Political and ethical fragments

The collection of Pythagoric Fragments contained in this volume must be considered by every one as highly valuable if their antiquity only is regarded; but by the lover of genuine wisdom they will be deemed inestimable, as proceeding from the school of the father of philosophy.

Of the greater part of the authors of these fragments little more than the country in which they lived is known. But of Charondas, and Zaleucus, those celebrated legislators, Seneca in his 90th Epistle informs us that they learnt their laws in the silent and sacred recess of Pythagoras. Though[vi] Seneca, however, Diodorus Siculus, Diogenes Laertius, Porphyry, and Iamblichus make both Charondas and Zaleucus to be the disciples of Pythagoras; yet Dr. Bentley, in his Dissertation on Phalaris, seems more disposed to think that they were not Pythagoreans than that they were. At the conclusion, however, of his discussion of this subject he says, “I do not assert any thing positively on either side of this whole debate about the two lawgivers [Charondas and Zaleucus]. I rather desire to stand a neuter, till the matter shall be decided by some abler hand[1].” But the man of intellect who reads this concession of the doctor, will doubtless laugh when he finds him also asserting, “Thus much I am sure may be safely concluded, that if Zaleucus was really Pythagoras’ disciple, the learned Mr. Dodwell’s calculation must be wrong [respecting the age of Pythagoras]. For[vii] which is more probable, that a Mr. Dodwell was mistaken in this particular, or that Diodorus Siculus, Laertius, Porphyry, and Iamblichus were wrong, who lived so many centuries prior to him, and who were able to derive information so much more decisive respecting Zaleucus, through books which were then extant, but which have long since utterly perished? By Vossius[2], however, who, though he was not perhaps so great a verbal critic as Bentley, was certainly a man of more intellect[3], the whole[viii] of these fragments were considered as precious monuments; and he wonders, and is[ix] at the same time indignant, at their not being more frequently perused.

Of Hierocles, the author of the Ethical Fragments, something more is known than of the authors of the Political Fragments, through what is said of him[x] by Suidas, Damascius[4], and Æneas Gazæus. For from the last of these we learn that he flourished about the end of the fifth century of the Christian era; and from the other two, that he was a Platonic philosopher of Alexandria: that his conceptions were magnificent, and his genius sublime; that he was very eloquent, astonished his auditors by the beauty and copiousness of his language, and contended with Plato himself in elegance of diction, and fertility of intellect. One of his auditors was Theosebius, a man of great penetration, who at different times twice heard Hierocles orally explaining the Gorgias of Plato; and though on comparing the latter with the former explanation, he found nothing in the one which might be said to be the same with what was in the other, yet each of[xi] them unfolded as much as possible the intention of Plato in that dialogue—which, as Damascius well observes, was a thing of a most singular nature, and clearly demonstrates the amplitude of his conceptions. We are informed, also, by the same Theosebius, that Hierocles once said, when expounding Plato, that the discourses of Socrates[5] resembled cubes, because they remained firm wherever they might fall.

The following circumstance, says Suidas, evinces the fortitude and magnanimity of Hierocles. On coming to Byzantium, he offended the prevailers (προσεκρουσε τοις Κρατουσι) i.e. the Christians[6]; and being brought[xii] into a court of justice by them was whipped. But while the blood was flowing, he took[xiii] some of it in the hollow of his hand, and besprinkled with it the judge, at the same time exclaiming:

Being banished, most probably in consequence of this magnanimous behaviour; and returning some time after to Alexandria, he gave philosophical lectures to his auditors in his usual manner. Suidas adds, that the grandeur of the conceptions of[xiv] Hierocles may be learnt from the perusal of his Commentaries On the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans, and from his treatise On Providence[8]; in which works it appears that he was sublimely wise in his life, but not accurate in his knowledge. Damascius also says, that Hierocles was not at all deficient in any thing pertaining to merely human science, but that he was by no means replete with blessed conceptions, i.e. with conceptions which are the offspring of an entheastic, or divinely inspired energy; and which are to be found in abundance in the writings of Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Damascius himself. This, indeed, will be immediately evident[9] to the man who has penetrated[xv] the depth of these writings, but to the merely[xvi] verbal critic is a circumstance involved in Cimmerian darkness.

POLITICAL FRAGMENTS
OF THE
PYTHAGOREANS.

FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS THE THURIAN ON A REPUBLIC.

I say that the whole of a polity is divided into three parts. And one part, indeed, consists of good men, who manage the public affairs. But the second part consists of those who are powerful. And the third part is composed of those who are employed in supplying and procuring the necessaries of life. I denominate, however, the first multitude [in a polity] that which consults [for the good of the whole]; the second, that which is auxiliary; and the third, that which pertains to mechanical and sordid occupations. Of these also, I say that the two first belong to those whose condition in life is liberal; but the third, to those who labour to procure subsistence. And of these indeed,[2] that which consults is the best; but that which is employed in sordid occupations is the worst; and that which is auxiliary, is a medium between the two. That which consults likewise [for the general good] ought to govern; but that which is engaged in sordid occupations ought to be governed: and that which is auxiliary ought both to govern and be governed. For that which consults for the general good previously deliberates what ought to be done; but that which is of an auxiliary nature, so far as it is belligerent, rules over the whole of the mechanical tribe; but so far as it antecedently receives counsel from others, is itself governed.

Of these parts, however, each again receives a triple division. For of that which consults, one part presides, another governs, and another counsels for the general good. And with respect to the part which presides, it is that which plans, contrives, and deliberates about what pertains to the community, prior to the other parts, and afterwards refers its counsels to the senate. But the governing part is either that which now rules [for the first time], or which has before performed that office. And with respect to the third part, which consults for the general good, this receives the advice of the parts prior to itself, and confirms by its suffrages and authority whatever is referred to[3] its decision. And, in short, it is requisite that those who preside should refer the affairs of the community to that part which consults for the general good; but that this latter part should refer these affairs through the Prætors to the Convention.

In a similar manner also of that part which is auxiliary, powerful, and efficacious, one part is of a governing nature; another part is defensive; and the remaining, which is the greater part, is gregal and military. It is the governing part, therefore, from which the leaders of armies, the præfects of cohorts, the bands of soldiers, and the vanguards are derived, and universally all those who rank as leaders. But the whole genus of the vanguards consists of those that are most brave, most impetuous, and most daring. And the remaining multitude is gregarious and military. Of the third part, however, which is engaged in sordid occupations, and in labouring to procure the necessaries of life, one part consists of husbandmen, and those who are employed in the elaboration of the land; but another part consists of artificers, who procure such instruments and machines as the occasions of life require; and another part is engaged in peregrinations and merchandise, and in exporting to foreign regions such things as are superabundant in the[4] city, and importing into it other things from foreign countries. The systems of political society, therefore, are coarranged through so many and such like parts.

In the next place, it is requisite to speak of their adaptation and union. Since, however, the whole of political society may be perfectly assimilated to a lyre, in consequence of requiring apparatus and coaptation, and also because it is necessary that it should be touched and used musically;—this being the case, I have sufficiently spoken above about the apparatus of a polity, and shown from what and from how many particulars it is constituted. I shall now, therefore, endeavour to speak of the coaptation and union of these. I say then, that political society is coadapted from the following three particulars, from disciplines, the study of manners [or customs], and from the laws; and that through these three, man is instructed, and becomes more worthy. For disciplines are the sources of erudition, and cause the desires to be impelled to virtue. But the laws, partly detaining by fear, repell men [from the commission of crimes,] and partly alluring by honours and gifts, excite them [to virtue]. And manners and studies fashion the soul like wax, and through their continued energy impress in it propensities that become, as it were, natural.[5] It is necessary, however, that these three should have an arrangement in conjunction with the beautiful, the useful, and the just; and that each of these three should, if possible, have all these for its final intention; but if not all of them, it should at least have two or one of them as the mark at which it aims, in order that disciplines, manners, and laws may be beautiful, just, and advantageous. In the first place, however, the beautiful in conduct should be preferred; in the second place the just; and in the third place, the useful. And universally the endeavour should be, that through these the city may become, in the most eminent degree, consentaneous and concordant with its parts, and may be free from sedition and hostile contention. But this will be effected, if the passions in the souls of youth are disciplined, and in things pleasing and painful are led to mediocrity, and if the possessions of men are moderate, and they derive their subsistence from the cultivation of the earth. And this will also be accomplished, if good men rule over those that are in want of virtue; skilful men over those that are deficient in skill; and rich men over those things that require a certain largess and expenditure; and if also appropriate honours are distributed to those who govern in all these in a becoming[6] manner. But there are three causes which are incitements to virtue, viz. fear, desire, and shame. The law, however, is able to produce fear, but custom shame: for those that have been accustomed to act well, will be ashamed to do any thing that is base. And disciplines are capable of producing desire. For they at one and the same time assign the causes of things, and attract the soul, and they especially effect this when they are accompanied with exhortation. Hence it is necessary that the souls of young men should be sufficiently instructed in what pertains to senates, fellowship, and associations, both military and political, but that the tribe of elderly men should be coadapted to things of this kind; since young men, indeed, require correction and instruction, but elderly men are in want of benevolent associations, and a mode of living unattended with pain.

