orders but summarized notes. Can you comment on these?

JODL: These summarized notes were an arrangement used on higher staff levels for the convenience of people who had not time to study enormous files. The summarized notes contained, in a short condensed form, a description of some matter or other, frequently the views taken by other departments and sometimes even a proposal. The important point, however, is that it was not an order; it was not a draft of an order, but it formed the basis for an order.

DR. EXNER: Perhaps the situation will best be clarified if you can explain this to the Tribunal in connection with the draft notes concerning the commissars, which were touched on yesterday. It is 884-PS, Exhibit USSR-351; Volume II of my document book, Page 152.

Before you start I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to an error in the translation. On Page 152, under Figure I, it says:

“The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding political officials et cetera ... regarding commissars...”

The English translation says: “The Army High Command presents a statement...”; but it is a draft. And I cannot quite follow the French; it says: Confirmation des instructions. It should obviously be projet.

“The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding treatment of political officials et cetera, for the uniform application of the order issued on 31 March 1941.”

And these are the commissars. The whole of this is a condensed draft. Will you please explain what it means?

JODL: This document is a typical example. First of all it contains the draft by another department of the Army High Command, not verbatim, but in a brief, condensed form. Then, secondly, under Figure II, on Page 153, the views of another department—that of Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s—are set forth. Then, under Figure III, it contains a proposal of my own staff.

The whole matter, therefore, is far from being an order; it is to become one. And on a summarized draft like that, I naturally made very many, I might say, cursory marginal notes to serve as a guide for the further treatment and discussion or disposal of the whole question. Therefore one cannot apply to this the same criteria as would be applied to the well-considered words contained in an actual order.

Now we turn to the very delicate topic of the Commando Order. This matter has been dealt with here on various occasions; and indeed, it goes beyond this Court in its importance and its repercussions, as we know from the newspapers.

I should like to hear from you something about the factors that led to this order. This order is Document 498-PS, Exhibit Number USA-501. I do not have it in my document book, but I asked the General Secretary to have it put at the disposal of the Tribunal in the various languages. I hope this has been done.

Then there is an explanatory decree in addition to the main order; both are signed by the Führer. That is Document 503-PS, Exhibit Number USA-542.

MR. ROBERTS: It is 498-PS. It is in the Keitel and Jodl Document Book, Number 7, Page 64.

DR. EXNER: The first order is addressed to the troops; the second is an explanatory order addressed to the commanders-in-chief. The first order threatens enemy soldiers with death if they engage in bandit-like warfare; and it refers to the Wehrmacht communiqué in this connection.

Can you first explain the connection between the Commando Order and the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October ’42?

JODL: May I ask the Tribunal to permit me, as an exception, to go into greater detail. Very much depends on this order; not my person, my own person does not matter in this Trial, but the honor of German soldiers and German officers whom I represent here is in question.

The Commando Order is inseparably linked with the announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942, for this announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué heralded the actual Commando Order.

DR. EXNER: And who was responsible for this announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué? Who wrote it?

JODL: This Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942—it was really a supplement to the communiqué—emanated in the main from me. It deals with the denial of a report by the British Ministry of War, a matter which I will not discuss further, for it is a very delicate point. The Prosecution especially does not wish it to be brought up.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, we do not know—at least I have not seen the document of 7 October 1942, and the Prosecution has made no objection to any answer to any English documents as far as we know.

THE PRESIDENT: What does the defendant mean by saying that the Prosecution does not wish him to present it or to answer it?

DR. EXNER: He probably refers to the fact that we were not allowed to present this Wehrmacht communiqué; but he can give us the contents of it briefly.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it may be a question of translation, but if he means simply that no evidence has been given by the Prosecution on the subject, of course, there is no objection to his saying that; but when he says that the Prosecution does not want him to put forward or does not want him to answer the document, that is a most improper statement to make.

[Turning to the defendant.] Perhaps you can tell us briefly the contents of this Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942. I believe you have it in your own document book.

THE PRESIDENT: No, but, Dr. Exner, that is not quite what I mean. What the defendant has said was that the Prosecution does not want him to deal with this subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, if that is the remark that is made, that is an improper remark to make. The Prosecution have no communication with the Defense upon this subject, presumably, except that they have put it forward in the evidence in this case.

DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Did you understand? You must not say that you are not allowed to touch upon this subject. Perhaps you will give us an explanation of what you meant?

JODL: This communiqué is in direct connection with the Commando Order. Only the last paragraph of this Wehrmacht communiqué is important. It was written by the Führer himself, as Field Marshal Keitel has already stated, and Professor Jahrreiss read it here before the Tribunal. It is the sentence which reads:

“...in future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices who do not act like soldiers but like bandits will be treated as such by the German troops and will be ruthlessly eliminated in battle wherever they appear.”

DR. EXNER: And then you were instructed to issue a detailed order to that effect...

Defendant, what the Tribunal wants to know is this: You said that the Commando Order appeared originally in a Wehrmacht report of the 7th of October 1942 which, in the main, emanated from you, and that that report refuted an English statement by the Ministry of War which the Prosecution did not want you to deal with. What do you mean by that?

JODL: By that I meant that my defense counsel intended to submit the entire Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942 as a document in evidence. But he refrained from doing so when the Prosecution objected to the document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have certainly never objected to this document. I have asked Mr. Roberts and he tells me that he has never objected to it; and, as far as we know, no one on behalf of the Prosecution has ever objected to it. I certainly have no objection to it at all myself; as a member of the English Government at the time when this matter was issued, I have never heard anything about it before; but I have no objection to it at all.

DR. EXNER: If there has been a misunderstanding here, we shall be all the more pleased, and we shall submit this Wehrmacht communiqué either this afternoon or tomorrow.

I should like to clarify one point regarding the question which Mr. President put to the defendant. The defendant said that the Wehrmacht communiqué, in the main, emanated from him, but that the Führer wrote the supplementary sentence...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, if you want to correct anything that I have said you must do it through the witness and not through yourself. You are not entitled to give evidence. You only give evidence through the witness.

[Turning to the defendant.] Please, state once more which part of the Wehrmacht communiqué you wrote and which part was added by the Führer.

JODL: The entire first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué has nothing whatever to do with Commando troops, but is concerned with the well-known affair of the shackling of German prisoners of war on the beach of Dieppe. I shall refer to that again later.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that I was correct in saying that in the main it emanated from you?

JODL: Yes, absolutely. The first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué was formulated by me and contains an authentic refutation of a statement of the British Ministry of War broadcast by the British radio.

This statement of the British Ministry of War was false, and I established the reasons why it was false on the basis of records, photographs, and affidavits which we possessed. Initially this affair had nothing to do with Commandos and reprisals. That was only introduced into the Wehrmacht communiqué through the supplement by the Führer, which begins with the sentence: “The High Command of the Wehrmacht is therefore compelled to decree the following.”

DR. EXNER: And it was considered necessary to make this announcement known in the Wehrmacht communiqué in an executive order. Did the Führer demand from you drafts for an executive order?

JODL: When the Führer had written this last supplementary sentence, he turned to Field Marshal Keitel and to me and demanded an executive order to follow this general announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué. And he added: “But I do not want any military courts.”

JODL: I had very many doubts which a careful study of the Hague rules of warfare could not dispel. Neither Field Marshal Keitel nor I prepared such a draft; but members of my staff, on their own initiative, asked for drafts and for the views of various departments. Thus Document 1263-PS came into being, to which I shall return later.

DR. EXNER: 1263. It is Page 104, Volume II of my document book, 1263-PS, RF-365; but we shall deal with that later.

JODL: My wish was an entirely different one. It was my intention to avoid an order altogether, and I rather expected that as a result of the announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué—an announcement which was certainly not kept secret but which was broadcast over the air to the entire world—the British Ministry of War would approach us again, either directly or via Geneva, as it had done on several previous occasions. And I hoped that in this way the whole matter would be shifted to the sphere of the Foreign Office. However, that did not happen. The British War Ministry remained silent.

In the meantime 10 days had passed and nothing had been done. Then on 17 October General Schmundt, the Chief Adjutant of the Führer, came to me and said that the Führer was demanding an executive order. I gave him the following answer, word for word:

“Please give him my best regards, but I will not issue an order like that.” Schmundt laughed and said, “Well, I cannot tell him that,” and my reply was, “Very well, then, tell the Führer that I do not see how a decree like that could be justified under international law.”

And with that he left. I hoped now that I would be asked to come to the Führer, so that at last, after many months, I should again be able to speak to him personally.

JODL: Yes. I wanted an opportunity either of telling him my misgivings or else being thrown out altogether. Either eventuality would have helped me but neither occurred. A few minutes later Schmundt called me on the telephone and informed me that the Führer was going to draw up the orders himself. On 18 October Schmundt again came in person and brought with him these two orders of the Führer—the order to the troops, and an explanation for the commanders.

JODL: These are the two documents, 498-PS and 503-PS. The papers submitted to the Tribunal as documents are not the originals of the Führer; I personally handed over the originals at Flensburg. The documents which are in the hands of the Tribunal are copies of the originals, or mimeographed copies of my staff.

DR. EXNER: Now, I should like to interpolate a question. You mentioned that your staff worked out something in detail, and you referred to 1263-PS, which has been submitted to the Tribunal—Page 104 of Volume II. In this document you wrote two remarks on Page 106. The first remark on that page is “No.” In the French translation this non is missing, and should be added. On the same page a little further down, it says in your own handwriting, “That will not do either,” and your initial “J” for Jodl.

JODL: As I have already said, the members of my staff—as may be seen under the first figure on Page 104—on their own initiative asked for proposals, firstly, from the foreign intelligence department, Canaris, because he had a group of experts on international law and, secondly, from the Wehrmacht legal department, since, after all, we were concerned with a legal problem.

On Page 106, under paragraph “a,” there is the proposal which the foreign division of the intelligence department made:

“Members of terrorist and sabotage troops who are found ... without uniform, or in German uniform, will be treated as bandits ... or if they fall into German hands outside battle operations, they are to be taken at once to an officer for interrogation. Thereafter they are to be dealt with by summary court martial.”

That was quite impossible, for if one came across a soldier in civilian clothing, without uniform, no one could know just who he was. He might be a spy or an escaped prisoner-of-war or an enemy airman who had saved his life by jumping from his plane and now hoped to escape in civilian clothing. That had to be determined by an experienced interrogating officer and not by a summary court martial consisting of a lieutenant, two noncommissioned officers, and two soldiers. In paragraph “b”...

In paragraph “b” it was suggested that if such sabotage groups were captured wearing uniforms, a report should be made to the Armed Forces Operations Staff, which should then decide what should be done. But in that case the Armed Forces Operations Staff would have assumed the function of a military court, and that it could never be.

I really must claim for myself that, thanks to my wider experience, I saw these problems a little more clearly than some of my subordinates.

DR. EXNER: And so you rejected this proposal. You said that you also had grave misgivings about the Führer Order. Will you tell the Court now what misgivings you had?

JODL: First of all I had a number of doubts as to its legality. Secondly, the order was ambiguous, and also it was not sufficiently clear for practical application. Particularly in this case I considered military courts absolutely necessary. I know well that even judges may on occasion, consciously or not, be under coercion and may pass judgment not strictly in accordance with the law; but at least they provide some safeguard against a miscarriage of justice.

DR. EXNER: Therefore, if I understand you rightly, you wanted to install some legal procedure. What did you mean by unclear and ambiguous?

JODL: The theory was that soldiers, who by their actions put themselves outside the laws of war, cannot claim to be treated in accordance with the laws of war. This is a basic principle definitely recognized in international law, for instance in the case of a spy or a franc-tireur.

The aim of this order was to intimidate British Commando troops who were using such methods of warfare. But the order of the Führer went further and said that all Commando troops were to be massacred. This was the point on which I had grave misgivings.

JODL: Just this doubt—that on the basis of this order, soldiers also would be massacred...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, it is not necessary to speak so slowly, if you can speak a little bit more fast.

JODL: I was afraid that not only enemy soldiers who, to use the Führer’s expression, really behaved like bandits, but also decent enemy soldiers, would be wiped out. In addition—and this was especially repugnant to me—at the very end of Document 503-PS it was ordered that soldiers were to be shot after they had been captured and had been interrogated. What was totally unclear to me was the general legal position, namely, whether a soldier who had acted like a bandit would upon capture enjoy the legal status of a prisoner-of-war, or whether on account of his earlier behavior he had already placed himself outside this legal status.

DR. EXNER: Could you understand the idea that enemy soldiers who had acted in an unsoldierly manner should not be treated as soldiers?

JODL: Yes, I could quite understand that, and so could others, for the Führer had received very bitter reports. We had captured all the orders of the Canadian brigade which had landed at Dieppe, and these orders were put before me in the original. These orders said that, wherever possible, German prisoners were to have their hands shackled. But after some time, through the Commander, West, I received authentic reports and testimony of witnesses, with photographs, which definitely convinced me that numerous men of the Todt Organization, fathers of families, unarmed, old people, who were wearing an arm band with a swastika—that was their badge—had been shackled with a loop around their necks and the end of the rope fastened around their bent-back legs in such a way that they had strangled themselves.

I may add that I kept these photographs from the Führer, and I did not tell him of these aggravating incidents which to me had been proved. I concealed them from the German people and from the Propaganda Ministry. Then came the English radio report denying emphatically that any German soldier had been shackled at Dieppe.

Some time later, a Commando troop made an attack on the island of Saercq. Again we received official reports that German prisoners had been shackled.

Finally we captured the so-called British order for close combat. That was the last straw for the Führer; I also studied it very carefully. These close-combat instructions showed by pictures how men could be shackled in such a way that they would strangle themselves through the shackling, and it was stated exactly within what time death would occur.

DR. EXNER: Therefore, the reasons which Hitler gave for his Order 498 were actually based on reliably reported facts. I remark that Hitler referred to prisoners who had been shackled, prisoners who had been killed, and that criminals, as Commandos...

THE PRESIDENT: You are paraphrasing the evidence in a way that is inaccurate, because the defendant has just said that he kept these things from Hitler. You are now saying that Hitler knew about them. That is not what the witness said.

DR. EXNER: Then, I must ask you whether the facts upon which this order is based were reported to you.

JODL: I believe the Tribunal has Document 498-PS. In it the Führer first makes the general statement that for some time our opponents in their conduct of the war have been using methods which violate the international Geneva Convention. I must support this statement as true on the basis of reports which, regrettably, we had been receiving since the summer of 1941. I do not wish to go into individual cases. There was an outrageous incident with a British U-boat in the Aegean Sea. There was the order in North Africa that German prisoners of war should not be given water before they were interrogated. There were a large number of such reports.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal thinks that it is very difficult to go into individual incidents which occurred long before this order was drafted, and you have told us what you said the order was drafted in respect of, namely the shackling; and you are now referring to other things which you allege happened long before that. It does not seem that it is possible for the Tribunal to investigate all those matters which happened long before.