Since, therefore, we have said, that the worthy man is perfected through three things, viz. through customs, laws, and disciplines, it is requisite to consider how customs or manners are usually corrupted, and how they become permanent. We shall find, then, that customs are corrupted in two ways: for they are either corrupted through ourselves or through foreigners. And through ourselves, indeed,[7] either through our flying from pain, or through our pursuit of pleasure. For in consequence of flying from pain, we do not endure labour; and through our pursuit of pleasure, we reject what is good. Labours, however, procure good for mankind; but pleasures evil. Hence men through pleasures, becoming incontinent and remiss, are rendered effeminate in their souls, and more profuse in their expenses. But customs and manners are corrupted through foreigners, when a multitude of these dwelling with us, rejoice in the success of their emporetic employment; or when those who dwell in the suburbs, being lovers of pleasure and luxury, impart their manners to the neighbouring inhabitants. On this account it is necessary that the legislators, and prefects of the mass of the people, should diligently observe whether the customs of the city are carefully preserved, and proceed equally through all the citizens. And farther still, they should observe whether the genuine and indigenous multitude, of which the polity consists, remains pure and unmingled with any other nation; and whether the magnitude of possessions remains in the same state, and does not become excessive. For the possession of superfluities is accompanied by the desire of still more[8] of the superfluous. After this manner, therefore, customs ought to be rendered secure.

With respect to disciplines, however, the same legislators and præfects should diligently inspect and examine the tribe of sophists, whether they teach what is useful to the laws, to political dogmas, and to the peculiar economy of life. For the doctrines of the sophists ingenerate in the souls of men, no casual but the greatest infelicity; when they dare to make innovation in any thing pertaining either to human or divine concerns, contrary to common conceptions; than which nothing can be more pernicious either with respect to truth, or security, or renown. And in addition to this, also, they introduce darkness and confusion into the minds of the vulgar. But of this kind are all such doctrines as either teach that there is no God, or if there is, that he is not so affected towards the human race, as to look to it with providential attention, but deserts and despises it. For doctrines of this kind produce in men folly and injustice, to an extent which it is not easy to narrate. For every man who is full of anarchy, and who has shaken off the fear of disobedience [to rulers and the laws], wantonly exults, and violates the laws. Hence it is necessary to employ political and venerable[9] assertions, which are adapted to the disposition of the speaker, and which are void of dissimulation. For thus what is said will exhibit the manners of the speaker. From the laws, however, security will thus be necessarily introduced, if the polity is composed and coarranged from every thing which is according to nature, and not from such things as are preternatural. For cities derive no advantage from a tyranny, and very little from an oligarchy. It is necessary, therefore, that a kingdom should be established in the first place; and in the second place, an aristocracy. For a kingdom, indeed, is a thing imitative of God, and which is with difficulty preserved and defended by the human soul. For it is rapidly changed through luxury and insolence. Hence it is not proper to employ it universally, but only so far as it may be useful to the polity; but an aristocracy should be more abundantly interwoven in it, because it consists of many rulers, who emulate each other, and who often alternately govern. It is also entirely necessary that a democracy should be introduced. For as a citizen is a part of the whole polity, it is requisite that he should receive a certain reward from it[10].[10] But it is necessary that he should be sufficiently restrained. For the vulgar are audacious and precipitate.

FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.

It is necessary that the laws should not be enclosed in houses, and by gates, but in the manners of the citizens. What, therefore, is the principle of every polity? The education of youth. For vines will never bear useful fruit, unless they are well cultivated; nor will horses ever become excellent, if colts are not properly trained. For recently produced fruit receives a figure especially similar to that which touches and is near to it. And men prudently attend to the manner in which vines ought to be cut and taken care of; but in things pertaining to the education of their own species, they conduct themselves negligently and rashly; though neither vines nor wine govern men, but man and the soul of man. And we commit the nurture of a plant, indeed, to a man of some worth, and think that he who takes care of it, deserves no less than two mina; but we commit the education[11] of youth to some Illyrian or Thracian, who are men of no worth. The first legislators, however, as they could not render the middle class of mankind stable, adjoined [in their education] dancing and rhythm, which participate of motion alone and order; and besides these they added sports, some of which exhorted them to fellowship, but others to truth and mental acuteness. In a similar manner also they instituted for those who through intoxication or repletion had committed any crime, the pipe and harmony, by which they gave an arrangement to the mind, so that the manners being matured and rendered mild, they might be capable of being adorned.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ARCHYTAS ON LAW AND JUSTICE.

I say that every [political] association consists of a governor and the governed; and of a third thing, viz. the laws. Of laws, however, one is animated, viz. a king; but another inanimate, viz. written law. The first law, therefore, is animated[11]; and if it is observed, the[12] king will be legitimate; the magistrate will be consentaneous; the subject will be free; and the whole community will be happy. But if both the animated and written laws are transgressed, the king will be a tyrant; the magistrate unfit for his office; the subject a slave; and the whole community unhappy. For actions form a continued series from governing, the being governed, and, in the third place, from subjugation. To govern, therefore, is the province of that which is more, but to be governed, of that which is less excellent, and to be subjugated, pertains to both these. For that part of the soul which is rational governs, the part which is irrational is governed, and both are vanquished by the passions. For virtue is produced from the apt conjunction of both these parts; and she leads the soul from pleasures and pains to tranquillity and apathy[12].

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

It will be beneficial to the community, if law is not monarchical, and advantageous [only] to[13] a private individual, but if it is generally useful, and extends to every one. But it is also necessary that the law should look to the whole region, and to the different places in it. For neither is the earth able to receive the same fruits [every where] nor the soul of every man the same virtue[13].

IN ANOTHER PART ALSO OF THE SAME WORK.

But it is necessary that the more excellent law and the city should be composed of every other polity, and should have something of a democracy, of an oligarchy, of a kingdom, and of an aristocracy; as is the case in Lacedæmon. For the kings there are monarchs; the elders form an aristocracy; the ephori an oligarchy; and the ippagretæ[14] and the young men a democracy. It is necessary, however, that law should not only be good and beautiful, but that[14] it should also reciprocate in its parts: for thus it will be strong and stable. But when I say it should reciprocate, I mean that the same magistrate should alternately govern and be governed, as in Lacedæmon, in which there are the most equitable laws. For there the ephori are opposed to the kings, the elders to the ephori, and the media between these are the young men, and the ippagretæ; for these last both incline to those rulers that excel in power, and are in subjection to others.

It is necessary that the law should, in the first place, establish what pertains to the gods, to dæmons and parents, and, in short, to what is beautiful and honourable. But in the second place, it should establish what pertains to things that are useful. For it is fit that minor concerns should be subsequent to such as are greater. Nor should the laws be contained in houses and gates, but in the manners of the citizens. For neither in Lacedæmon, which possesses the most excellent laws, is the city governed by a multitude of writings, but rather by the manners of the subjects. But it will be beneficial to the community, if law is not monarchical, and advantageous [only] to a private individual, but if it is generally useful, and extends to every one; and if it refers punishment to disgrace and ignominy, and not to the loss of[15] property. For by punishing with disgrace, the citizens will endeavour in the most decorous and useful manner, to avoid the punishment ordained by the laws. But if the punishment is pecuniary, the citizens will value money immoderately, and will conceive it to be the greatest remedy of crimes. It will be best, therefore, for the whole city to be so arranged that it may not be in want of any thing external, either with respect to virtue or power, or any other cause. For thus the body, a family, and an army will be beautifully constituted, when each of these has the cause of safety in itself, and does not derive it externally. And this, indeed, will be the case with the body when it is strong, with a family when it is well composed, and with an army which neither consists of mercenaries, nor is unexercised. For these, when thus constituted, will be far more excellent than others, and will be free indeed, and foreign from every thing of a servile nature; and will not, for the purpose of endurance, be in want of many things, but of a few, and those easily procured. For thus he who is strong will not sink under burdens, and he who is thinly clothed will vanquish cold; since men are exercised by casualties and calamities. Indeed, to the man who is temperate, and who has laboured much[16] both in body and soul, all meat and drink will appear to be agreeable; and a bed composed of leaves will be pleasant; but to him who has deliberately chosen a luxurious and Sybaritic life, even the apparatus of the great [or Persian] king would not be sufficiently pleasing. Hence it is necessary that the manners and pursuits of the citizens should be deeply tinctured with law: for this will cause them to be sufficient to themselves, and will be the means of distributing to each of them that which is due to him according to his desert. For thus, also, the sun, moving in a circle through the zodiac, distributes to every thing on the earth generation, nutriment, and an appropriate portion of life; administering, as if it were equitable legislation, the excellent temperature of the seasons. Hence, too, Jupiter is called Nomios, or legal; and Nemeios, or the distributor. He, likewise, who distributes nutriment to sheep, is called Nomeus, or a shepherd; and the songs of harpers are denominated Nomai. For these properly dispose the parts of the soul by harmony, rhythms, and measures.

ON THE MUTATIONS OF POLITIES, FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS ON A POLITY.

Every thing mortal, by a necessity of nature, is conversant with mutations; some things, indeed, receiving a revolution from a worse to a better condition, but others from a better to a worse. For things that are generated, are increased; when increased, arrive at their acme: after this become old, and at length finally perish. And things, indeed, which are generated by nature, through the same nature terminate in the immanifest; and again from the immanifest accede to mortality, through a permutation of generation; and, by a reciprocation of corruption, form a circular retrogression. And some things, through human folly, from an ebullition of insolence and satiety, when both houses and cities have been exalted to the summit of human felicity, and been exuberantly rich, have perished, together with their much applauded possessions. Thus, also, it happens that every empire is bounded by three times: by one, indeed, and that the first, which comprehends in itself acquisition; by the second, which comprehends fruition; and by the last, which brings with it destruction. For empires at their commencement[18] being destitute of the goods of fortune, are busied in acquisition; but afterwards becoming prosperous, they perish. Such things, therefore, as are under the dominion of the gods, being incorruptible, are preserved through the whole of time by incorruptible natures; but such things as are under the government of men, being mortal, receive from mortals a perpetually various mutation. For the end, indeed, of satiety and lascivious insolence is destruction; but a strenuous and worthy life is the end of poverty and narrow circumstances. Not only poverty, however, but many other things bring human life to an end.

FROM DIOTOGENES IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING A KINGDOM.

A king should be one who is most just; and he will be most just who pays the greatest attention to the laws. For without justice no one will be a king; and without law there can be no justice. For that which is just is just through law, which is the effective cause of justice. But a king is either animated law, or a legal ruler. And hence it follows that he will be most just and most observant of the laws. There are, however, three peculiar employments[19] of a king; viz. to lead an army, to administer justice, and to worship the gods. He will, therefore, be able to lead an army properly, if he knows how to carry on war in a becoming manner. But he will be skilled in administering justice, and in governing all his subjects, if he has well learned the nature of justice and law. And he will worship the gods in a pious and holy manner, if he has diligently considered the nature and virtue of God; so that a good king must necessarily be a good general, judge, and priest. For these are things consequent and suitable to the transcendency and virtue of a king. For it is the province of the pilot to preserve the ship, of the charioteer to preserve the chariot, and of the physician to save the sick; but it belongs to a king and to a general to save those who are in danger in battle. For of that of which any one is the leader, he is also the provident inspector and artificer. But to be conversant with judicial affairs is, indeed, a universal thing; but is particularly the proper work of a king; who, like a god, is a leader and protector in the world. And universally, indeed, it is fit that the whole polity should be coadapted to one ruler and empire; but, especially, that things which have the relation of parts should accord with the same harmony[20] and supreme domination. Farther still, it is the province of a king to oblige and benefit his subjects, but this not without, justice and law. And the third thing which is adapted to the dignity of a king is the worship of the gods. For it is necessary that what is most excellent should be honoured by the most excellent; and that which is the leader and ruler, by that which leads and rules. Of things, therefore, which are by nature most honourable, God is the best; but of things on the earth, and pertaining to men, a king is the most excellent. As God also is to the world, so is a king to the city [which he governs]; and as a city is to the world, so is a king to God. For a city, indeed, being coadapted from things which are many and different, imitates the coarrangement and harmony of the world; but a king who possesses an innoxious dominion, and who is himself animated law, exhibits the form of God among men.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME TREATISE.

Hence it is necessary that a king should not be vanquished by pleasure, but that he should vanquish it; that he should not be[21] similar to, but far excel the multitude; and that he should not conceive his proper employment to consist in the pursuit of pleasure, but rather in the acquisition of probity. At the same time also it is fit that he who has occasion to rule over others should first be able to govern his own passions.

But with respect to the desire of obtaining great property, it must be observed, that a king ought to be wealthy in order that he may benefit his friends, relieve those that are in want, and justly punish his enemies. For the enjoyment of prosperity in conjunction with virtue is most delightful. The same thing must be said concerning the transcendency of a king. For since he always surpasses others in virtue, it is fit to form a judgment of his empire with reference to virtue, and not with reference to riches, or power, or his military strength. For he possesses one of these [viz. riches] in common with any casual persons; another [viz. power] in common with irrational animals; and the last in common with tyrants. But virtue is alone the peculiarity of good men. Hence, whatever king is temperate with respect to pleasures, liberal with respect to money, and prudent and most skilful in governing, he will be in reality a king. The people, however, have the same analogy with respect[22] to the virtues and the vices, as the parts of the human soul. For the desire of accumulating more than is fit subsists about the irrational part of the soul: for desire is not rational[15]. But ambition and ferocity subsist about the irascible part: for this is the fervid and strenuous part of the soul. And the love of pleasure subsists about the epithymetic part: for this is the effeminate and yielding part of the soul. But injustice, which is the most perfect vice, and is of a composite nature, subsists about the whole soul. Hence it is necessary that the king should coharmonize like a lyre the city that is furnished with good laws, first establishing in himself the most just boundary and order of law, as knowing that the proper arrangement of the people, over whom divinity[23] has given him dominion, ought to be coadapted to this boundary. It is also necessary that a good king should establish becoming positions and habits in the delivery of public orations, conducting himself politically, seriously, and earnestly, in order that he may neither appear to be rough to the multitude; nor may be contemptible; but may be agreeable and easy in his manners. He will however obtain these things, if in the first place he is venerable in his aspect and his discourse, and appears to deserve the sovereign authority which he possesses. But, in the second place, if he proves himself to be benign from his behaviour to those whom he may happen to meet, from his countenance and his beneficence. And in the third place, if he is formidable from his hatred of depravity, from the punishment which he inflicts on it, from his celerity in inflicting it, and, in short, from his skill and exercise in the art of government. For venerable gravity, being a thing which imitates divinity, is capable of causing him to be admired and honoured by the multitude. Benignity will render him pleasing and beloved. And his being formidable will cause him to be terrible to and unconquered by his enemies, and magnanimous and confident to his friends.