JODL: And I do not want to speak about these matters any longer. I only want to point out, as I think I must, that generally speaking the reasons given by the Führer for this order did not spring from a diseased imagination but were based on actual proof in his and in our possession. For it is certainly very different whether I, in my own mind, had to admit there was some justification for this order or whether I considered the whole order an open scandal. That is a vital point for my own conduct. But I shall try to be very brief. The fact that many previously convicted persons and criminals were included in the Commandos, who were of course reckless people, was proved by the testimony of prisoners; and the fact that prisoners were shackled was obvious from captured orders and the testimony of witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that already. We have heard that more than once—that you had evidence before you that prisoners were shackled and that you had the Canadian orders before you.

DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can just say a few words on the subject of killing prisoners.

JODL: In conclusion, I want to say that I did not see any order, any captured order, which decreed death for German prisoners of war, though this was also contained as a reason in the Führer Order. But I must explain that the British Ministry of War advised us—I cannot recall exactly whether it was via Geneva or through the radio—that situations might very well arise in which prisoners of war would have to be killed—no, rather, in which prisoners of war would have to be shackled because otherwise one would be forced to kill them. And so, if at the end here the Führer says orders have been found according to which the Commandos were on principle to kill prisoners, then I think he is referring to the British close-combat instructions which described a method of shackling which would cause death.

JODL: My part consisted only in distributing this order, or having it distributed, in accordance with express instructions.

DR. EXNER: The Prosecution said once that you also signed this order—one of these two orders, I do not know which one. That is not correct?

DR. EXNER: Yes, we will deal with that in a moment. Could you have refused to transmit this order?

JODL: No, if I had refused to transmit an order of the Führer, I would have been arrested immediately; and I must say, with justification. But as I said, I was not at all sure whether this decree, either in its entirety or in part, actually violated the law; and I still do not know that today. I am convinced that if one were to convene here a conference of experts on international law, each one of them would probably have a different opinion on the subject.

JODL: At any other time, probably yes. At that time, however—a time of conflict with the Führer—it was not possible for me to speak to him personally at all. To broach the subject during the general conference on the situation was quite out of the question. Therefore I intended in the execution of this order to adopt a very magnanimous attitude, and I was certain that the commanders-in-chief would do the same.

DR. EXNER: And what do you mean by magnanimous? Could this order have been interpreted in different ways?

JODL: Yes. The order offered two ways of avoiding the treatment of really decent soldiers like criminals. If a Commando troop, mostly encountered in fights at night, was not wiped out but captured, as was the rule in almost all cases, that was already certain proof that our troops did not consider these men as bandits. It was then the task of the commanders-in-chief to make an investigation. If it was purely a reconnaissance operation, the entire action did not fall within the sphere of the Commando Order at all and would not be reported as a Commando raid. However, if the operation was really carried out by a sabotage and demolition unit, its equipment had to be examined. It had to be investigated whether the men were wearing civilian clothing under their uniforms; whether they were carrying the famous armpit guns, which go off automatically when the arms are lifted in the act of surrender; or whether they used other despicable methods during the fighting. The commanders-in-chief could then act in accordance with the outcome of such an investigation. I believe that in that way it was quite possible—and in fact it happened many times, I might almost say in the bulk of cases—that the shooting of brave, decent soldiers was avoided.

DR. EXNER: Could you yourself exert any influence on the practices followed by the troops?

JODL: I tried to exert my influence on various occasions. When it was reported to me that a Commando unit had been captured—which according to the Führer decree was not allowed—then I raised no questions or objections. I made no report at all to the Führer on Commando operations which met with only minor success. And finally, I often dissuaded him from taking too drastic views, as in the Pescara case, which Field Marshal Kesselring has already described here, when I succeeded in convincing the Führer that only a reconnaissance unit was involved.

JODL: Commando operations decreased considerably as a result of the public announcements in the Wehrmacht communiqué. I believe that not more than 8 or 10 cases occurred in all.

For a time, during the months of July and August 1944, increasingly large numbers of terrorists were reported killed in the Wehrmacht communiqué; these, however, were not Commando troops, but insurgents who were killed in the fighting in France. That may be proved if the Tribunal will read Document 551-PS, Figure 4. There the order is given—it is USA-551, on Page 117.

DR. EXNER: What is ordered? I should like to deal now with another document, Document 532-PS.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. EXNER: With reference to the Commando Order, I want to mention Document 532-PS, Exhibit Number RF-368, which is in our Document Book 2, Page 113.

This document was offered on a previous occasion, and I objected to it because it was not signed, or rather because it was crossed out.

Will you explain why you crossed out the draft order which is contained in this document?

JODL: Immediately before this draft order was written, the Commander, West requested that now, after the invasion, the Commando Order should be rescinded altogether. I approved that proposal. A draft was submitted to me here which rescinded the order only partially, namely in regard to the immediate area of the beachhead and that part of Brittany, a little further from the beachhead, where landings by parachutists were taking place daily at that time.

THE PRESIDENT: At the time of your objection was this document not rejected? You told us that you objected to the document. What I am asking you is, what did the Tribunal do upon your objection? Did they maintain it, or did they deny it?

DR. EXNER: The objection was allowed, and I think the document was struck off. I do not think that I am mistaken.

DR. EXNER: I did not ask at the time to have the document struck off. I merely raised the objection that no mention was made of the facts that the draft order in the document was crossed out, and that it clearly bore a handwritten marginal note by Jodl rejecting it.

THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Either the document was offered in evidence or it was not; and either it has got an exhibit number or it has not; and, as I understand, your objection was rejected.

MR. ROBERTS: It was in fact objected to by Dr. Exner, after having been given the French Exhibit Number RF-368; and after discussing it, it was then stricken from the record, the English shorthand note reference being Page 3631 (Volume VI, Page 360). My Lord, I think in fact both the Prosecution and the Defense agreed it has Jodl’s writing upon it; and, therefore, I feel certain that there can be no question as to its admissibility, either on behalf of the Prosecution or the Defense. My Lord, I certainly intend, with the permission of the Tribunal, to cross-examine him about it; and I have not the slightest objection to my friend Dr. Exner putting it in.

JODL: At that time it was my intention to get rid of the Commando Order entirely. For that reason I wrote, next to the sentence under Figure 4: “That is just what they should not”—the entire first page. That was of no use, however, because on that very day the Führer made a different decision with regard to the request of the Commander, West, and his decision is contained in Document 551-PS.

DR. EXNER: 551-PS, Exhibit Number USA-551. That is contained in the second volume on Page 115; it is an order on the treatment of men belonging to Commandos. This order contains the following handwritten remark of yours: “Similar action should be taken in the Italian theater of war.” This is on Page 117.

Will you briefly explain the contents of that order and the reason for your remark.

JODL: That can be quickly explained. In that order territorial limits were set restricting the use of the Commando Order, which henceforth was to apply only to enemy operations behind the corps command posts but not to the battle area of the beachhead. These were territorial limitations which had not so far been fixed or ordered; and I immediately accepted this order for the Italian theater of war, because in Italy also there existed a fighting front on land. If this order were put into practice in Italy, it would mean that no Commando operation which began with a landing on the coast need be regarded as a Commando operation, because all these landings took place in front of the lines of the corps command posts. Therefore I was very anxious to have the same lighter conditions applied to the whole Italian theater of war.

DR. EXNER: I just want to read one paragraph on Page 116. It is the second paragraph under Number 1. In the first paragraph it says: “...the order remains in force....” But the second paragraph reads:

“Excepted are enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate battle area of the beachhead—that is in the area of the divisions fighting in the front line—as well as reserve troops up to and including corps commands, in accordance with Figure 5 of the basic order....”

The word “Generalkommando” means “corps command,” and it has not been quite correctly translated into English and French. This limitation of the order to certain areas was, on the basis of Jodi’s comment, also to apply to the Italian theater.

DR. EXNER: Yes; the word “Generalkommando” has been translated into the French, Région Militaire. Région Militaire is not quite clear.

DR. EXNER: And in the English it says, “corps command.” That is correct. The English is correct: “corps command.” That is the same as “Generalkommando.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal would prefer that you should draw the attention of the Tribunal to anything which you say is a mistranslation, rather than stating that it is a mistranslation. I call it a question of opinion whether it is a mistranslation or not. It is not for you to tell us that it is a mistranslation. You may draw our attention to it and say that you submit it as a mistranslation. But now, will you tell us this also: In one copy of this Document 551-PS, it appears to be signed by, or initialed by Warlimont. In the other, in your version of the translation, it appears to be signed by the Defendant Keitel. What is the explanation of that?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, might I make a suggestion? I think the Court should get the original from the Exhibit Room. 551-PS in fact consists of three documents. The first is a draft altered in pencil; and the second is a draft initialed “W”—that is Warlimont, with Jodi’s penciled note at the end extending it to Italy; and the third is the final order in which the penciled note of Jodl and the alteration of distribution to Italy is incorporated. So, there are really three documents, and the last is a mimeographed document with the mimeographed signature of Keitel. That appears from the original draft.

DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution has been emphasizing that you gave strict instructions to have this order kept secret, and that you ordered its distribution only down to the level of commanding officers to avoid its falling into enemy hands at all costs. You gave these instructions for the second order, the explanatory order, 503-PS. Will you explain why you ordered such strict secrecy?

DR. EXNER: That, I may add, is in the second volume of my document book, on Page 102. That is the order for secrecy, signed by Jodl.

JODL: Particular secrecy for this order was quite inevitable. First of all, it was directed only to the commanders. Secondly, the order contained in great detail information on the considerable damage which the German Wehrmacht had already suffered through these Commando operations, and the damage which might still be caused under certain circumstances. If the order were to fall into enemy hands, it would certainly be an incentive for the enemy to continue that particular type of warfare in increased measure. Thirdly, the order, 498-PS, could be considered as a reprisal. But the last sentence in Document 503-PS, a sentence which can easily be recognized as a later addition—as the order seems to end before it—that sentence, I must say, made me indignant and was one of the reasons why I insisted on such particularly strict secrecy for this order.

“If it should serve some useful purpose to save one or two men temporarily to interrogate them, they are to be shot immediately after interrogation.”

THE PRESIDENT: You have not printed the whole of 503 in your document book. Is that it?

DR. EXNER: Unfortunately, 503-PS is not in it, but only the secrecy order, Page 102. I expressly requested, however, that it should be submitted to the Tribunal.

JODL: May I add that this sentence became the source of all trouble. The troops made use of that sentence and on principle, or as a rule, did not kill Commandos but took them prisoner.

DR. EXNER: You said this last sentence made you indignant. Were you also convinced that it was against international law?

JODL: One might have doubts in that respect too. But I found it distasteful from a human point of view, for if one does shoot a man, I think it is base to extort all information out of him first.

DR. EXNER: I want to ask one more question concerning what you mentioned before the recess. You said that you did not report everything to the Führer; you did not report all Commando raids to him. That is quite clear. But you said you also did not report information which you obtained from the enemy—killings, and so on. What did you mean by that?

JODL: I reported the results of Dieppe and, should we say, the violations of international law which we considered had been committed there—the shackling of German prisoners, and so on. There was only one thing which I did not report, namely, the shackling of some men belonging to the Todt Organization in such a manner that they strangled themselves. I did not report that, and it did not appear in any order or Wehrmacht communiqué.

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already told us about this, so why you should ask him again I don’t know.

[Turning to the defendant.] We now pass to another subject, the order regarding Leningrad and Moscow. How did Hitler’s order about the fate of Leningrad and Moscow come into being? It is C-123, second volume, Page 145 of my document book; it was submitted under the number USSR-114. This is the order stating that surrender was not to be accepted. How did this order come into being?

JODL: At the beginning of the second paragraph appears the sentence: “The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world.” I shall now explain that. The first reason was a report from Field Marshal Von Leeb, the Commander of Army Group North at Leningrad. He reported that the population of Leningrad had already begun to flock out toward his lines in the south and west. He pointed out that it would be absolutely impossible for him to keep these millions of Leningrad people fed and supplied if they were to fall into his hands, because the supply situation of the army group was deplorable at that time. That was the first reason. But shortly beforehand Kiev had been abandoned by the Russian armies, and hardly had we occupied the city when tremendous explosions occurred one after another. The major part of the inner city was destroyed by fire; 50,000 people were made homeless; German soldiers were used to fight the flames and suffered considerable losses, because further large masses of explosives went off during the fire. At first the local commander at Kiev thought that it was sabotage on the part of the population, until we found a demolition chart, listing 50 or 60 objectives in Kiev which had already been prepared for destruction some time before; and this chart was in fact correct, as investigation by engineers proved at once. At least 40 more objectives were ready to be blown up, and for most of them a remote-control was to set off the explosion by means of wireless waves. I myself had the original of this demolition chart in my hands. That proved...

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the details of Kiev. This deals with Leningrad. The defendant might briefly state in substance what he says happened at Kiev; but we cannot investigate details of it.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to show that it was feared these happenings in Kiev might repeat themselves in Leningrad.

THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that; but if he said that he had plans of the blowing up of Leningrad, it would be a different matter, and he could give that in more detail. But what I am saying is we cannot go into the details about Kiev.

DR. EXNER: No. I only want to refer without quoting to my Exhibit AJ-15 (Document Jodl-50), on Page 149 of my second volume. That is a report on these explosions in Kiev. We will not delay over this matter any more now. I just wanted to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal.

JODL: Then I only need to say in conclusion that the Führer always expected that what had happened in Kiev, in Kharkov, and in Odessa would happen also in Leningrad, and possibly in Moscow. That was the decisive reason why this order, which already had been put into writing, was given by him orally to the High Command of the Army. And the order was given added weight because the Russian radio reported that Leningrad had been undermined and would be defended to the last man.

The purpose of the order was exclusively that of protecting German troops against such catastrophes as had already occurred; for entire staffs had been blown into the air in Kharkov and Kiev. For this reason the Führer issued this order, which I in turn, at his express request, put into writing. Therefore the order began with the words, “The Führer has again decided”—that means “once more,” “for the second time.”

DR. EXNER: What was the reason for the order to leave openings to the east in the encirclement of Leningrad and Moscow?

JODL: We did not want these masses of the population. We had had our experiences in Paris. There it had even been necessary to use the transport space of four divisions and the whole relief train “Bavaria,” which could supply tens of thousands of people, to save the population from starvation. In Leningrad that would have been quite impossible, because in the first place the railways had been destroyed; the rails had not yet been adjusted to our gauge, and the supply situation was very difficult. It would have been impossible to help these millions of people in any way; there would have been a real catastrophe. Hence the idea of pressing them back to the east, into the Russian areas; an idea, incidentally, not in conformity with the assertion which has been made here that we wanted to exterminate the Slavs.

DR. EXNER: I now come to another subject. The French prosecutor has accused you of ordering in Document UK-56—which is Exhibit RF-335 in my document book, the second volume, Page 153—of ordering the deportation of Jews, thereby giving, as chief of a military staff, a political order.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the translation must have come through wrong. You said—at least, I took it down—Page 153.