It is necessary, however, that his gravity[24] should have nothing in it of an abject or vulgar nature, but that it should be admirable, and such as becomes the dignity of empire and a sceptre. Nor should he ever contend with his inferiors, or his equals, but with those that are greater than himself; and he should conceive, conformably to the magnitude of his empire, that those pleasures are the greatest which are derived from beautiful and great deeds, and not those which arise from sensual gratifications; separating himself indeed from human passions, and approximating to the Gods, not through arrogance, but through magnanimity and an invincible transcendency of virtue. Hence he should invest himself with such a gracefulness and majesty in his aspect and his reasonings, in the conceptions of his mind, in the manners of his soul, and in his actions and the motions and gesture of his body, that those who survey him may perceive that he is adorned and fashioned with modesty and temperance, and a decorous disposition. For a good king should convert to himself the souls of those that behold him, no less than the sound of a flute and harmony attract the attention of those that hear them. And thus much concerning the venerable gravity of a king.

But I shall now endeavour to speak of his benignity. Universally, therefore, every king[25] will be benign, if he is just, equitable, and beneficent. For justice is a connective and collective communion, and is alone that disposition of the soul which adapts itself to those that are near to us. For as rhythm is to motion, and harmony to the voice, so is justice to communion; since it is the common good of those that govern, and those that are governed, because it coharmonizes political society. But equity and benignity are certain assessors of justice; the former indeed softening the severity of punishment; but the latter extending pardon to less guilty offenders. It is necessary, however, that a good king should give assistance to those that are in want of it, and be beneficent. But his assistance should be given not in one way only, but in every possible way. And it is requisite to be beneficent, not looking to the magnitude of honour, but to the manner and deliberate choice of him by whom honour is conferred. It is likewise necessary that a worthy king should so conduct himself towards all men as to avoid being troublesome to them, but especially towards men of an inferior rank and of a slender fortune: for these, like diseased bodies, can endure nothing of a troublesome nature. Good kings, indeed, have dispositions similar to those of the Gods, and which especially resemble those of Jupiter, the[26] ruler of all things. For he is venerable and honourable, through transcendency and magnitude of virtue. He is benign, because he is beneficent, and the giver of good; and hence he is said by the Ionic poet [Homer] to be the father of men and Gods. He is also terrible and transcendent, because he punishes the unjust, and reigns and rules over all things. But he carries thunder in his hand, as a symbol of his formidable excellence. From all these particulars, therefore, it is requisite to remember that a kingdom is a God-resembling thing.

FROM THE TREATISE OF STHENIDAS THE LOCRIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

It is requisite that a king should be a wise man: for thus he will be honoured analogously to the first God, of whom also he will be an imitator. For this god is by nature the first king and potentate; but a king is so by birth and imitation. And the former rules in the universe, and in the whole of things; but the latter in the earth. The former also governs all things eternally, and has a never-failing life, possessing wisdom in himself; but the latter acquires science through time. But a king will imitate the first God in the most[27] excellent manner, if he acquires magnanimity, gravity, and the want of but few things; exhibiting to his subjects a paternal disposition. For on this account especially, the first God is conceived to be the father both of Gods and men, because he is mild to every thing which is in subjection to him, and never ceases to govern with providential regard. Nor is he alone satisfied with being the maker of all things, but he is the nourisher, the preceptor of every thing beautiful, and the legislator to all things equally. Such also ought the king to be who rules over men on the earth. Nothing however is beautiful which is deprived of a king and a ruler. But it is not possible for a king or a ruler [properly so called] to exist without wisdom and science. He, therefore, who is a wise man and a king, will be an imitator, and a legitimate minister of God.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ECPHANTUS, THE CROTONIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

That the nature of every animal is adapted to the world, and to the things contained in the world, appears to me to be evident from many arguments. For every animal thus conspiring [into union and consent], and having such a[28] colligation of its parts, it follows a series which is most excellent, and at the same time necessary, through the attractive flux of the universe about it, which is effective of the general ornament of the world, and the peculiar permanency of every thing which it contains. Hence it is called κοσμος kosmos, and is the most perfect of all animals. But in its parts, which are many, and naturally different, a certain animal excels; both from its native alliance to the world[16], and from participating of divinity in a greater degree. [And in the nature, indeed, of the God who is eternal, the stars called planets are comprehended, forming the first and the greatest series[17]]. But in the sublunary region, where bodies move in a right line, the nature of demons has its subsistence. And in the earth, and with us, the most excellent nature is man; but the most divine is a king, who surpasses other men in the common nature: in his tabernacle, indeed, [i.e. in his body], resembling other men, as being generated from the same matter, but fashioned from the best of artificers, who fabricated[29] him, by using himself as the archetype. Hence, in a certain respect, a king is one and alone; being the production of the supernal king, with whom he is always familiar: but being beheld by his subjects in his kingdom as in a splendid light. For a kingdom is judged and proved to resemble the eagle, the most excellent of winged animals, which looks undazzled at the sun. And a kingdom is, indeed, analogous to the sun, because it is divine; and through excess of splendour cannot be seen without difficulty, except by genuine eyes. For the numerous splendours which surround it, and the dark vertigos which it produces in those who survey it, as if they had ascended into a foreign altitude, evinces that their eyes are spurious. But those who can fitly arrive thither, on account of their familiarity with, and alliance to it, are able to use it properly. A kingdom, therefore, is a thing pure, genuine, uncorrupted, and through transcendency, most divine; and difficult to be acceded to by man. Hence it is necessary that he who is established in it should be naturally most pure and pellucid [in his soul], in order that he may not obscure by his stains that which is most splendid; as some persons defile the most sacred places, and the impure pollute those they[30] may happen to meet. But it is requisite that a king, who associates with men, should participate of an undefiled nature, and should know how much more divine both himself and his qualifications are than other things; and from the exemplars to which he assimilates himself, he should use both himself and his subjects in the best manner. And to other men, indeed, if they are delinquents, the most holy purification is for them to be assimilated to their rulers, whether law or a king administers their affairs. But kings who cannot find any thing on the earth to imitate more excellent than their own nature, ought not to wander any farther in search of a paradigm, but should immediately become benefited by imitating God. For neither should any one search for the world, since he exists in, and is a part of it; nor should he who governs others be ignorant of him by whom he is governed. This, however, is a most abundant ornament, that nothing [in the universe] can be found without a ruler.

The manners of a king also ought to be the preceptors of his government. For thus the beauty of it will immediately shine forth, since he who imitates God through virtue will be dear to him whom he imitates; and much more will he be dear to his subjects. For no[31] one who is beloved by divinity will be hated by men; since neither do the stars, nor the whole world hate God. For if they hated their ruler and leader, they would never be obedient to him. But because he governs properly, mundane affairs are well governed. I therefore, indeed, apprehend that the terrene king ought not to be deficient in any one of the virtues which pertain to the celestial king. But as the former is a certain foreign and external thing, in consequence of proceeding to men from the heavens; so, likewise, his virtues may be conceived to be the works of God, and to accede to him through divinity. And if you consider the thing from the beginning, you will find what I say to be true. For the terrestrial king obtains possession of the race of men by a communion, which is the first and the most necessary of all things. And this race is also the possession of him who governs every thing in the universe. For it is impossible that any thing can subsist without friendship and communion; the truth of which may be easily seen, if the accustomed communion which exists among citizens is supposed to be destroyed; since this is much inferior to a divine and royal nature. For natures of this kind are not oppressed by any such indigence; but, conformably to intellect, they supply the[32] wants of others, and afford them assistance in common. For they are perfect in virtue. But the friendship which is in a city, and which possesses a certain common end, imitates the concord of the universe. But without the arrangement of magistrates no city can be inhabited. In order, however, to effect this arrangement, and to preserve the city, laws are necessary, and a certain political domination, and also a governor and the governed. But, the consequence of these things is, the general good, a certain concinnity, and the consent of the multitude in conjunction with concordant persuasion. He, likewise, who governs according to virtue, is called a king, and is so [in reality]; since he possesses the same friendship and communion with his subjects as divinity possesses with the world, and the natures which it contains. All benevolence, however, ought to be exerted; in the first place, indeed, by the king towards his subjects; but in the second place, by the subjects towards the king: and this benevolence should be such as that of a parent towards his child, of a shepherd towards his flock, and of law towards him who uses it.

For there is one virtue pertaining to the government, and to the life of men. But no one should through indigence solicit the assistance[33] of others, when he is able to supply himself with what nature requires. For though there is a general communion [in the city], yet every one should so live as to be sufficient to himself; since he who is sufficient to himself does not appear to require the aid of any other person in his passage through life. If, therefore, it is necessary to lead an active life, it is evident that a king, though he should also assume other things, will, nevertheless, be sufficient to himself. For he will have friends through his own virtue; and in using these, he will not use them by any other virtue than that by which he regulates his own life. For it is necessary that he should follow a virtue of this kind, since he cannot procure any thing which is more excellent. And God, indeed, not having either ministers or servants[18], nor employing any mandate, and neither crowning nor proclaiming those that are obedient to him, or disgracing those that are disobedient, thus administers so great an empire. But as it appears to me exhibiting himself to be most[34] worthy of imitation, he inserts in all things a vehement desire of participating his nature. He is, however, good; and the communication of goodness, and this, with the greatest facility, is his only work. But those who imitate him[19], accomplish every thing in a better manner through this imitation. And the imitation of him is to every thing the source of sufficiency. For there is not one virtue which makes things to be acceptable to God, and another which imitates him; [but both these are effected by one and the same virtue]. And is not our terrestrial king in a similar manner sufficient to himself? For assimilating himself to one, and that the most excellent nature, he will beneficently endeavour to render all whom he governs similar to himself. But such as offer violence to, and compel their subjects, entirely[20] destroy in every individual of the community a promptitude to imitate [that which is most excellent]. For without benevolence, it is impossible there can be assimilation; since benevolence especially destroys every thing of a terrific nature. It is much to be wished, indeed, that human nature was not in want[35] of persuasion: for persuasion is the relic of human depravity, of which this temporary animal [man] is not destitute. Persuasion, indeed, is a thing proximate to necessity; since this first of itself performs those things which fly from necessity. Such beings, however, as spontaneously use what is beautiful and good, are not influenced by the reverence of persuasion; for neither are they influenced by the fear of necessity.

Again, a king alone is capable of effecting this good in human nature, that through the imitation of what is more excellent, man may pursue what is fit and decorous; and that those who are corrupted as if by intoxication, and through a bad education have fallen into an oblivion of that which is more excellent, may through his eloquence be corroborated, may have their diseased minds healed, and the oblivion which dwells in them through depravity being expelled, may have memory for an intimate associate, from which persuasion is produced. For this, though it originates from depraved seeds, yet is the source of a certain good to the inhabitants of the terrestrial region, in which language supplies what is deficient (through the imbecility of our nature), in our converse with each other.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

He who has a sacred and divine conception of things, will be in reality a king[21]. For being persuaded by this, he will be the cause of all good but of no evil. And, moreover, that he will be just, being fitted for society, is evident to every one. For communion or association consists in equality, and in the distribution of it. And justice indeed precedes, but communion participates. For it is impossible for a man to be unjust, and yet distribute equality; or that he should distribute equality, and yet not be adapted to association. But how is it possible that he who is sufficient to himself should not be continent? For sumptuousness is the mother of incontinence, and incontinence of wanton insolence, from which so many human evils are derived. But self-sufficiency is not vanquished by sumptuousness, nor by any thing which proceeds from it; but being itself a certain principle, it leads all things, but is not led by any thing. And to govern, indeed, is the province of God, and also of a king (on which account, likewise, he is denominated[37] sufficient to himself); but it pertains to both, not to be governed by any one. It is, however, evident, that these things cannot be effected without prudence. And it is manifest that God is the intellectual prudence of the world. For the world is connectedly contained by gracefulness, and a fit order of things, which cannot take place without intellect. Nor is it possible for a king without prudence to possess these virtues; I mean justice, continence, communion, and such other virtues as are the sisters of these.

FROM ARCHYTAS.

The unwritten laws of the gods were promulgated against depraved manners, inflicting a severe destiny and penalty on the disobedient; and these unwritten laws are the fathers and leaders of those that are written, and of the dogmas established by men.

FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.

It is proper to invoke God in the beginning both of supper and dinner, not because he is in want of any thing of this kind, but in order[38] that the soul may be adorned by the recollection of Divinity. For since we proceed from him, and participate of a divine nature, it is requisite that we should honour him. And since God also is just, it is fit that we should act justly in all things. In the next place, there are four causes which terminate all things, and bring them to an end, viz. nature, law, art, and fortune. And nature, indeed, is universally the principle of all things. But of those things which from manners lead to political concord, law is the inspective guardian and fabricator. Of things which obtain their consummation through human prudence, art is justly said to be the mother and leader. And of those things which, casually and accidentally, similarly befall the worthy and the depraved, we assert fortune to be the cause. For fortune does not produce any thing in measure and bound, in an orderly and prudent manner.

THE PREFACE OF CHARONDAS, THE CATANEAN, TO HIS TREATISE OF LAWS.

It is requisite that those who deliberate about, and perform any thing, should begin from the Gods: for it is best, as the proverb says, for God to be the cause of all our deliberations[39] and works. And, farther still, it is requisite to abstain from base actions, and especially on account of consulting with God. For there is no communication between God and him who is unjust. Every one, also, should give assistance to himself, and should incite himself to the undertaking and performance of such things as are conformable to his desert; since for a man to extend himself similarly to small and great undertakings appears to be too sordid and illiberal. Hence, you should be very careful to avoid falling vehemently into things of an extended nature, and of great consequence. But, in every undertaking, you should measure your own desert and power, in order that you may obtain honour and veneration.

Let no assistance be afforded to a man or woman who has been condemned by the city, nor let any one associate with such a person, or if he does, let him be disgraced, as being similar to him or her with whom he associates. But it is proper to love men who, from the previous decision of the city, are good, and to associate with them; and by imitating and acquiring in reality their virtue and probity, to be thus initiated in the greatest and most perfect of the mysteries. For no man is perfect without virtue. And assistance should be given to[40] an injured citizen, whether he is in his own, or in a foreign country. But let every stranger who was venerated in his own country, and conformably to the proper laws of that country, be received and dismissed auspiciously and familiarly, calling to mind hospitable Jupiter, as a God who is established by all nations in common, and who is the inspective guardian of hospitality and inhospitality.

Let more elderly men also preside over such as are younger, so that the latter may be ashamed of and deterred from vice, through reverence and fear of the former. For in cities in which more elderly men are shameless, the children and grandchildren of these are also destitute of shame. But wanton insolence and injustice are the attendants of shamelessness and impudence. And destruction follows these. Let, however, no one be impudent[22], but let every one be modest and temperate; because he will thus have the Gods propitious to him, and will procure for himself salvation. For no vicious man is dear to divinity. Let every one likewise honour probity and truth, and hate what is base and false. For these are the indications of virtue and vice. Hence[41] it is requisite to accustom children from their youth [to worthy manners], by punishing those that are lovers of falsehood, but being delighted with those that are lovers of truth, in order that in each that which is most beautiful, and most prolific of virtue, may be implanted. Each of the citizens, likewise, should be more anxious to pretend to be temperate than to pretend to be wise: for the pretence of wisdom is a great indication of an ignorance of probity, and is also a sign of pusillanimity. But let the pretence of temperance be considered as a true claim to it. For no one should feign with his tongue, that he performs beautiful deeds, when at the same time he is both destitute of worthy conduct and good intentions.

It is likewise requisite to preserve benevolence towards rulers, being obedient to and venerating them as if they were parents. For he who does not conceive that this is proper will suffer the punishment of bad counsel from the dæmons who are the inspective guardians of the seat of empire. For the rulers are the guardians of the city, and of the safety of the citizens.

But it is also necessary that governors should preside justly over those that are governed, in the same manner as over their own children, in[42] passing sentence on others, laying asleep hatred, friendship, and anger.

Let those likewise be praised and celebrated who, being themselves in affluence, have assisted the indigent, and let them be considered as the saviours of the children and defenders of their country. And let the wants of those be relieved who are poor through fortune, and not through an indolent and intemperate life. For fortune is common to all men, but an indolent and intemperate life is peculiar to bad men.