DR. EXNER: Page 155. I beg your pardon, it is on Page 155 of the second volume of my document book. The actual order is on Page 156.

JODL: I must explain in connection with this document that the deportation of Jews from Denmark was discussed during a conference at which I did not participate. Himmler suggested it to the Führer; and the Führer approved or ordered it. I was informed of it either through General Schmundt or Ambassador Hewel.

Then on instructions conveyed to me by Schmundt, I transmitted to the military commander in Denmark the details of this order. The heading, or rather, the address of this teleprint message shows that it was directed to two offices, namely to the Foreign Office and to the commander of the German troops in Denmark. These are the two principal offices for which it was destined. The Reichsführer SS received the letter only for information purposes, as is noted on it in accordance with our office practice. He did not have to act upon it; it was not an order for him, but it was merely for information. He already knew the Führer’s decision.

I did not in any way order the deportation of the Jews, but I wrote, “The deportation of Jews will be carried out by the Reichsführer SS...”

JODL: Figure 2. Had this been an order, it would have had to be addressed to the Reichsführer SS; and it would have had to be worded like this: “Reichsführer SS is to deport Jews from Denmark.” But it is exactly the other way about. This Figure 2 informs General Von Hannecken in Denmark that he has nothing to do with this affair, but that it is being handled by the Reichsführer SS. But General Von Hannecken had to be told of this, because at that time a state of military emergency existed. He had executive power in Denmark, and if anything like that had been done without his knowledge he might immediately have objected to it and forbidden it.

The matter appeared to me so urgent that, in order to avoid incidents, I informed the military commander in Denmark about it over the telephone, quite openly and without regard to its secrecy. The French Prosecution mentioned an indiscretion which enabled most Jews to escape from Denmark into Sweden; presumably it was this telephone call which made that possible.

Finally, therefore, I repeat that I was far from ordering the deportation of Jews; I merely informed the military commander in question that he was to have nothing to do with the matter. Besides, as I heard afterwards on making inquiries, these Jews were taken to Theresienstadt, where they were cared for and visited by the Red Cross; and even the Danish minister declared himself satisfied with their treatment.

DR. EXNER: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to what I consider is an inadequate translation into English and French. Under Figure 1 on Page 156 of the second volume the word “volunteers” does not appear in the translation. It says here, “The Reichsführer SS has permission to recruit volunteers from the former members of the Danish forces who are to be released...” The word “volunteers” is missing in the English translation; the French, merely says hommes—“men.”

[Turning to the defendant.] You actually had no dealings with matters in occupied territories; they were outside your jurisdiction. How then did you come to sign this order?

JODL: Actually this affair did not concern me at all. I signed the order because Field Marshal Keitel was away on that day.

DR. EXNER: As we are just talking of the Jews, will you tell the Court what you knew about the extermination of Jews? I remind you that you are under oath.

JODL: I know just how improbable these explanations sound, but very often the improbable is true and the probable untrue. I can only say, fully conscious of my responsibility, that I never heard, either by hint or by written or spoken word, of an extermination of Jews. On one single occasion I had doubts, and that was when Himmler spoke about the revolt in the Jewish Ghetto. I did not quite believe in this heroic fight; but Himmler immediately supplied photographs showing the concrete dugouts which had been built there, and he said, “Not only the Jews but also Polish Nationalists have taken refuge there and they are offering bitter resistance.” And with that he removed my suspicions.

JODL: I am speaking of the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto of which I heard through a personal report from Himmler given in our presence, in the presence of soldiers at the Führer’s headquarters. Himmler spoke only of an uprising and of bitter fighting. As far as the activities of the Police are concerned, of the so-called action groups, Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos—a conception, incidentally, of which I first heard here in detail—there was never any explanation through the Führer himself other than that these police units were necessary to quell uprisings, rebellions, and partisan actions before they grew into a menace. This was not a task for the Armed Forces, but for the Police, and for that reason the Police had to enter the operational areas of the Army. I have never had any private information on the extermination of the Jews; and on my word, as sure as I am sitting here, I heard all these things for the first time after the end of the war.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it is necessary to point out to you that you cannot speak about there having been no explanation to the Führer; you can only speak about there having been no explanation to yourself. The translation I heard was, as to these Einsatzgruppen, that there had been no explanation to the Führer.

JODL: I said that the Führer had never given us any other reason for the presence of police forces than his statement that police measures were necessary.

DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about concentration camps, or what did you know about them? Please be brief.

JODL: I can briefly say that I knew there were concentration camps at Dachau and Oranienburg. Some divisional officers visited Oranienburg once in 1937 and gave me very enthusiastic accounts of it. I heard the name of Buchenwald for the first time in the spring of 1945. When the name was mentioned, I thought it was a new troop training camp; and I made inquiries. The inmates were always described as German habitual criminals and certain inveterate political opponents, who however, like Schuschnigg or Niemöller, were held there in a kind of honorable detention. I never heard a single word about tortures, deported persons, or prisoners of war, crematoriums or gas vans, torments reminiscent of the Inquisition, and medical experiments. I can only say that, even if I had heard of these things, I would not have believed them until I had seen them with my own eyes.

DR. EXNER: The French prosecutor read a statement by the German Police General Panke, according to which you were present at a conference with Hitler on 30 December 1942, when terror and counterterror and so on, and reprisal murders in Denmark were said to have been discussed. What do you say to that?

JODL: In some points that statement is correct; in others it is incorrect. During that conference, at least as long as I was present, the word “murder” was never mentioned. The Führer said:

“I want to fight the terror of sabotage and attacks, now beginning in Norway, with exactly the same weapons. That is to say, if a Danish factory working for Germany is blown up, which has happened, then a factory working solely for the Danes will be blown up also. If some of our strong points are attacked by terrorists, which has also happened, these terrorists will be hunted, surrounded, and wiped out in fighting; and I do not want courts martial, which only create martyrs.”

He did not say or suggest, however, that innocent Danes should now be murdered as a reprisal. I can only say that, in my presence and in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel, that and nothing else was said. Again, it is a very debatable question from the point of view of international law whether an army is not entitled to adopt the fighting methods of its opponents in its countermeasures, particularly in such franc-tireur warfare and in rebellions like these. It seems to me a very moot point.

DR. EXNER: You just said, “as long as I was present.” Were you not present during the entire conference? Can you remember?

JODL: I do not think that even in my absence any other statements were made. Once during the conference I went out to telephone and was away for a short time, perhaps 15 minutes.

DR. EXNER: We now come to the partisan fighting. Partisan fighting and partisans have been mentioned frequently here. Can you say briefly what these partisans were?

JODL: It is not easy to define that clearly, considering all the types of fighting adopted in this world war; but there are five characteristics:

1) A partisan group is a fighting unit formed behind one’s own front; 2) it is not or is only partly in uniform; 3) it is not an organic part of the Armed Forces even though it receives its orders from them; 4) it must be in a position, or it generally is in a position to...

DR. EXNER: Well, then we know approximately what partisans are. I now want to ask you about the fighting against partisan groups. First of all I must read what we have heard here about partisans, Document L-180, USA-276, which is contained in the second volume of my document book, Page 121. That is a complete report of an Einsatzgruppe in action against partisans; it is Appendix Number 9. What is found on Page 122 is, I think, of importance. First of all under Roman Numeral I, Figure 5, I quote:

“In the larger cities, especially those with industrial works, so-called istrebitelni battalions (i. e. destruction battalions) were formed by the Soviets before the entry of the German troops....”

“...the tasks and fighting methods of the various partisan groups have become known ... partly from the captured combat directives of the partisans themselves. This statement of a captured partisan ... is significant: ‘A partisan must destroy everything that he can reach...’ ”

And then, in one of the “Combat Directives for Partisan Groups” received by us from the commander of the army, rear area North, we find stated:

“Unbearable conditions are to be created for the enemy and his allies in territories occupied by him. All the measures of the enemy are to be opposed.”

And then instructions are given to blow up bridges, to destroy roads, et cetera. I shall not read it all. In the last paragraph, which I have on Page 123, it expressly states that partisans are to disguise themselves cleverly; that they will sometimes appear as farmers or will work in the fields as soon as German forces appear in the vicinity. The witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski stated here that the fight against partisans was carried out in a chaotic manner. He meant by that that it was not directed from higher quarters. You must be informed about that. Is that correct?

JODL: No, that is not correct. This expert on partisan fighting obviously has a bad memory. I draw attention to Document F-665, in Document Book 2, Page 126. Here the first page is given of a directive for partisan warfare. It is called “Instructions for Partisan Warfare,” and was signed by me personally on 6 May 1944. The Tribunal will see that in the second sentence it says that...

JODL: ...the instructional pamphlet number so-and-so, “Instructions for Partisan Warfare in the East,” issued by the OKW, Armed Forces Operations Staff, dated 11 November 1942, is canceled. That proves that at least since 11 November 1942, the troops had in their possession instructions issued by the Armed Forces Operations Staff as to how the battle against partisans should be conducted.

DR. EXNER: May I now draw attention to my Document AJ-1, Page 133. It is an affidavit of a Pastor Wettberg; I do not want to read it. Pastor Wettberg contacted me because he himself had been engaged in the warfare against partisans, and he confirmed that the fighting was perfectly well directed even before the new instructions were issued, that is, from 1942 onwards. In 1944 you issued this new directive without Hitler’s permission; is that correct?

JODL: I want to state that I did not submit this directive either to Field Marshal Keitel or to the Führer, because it was a contradiction of all existing orders. I shall prove in detail later that it gives instructions for all so-called partisans in France and Yugoslavia—partisan areas in Russia were now in front of our lines—to be treated immediately as regular fighting troops, and thus as prisoners of war.

I took this unusual step because I became convinced, after the shooting of the English Air Force officers at Sagan, that the Führer no longer concerned himself with the idea of human rights; and also because after 1 May 1944 I myself felt responsible for questions of international law, as the “Canaris” department had been dissolved on that day and the foreign section, together with the international law department, had come under my command. I was resolved not to tolerate and not to participate in any such violations of international law on our part, and I acted accordingly from that day up to the end of the war.

In this order I declared all partisans and those supporting them, and even those wearing civilian clothes, to be regular troops and prisoners of war, long before Eisenhower—on 7 July 1944 only—demanded that terrorists in France should be given that status.

DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that the fight against partisans was only a code name under which Jews and Slavs were killed; is that true?

JODL: The fight against partisans was a horrible reality. In July 1943, to quote some figures, 1,560 instances of railway sabotage occurred in Russia. There were 2,600 in September; that is 90 per day. A book by Ponomarenko was published from which an American paper quoted 500,000 Germans as having been killed by the partisans. If a nought is crossed off from that figure, it is still quite a considerable achievement for a peaceful Soviet population. But the book is also said to have stated that the population became increasingly hostile; that murder and terror became more frequent; and that the peaceful Quisling mayors were being killed. At any rate it was a tremendous fight which was taking place in the East.

DR. EXNER: In this connection, I would like to draw the Tribunal’s attention to an entry in Jodl’s Diary, Document 1807-PS. It is on Page 119 of the second volume of my document book. Under 25 May it says, “Colonel General Halder draws the attention of the Führer to increasing partisan activity...”

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The defendant stated, I think, that in this directive of his on the 6th of May 1944 there was an order that guerrillas should be treated as prisoners of war. Will you refer us to the passage?

JODL: “All partisans captured in enemy uniform or civilian clothing or surrendering during combat are to be treated in principle as prisoners of war. The same applies to all persons encountered in the immediate fighting area who may be considered as supporting the partisans, even when no combat action can be proved against them. Partisans in German uniform, or in the uniform of an allied army, are to be shot after careful interrogation if captured in combat. Deserters, no matter how they are dressed”—and, may I add, even if dressed in German uniform—“are, on principle, to be well treated. The partisans must hear of this.”

THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Well, perhaps—it is 1 o’clock—we might break off now.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

DR. EXNER: I have one further question concerning the partisan regulations. The Prosecution brings the charge that you, through Number 161 of the partisan regulations—that, Your Honors, is in the document we used last, F-665, Page 130 of Volume II—were responsible for the destruction of whole villages, and even of the total population of villages in France. Will you please comment on this?

JODL: I believe the opposite is true. Through Number 161, I reduced the collective measures and collective punishments that the Führer had decreed without restraint, to what was permitted by Article 50 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare. In this article collective punishment is prohibited unless the entire population is equally guilty in terror activities of any kind. Therefore, with this Number 161 I did not order the burning down of villages, not even in exceptional cases, but on the contrary I said that such collective measures might be used only in very exceptional cases, and then only with the approval of a divisional commander, for he would have a tribunal and could make a judicial investigation.

I do not wish to trouble the Tribunal with any other merits of mine, which may be read in this document. I discussed the good treatment of the population; the necessity of leaving them the necessaries of life, et cetera. I believe, at any rate, that this document actually serves as a model of how this sort of war may be brought within the scope of international law. I did this as I was convinced that at that time the French Maquis movement, and also the Tito revolt had gradually begun to develop into a regular war.

Now the case of the 2d SS Panzer Division is cited as an example of things that I caused through this Number 161. I can say only that the behavior of the SS Panzer Division is the responsibility of its commander. I learned about it only months afterwards. I am grateful to the French Prosecution for having submitted this document, and I am grateful also for the statement that the Maquis movement in the beginning was nothing else than franc-tireur warfare, the heroism of which I do not dispute.

DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different problem, the low-level fliers. From Document 731-PS, Page 139 of the second document book, and Page 144 of Volume II of my document book—from these documents it can be seen that from various sources proposals had been made as to the treatment of enemy airmen who had made emergency landings. Can you tell us, first of all, the reason for this, and what your attitude was toward these proposals?

JODL: I shall try to be as brief as possible. The reason was that numerous reports had been received of people being attacked by individual enemy aircraft contrary to international law. The Führer demanded countermeasures, and that is the origin of the memorandum 731-PS, Exhibit RF-1407. It is not a draft for an order, still less an order. It is a note containing proposals made by the Luftwaffe in that connection. There was no talk as yet about lynching. The fact that I concerned myself with this problem at all may find its explanation in the responsibility which, as I have previously mentioned, I believed had rested with me since 1 May with regard to questions of international law. The note which I wrote on the document has already been read. I objected to one paragraph—a case which I nevertheless considered entirely admissible according to international law. This was later crossed out and replaced by a statement that it was to be considered murder if one of our soldiers landing by parachute was shot. I wrote this objection on Document 735-PS. The concept of lynching...

DR. EXNER: I should like to state, for the assistance of the Tribunal, where this passage is. The remark made by Jodl in his handwriting is found on Page 144 of the document book. Various proposals are made in this memorandum, and then Jodl adds “To Number 3...”; and then there is a notation.

JODL: My notation was: “Is the Foreign Office in agreement with Number 3b?”—namely, that the shooting of our own airmen who have been shot down and are parachuting to earth is to be considered a mean terrorist act.

JODL: I just wanted to add that lynching was suggested in an article by Goebbels, published in the Völkischer Beobachter. The more I concerned myself with this problem, the more it was obvious that nothing at all could be achieved with measures of this kind, for one could never capture a guilty low-flying airman, for he would either escape or he would be dashed to pieces on the ground. This would only lead to a general murder of airmen. Therefore, I decided—and I was in complete agreement with Field Marshal Keitel on this point—to cause this entire action to fail. The Court can see that between Document 731-PS, which was compiled on 21 May, and Document 735-PS, 16 days had elapsed wherein nothing had been done. When on 6 June I received a rather lengthy report, I noted on it, “This is not sufficient; we have to start all over again; how can we be certain that other enemy airmen will not be treated in the same way? Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?” If I wrote that, then, Your Honors, it is absolute proof, if you consider my general method of work, that I had no other intention than to delay and drag things out until the matter had solved itself. And I succeeded in this case. No military authority issued an order. We did not even go so far as to make a draft of an order. The only thing we had were these scraps of paper. It has been proved, and it will be proved further, that many months afterwards the Führer brought the gravest charges against us, and against the Luftwaffe in particular, of having torpedoed his order.

DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to something entirely different. The Chief of the OKW, in a letter written in 1941, called you and Warlimont his representatives for collaborating with Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. That is Document 865-PS, Exhibit USA-143. How did that work out in practice?

JODL: Not at all. Apart from one conference in 1943 dealing with an appeal to the peoples of the East, I had no connection with Rosenberg’s Ministry whatsoever. The only collaboration which took place constantly was carried on by my propaganda division, for all pamphlets which it compiled and which were dropped over Russia were discussed first with the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories.

JODL: That was purely a matter of form, because Minister Dr. Lammers wrote to each of the higher Reich authorities in general asking that a deputy be designated; and so Field Marshal Keitel also designated a deputy.

DR. EXNER: We shall now turn to something new. You have been shown the rather strange Document C-2, Exhibit USA-90. It is not contained in my document book, but the Court will remember it at once. It is a compilation in tabular form in which certain incidents of significance in international law are cited in the first column. In the second column there are examples; in the third and fourth...

DR. EXNER: This is a diagramatic compilation which sets down on one side a certain incident, and on the other enumerates the consequences of this incident: its appraisal in the light of international law, its use for propaganda, and so forth.

Will you explain how this came about? It is really a very strange document. Twelve infringements of international law by our side are set down, and, I believe, 13 infringements by the enemy.

JODL: I do not think this document is so remarkable after all. It was compiled at the end of September 1938, shortly before the Munich Conference. As I, in my department, did not know for certain whether we would have an armed conflict or not, and as at that time the stipulations of international law were not clear to us, I wanted, by taking various examples, to find out from the experts on international law what the present attitude was towards such infractions. Every officer in my division then racked his brain to find an example, and we tried to cover every branch of international law through some specific instance. I consider it worthy of note that even then we concerned ourselves with the conception of international law. There can be no doubt whatsoever that I alone carry responsibility for having thought out these examples. But if one were to take exception to the reply to these examples, that is to the judgment on the lines of international law or to justification according to the rules of warfare, I can only say that this did not come from me; it emanated from the office of Canaris. Apart from that, it shows a very careful and noteworthy attitude toward international law, especially concerning air warfare. At any rate, it was on a much higher level than what took place in actual practice.

DR. EXNER: Therefore, was it the intention to commit these infractions of international law?

JODL: Not at all, but as one conversant with the history of warfare, I knew that there has never yet been in this world a war in which infractions of international law did not occur.

If, perhaps, objection should be raised that quite at the end of the paragraph there appears: “Explanation by the Propaganda Ministry,” I should like to say that that comes at the end, after the justification according to the laws of war and the judgment from the standpoint of international law, and that Admiral Bürckner, who gave the reply, himself referred to it—that propaganda could be put into practice only after the aspects of international law had been clarified. Moreover the whole answer was only a preliminary one, as first the Foreign Office and the various branch chiefs of the Wehrmacht would have had to be heard on the subject.

DR. EXNER: I asked for Admiral Bürckner as a witness on this question, but it really seems to be too unimportant a matter, and I shall therefore forego the calling of this witness.

[Turning to the defendant.] I want to ask you the following question in this connection: What was your attitude in general as to the limitations placed on the conduct of war by international law?

JODL: I recognized and valued international law with which I was well acquainted, as a prerequisite for the decent and humane conduct of war. Copies of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention were always lying on my desk. I believe that by my attitude toward the Commissar Order, toward lynching, and toward the intention to repudiate the Geneva Convention—bluntly rejected by all Commanders-in-Chief and all branches of the Wehrmacht, and by the Foreign Office—I have proved that I tried, as far as it was possible for me, to observe international law.

Of course, there is a wealth of positive proof available. The pertinent documents will probably be submitted by my defense counsel. I will refer only to the behavior of the German Wehrmacht in Norway, a matter in which I collaborated. I refer to the partisan regulations...

DR. EXNER: I submit Document AJ-14, Pages 99 and 100 in my document book, Volume I. These are special directives for conduct during the occupation of Norway and Denmark, directives which, therefore, were issued when those countries were occupied. There are some very characteristic sentences contained in this document, sentences which I should like to read. You will find on Page 98, Figure I:

“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway is taking place for the purpose of ensuring the neutrality of these countries. The aim must be to carry this out in a peaceful way.”

“Directives for conduct in personal intercourse with the Norwegian population.

“Every member of the Armed Forces must remember that he is not entering enemy country, but that the troops are moving into Norway for the protection of the country and for the safety of its inhabitants.

“Therefore, the following is to be observed:

“I. The Norwegian has a strongly developed national consciousness. Moreover the Norwegian people feel themselves closely related to other Nordic peoples.

“Therefore avoid anything that might wound national honor.”

“The home of the Norwegian is sacred according to the old Germanic conception. Hospitality is offered generously. Property is inviolable. The house remains...”

THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to read all of this. One paragraph is enough to show the nature of the document, isn’t it?

DR. EXNER: Then I will make mention of the remainder of the document which I shall not read, and ask that the Tribunal take official notice of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, that last document does not appear to have been signed by the defendant, does it?

DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] What had you to do with this document? Did you...

JODL: It is signed by Von Falkenhorst, but it is well known that we—the Armed Forces Operations Staff and the staff of Von Falkenhorst—comprised one unit for the Norwegian enterprise. I participated in the drawing up of this document, and I submitted it to the Führer and the Führer approved of it. There is even an entry to that effect in my diary.

“Special directives for the administration and pacification of the occupied areas of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.” This is Page 161, Volume II of my document book. I will quote only from Page 162 in order to save time. I will read perhaps the last sentence: “International law must be strictly observed in every case.” But I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the other regulations.

In this connection I should like to mention Document 440-PS, Exhibit GB-107, in my Document Book 2, Page 164—Directive Number 8 regarding the conduct of war, dated 20 November 1939. It says in respect to the tasks of the Air Force—I will read the last paragraph:

“Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are not to be attacked without a compelling military reason, neither in the Dutch nor in the Belgian-Luxembourg areas.—Signed Keitel.”

DR. EXNER: Then we might refer to the regulations for fighting partisans, a matter which has been discussed here also.

JODL: And I should like to refer to something I believe I have stated already, that I ordered an immediate investigation of the Malmédy incident.

DR. EXNER: Did you constantly bear in mind the aspects of international law where your orders were concerned?

JODL: I believe I have already stated that. I studied international law very carefully in its bearing on my orders. I do not wish to detain the Court with the knowledge I gathered from these regulations, for it is only incomplete, but I should like to conclude by saying that owing to the fact that there were no regulations governing air warfare, deplorable confusion in definition arose—for instance between rebellion and legal war force; between franc-tireur, bandit, and scout; between spy and scout; demolition crews and saboteurs. Any time with the help of aircraft a rebellion might be converted into a legal war; and a legal war, on the other hand, might become a state of rebellion. That is the effect that parachute troops and the furnishing of supplies by air have had on international law.

DR. EXNER: In this connection, I should like to submit the affidavit of Lehmann, Exhibit AJ-10 (Document Number Jodl-63). This document has not been submitted to the Court because it was only yesterday that the Prosecution declared itself in agreement with the use of this affidavit. I believe it is the affidavit of the Judge Advocate General, Dr. Lehmann. If the Tribunal will declare this affidavit admissible, I can perhaps merely refer to it...

DR. EXNER: I submit it herewith but it has not been translated yet, as we received permission for it only yesterday in Court.

MR. ROBERTS: As Sir David said yesterday there is no objection to the affidavit, although there was no actual order granting the affidavit of Lehmann. My Lord, it is very short, especially the copy I had, and I think there is no reason to object to it.

DR. EXNER: Then, in order to save time, I shall just refer to it; and I beg the Tribunal to read these statements of Dr. Lehmann. They seem to me to be significant, as after all it is the highest jurist in the German Wehrmacht, Judge Advocate General Lehmann, who is giving information here.

DR. EXNER: This gentleman mentions legal discussions, which he had occasion to carry on with Jodl, and he gives us Jodl’s attitude toward legal questions.

And now, General, in connection with crimes against the laws of war there is one last question which comes to our attention. Numerous entries in the war diary, orders, et cetera, are the subject of serious charges against you. Did you have the possibility, before you were captured, of destroying all this material?

JODL: Yes, between 3 May and 23 May I had time and leisure to burn every piece of paper, but I gave instructions to my staff not to destroy a single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal. I handed the complete files, and above all the especially important ones, all the original Führer directives since 1940, to the American officer when I was captured.

DR. EXNER: And now I shall turn to the alleged Crimes against Peace. First of all we have to make it clear what posts you held during this critical period. Tell us, please, what posts you held from 1933.

JODL: From 1932 to 1935 I was in the division which was later called the Operations Division of the Army. From the middle of 1935 until October 1938 I was Chief of the Department for National Defense in the Wehrmachtsamt, which was later called the OKW.

JODL: Yes, later on. From October 1938 until shortly before the Polish campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna and at Brünn, in Moravia; and from 27 October 1939...

JODL: No—August, rather. On 27 August 1939 I took over the office and the tasks of Chief of the General Staff.

DR. EXNER: Now, let us take that period. Did you concern yourself with war plans in the years 1932-35 when you were in the so-called Truppenamt?

JODL: At that time there were no preparations in the Operations Division, except for combat directives for the improvised Grenzschutz Ost (frontier guard East). This was a militia-like organization, and preparations were made to evacuate the whole German border in case of enemy occupation. That was all.

DR. EXNER: Had you anything to do with the proclamation of general conscription?

JODL: No, I had nothing to do with that. I believe I heard about it the day before.

DR. EXNER: What were your duties as chief of the Department for National Defense from June 1935 to October 1938?

JODL: In this position I had to work out the operational strategic directives according to the instructions of my chiefs, Keitel and Blomberg. I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of the Wehrmacht; to prepare studies and exercises for the big Wehrmacht maneuvers in 1937. I had to supervise the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to work out drafts for laws in connection with the general conscription order and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian sector, that is, of state and people. The so-called Secretariat of the Reich Defense Committee came under me.

DR. EXNER: Tell us, please, what were you at that time? What was your military rank?

JODL: I acquired that position while I was lieutenant colonel; and in 1936—I believe—I became a colonel.

DR. EXNER: But the Prosecution is accusing you of participation in it on the grounds of a supplement which you made to the Document 2261-PS, Exhibit USA-24, which is to be found in Volume I, Page 9. In this document it says, “Attached a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935...” The signature is Blomberg’s and it is dated 24 June. Then comes a supplementary paragraph: “Berlin, 3 September 1935. To the Defense Economic Group la, copy transmitted, Signed Jodl.” What can you tell us about that?

JODL: Indisputably that is a valid Reich law of which I had to transmit a copy to one of the other offices. I need not say more than that.

DR. EXNER: You yourself did not participate in the drawing up of the law itself?

JODL: I was that automatically from the moment I took over the direction of the National Defense Department. At the tenth session of this meeting of experts, on 26 June 1935, General Von Reichenau designated me as his deputy.

DR. EXNER: What was the purpose of this committee? This has already been discussed, I believe, so please be as brief as possible.

JODL: In a few words: With this committee a unified mobilization, not of the Army, but the mobilization of the State and people, corresponding to military mobilization, was prepared. These plans were laid down in the mobilization books giving final figures and various stages of tension.

JODL: We had learned about this from France and had adopted it. The French had a system by which mobilization was carried out in five stages according to the degree of tension existing.

THE PRESIDENT: Do we need the detail about this? Is it not sufficient to say it was copied from France?

[Turning to the defendant.] Perhaps you can tell us what this meant; why we adopted this system of stages of tension? What was the reason?

JODL: The purpose was to have some means at our disposal—as was customary all over Europe at that time—that would achieve an intensified readiness for war before the public order for mobilization was issued.

DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with political plans or intentions?

DR. EXNER: In this committee you concerned yourself with mobilization books. Is that correct?

JODL: Yes. I believe I have already explained that. In these books the details of all the chief Reich authorities were set down and indexed according to degrees of tension.

JODL: Yes, the civil authorities. And the preparations made by them had to be brought into line with the preparations by the military.

JODL: The preparations in the demilitarized zones were connected solely with evacuation, that is the surrendering of the areas west of the Rhine in case of a French occupation.

DR. EXNER: I believe we have discussed that at length already, and in this connection I should like to refer to Document EC-405, Exhibit GB-160, Page 11 of my document book, the first volume, where the tenth session is mentioned. You are accused of having decreed the utmost secrecy concerning all these preparations, which, according to your description, were of a purely defensive nature. Why all this secrecy?

JODL: Keeping measures of this kind secret is taken for granted all over the world. For us in Germany it was especially important, as for years the civil authorities had no longer been accustomed to concern themselves with military matters, and it seemed to me of particular importance that in foreign countries no misunderstanding should arise by, let us say, the capture of an order of this nature—a very characteristic misunderstanding such as occurred in these proceedings in connection with the “Freimachung” of the Rhine.

DR. EXNER: And why did you decree secrecy? So that foreign countries would not be disquieted?

JODL: At that time we were even weaker than during the period when we had an army of only 100,000 men. This army of 100,000 men had been broken up into hundreds of small groups. It was the time of our very greatest impotence, and at that period we had to be extremely careful to avoid any and all tension with foreign countries.

JODL: I have already said that there were the combat directives for the Grenzschutz Ost. I had also worked out instructions for the commander in East Prussia in case he were cut off from the Reich through a sudden attack by Poland.

DR. EXNER: Well, I should like to quote one sentence from the twelfth session of the Reich Defense Council. It is on Page 14 of Volume I of my document book, Document EC-407, Exhibit GB-247. At that meeting Lieutenant Colonel Wagner of the OKH said—who was he, by the way?