Let it also be considered as a worthy deed, to point out any one who has acted unjustly, in order that the polity may be saved, which has many guardians of its decorous arrangement. But let the indicator of the unjust action be considered as a pious man, though his information should be respecting his most familiar acquaintance. For nothing is more familiar and allied to a man than his country. Let, however, the indication be made, not of things done through involuntary ignorance, but of such crimes as have been committed from a previous knowledge [of their enormity.] And if he who is detected should be hostile to him by whom he is detected, let him be hated by all men, in order that he may suffer the punishment[43] of ingratitude, through which he deprives himself of being cured of the greatest of diseases injustice.

Farther still, let a contempt of the Gods be considered as the greatest of iniquities, and also injuring parents voluntarily, the neglecting rulers and laws, and voluntarily dishonouring justice. But let him be considered as a most just and holy citizen who honours these things, and indicates to the citizens and rulers those that despise them.

Let it be esteemed to be more venerable for a man to die for his country than, through a desire of life, to desert it, together with probity. For it is better to die well than to live basely and disgracefully.

It is likewise requisite to honour each of the dead, not with tears nor with lamentations, but with good remembrance, and with an oblation of annual fruits. For when we grieve immoderately for those that are dead, we are ungrateful to the terrestrial dæmons.

Let no one curse him by whom he has been injured. For praise is more divine than defamation.

Let him be thought to be a better citizen who is superior to anger, than him who is an offender through it.

Let not him be praised but disgraced, who,[44] in the sumptuousness of his expence, surpasses temples and palaces. For let nothing private be more magnificent and venerable than things of a public nature.

Let him who is a slave to wealth and money be despised, as one who is pusillanimous and illiberal, and is astonished by sumptuous possessions, and let him be considered as one who leads a tragical life, and whose soul is vile. For he who is magnanimous foresees with himself all human concerns, and is not disturbed by any thing of this kind [whether prosperous or adverse], when it accedes.

Let no one speak obscenely, in order that he may not in his thoughts approach to base deeds, and that he may not fill his soul with impudence and defilement. For we call things which are decorous and lovely, by their proper names, and by those appellations which are established by law. But we abstain from naming things to which we are hostile, on account of their baseness. Let it also be considered as base, to speak of a base thing.

Let every one dearly love his lawful wife, and beget children from her. But let no one emit the seed of his children[23] into any other person; nor let him illegally consume that[45] which is honourable both by nature and law, and act with wanton insolence. For nature produced the seed, for the sake of procreating children, and not for the sake of lust.

But it is requisite that a wife should be chaste, and should not admit the impious connection with other men, as by so doing she will subject herself to the vengeance of the dæmons, whose office it is to expel those to whom they are hostile from their houses, and to produce hatred.

Let not him be praised who gives a stepmother to his children[24], but disgraced, as being the cause of domestic dissension.

And as it is proper to observe these mandates, let him who transgresses them be obnoxious to political execration.

The law also orders that these proems should be known by all the citizens, and should be read in festivals after the pæans[25] by him who is appointed for this purpose by the master of the feast, in order that the precepts may be inserted in the minds of all that hear them.

THE PREFACE OF ZALEUCUS, THE LOCRIAN, TO HIS LAWS.

It is requisite that all those who inhabit a city and country should in the first place be firmly persuaded that there are Gods, in consequence of directing their attention to the heavens and the world, and the orderly distribution of the natures which they contain. For these are not the productions either of fortune or of men. It is also requisite to reverence and honour these, as the causes to us of every reasonable good. It is necessary, therefore, that every one should so prepare his soul that it may be free from every vice; since God is not honoured by a bad man, nor is he to be worshiped sumptuously, nor with tragical expence, like some depraved man; but by virtue, and the deliberate choice of beautiful and just deeds. Hence it is necessary that every one should be good to the utmost of his power, both in his actions and his deliberate choice, if he wishes to be dear to divinity, and should not fear the loss of money more than the loss of renown. And it is also requisite to call him a better citizen who would rather sustain a loss of property than of probity and justice.

Let, however, such things as the following[47] be denounced by us against those who are not easily impelled to do what we have above enjoined, but whose soul is easily excited to injustice. All citizens of this kind, both male and female, and also those who live in the same house with them, should remember that there are Gods who punish the unjust, and should place before their eyes that time in which to every one there will be a final liberation from life. For all such will repent when they are about to die, from a remembrance of their unjust deeds, and from their being impelled to wish that all things had been done by them justly. Hence it is necessary that every one, in every action, should always associate to himself this time, as if it were present: for thus he will especially pay attention to probity and justice. But if an evil dæmon is present with any one, converting him to injustice, such a one should abide in temples, at altars, and in sacred groves, flying from injustice as a most impious and noxious mistress, and supplicating the Gods to cooperate with him in turning from it. He should also accede to those men who are renowned for their probity, in order to hear them discourse about a blessed life, and the punishment of bad men, that he may be deterred from unjust deeds; but he should only dread avenging dæmons. Those, likewise,[48] that dwell in the city, should honour all the Gods according to the legal rites of the country, which are to be considered as the most beautiful of all others. All the citizens, too, should obey the laws, reverence the rulers, and rise to them, and comply with their mandates. For after the Gods, dæmons, and heroes, proximate honours are paid by men who are intelligent, and wish to be saved, to parents, the laws, and the rulers. Let, however, no one make the city to be dearer to him than his country, since he will thus excite the indignation of the Gods of the country: for such conduct is the beginning of treachery. And farther still, for a man to be deprived of his own country, and to live in a foreign land, is a thing of a more afflictive nature, and more difficult to be borne [than most other misfortunes]: for nothing is more allied to us than our country. Nor let any one think that a citizen, whom the laws have permitted to partake of the polity, should be considered by him as an implacable enemy; since a man who is capable of thus thinking can neither govern nor judge in a proper manner, in consequence of his anger predominating over his reason. Let no one, likewise, speak ill either of the city in common, or of a citizen privately. But let the guardians of the laws keep a watchful eye over offenders,[49] in the first place by admonishing them; and in the next place, if they are not restrained by this from acting ill, let them be careful that they are punished. And with respect to the established laws, if some one of them should appear not to be well ordained, let it be changed into one that is better. But where all of them remain, let them be [universally] obeyed; as it is neither beautiful, nor beneficial, for the established laws to be vanquished by men; though it is both profitable and beautiful, to be restrained, as if vanquished, by a more excellent law. It is requisite, however, to punish those who transgress these, as machinating for the city the principle of the greatest evils anarchy. But the magistrates should neither be arrogant, nor judge insultingly, nor in passing sentence be mindful either of friendship or hatred, but of what is just. For thus they will decide most justly, and will be worthy of the magistracy. It is fit, therefore, that slaves should do what is just through fear, but those that are free, through shame, and for the sake of the beautiful in conduct. Hence it is requisite that the governors should be men of this kind, in order that they may be reverenced by those whom they govern. But if any one wishes to change some one of the established laws, or to introduce another law, let him, with a halter[50] about his neck, speak of the subject of his wishes to the people. And if it shall appear from the suffrages, that the law already established should be dissolved, or that a new law should be introduced, let him not be punished. But if it should be thought that the preexisting law is better, or that the law which is intended to be introduced is unjust, let him who wishes to change an old, or to introduce a new law, be executed by the halter.

FROM THE TREATISE OF CALLICRATIDAS ON THE FELICITY OF FAMILIES.