“The outcome of the war”—that is, the last war—“has resulted in a completely changed military and political situation in the case of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in one’s own country.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, surely it is a statement by somebody else, and this statement speaks for itself. It is not a matter that this witness can interpret to us.

[Turning to the defendant.] Now, were you concerned with armament in the Truppenamt, and later in the Department for National Defense?

JODL: I personally had nothing at all to do with armament in the real sense. That was a matter for the various branches of the Wehrmacht—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force—and it was dealt with and handled by their organizational staffs. The Commanders-in-Chief discussed these matters with the Führer direct. But I hope, and I will not deny, that my work in the General Staff contributed to the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht.

DR. EXNER: Your diary, 1780-PS, does not contain a word about armament, and it seems obvious that at that time you did not concern yourself with this problem. What were your thoughts and ideas on the question of armament? Were you in favor of it?

JODL: At that time I was of the same opinion as my superiors; and it was characteristic that on the day before the statement was made that 36 divisions were to be formed, Blomberg as well as Fritsch suggested to the Führer that only 24 divisions should be formed. They feared a thinning down of the entire army. Perhaps they also feared too stormy a foreign policy, based on forces existing only on paper.

DR. EXNER: Please answer a question which appears to be important to me: What were the deadlines in connection with the armament in 1935?

JODL: Various stages were provided for. The first deadline set was 1942-43. Most of the West Wall was to be completed by 1945. The Navy’s plan of construction ran on to 1944-45.

JODL: Since it was not possible to achieve general disarmament, the objective was to establish military parity between Germany and the neighboring countries.

DR. EXNER: In this connection I should like to refer to a document which has already been submitted—the 2-year report of General George Marshall. This has already been submitted as Raeder-19. I have a part of it here before me, a part which I submitted under Exhibit AJ-3, (Document Jodl-56) Page 168. Regarding the problem of rearmament, some sentences seem to hit the nail right on the head.

“The world does not seriously consider the wishes of the weak. Weakness is too great a temptation to the strong, particularly to the brutal who scheme for wealth and power.”

“Above all we must, I think, correct the tragic misunderstanding that a security policy is a war policy...”

Can you tell us, please, what the ratio of our military strength to that of foreign countries was at that time?

JODL: In 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia possessed 90 divisions for times of peace, and 190 divisions for war. We had hardly any heavy artillery, and tank construction was in its earliest stages. The conception of defensive and offensive armament has been discussed here on various occasions. It would lead us too far afield to go into that in detail. But I should like to say only that as far as Germany was concerned, with her geographical position this conception did not apply. The disarmament conference too, after months of discussion, failed because a proper definition for this conception could not be formed.

DR. EXNER: I should like to quote from an expert, George Marshall again, on Page 168 of my document book, from which I have just quoted; and again just one sentence. It is in the first paragraph: “The only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack...”

Now, however, the Prosecution asserts that you should have known that such a tremendous rearmament as the German rearmament could serve only for an aggressive war. Will you comment on this, please?

JODL: I believe this can only be explained as an expression of military ignorance. Up to the year 1939 we were, of course, in a position to destroy Poland alone. But we were never, either in 1938 or 1939, actually in a position to withstand a concentrated attack by these states together. And if we did not collapse already in the year 1939 that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held completely inactive against the 23 German divisions.

JODL: Real rearmament was only begun after the war had already started. We entered into this world war with some 75 divisions. Sixty percent of our total able-bodied population had not been trained. The peacetime army amounted to perhaps 400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in 1914. Our supplies of ammunition and bombs, as the witness Milch has already testified, were ridiculously low.

DR. EXNER: In that connection I should like to read a diary entry of yours, Page 16 of Volume I of my document book, which is 1780-PS, USA-72. On 13 December you said:

“After completion of project for L”—that is the Landesverteidigung, National Defense—“Field Marshal reports on state of war potential of Wehrmacht, indicating chief bottleneck is inadequate stocks of ammunition for Army—10 to 15 days of combat equals 6 weeks’ supply.”

[A recess was taken.]

DR. EXNER: General, when did you first hear of the plans to occupy the Rhineland?

JODL: On 1 or 2 March 1936; that is to say about 6 days before the actual occupation. I could not have heard of them any earlier because before that the Führer had not yet made the decision himself.

DR. EXNER: Did you and the generals have military objections to that occupation?

JODL: I must confess that we had the uneasy feeling of a gambler whose entire fortune is at stake.

JODL: No; I was neither an expert on international law nor a politician. Politically speaking it had been stated that the agreement between Czechoslovakia, Russia, and France had made the Locarno Pact void, which I accepted as a fact at the time.

JODL: We occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but only three battalions of that went into the territory west of the Rhine; one battalion went to Aachen, one to Trier, and one to Saarbrücken.

DR. EXNER: Three battalions. That is really only a symbolic occupation, is it not?

DR. EXNER: Did you do anything to avoid a military conflict because of that occupation?

JODL: There were serious reports which came from our military attachés in Paris and London at the time. I could not fail to be impressed by them. We suggested to Field Marshal Von Blomberg then that perhaps he ought to discuss withdrawing these three battalions west of the Rhine on condition that the French would withdraw four to five times as many men from their borders.

JODL: Yes, it was made to the Führer, but he turned it down. He rejected very bluntly General Beck’s suggestion that we should declare that we would not fortify the area west of the Rhine. That was a suggestion of General Beck’s, which the Führer turned down very bluntly.

DR. EXNER: Did you think at the time that that action was connected with any aggressive intention?

JODL: I can only say that, considering the situation we were in, the French covering army alone could have blown us to pieces.

JODL: No, nobody had aggressive intentions; but it is of course possible that in the brain of the Führer there was already an idea that the occupation was a prerequisite for actions to be taken later in the East. That is possible; but I do not know, because I could not see into the Führer’s brain.

DR. EXNER: Did you know of the so-called testament of Hitler dated 5 November 1937 which has been presented here?

JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg informed Keitel and Keitel informed me that there had been a discussion with the Führer. When I asked for the minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken. I refer to my diary, Document 1780-PS, as proof of this. What I was told was not at all sensational and hardly different in any way from anything contained in general directives for the preparation of a war. I can only assume that Field Marshal Von Blomberg at that time kept these things to himself because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out.

JODL: There was no operational plan against Austria. I state that most emphatically.

DR. EXNER: Now we come to Document C-175, a directive which has the Exhibit Number USA-69. It is in Volume I; Page 18 and the following pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces for war of the year 1937. The Prosecution quoted Case Otto only from this directive, so that the impression was bound to be created that the whole was a plan for a campaign against Austria. Please explain what this directive means.

JODL: It was one of those typical standard preparations for war, for every conceivable eventuality. Such directives had come out every year in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and general conscription. These theoretical military studies made a distinction between two cases, namely cases of war which because of their nature were politically probable or might be probable, and cases which were improbable. As far as the former were concerned, a plan of operations was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force. For the latter appropriate suggestions only were to be brought forward. If the Tribunal would turn to Page 21 of the document, there appears at the end of the page, Part 3, a sentence as follows: “The following ‘special cases’ are to be considered by the High Command in general without participation by regional authorities...” and among such cases, on Page 22, is the special “Case Otto.”

DR. EXNER: On Page 18 of this document is a directive valid from 1 July 1937 until, probably, 30 September 1938, that is a little more than a year. That, in turn, replaces another similar directive which is referred to in the first paragraph, which had been drawn up for the same problems previously. Did you participate in discussions on the Austrian case?

DR. EXNER: It is said in the trial brief that on 12 February 1938 you had been at Obersalzberg. Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry in the diary under 12 March 1938 is, therefore, based only on an account which you received through Keitel; is that right?

JODL: Yes. It is merely a note on a brief account given to me by General Keitel about that day, probably related a bit colorfully.

DR. EXNER: But then it says, evening of 11 February: “General Keitel with Generals Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and G. Schmidt are being subjected to very great political and military pressure.” In the English and French translations it says that Schuschnigg and Schmidt are “again subjected to very great political and military pressure.” This word “again” does not appear in my German original.

Now, did you suggest deceptive maneuvers against Austria? That is being held against you.

JODL: I did not suggest any deceptive maneuvers. The Führer ordered them; and I do not think that they are illegal, because I believe that in the gambling of world history, in politics and in war, false cards have always been played. But the Führer ordered it and that is stated in the entry in my diary. I supplied military information and documents to Canaris as to where our garrisons were situated, what maneuvers were taking place. Canaris elaborated them and then released them in Munich.

JODL: I had been told that the purpose was to exert a certain amount of pressure so that Schuschnigg, when he had returned home, would adhere to the agreement made at Obersalzberg.

DR. EXNER: How long before the actual entry into Austria did you know of such intentions?

JODL: On 10 March in the morning just before 11 o’clock I heard of it for the first time.

JODL: On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viehbahn, who was then temporarily Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, were suddenly ordered to the Reich Chancellery that I heard of the intention for the first time.

JODL: The Führer surprised them by stating that the question involved was the Austrian problem; and then they remembered, that there was a General Staff plan called “Otto.” They sent for me and for the directive, and learned from me that such a directive actually did exist, but that in practice nothing at all had been prepared. As it had only been a theoretical plan and drafted solely in the event of an Austrian restoration, and as such a restoration was not expected for the moment, the High Command of the Army had virtually done nothing about it.

JODL: It appeared to me to be a family squabble which Austria herself would solve through her domestic politics in a very short time.

JODL: My own extensive knowledge of Austria. Through relatives and acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club to which I belonged, as one who knew the Austrian mountains, I had been in closer contact with Austria than with northern Germany, and I knew that in that country there had been a government against the will of the people for a long time. The peasant uprising in Styria was a characteristic example.

DR. EXNER: Was the march into Austria the carrying out of the suggestion, C-175?

JODL: No, it was completely improvised within a few hours with the corresponding result. Seventy percent of all the armored vehicles and lorries were stranded on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna, because the drivers had been taken from their recruitment training to be given this task.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you said just now, didn’t you, that the Führer told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn’t you?

JODL: I said that the Führer had informed General Keitel and General Viehbahn about that on 10 March, in the morning. He did not talk to me, and until that day I had not talked to the Führer either.

DR. EXNER: Is it correct that only peacetime formations marched into the frontier districts, into Austrian territory?

JODL: Yes; it is a fact that only peacetime units which were intended for the parade in Vienna actually marched in. All units which might have been necessary for a military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border.

DR. EXNER: Was there any hesitation among the political leaders at the last moment?

JODL: On 11 March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reich Chancellery that the Wehrmacht was not to move in, but that the Police would pass through the Wehrmacht and move in alone. In the evening, however, on 11 March, at 2030 hours, the final decision reached me, which was that the Wehrmacht was to move in after all. I was unable to find out the reason for that hesitation.

JODL: No, it was a purely peaceful occupation. It was characterized by my suggestion to the chief of the operations department of the Army that he should have bands marching at the head of the columns and that all drivers should be sure to wear goggles, otherwise they might be blinded by the flowers thrown at them.

DR. EXNER: What was the significance of the order you signed regarding the march into Austria? It has been put before you under Document Number C-182, Exhibit USA-77. You remember it, do you not?

JODL: Yes, I remember. That is nothing other than the written record of something which had previously been ordered orally and which was already being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too late.

DR. EXNER: And what is the significance of Document C-103, Exhibit USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that?

JODL: That was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army. They wanted to know, even in the case of the remotest eventuality, how the troops were to comport themselves. I clarified the matter over the telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Führer, and I then put his decision down in writing, by his order.

JODL: It came off exactly as expected. There was jubilation and a triumphal march, such as the world probably has seldom seen—even though no one likes to acknowledge it today. The population came to meet us during the night already; the custom barriers were removed, and all the German troops called that march just a battle of flowers.

DR. EXNER: We now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. Did you participate in the conferences on 21 April 1938, and 28 May 1938, which the Prosecution have described as conspirators’ conferences?

DR. EXNER: What type of General Staff work were you carrying out for “Case Green”—which is, of course, the Czechoslovakia operation?

JODL: I must refer again to Document C-175, which is on Page 17 of the first volume of my document book. In that general directive for the unified preparation for war two important cases were dealt with, or were to be dealt with: A defensive deployment against France if she opened hostilities—“Case Red” and an offensive deployment—Case Green—against Czechoslovakia. That would have been worked out in just the same way, even if we had not had an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a war on two fronts—which was the problem we always faced—could never be conducted or won in any other way than by means of an attack against the weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be drawn up afresh the very moment that Austria automatically became a new assembly zone. Thus, on 20 May 1938, a new draft was made by me for Case Green which began with the customary words: “I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation...”

DR. EXNER: Just wait a minute. That quotation is Document 388-PS, Exhibit USA-26. It is the document dated 20 May 1938. “I do not intend to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without provocation...” Now, please continue.

JODL: That was 20 May. On the 21st, the day after, a monstrous incident occurred. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even marched up to our borders. The Czechoslovakian Chief of General Staff explained this to Toussaint by saying that 12 German divisions had been assembled in Saxony. I can only state—and my diary entries prove it—that not a single German soldier had been moved. Nothing, absolutely nothing had happened.

DR. EXNER: In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of the Tribunal to a questionnaire—Exhibit AJ-9 (Document Jodl-62). It is a questionnaire submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the German military attaché in Prague. He confirms the mobilization of that time. Third volume, 199—Page 201 of the document, at the bottom, there is the following question: “What was the reason for the Czechoslovakian mobilization in May 1938?”

“It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovakian Government wished to force her political allies to take up a definite position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff, informed me, as the reason for the mobilization, that he had exact information that 10 to 12 German divisions had assembled in the Dresden area, and that he could no longer bear the responsibility of not taking countermeasures.”

On the other hand a diary note from Jodl, Volume I, Page 26 should be mentioned:

“The Führer’s intention not to touch on the Czech problem yet is altered by the Czech deployment on 21 May, which took place without any German threat and without even any apparent cause. Germany’s silence thereto would lead to a loss of prestige for the Führer, to which he is not willing to submit again. Hence the issuing on 30 May of the new directive for Case Green.”

[Turning to the defendant.] That is from Jodl’s diary, Page 26, first volume. Now continue, please.

JODL: That was the information which I received, partly through General Keitel and partly through the then Major Schmundt, regarding the impression made on the Führer. The result was that he personally changed my draft of 20 May and put at the beginning the following words:

“It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be destroyed within a reasonable period of time by military action. To decide upon the militarily and politically opportune moment is a matter for the political leadership.”

DR. EXNER: These words appear in the Document 388-PS, which I have already referred to, which is Exhibit USA-26. It is the order of 30 May 1939.

[Turning to the defendant.] Please tell us briefly what the contents of these directives were.

JODL: In that order of 30 May three possibilities were mentioned by the Führer as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise: 1) Without particular cause—politically impossible and out of the question; 2) after a prolonged period of tension—most undesirable, because of the lack of the element of surprise; 3) the best solution, after an incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, and which would justify us morally before the world if we decided to intervene.