The universe must be considered as a system of kindred communion or association. But every system consists of certain dissimilar contraries, and is coarranged with reference to one certain thing, which is the most excellent, and also with a view to a general benefit. For that which is denominated a choir, is a system of musical communion, and is referred to one certain common thing, a concert of voices. Farther still, the system of body about a ship consists of certain dissimilar and contrary things, and is coarranged with reference to one thing which is best, viz. the pilot, and also with a view to a common benefit, a prosperous[51] navigation. Thus, too, a family, being a system of kindred communion, consists of certain dissimilars, which are its proper parts; and is coarranged with a view to one thing which is best, viz. the father of the family; and is referred to a common advantage, unanimity. And, in short, every family, in the same manner as a psaltery[26], requires these three things, apparatus, coadaptation, and a certain contrectation, and musical use. Apparatus, indeed, being the composition of all its parts, from which the whole, and all the system of kindred communion derives its completion. But of the parts of a family there are two first and greatest divisions; viz. man and possessions, the latter of which is the thing governed, and affords utility. Thus, also, the first and greatest parts of an animal are soul and body; and soul, indeed, is that which governs and uses, but the body is that which is governed, and imparts utility. And possessions, indeed, are the adscititious instruments of human life; but the body is the connascent and allied instrument of the soul. Of those persons, however, that give completion to a family, some are consanguineous, but others have an affinity to the family. And those that are kindred are[52] generated from the same blood, or have the same origin from those who first disseminated the race. But those that have an affinity have an adscititious alliance, as commencing from the communion of wedlock. And these are either fathers or brothers, or maternal or paternal grandfathers, or some other of those relatives that are produced by marriage. But if the good arising from friendship is also to be referred to a family (for thus it will become greater and more magnificent, not only through an abundance of wealth and many relations, but also through numerous friends); in this case it is evident, that the family will thus become more ample, and that the social species of friendship is to be enumerated among things which are requisite to the completion of a family. But of possessions some are necessary, and others are of a liberal nature. And the necessary, indeed, are those which are subservient to the wants of life; and the liberal are such as lead a man to an elegant and well arranged mode of living, so that he may not be in want of other things. Such things, however, as exceed what is requisite to a liberal and elegant mode of life, are, at the beginning, the roots to men of wanton insolence, and destruction. For those that have great possessions are necessarily at first inflated with pride, and when thus[53] inflated become arrogant; and, being arrogant, they also become fastidious, and conceive that their kindred, and those of the same nation and tribe with themselves, neither resemble, nor are equal to them. But when they are fastidious, they also become wantonly insolent. And the extremity and end of all wanton insolence is destruction. When, therefore, in a family and city there is a superfluity of possessions, it is necessary that the legislator should cut off, and, as it were, amputate the superfluities, in the same manner as a good husbandman lops the too luxuriant leaves of trees. But of the kindred and domestic part of man there is a triple species. For there is one species which governs, another which is governed, and another which gives assistance to a family and relatives. And the husband, indeed, governs, but the wife is governed, and the offspring of both these is an auxiliary.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

With respect also to practical and rational domination, one kind is despotic, another is of a guardian nature, and another is political. And the despotic, indeed, is that which governs with a view to the advantage of the governor,[54] and not of the governed. For after this manner a master rules over his slaves, and a tyrant over his subjects. But the guardian domination subsists for the sake of the governed, and not for the sake of those that govern. And with this kind of power the anointers rule over the athletæ, physicians over the sick, and preceptors over their pupils. For their labours are not directed to their own advantage, but to the benefit of those whom they govern; those of the physician being undertaken for the sake of the sick, the anointers for the sake of exercising the body, and those of the erudite for the sake of the inerudite. But the political domination has for its end the common benefit both of the governors and the governed. For according to this domination, in human affairs, both a family and a city are coharmonized; but in things of a divine nature the world is aptly composed. A family, however, and a city are an imitation according to analogy of the government of the world. For divinity is the principle of nature, and his attention is neither directed to his own advantage, nor to private, but to public good. And on this account, the world is called κοσμος, from the orderly disposition of all things which are coarranged with reference to one thing which is most excellent,[55] and this is God, who is, according to conception, an intellectual[27] animal, incorruptible, and the principle and cause of the orderly disposition of wholes. Since, therefore, the husband rules over the wife, he either rules with a despotic, or with a guardian, or, in the last place, with a political power. But he does not rule over her with a despotic power: for he is diligently attentive to her welfare. Nor is his government of her entirely of a guardian nature: for this is itself a part of the communion [between man and wife]. It remains, therefore, that he rules over her with a political power, according to which both the governor and the thing governed establish [as their end] the common advantage. Hence, also, wedlock is established with a view to the communion of life. Those husbands, therefore, that govern their wives despotically, are hated by them; but those that govern them with a guardian authority are despised by them. For they appear to be, as it were, appendages and flatterers[56] of their wives. But those that govern them politically are both admired and beloved. And both these will be effected, if he who governs exercises his power so that it may be mingled with pleasure and veneration; pleasure indeed being produced by his fondness, but veneration from his doing nothing of a vile or abject nature.

AND AGAIN, IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

He who wishes to marry ought to take for a wife one whose fortune is conformable to his own, in order that he may not contract nuptials either above or beneath his condition, but analogous to the property which he possesses. For those who marry a woman above their condition have to contend for the mastership; for the wife, surpassing her husband in wealth and lineage, wishes to rule over him; but he considers it to be unworthy of him, and preternatural to submit to his wife. But those who marry a woman beneath their condition subvert the dignity and splendour of their family. It is necessary, however, on this occasion to imitate the musician, who, having learned the proper tone of his voice, endeavours to bring it to such a medium that it may be rendered sufficiently[57] sharp and flat, and may be neither broken, nor lose its intenseness. Thus, therefore, it is necessary that wedlock should be coadapted to the peculiar tone of the soul, so that the husband and wife may not only accord with each other in prosperous, but also in adverse fortune. It is requisite, therefore, that the husband should be the regulator, master, and preceptor of his wife. The regulator, indeed, in paying diligent attention to her affairs; but the master, in governing and exercising authority over her; and the preceptor in teaching her such things as it is fit for her to know. This, however, will be especially effected by him who, directing his attention to worthy parents, marries from their family a virgin in the flower of her youth. For such virgins are easily fashioned, and are docile; and are also naturally well disposed to be instructed by, and to fear and love their husbands.

FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE[28] ON THE DUTIES OF A WOMAN.

It is necessary that a woman should sufficiently possess a harmony full of prudence and temperance. For it is requisite that her soul[58] should be vehemently inclined to the acquisition of virtue; so that she may be just, brave, and prudent, and may be adorned with frugality, and hate vainglory. For, from the possession of these virtues, she will act worthily when she becomes a wife, towards herself, her husband, her children, and her family. Frequently, also, such a woman will act beautifully towards cities, if she happens to rule over cities or nations, as we see is [sometimes] the case in a kingdom. If, therefore, she subdues desire and anger, a divine harmony will be produced. Hence she will not be pursued by illegal loves, but she will love her husband, her children, and all her family. For such women as are fond of being connected with other men besides their husbands, become hostile to the whole of their families, both to those branches of it that are free, and those that are slaves. They also machinate stratagems against their husbands, and falsely represent them as the calumniators of all their acquaintance, in order that they alone may appear to be exceedingly benevolent; and they govern their families in such a way as may be expected from those that are lovers of indolence. For from such conduct the destruction ensues of every thing which is common to the husband and wife. And thus much as to these particulars.

It is also requisite to lead the body to what is naturally moderate, with respect to nutriment, clothes, bathing, anointing, dressing the hair, and to whatever pertains to decoration from gold and jewels. For whatever of a sumptuous nature is employed by women in eating and drinking, in garments and trinkets, renders them disposed to be guilty of every crime, and to be unjust both to their husband’s bed, and to every other person. It is requisite, therefore, that they should only satisfy hunger and thirst, and this from things easily procured; and that they should defend themselves from cold by garments of the simplest kind. But to be fed with things which are brought from a distant country, or which are obtained at a great price, is no small vice. It is also great folly to search after exceedingly elegant garments, which are variegated with purple, or any other precious colour. For the body wishes to be neither cold nor naked, but to be covered for the sake of decorum, and is not [externally] in want of any thing else. The opinion of men, however, in conjunction with ignorance, proceeds to inanities and superfluities. Hence a woman should neither be decorated with gold, nor with Indian gems, nor with the jewels of any other nation, nor plait her hair with abundance of art, nor be perfumed[60] with Arabian unguents, nor paint her face so that it may be more white or more red, nor give a dark tinge to her eyebrows and her eyes, nor artificially dye her gray hairs, nor frequently bathe. For the woman who seeks after things of this kind searches for a spectator of female intemperance. For the beauty which is produced by prudence, and not by these particulars, pleases women that are well born. Nor should she conceive that nobility and wealth, the being born in a great city, glory, and the friendship of renowned and royal men, are to be ranked among things that are necessary. For if they happen to be present, they should not be the cause to her of any molestation; and if they should not be present, she should not regret their absence. For a prudent woman will not be prevented from living [properly] without these. And if those great and much admired things which we have mentioned should not be present, her soul should not anxiously explore, but withdraw itself from them. For in consequence of drawing their possessor to misfortune, they are more noxious than beneficial. For to these, treachery, envy, and calumny are adjacent, so that such a woman cannot be free from perturbation.