Furthermore, there was the command that on the first day the Army should break through the fortifications in order to clear the way for the free operation of the mobile forces, the armored divisions, so that after 4 days such a situation would be created that the military position of Czechoslovakia would become untenable.

JODL: The entire directive C-175 was thoroughly revised in June. This was done because on 1 October a new mobilization year began, and because this directive C-175 was in any case planned to be valid only until 30 September 1938. The old directive was, of course, still in force until 1 October, but became invalid on 1 October through that directive which had been drafted by me on 24 June, or 18 June. In that directive the Case Green was mentioned in the sense of the Führer’s intention—namely, that it was the immediate aim of his policy that from 1 October 1938—not on, but from 1 October 1938—every favorable opportunity was to be utilized to solve the problem of Czechoslovakia, but only if France did not interfere or march, or Great Britain either.

I confirm that no date existed in any of the orders for the starting of a war against Czechoslovakia. In the directive of 30 May the date was left open altogether; and the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June stated only from 1 October, on the first favorable occasion.

DR. EXNER: That is on Page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: “I have decided, from 1 October...”

JODL: May I perhaps conclude this whole question by saying, in order to be explicit, that actually before 14 September, as far as the military forces were concerned, nothing happened.

DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl’s Diary Volume I, Page 32. It is an extract from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72, and is the entry under 14 September 1938:

“At noon it was announced that the general order for mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia.... This, however, did not take place, although approximately eight age groups were called up at short notice. As the Sudeten Germans are crossing the border en masse, we request at about 1730 hours, at the suggestion of the OKH, Department 2, the calling up of the strengthened frontier guard (GAD) along the Czech border in military districts VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The Führer gives his authorization from Munich.”

DR. EXNER: I have read from Page 32 of my document book; Volume I, Page 32, and it is an excerpt from Jodl’s diary of 14 September, therefore an entry made in the midst of that critical period.

[Turning to the defendant.] Just what were these military measures which were being introduced?

JODL: On 13 or 14 September the eight age groups were called up in Czechoslovakia. We used the strengthened frontier guard so that the many escaping Sudeten Germans could be taken over.

On 17 September the Führer formed the Freikorps Henlein, contrary to the previous agreement and without telling us beforehand. Previously it had been agreed that these Sudeten Germans of military age were to join the Reserve Army.

Around that time the political discussions started. The first one at the Berghof had already taken place. Beneš ordered mobilization in Czechoslovakia on 23 September and only now, and in accordance with the political discussions, did the military deployment against Czechoslovakia commence.

I had no doubt that it was going to be used in the event of Czechoslovakia not submitting to any agreement we had made with the Western Powers; for the Führer had clearly stated that he would negotiate only if France and England did not intervene politically or militarily.

DR. EXNER: You made two more entries in your diary, on 22 and 26 September, which prove that you were worried at the time. Statement made by Captain Bürckner, in the first volume of my document book, on Page 34; again an excerpt from 1780-PS, dated 22 September:

“Captain Bürckner, chief of the foreign section, reports that according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation between Prague and the local Czech Legation Counsellor, the German Embassy in Prague has just been stormed. I am immediately having connection made by telephone and wireless with Prague through Colonel Juppe.

“1050 hours: Bürckner reports that the incident has not been confirmed. The Foreign Office has spoken with our Embassy.

“1055 hours: I establish liaison with Prague and with Toussaint. To my question as to how he is getting along, he replies, ‘Thanks, excellently.’ The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces, who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion that he should think over what measures would have to be taken if the Führer should wish for an immediate bombardment of Prague, is informed through Ic about the false report which may have had the purpose of provoking us to a military action.”

“It is important that false reports do not induce us to military actions before Prague replies.”

The Prosecution have stated that 1 October had long before been decided on as the date for aggression. Will you tell me what significance that date, 1 October 1938, had for Case Green?

JODL: I have already said that, I believe. I explained that the new mobilization year had started, and that no order contained a fixed date for the beginning of the campaign against Czechoslovakia.

JODL: I was certainly convinced of that, because I could not imagine that the Führer, in the position we were in, would start a conflict with France and Britain which had to lead to our immediate collapse.

DR. EXNER: And the entries in your diary probably show your concern about incidents?

JODL: Yes. In my diary on 8 September there is reference to a conversation with General Stülpnagel. According to that, Stülpnagel was at the moment very worried lest the Führer should depart from his oft-defined attitude and allow himself to be dragged into military action, in spite of the danger of France’s intervention.

According to the entry in my diary I replied that actually at the moment I shared his worries to some extent.

DR. EXNER: This is an entry which the Tribunal will find on Page 26 of the first volume of my document book. Once again it is an extract from Document 1780-PS, and it is the entry of 8 September 1938.

[Turning to the defendant.] You have already said, have you not, what your worries were? Our weakness?

JODL: It was out of the question with five fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions in the western fortifications, which were nothing but a large construction site, to hold out against 100 French divisions. That was militarily impossible.

DR. EXNER: On 24 August, in a letter addressed to Schmundt, you referred to the importance of an incident for the tasks of the Wehrmacht in this case. You have been gravely accused of that, and I want you to tell me what the significance of that statement is.

Your Honor, it is 388-PS, and it is on Page 35 of the first volume. It is an extract from the often quoted Document 388-PS: It is a report made at the time of the “X” Order and the preliminary measures.

[Turning to the defendant.] Please, will you state what you intended in this work of the General Staff?

JODL: The Führer’s order of 30 May which I have already explained, assuming that it ever came to this action, left no other choice than to attack on a previously decided date. This could only follow as the result of an incident, because without provocation the operation was out of the question; and it was not to be attempted if too long a time had passed.

The Army, in order to be ready for such a surprise break-through of the Czech fortifications, required 4 days of preparation. If nothing happened after those 4 days, the military preparations could no longer be kept secret and the surprise element would disappear. Therefore, nothing else remained but either a spontaneous incident in Czechoslovakia, which would then 4 days later have resulted in military action, or a date which had to be decided on previously. In that case an incident had to happen during those 4 days which the Army required for deployment.

The Führer’s demands could, in fact, not be solved in any other way from the point of view of the General Staff. My letter to Major Schmundt was meant to explain that difficult situation to the Führer.

At that time incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that since the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans liable to be called for military service had mostly evaded the order. They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovakian border police shot at them. Bullets were shot over daily into Germany. All together, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in that manner.

From that point of view the conception of an incident was not so mean and criminal as it might have been, for instance, if peaceful Switzerland had been involved. If I said, therefore, how keenly interested we would be in such an incident, that was meant to express that if one resorted to military action at all—all this is, of course, purely theoretical—one might use just such an incident as a casus belli.

DR. EXNER: And how do you explain this remark of yours: “...unless the intelligence department is ordered to organize this incident in any case”?

That is at the end of Page 38 in the second paragraph. It is an extract from 388-PS.

JODL: Yes, I had too much knowledge of European military history not to know that the question of the first shot—the apparent cause of war, not the inner cause of war—has played an important part in each war and on each side.

The responsibility for the outbreak of war is always attributed to the enemy; it is not characteristic of Germany alone, but of all European nations who have ever been at war with one another. In the case of Czechoslovakia the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need not describe the condition in which 3½ million Germans found themselves who were supposed to fight against their own people. I myself was able to watch that tragedy in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of the war, was firmly established, and Lord Runciman, who came on that mission from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a situation I certainly had no moral scruples about exaggerating one of these incidents, and, by means of a counteraction in vigorous reply to the Czech doings and activities, extending and enlarging such an incident in order that if the political situation allowed it, and England and France did not interfere—as the Führer believed—we might find a really obvious reason for taking action.

DR. EXNER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, there is one point to which I wish to draw your attention. In my opinion it is once more a mistake in translation. I refer to the second paragraph from the bottom on Page 36. It is the report about the incident. The second but last paragraph on Page 36 states: “...that Case Green may be set in motion as a result of an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation (Anlass) for military intervention.” The translation in English of these last words is a “provocation”; “Anlass” is translated as “provocation.”

DR. EXNER: I believe that the translation is not correct. I am not absolutely certain but I would like to call the Tribunal’s attention to it. “Anlass” means “prétexte” in French—which as far as we know is “pretext.”

THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, there is no difference in the meaning of the words, whether it is “provocation,” or whether it is “cause.”

DR. EXNER: “Provocation” sounds a bit more aggressive, does it not? I just want to call your attention to it. In the German it is “cause” and not “provocation.”

[Turning to the defendant.] Now the Prosecution calls these considerations, which we have just talked about, criminal ideas and connects them with the supposedly planned murder of the German Ambassador in Prague. We are said to have planned that murder so as to have a cause for marching into Czechoslovakia. What do you have to say to that?

JODL: This, of course, is grotesque. The example that the Führer allegedly mentioned in his talks with Field Marshal Keitel, that the German Ambassador had been murdered by the people of Prague, was not even known to me. General Keitel did not tell me; I only heard of it here. Apart from that, I think it is useless to go on discussing it as we did exactly the opposite. We gave the order to General Toussaint to protect the German Embassy in Prague and to protect the lives of the people in it, because, in fact, at one stage it had been seriously threatened.

DR. EXNER: This is proved by Exhibit AJ-9, Document Jodl-62, third volume of the document book, Page 200. That again is the interrogatory of General Toussaint, who was a military attaché in Prague at that time. The third question is as follows:

“Is it true or not that in the summer of 1938 you received the order to defend the German Embassy at Prague and to protect the lives of all the Germans in the Embassy?”

“Yes, it is true. I remember this order was given to me by telephone probably in September 1938...”—and so on and so forth.

“It is true that the German Embassy...”

DR. EXNER: [Turning to the defendant.] Then I shall only refer to the testimony of Toussaint. In addition it has been said that the incident had been staged by us. We need not go into that in detail. Did the incident really happen?

JODL: No, there was neither a preparation for the incident, nor was it necessary. Incidents kept multiplying day after day, and the solution was a political one and entirely different.

DR. EXNER: So that this note, which we have often read, remained purely theoretical, did it?

JODL: It was merely work on paper, an idea, which was not really necessary at all.

But it has already been made clear that as soon as the political discussions started I made continuous efforts to prevent the provocations, apparently desired on the part of the Czechs, from leading to any military measures on our part.

DR. EXNER: Did the signatory powers in Munich at the end of September know of Germany’s military preparations? Did the statesmen there know that we were militarily prepared?

JODL: The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that that had become known only today, and that it was unknown in the autumn of 1938 at Munich. But that is quite impossible. All the world knew of the calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political correspondent of The Times wrote an article on 28 September against this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched into...

Is it true that in August 1938 you prepared a new operational plan of which you had already spoken on 7 July? A new plan based on the previous one?

JODL: Yes. Already before the solution brought about by the Munich Pact, I, on my own initiative, drew up a secret operational plan for the protection of all the German borders. It was so arranged that the borders only were to be protected while the bulk of the Army was to be kept in reserve in the center of Germany. That complete plan was available here during my interrogation. It is now no longer contained in Document 388-PS, but there is a reference made to it.

DR. EXNER: On Page 40, Volume I of our document book, I again read an extract from 388-PS. At the very end the following is stated:

“...after the conclusion of Green, it must be made possible to put a provisional deployment into action soon.”

“...first the Wehrmacht will guarantee the protection of the German frontiers, including those of the newly acquired lands, while the bulk of the Army and of the Air Force will remain at our disposal. Such a future ‘frontier protection’ deployment should be executed separately on the various fronts.”

Why did you prepare this “frontier protection” deployment? What was the cause of it?

JODL: The reason was that once the necessity for an operation against Czechoslovakia had become superfluous, through the problem being solved in some way, we would no longer have had any deployment plan at all. And as no other intention of the Führer was known to me, I on my own initiative drew up a plan for this operation which would be suitable for any eventuality.

DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about the intentions of the Führer, after the Munich Agreement, to go even further and occupy Bohemia and Moravia?

JODL: No, I had no idea of that. I knew of his speech of 26 September where he said: “Now we are facing the last problem to be solved.”

I believed in that assurance, and this is proved by the fact that during those days—it was about 10 or 11 September—I suggested to Field Marshal Keitel, than General Keitel, that he should ask the British Delegation, whose arrival had been announced, to come to Iglau in Moravia, because many Germans who were living there had been threatened by armed Czechoslovakian Communists. This of course was a suggestion which I would never have made if I had had any idea that the Führer nourished any further intentions concerning Bohemia and Moravia.

DR. EXNER: These further intentions of the Führer were recorded on 21 October 1938 in a directive. Did you know about that in the OKW, or what was the position?

JODL: No, I did not know about it. I did not see it. I only saw it here in this courtroom during my preliminary interrogation.

JODL: I was transferred to Vienna as Artillery Commander of the 44th Division stationed there.

DR. EXNER: How did you imagine further military developments would be? But, of course, you have already answered that.

JODL: Actually, I expected an easing of the political tension and a period of peace. I can certainly say that.

JODL: As I knew of no other plans, I transferred my home to Vienna taking all my furniture with me. Naturally I would never have done that if I had had the faintest idea that war was pending, because I knew that in the event of war I was to become the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and so would have to return to Berlin. I asked General Keitel to help me to become the Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall, from 1 October 1939, a request which again it would never have entered my mind to make if I had any idea of what was going to come.

DR. EXNER: Did you as Artillery Commander in Vienna remain in contact with the OKW?

JODL: No, hardly at all. I had no connections with the OKW. I received no military documents from the OKW during all that period.

JODL: Nobody. During that time I knew no more about what was going on or what was intended than any lieutenant in my artillery.

JODL: I received one letter from General Keitel. It was, I think, at the end of July 1939. He personally gave me the good news that quite probably I would become Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in Reichenhall on 1 October, and that General Von Sodenstern would become Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, now on peacetime footing, on 1 October.

DR. EXNER: Did you help to draw up the plan for the occupation of the remaining parts of Czechoslovakia?

JODL: No, I did not. During this occupation I remained in Vienna for the time being and temporarily became Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps at Vienna. Then, later on, I was transferred to Brünn in Czechoslovakia together with the entire 44th Division.

JODL: It was through the orders of my divisional staff that I heard of that operation in March of 1939, some 2 or 3 days beforehand.

DR. EXNER: Was this move into Czechoslovakia the carrying out of Case Green which you had originally drafted?

JODL; No; it had no longer anything to do with that. There were completely different troop units, and not even half of the troops provided for in 1938 were actually used for the march into Czechoslovakia in 1939.

DR. EXNER: Now, during that period when you were in Vienna there was a conference with the Führer on 23 May 1939, which has often been mentioned here, concerning the disregarding of neutrality, et cetera. It has often been stated that Warlimont was present there as your representative. What was the position? Was he your representative?

JODL: With great persistence it has been said again and again that General Warlimont took part in the conference as the representative of Jodl, or even, it was once said, as his assistant. There is no question of that. He was my successor but not my representative. And even if it is repeated again and again, it still does not make it true. He was my successor.

JODL: Yes, I had completely left the OKW. The fact that quite accidentally Warlimont became my deputy later on has nothing whatsoever to do with the events of May 1939.

DR. EXNER: Did you have any contact with Party leaders meanwhile, or with Austrian National Socialists?

DR. EXNER: Once during that time the Führer went to Vienna with Keitel. I think they were there 2 days or so. Did you have to report to him on that occasion?

JODL: Yes, coming from Prague he visited Vienna quite unobtrusively, and on that occasion I spoke a few words to General Keitel, but I did not talk to the Führer.

JODL: As I have already said, in the event of a war I was to become Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

JODL: For that summer I already had tickets for a cruise in the eastern Mediterranean on 23 September 1939.

JODL: I am not absolutely certain about the exact date, but I imagine that it was on 23 or 24 August—according to a telegram which reached me unexpectedly in Brünn.

DR. EXNER: If you had not received that telegram, when would you have had to go to Berlin?

JODL: In case of a general mobilization I would have had to go to Berlin anyway.

JODL: No, I did not report to him, either. I only reported, of course, to General Keitel and to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the Air Force and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have now completed that subject, and I thought that this would be a convenient time to adjourn.

DR. EXNER: I very much hope—certainly it will be in the course of tomorrow morning; but shall we say until noon?

DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr. President, as Counsel for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I have to ask on behalf of my client that he may be permitted to be absent from the session for 2 days, to prepare his defense.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 5 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

Morning Session

THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that Defendant Seyss-Inquart is absent.

PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, in agreement with the Prosecution I ask permission to submit a memorandum by Hitler, concerning the Four Year Plan of 1936. It is a certified copy, certified by a British officer in Dustbin Camp. I have numbered it Exhibit Schacht-48. In the afternoon session of 1 May my friend Dr. Dix referred to this memorandum, which could not at that time be incorporated into the record. Dr. Schacht then quoted a few passages from this memorandum. The President stated that we could submit the memorandum at a later date on condition, of course, that the Prosecution agreed. The Prosecution has acquiesced and I therefore trust that I may now be permitted to submit it.

Furthermore I am handing in a number of English translations. I regret I have not yet been able to have translations made in the other languages, and I ask permission to supply those translations later on.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kraus, until the other translations are actually made, the documents will not become part of the record.

DR. KRAUS: No. The English translations are available, and the others are not yet ready. May I submit them later?

DR. EXNER: Generaloberst, you told us yesterday that you were the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war and that your main task consisted in the preparation of military operational plans. That is correct, is it not?

DR. EXNER: Then, where did you get the plans? Who decided what plans you had to make?

JODL: It was the same as in any other military staff. The Commander-in-Chief—in this case the Führer personally—received data for the decisions to be made: maps, strength returns of both our own and enemy forces, and information about the enemy. He then made his own decisions, and thereupon I would set my general staff to work, giving these decisions the military form necessary for the entire machinery of the Wehrmacht.

DR. EXNER: Now, in the course of these tasks and studies you also had to work on operations which were never actually carried out?

JODL: I have prepared a great number of such operations. Of the total number of operations for which I prepared orders and instructions there was only one which I definitely knew would be carried out; that was the operation against Yugoslavia. In the case of all the other operational plans, the decision as to whether it would be carried out or not remained undecided for a long time.

As an example of operational plans which had been drafted in every detail but which were never carried out, I mention the invasion of England, the march into Spain, the seizure of Gibraltar, the seizure of Malta, the capture of the Fischer Peninsula near Petsamo, and a winter attack on Kandalakscha on the Murmansk Railway.

JODL: At the beginning of the war the work of my general staff did not apply to theaters of war at all, but the Führer’s instructions went only to the branches of the Wehrmacht—that is to the Army, the Navy and the Air Force; and it was only in the Norwegian campaign that circumstances developed for the first time so that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was made responsible for a theater of war. And this condition changed completely when in the beginning of 1942 the Führer himself assumed supreme command in the Army. Kesselring has already been asked about this, but did not answer. However, it stands to reason that the Führer, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, could not issue orders through Jodl to himself in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and then have them carried out through Generaloberst Zeitzler. Consequently a separation came about. From that moment on he, with the General Staff of the Army, directed the entire Eastern Front, while the Armed Forces Operations Staff became responsible for the general staff work of all the other theaters of war.

DR. EXNER: Now, the witness Field Marshal Paulus stated before the Tribunal that the OKW was responsible for the order to hold Stalingrad; and, as a matter of fact, both Keitel and Jodl have been repeatedly accused by the foreign press of having given that disastrous order. Is that true?

JODL: No, that is not true. The witness, for whom I feel the deepest sympathy and with whom I have worked in the most comradely fashion possible, could not have known anything at all about it. The facts are as follows: The moment danger threatened, the decision that Stalingrad must be held was made by the Führer during a private conversation with Generaloberst Zeitzler and contrary to the latter’s advice. Zeitzler told me so himself on his return from this interview. At a later stage, when blizzards were already raging across the steppes of the Don, the question of a break-through by the Stalingrad garrison was discussed again. Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Zeitzler, and I were present on this occasion.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I do not quite see how that is relevant, although Field Marshal Paulus may have said something about it. I mean, he may have given some evidence on the fighting at Stalingrad, and he undoubtedly did; but I do not see how it bears upon the case before us, or how it bears upon the case for Jodl.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, this has already settled the matter. It was necessary to clear up Field Marshal Paulus’ error. But this has already settled the matter.

[Turning to the defendant.] We now come to the time when you were recalled from Vienna to Berlin in 1939. What state of affairs did you find in Berlin on your arrival?

JODL: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in Berlin—at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was really true or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes which were immensely increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared except the operations for the attack on Poland.

There was only a defensive deployment of troops on the West Wall. The forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however, efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of Dahlerus—all these negotiations remained unknown to me insofar as they were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and France it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought in the first World War. And I heard in confidence from General Stapf—today the matter is no longer confidential—that the Reich Marshal reacted in exactly the same way.

JODL: That I cannot say. I only know that at the moment when I arrived in Berlin and was being informed by General Von Stülpnagel for the very first time about the situation and our own strength, a Polish deployment was already in progress along the frontier, as well as the German one.

DR. EXNER: That in itself already answers the accusation brought against you in the trial brief, namely “planning against Poland.”

JODL: No. Not by a single stroke of the pen did I participate in the preparations for the Polish war.

DR. EXNER: Then I am right in saying, to sum up, that when you left Berlin there was not yet a plan of operations against Poland?

DR. EXNER: Did you hear the Führer’s speech of 22 August 1939 which has been so often quoted here?

DR. EXNER: Do you remember the meeting in the Führer’s special train on 9 September 1939, described here by General Lahousen? Can you remember that?

DR. EXNER: What was the subject of conversation during that meeting while you were on the Führer’s train?

JODL: I met the Führer in the so-called command car, in the chartroom, where Field Marshal Keitel, Canaris, and Lahousen were; and then Canaris made a brief report on the information he had received from the West and expressed the opinion that a French attack in the Saarbrücken sector was imminent. The Führer contradicted this, and so did I. Apart from that nothing else was discussed.

DR. EXNER: Then Lahousen’s statement is correct that you were only present during that particular part of the discussion?

JODL: As far as I am concerned I have not a word of objection to raise against Lahousen’s statement. Absolutely correct.

DR. EXNER: Frequent mention has been made during this Trial of the artillery and air bombardment of Warsaw. Did you participate in the giving of the orders for this?

JODL: Yes, I participated insofar as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army had applied to the Führer for permission for the artillery to bombard Warsaw as soon as the deployment of artillery units had been completed. The Führer refused this. He said, “What is happening here because of the Poles is madness.” He ordered me to draft new leaflets—which I did personally and immediately—and have them dropped again over the city of Warsaw. It was only when this renewed demand to cease the hopeless resistance had proved absolutely unsuccessful that he sanctioned artillery bombardment and air attacks on the fortress of Warsaw—and I emphasize the word “fortress.”

DR. EXNER: When issuing orders, did you have anything to do with the co-ordination of German and Soviet Russian operations?

JODL: Yes. When we were still 3 days’ march away from the Vistula, I was informed to my great surprise—by, I believe, the representative of the Foreign Office—while I was entering the Führer’s headquarters, that Soviet Russia would occupy the Polish territories...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, if it is convenient to you, I think you might speak a little faster.

JODL: ...that the Polish territories east of an agreed demarcation line would be occupied by Soviet Russian troops at the appointed time. When we were approaching this agreed demarcation line, which was shown to me on a map—the line was the East Prussian Lithuanian border, Narew, Vistula, San—I telephoned to our military attaché in Moscow and informed him that we could probably reach individual points of this demarcation line in the course of the following day. Shortly afterwards I was informed over the telephone that the Russian divisions were not yet ready.

When, the day after the next, we reached the demarcation line and had to cross it in pursuit of the Poles, I once again received news from Moscow, at 0200 hours, that the Soviet Russian divisions would take up their position along the entire front at 0400 hours. This maneuver was punctually carried out, and I then drafted an order to our German troops that wherever they had contacted the troops of the Soviet Union, and in agreement with them, they were to withdraw behind the demarcation line.

JODL: I cannot tell you exactly when the troops reached the line, but I would say it was about 14 or 15 September.

DR. EXNER: We shall now deal with aggressive wars against the neutral countries...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, now all that the defendant has just been telling us seems to be to me a simple waste of our time, with absolutely no relevance to this case at all; and why you let him do it, I do not know.

DR. EXNER: You have been accused of having used your personal influence and your close relations with the Führer to attack a whole series of neutral countries. Tell me, is that true?

JODL: No, it is untrue. I remember that a witness here spoke of a sinister influence, of a key position of a sinister kind—at any rate, something sinister. But my influence on the Führer was unfortunately not in the least as great as it might, or perhaps even ought to have been in view of the position I held. The reason lay in the powerful personality of this despot who never suffered advisers gladly.

DR. EXNER: When did you first hear of a plan for a possible occupation of Norway?

JODL: The Führer first spoke to me—I think it was in mid-November 1939—at any rate, a fairly long time after Grossadmiral Raeder had first spoken to him. At that first conference, which I believe took place on 10 October, I had not yet heard of anything nor did the Führer give me any information. But in the middle of November he spoke to me about it. I first learned the details during the oral report made by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which took place on 12 November and at which I was present.

DR. EXNER: In this connection I would draw your attention to Document C-64, Exhibit GB-86, Page 46 of the document book. But I do not need to read it aloud. Volume I, Page 46.

JODL: The general attitude of the Führer at that time was—it is also established in writing: “I am not at all interested in extending the theaters of war, but if the danger of an occupation of Norway by England really exists and if that is true, then the situation would be quite different.”

JODL: Nothing was ordered at that time, but he merely instructed me to think this problem over generally. The preliminary work, as has been proved by documents, began on 27 January 1940.

Were you at that time of the opinion that the assurance given by Hitler in December and October 1939 that Norwegian neutrality would be respected—were you of the opinion that this assurance was given for the purpose of lulling Norway into a state of security, as has been alleged by the Prosecution?

JODL: That allegation can be definitely refuted, and by means of a few dates which I shall now enumerate. These assurances, these political assurances, were given by the Führer—or by the Reich Government, I do not know which—on 2 September and 6 October. On 9 October the Führer read and signed the famous memorandum known as Document L-52. I do not know whether the Tribunal is aware of the fact that it is a personal memorandum by the Führer.

DR. EXNER: That is Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. It is printed on Page 48, Volume I, of my document book.

JODL: This memorandum, as I think is obvious from the document, went out to the three Commanders-in-Chief and to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. It was dictated word for word by the Führer himself and was completed in 2 nights.

“The Nordic States.

“Their neutrality, provided no completely unforeseen circumstances arise, may be assumed also for the future. The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible, even if the war is of long duration.”

JODL: It is quite out of the question that the Führer, in this extremely secret memorandum, could have mentioned anything but his true purpose at that particular time. That, however, is all the more comprehensible since it was not until 1 day later, namely 10 October, that Grossadmiral Raeder first mentioned these fears to the Führer.

DR. EXNER: Was the occupation of Norway a very weighty decision for the leadership?

JODL: It was a terribly weighty decision. To put it shortly—it meant gambling with the entire German fleet. The result of it was that we had to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore, depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by actual danger. That is the reason why no definite date was fixed for this operation “Weserübung,” and the reason why I at a later date suggested that the forces for the Norway operation, in case it became necessary, and for an attack in the West, should be completely separate from each other.

DR. EXNER: What were the reasons why the occupation had to be prepared in every detail?

JODL: The reasons are quite openly and definitely stated in the order of 1 March 1940 which is Document C-174...

DR. EXNER: It is not printed in my document book. It refers to a document which the British Prosecution has submitted under Exhibit GB-89.

THE PRESIDENT: But 174 must mean something, must it not? The document said Document 174.

DR. EXNER: Now, you say in your diary that the Führer was searching for a justification. The meaning has already been explained here; but you yourself should know best what the meaning is, since you wrote it yourself. What does it mean?

JODL: The Führer said in those days, when I wrote it—not in a diary, but in my notebook, my memorandum book—he said: “To carry out a decision of this kind I need absolutely reliable information with which I can really justify this decision before the world and prove that it was necessary. I cannot tell, I only heard the following from Herr Quisling...” And for this reason he kept the Intelligence Service in particular very busy at this time, in order to get even more precise information for the Führer about these many reports which we received...

DR. EXNER: Now, Grossadmiral Raeder has explained the facts from which England’s plans could be deduced. Have you anything to add to that, or is the question settled?

JODL: On the whole, Grossadmiral Raeder has already submitted all the information. There is one thing which remains in my memory and which is also written in my notebook. That is the special insistence, quite openly advocated in the French press, that under all circumstances Germany must be cut off from the Swedish ore supplies. Then came the mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters; and then came the Altmark case which, according to my study of international law, was a flagrant breach of the agreement ruling the rights and duties of neutral states in naval warfare, and Articles 1 and 2...

DR. EXNER: Regarding the first two points which the witness has mentioned, I should like to draw attention to Document 1809-PS—that is, his diary, Exhibit GB-88, Page 53 of Volume I of my collection. There is an entry on 10 March:

“The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations is very gratifying from a political point of view. The French press is furious about it, because it considers it necessary to cut Germany off from Swedish ore.”

“The English have begun to molest or to fire on our merchantmen in Danish and Norwegian territorial waters.”

JODL: The Führer’s final decision was made on 2 April and was made on the basis of two pieces of information. First, the reports from the Navy regarding repeated firing on German merchant ships both in Norwegian and Danish territorial waters. Second, a report from Canaris that British troops and transports were lying in a state of readiness in the northern part of the English east coast.

DR. EXNER: What would have been the consequences for us if England had got there first?

JODL: As to that I can refer to Grossadmiral Raeder’s testimony, and can only say that once Norway was in British hands the war would have been half lost for us. We would have been strategically encircled on the northern flank and because of the weakness of our fleet we would have been incapable of ever rectifying this again.

DR. EXNER: Was indisputable proof found later that the British plan really existed?

JODL: We captured the entire records of the British brigade which landed in Namsos and in other places. We surprised and captured the British war correspondent Romilly in Narvik, where he expected anything rather than the arrival of German ships, otherwise he could have escaped capture. To the question what he wanted to report about the war in peaceful Narvik he could not give us any information at all.

Later on we captured all the records of the French General Staff, a part of which have already been presented by Admiral Raeder’s counsel. Particularly instructive, and of great interest to me, were the diaries carried by the English officers and some of the noncommissioned officers whom we captured in Norway. At least they proved one thing, namely, that all these troops had already been embarked and had been put ashore again the moment our German fleet advanced towards Norway.

DR. EXNER: I should like to refer again to two entries in the diary, Page 54, Volume I of my document book, the entry of 24 April and the entry of 26 April. There it says:

“Major Soltmann reports on the interrogation of the Englishmen and submits additional important documents, among them the secret Army list. At noon the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and confirm the authenticity of the orders. All the material is being handed over to the Foreign Office.”

In conclusion, I also draw your attention again to Soltmann’s interrogatory. It is Document AJ, Number 4, Exhibit Jodl-57, which I now present; Page 173 of Volume II. I need not read it aloud; I merely draw your attention to Soltmann’s answers to questions 4 and 5.

Now, one last question about this Norwegian affair. The English representative of the Prosecution has said that this shows how honorable the soldiers were who attacked Norway and then made use of lies and excuses. What do you say about this?

JODL: The Prosecution has thereby placed a purely operational problem on the level of soldierly or human honor. Until now that has never been the custom in this world. I can only say that I neither attacked Norwegians, nor did I resort to lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to contribute to the success of an operation which I considered absolutely necessary in order to forestall a similar action on the part of the English. If the seals of the archives are ever broken, the rightness of my attitude will then be clearly shown. But even if it were wrong, the honesty of my own subjective opinion at that time cannot for that reason be changed in any way.

DR. EXNER: We will now talk about the war in the West. After the end of the Polish campaign, was there already an operational plan for attacks in the West?

JODL: No. To begin with, there was no plan of attack in the West; but, on the contrary, there was, particularly in the Army, a widespread opinion that the war would die a natural death if only we kept quiet in the West. That went so far that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army transformed even mobile infantry divisions into fortress divisions, and took away all their mobile equipment from them.

DR. EXNER: Did you already know during the Polish campaign what the Führer’s intentions were concerning the West?

JODL: The Führer himself had his doubts during the Polish campaign. He too could find no plausible explanation for the complete inactivity of the French and English forces in France, who only staged a kind of a sham war with the help of their war communiqués. In reality not a single shot was fired at the front. But by the end of September, if I remember rightly, the Führer did realize that once England enters a war she fights it out to the bitter end.

DR. EXNER: As an officer of the General Staff you should be able to answer the following questions better than anybody else. Could we, from a purely strategical viewpoint, have remained purely on the defensive as far as the West was concerned?

JODL: I shall be very brief since such problems are not directly connected with the Trial. I will only say that it would have been the greatest possible error of strategy, because the superiority we possessed at that time would necessarily have diminished in proportion to our delay in making aggressive use of it; for England was continually bringing further divisions over to France, just as the French were from their colonial empire.

DR. EXNER: I draw your attention to Document C-62, Exhibit GB-106, Volume I of my document book, Page 56. I need not, however, read it aloud. It is a directive for the conduct of the war, and contains the basic ideas which we have already heard expressed.

JODL: One thing more is perhaps important. The Führer took such a serious view of this danger, that we might not maintain our superiority in the long run, that he actually wanted to attack in the winter, although all soldiers without exception advised him against it.

DR. EXNER: Here attention might be drawn to our document, Volume I, Pages 48 and 49. It is a memorandum of the Führer on the conduct of the war in the West, from which Jodl has already quoted Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. A detailed justification of this is on Page 49 of my document book.

Why then was France not attacked without violating the neutrality of Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium?

JODL: It was no trifle for the Führer to create new enemies possessing a strength of 500,000 men, which the Dutch and Belgian forces represented. It resulted in our having to make the attack in the West with actually inferior forces, namely, with 110 divisions against approximately 135 of the enemy. No military commander would do that except in an emergency.

JODL: We were not in a position to break through the Maginot Line at its strongest points, which would then have remained uncaptured—namely, between the Rhine and the Luxembourg border, or the Upper Rhine where the Vosges mountains were an additional obstacle in breaking through this West Wall at these points, this Maginot Line. For this purpose heavy artillery was lacking. But that was not a moral reason; it was, in fact, rather an unmoral one.

The great danger lay in the fact that so protracted an attack on the fortifications exposed us to an attack in the rear by the combined English and French mobile forces thrusting through Belgium and Holland; and they were north of Lille with their engines already running, one might say, for this very task. And the decisive factor was that owing to the many reports which reached us, the Führer and we ourselves, the soldiers, were definitely under the impression that the neutrality of Belgium and Holland was really only pretended and deceptive.

JODL: Individually the reports are not of great interest. There was, however, an endless number of reports from Canaris. They were supplemented and confirmed by letters from the Duce, Mussolini. But what was absolutely proved and completely certain, which I could see for myself on the maps every day, were the nightly flights to and fro of the Royal Air Force, completely unconcerned about neutral Dutch and Belgian territory. This necessarily strengthened the conviction in us that even if the two countries wished to—and perhaps in the beginning they did so wish—they could not possibly remain neutral in the long run.

DR. EXNER: What danger would the occupation of Belgium and Holland by the English and French have meant to us?

JODL: Those dangers were quite clearly indicated by the Führer, first, in his memorandum, Document L-52, which has been repeatedly quoted. There, on Page 48 of the document book, in the last paragraph of the page, is a reference to the enormous importance of the Ruhr—of which, incidentally, there seems to be quite sufficient evidence even today.

In his address of 23 November 1939 to the Commanders-in-Chief—Document 789-PS, or Exhibit USA-23—he describes once more, on Page 59, Volume I of the document book, precisely how that danger would be for the Ruhr district if one day British and French forces were to appear by surprise in that region. He referred to it there as the “Achilles’ heel,” and that is just what it was for German war strategy.

“We have an Achilles’ heel: the Ruhr district. The strategy of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr district. If England and France thrust through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the very greatest danger.”

JODL: I cannot, of course, or could not at the time, swear to the absolute accuracy of the numerous reports from Canaris, but the material we captured afterwards—and in this connection I would draw your attention to the conference of the Supreme War Council in London of 17 November 1939—confirmed on the whole the accuracy of the intelligence reports.

DR. EXNER: Presumably you had no reason at that time to doubt Canaris’ honesty, had you?

Now, the German attack was originally planned for November 1939. Why did the Führer postpone it over and over again? We have before us no less than 17 orders postponing the attack time and again.

JODL: It is not quite correct to say that the Führer had ordered the attack for mid-November, but rather he wanted to order the attack for a time when the meteorologists could predict about 6 or 7 days of clear, frosty weather. But the meteorologists failed completely in this. At times they thought they could predict such a state of the weather, and then all preparations would be made for the attack. Then they would cancel their weather forecasts again, and the final preparations for attack would be discontinued once more. That is why we so often prepared for the attack and then refrained from carrying it out.

On such an occasion I received a report from Canaris to the effect that one unit of the French Army had already crossed one part of the Belgian frontier. I do not know if that is true.

DR. EXNER: You have been accused by the Prosecution of first deceiving these countries and then invading them. Please tell us what you have to say on that subject.

JODL: The same applies here as I said before. I was neither a politician, nor was I the military Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. I was under the impression—and, indeed, an impression which could be proved—that in actual fact the neutrality of these two countries was no longer being respected. And as for the ethical code of my action, I must say that it was obedience—for obedience is really the ethical basis of the military profession. That I was far from extending this code of obedience to the blind code of obedience imposed on the slave has, I consider, been proved beyond all manner of doubt by my previous testimony. Nevertheless, you cannot get around the fact that, especially in operational matters of this particular kind, there can be no other course for the soldier but obedience.

And if the Prosecution today is in a position to indict German officers here at all, it owes this only to the ethical concept of obedience of its own brave soldiers.

DR. EXNER: We now come to the Balkans. In your diary, Document 1809-PS, on 19 March you made the following entry: “The Balkans should and must remain quiet.” That is on Page 61 of Volume I of my book, Exhibit GB-88, Document 1809-PS, the entry of 19 March. It says first:

“The Führer has returned beaming with joy and highly satisfied from the conference with the Duce. Complete agreement. ... The Balkans should and must remain quiet.”

DR. EXNER: Yes. Well then I must put in another question here. Your diary and your diaries are always being talked about. Explain just what this is—what we are dealing with here. Is one a real diary and the other not?

JODL: There is only one diary, and that is Document 1780-PS, which is from the year 1937 to 1938, and I used to make entries in it every evening.

JODL: I kept no diary at all during the war, but, of course, I filled up dozens of small notebooks. When one of these notebooks was full I marked important passages in red on the margin, and my secretary copied them out later, as they might be important for writing the history of the war and for the official diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. An example would be Document 1809-PS.

JODL: No, I did not check it, and never saw it again. It fell then into the hands of the Prosecution.

DR. EXNER: Now, there is still a third one which is always quoted here as a diary. That is the Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

THE PRESIDENT: You said it fell into the hands of the Prosecution. Do you mean it was not one of the documents that you handed over to the Prosecution?

JODL: No. I did not know at all where those extracts from my notebook had gone. The Prosecution captured it somewhere or other. The remainder are extracts, and partial extracts, from the official Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

DR. EXNER: And who kept this, the official Diary of the Armed Forces Operations Staff? Not you?

JODL: The final check was made by Dr. Schramm, a professor at the Göttingen University.

JODL: I usually did not have the time; but if General Scherff read through it and discovered anything in particular he would draw my attention to it.

We now come back to the Balkan question again. It says in your so-called diary, “The Balkans should and must remain quiet.” What was meant by that?

JODL: That was a brief note on the statement by the Führer—namely, that he was in perfect agreement with Mussolini that the Balkans must be kept quiet.

DR. EXNER: And did we not actually try to keep the Balkan states as quiet as possible?

JODL: Yes. We made unremitting endeavors for that. Our attitude toward Yugoslavia was as considerate as if we were dealing with a prima donna. Matters went so far that when we had to prepare the Greek campaign the Führer even refused a proposal from the Quartermaster General of the Army that sealed trains—the supply trains—should be sent through Yugoslavia, which would have been permissible according to international law. Moreover, we brought pressure to bear on Bulgaria so that she should not participate in the impending campaign against Greece, above all so as not to alarm Turkey. And even after the Greco-Italian campaign, the Führer still hoped that a conflict, an actual war, between Germany and Greece could be avoided.

DR. EXNER: I refer here to Directive Number 18, printed on Page 66 of Volume I of our document book, which contains an extract from Document 444-PS, Exhibit GB-116, and here we find the following statement in the paragraph before the last:

“The preparatory measures of the High Command for the conduct of the war in the near future are to be made in accordance with the following guiding principles...”

“The utilization of the railway through Yugoslavia may not be counted on for the deployment of these forces...”

JODL: That program was completely wrecked by Italy’s arbitrary act, about which the Reich Marshal and the Grossadmiral have already made statements. I have only a brief addition to make. Italy was beaten, as usual, and sent the Chief of the Operational Staff of the Supreme Command to me crying for help. But in spite of this calamity the Führer did not intervene in the war in Albania. He did not send a single German soldier there, although the matter had been under consideration. He ordered only an operation against Greece, starting from Bulgaria, to be prepared for the following spring. Even that was for the primary purpose of occupying the Salonika Basin, thereby giving direct relief to the Italians and only in the event, which to be sure was feared, of English divisions now landing in the Balkans as the result of Italy’s madness. In that case it was decided to consider the whole of Greece as an operational area, since we could not possibly tolerate a Royal Air Force base in the immediate vicinity of the Romanian oil fields. And this contingency is shown very clearly in the order which has been submitted to the Tribunal as Document 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-117, Pages 63 and 64 of the document book. I should like to quote two passages, two very brief passages from it. In Paragraph 2, Subparagraph b of Page 63, it says:

“ ‘Operation Marita.’ My plan therefore is”—I am quoting—“... to send these forces straight through Bulgaria, for the occupation of the north Aegean coast and, if necessary, the entire mainland of Greece.”

“The primary objective of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast and the Salonika Basin. The continuation of the attack by way of Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth may prove necessary.”

It is quite obvious from these conditional orders that the occupation of the whole of Greece was intended only if we should be forced to take this measure by the landing of English troops, which at that time was not yet the case.

CONTENTS


One Hundred and Forty-first Day, Wednesday, 29 May 1946,
	Morning Session	1
	Afternoon Session	36

One Hundred and Forty-second Day, Thursday, 30 May 1946,
	Morning Session	63
	Afternoon Session	100

One Hundred and Forty-third Day, Friday, 31 May 1946,
	Morning Session	132
	Afternoon Session	169

One Hundred and Forty-fourth Day, Saturday, 1 June 1946,
	Morning Session	212

One Hundred and Forty-fifth Day, Monday, 3 June 1946,
	Morning Session	253
	Afternoon Session	288

One Hundred and Forty-sixth Day, Tuesday, 4 June 1946,
	Morning Session	311
	Afternoon Session	338

One Hundred and Forty-seventh Day, Wednesday, 5 June 1946,
	Morning Session	370
	Afternoon Session	400

One Hundred and Forty-eighth Day, Thursday, 6 June 1946,
	Morning Session	435
	Afternoon Session	474

One Hundred and Forty-ninth Day, Friday, 7 June 1946,
	Morning Session	512
	Afternoon Session	546

One Hundred and Fiftieth Day, Saturday, 8 June 1946,
	Morning Session	574

One Hundred and Fifty-first Day, Monday, 10 June 1946,
	Morning Session	610
	Afternoon Session	640

The Project Gutenberg eBook of Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 15

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST DAY Wednesday, 29 May 1946

Morning Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

[The Tribunal adjourned until 30 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND DAY Thursday, 30 May 1946

Morning Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal adjourned until 31 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD DAY Friday, 31 May 1946

Morning Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal adjourned until 1 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH DAY Saturday, 1 June 1946

Morning Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal adjourned until 3 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH DAY Monday, 3 June 1946

Morning Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal adjourned until 4 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH DAY Tuesday, 4 June 1946

Morning Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

[A recess was taken.]

[The Tribunal adjourned until 5 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH DAY Wednesday, 5 June 1946

Morning Session

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIRST DAY
Wednesday, 29 May 1946

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SECOND DAY
Thursday, 30 May 1946

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD DAY
Friday, 31 May 1946

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH DAY
Saturday, 1 June 1946

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH DAY
Monday, 3 June 1946

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH DAY
Tuesday, 4 June 1946

ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 June 1946