It is also necessary that she should venerate[61] the Gods through good hope of obtaining felicity by this veneration, and by obeying the laws and sacred institutions of her country. But after the Gods, I say, that she should honour and venerate her parents. For these cooperate with the Gods in benefiting their children. Moreover, she ought to live with her husband legally and kindly, conceiving nothing to be her own property, but preserving and being the guardian of his bed. For in the preservation of this all things are contained. It is likewise requisite that she should bear every thing [in a becoming manner] which may happen to her husband, whether he is unfortunate in his affairs, or acts erroneously through ignorance, or disease, or intoxication, or from having connection with other women. For this last error is granted to men; but not to women, since they are punished for this offence. It is necessary, therefore, that she should submit to the law with equanimity, and not be jealous. She ought likewise to bear patiently his anger, his parsimony, and the complaints which he may make of his destiny, his jealousy, and his accusation of her, and whatever other faults he may inherit from nature. For all these she should cheerfully endure, conducting herself towards him with prudence[62] and modesty. For a wife who is dear to her husband, and who truly performs her duty towards him, is a [domestic] harmony, and loves the whole of her family, to which also she conciliates the benevolence of strangers. If, however, she neither loves her husband nor her children, nor her servants, nor wishes to see any sacrifice preserved; then she becomes the leader of every kind of destruction, which she likewise prays for, as being an enemy, and also prays for the death of her husband, as being hostile to him, in order that she may be connected with other men; and, in the last place, she hates whatever her husband loves. But it appears to me that a wife will be a [domestic] harmony, if she is full of prudence and modesty. For then she will not only love her husband, but also her children, her kindred, her servants, and the whole of her family, in which possessions, friends, citizens, and strangers are contained. She will likewise adorn the bodies of these without any superfluous ornaments, and will both speak and hear such things only as are beautiful and good. It is also requisite that she should act conformably to her husband’s opinion in what pertains to their common life, and be satisfied with those relatives and friends that meet with his approbation.[63] And she will conceive these things to be pleasant and disagreeable which are thought to be so by her husband, unless she is entirely destitute of harmony.

FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE ON THE HARMONY OF A WOMAN[29].

Parents ought not to be injured either in word or deed; but it is requisite to be obedient to them, whether their rank in life is small or great. And in every allotted condition of soul and body, and of external circumstances, in peace, also, and war, in health [and sickness[30]], in riches and in poverty, in renown and ignominy, and whether they are of the same class with most of the community, or are magistrates, it is necessary to be present with, and never to forsake them, and almost to submit to them even when they are insane. For such conduct will be wisely and cheerfully adopted by those that are pious. But he who despises his parents will, both among the living[64] and the dead, be condemned for this crime by the Gods, will be hated by men, and under the earth will, together with the impious, be eternally[31] punished in the same place by Justice, and the subterranean Gods, whose province it is to inspect things of this kind. For the aspect of parents is a thing divine and beautiful, and a diligent observance of them is attended with a delight such as neither the survey of the sun, nor of all the stars which dance round the illuminated heavens, is capable of producing, nor any other spectacle, should it even be greater than this. And, it appears to me, that the Gods are not envious[32] when they perceive that this takes place. Hence it is requisite to reverence parents both while they are living, and when they are dead, and never oppose them in any thing they may say or do. If also they are ignorant of any thing through deception or disease, their children should console[65] and instruct, but by no means hate them on this account. For no greater error and injustice can be committed by men than to act impiously towards their parents.

ON THE REVERENCE DUE TO PARENTS. FROM THE APOPHTHEGMS OF ARISTOXENUS, THE TARENTINE.

After divinity and demons, the greatest attention should be paid to parents and the laws; not fictitiously, but in reality preparing ourselves to an observance of, and perseverance in, the manners and laws of our country, though they should be in a small degree worse than those of other countries.

AND IN THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE SAME WORK[33].

But after these things follow the honours which should be paid to living parents, it being right to discharge the first, the greatest, and[66] the most ancient of all debts. Every one, likewise, should think that all which he possesses belongs to those who begot and nurtured him, in order that he may be ministrant to their want to the utmost of his ability, beginning from his property; in the second place discharging his debt to them from things pertaining to his body; and in the third place, from things pertaining to his soul; thus repaying with usury the cares and pains which his now very aged parents bestowed on him when he was young. Through the whole of life, likewise, it is requisite that he should particularly employ the most respectful language in speaking to his parents; because there is a most severe punishment for light and winged words; and Nemesis, the messenger of Justice, is appointed to be the inspector of every thing of this kind. When parents, therefore, are angry, it is requisite to yield to them, and to appease their anger, whether it is shown in words or in deeds; acknowledging that a father may reasonably be very much enraged with his son, when he thinks he has been injured by him. But on the death of parents, the most decent and beautiful monuments should be raised to them; not exceeding the usual magnitude, nor yet less than those which[67] our ancestors erected for their parents. Every year, too, attention ought to be paid to the decoration of their tombs. They should, likewise, be continually remembered and reverenced, and this with a moderate and appropriate expense. By always acting, therefore, and living in this manner, we shall each of us be rewarded according to our deserts, both by the Gods and those natures that are superior to us, and shall pass the greatest part of our life in good hope.

FROM THE TREATISE OF PEMPELUS ON PARENTS[34].

Neither divinity, nor any man who possesses the least wisdom, will ever advise any one to neglect his parents. Hence we cannot have any statue or temple which will be considered by divinity as more precious than our fathers and grandfathers when grown feeble with age. For God will recompense him with benefits who honours his parents with gifts; since if[68] this is not done, divinity will not pay any attention to the prayers of such parents for their children. The images of our parents, indeed, and progenitors should be esteemed by us as far more venerable and divine than any inanimate images. For these animated images, when they are continually adorned and rendered splendid with honour by us, pray for us, and implore the gods to bestow on us the most excellent gifts: but the contrary when we despise them. Neither of these, however, is effected by inanimate images. Hence he who conducts himself in a becoming manner towards his parents and progenitors, and other relatives of this kind, will possess the most proper of all statues, and the best calculated to render him dear to divinity. Every one, therefore, endued with intellect should honour and venerate his parents, and should dread their execrations and [unfavourable] prayers, as knowing that many of them frequently take effect. These things, therefore, being thus disposed by nature, men that are prudent and modest will consider their living aged progenitors as a treasure, to the extremity of life; and if they die before they arrive at that period, they will be vehemently desired by them. On the contrary, progenitors will be[69] terrible in the extreme to their depraved and stupid offspring. But he who, being profane, is deaf to these assertions, will be considered by all intelligent persons as odious both to Gods and men.

FROM THE TREATISE OF PHINTYS, THE DAUGHTER OF CALLICRATES, ON THE TEMPERANCE OF A WOMAN.

A woman ought to be wholly good and modest; but she will never be a character of this kind without virtue. For any virtue subsisting in any one thing renders that which receives it valuable. And the virtue, indeed, of the eyes is sight, but of the ears hearing. Thus, too, the virtue of a horse causes it to a good horse; and the virtue of a man and the virtue of a woman render each of them worthy. But the principal virtue of a woman is temperance; for through this she will be able to honour and love her husband. Many, indeed, may perhaps think it does not become a woman to philosophize, as neither is it proper for her to ride on horseback, nor to harangue in public. But I think that some things are the province of a[70] man, others of a woman, and that others are common both to man and woman. And, likewise, that some things pertain more to a man than to a woman; but others more to a woman than to a man. But the things peculiar to a man are, to lead an army, to govern, and to harangue in public. The offices peculiar to a woman are, to be the guardian of a house, to stay at home, and to receive and be ministrant to her husband. And the virtues pertaining to both are fortitude, justice, and prudence. For it is fit that both the husband and wife should have the virtues of the body, and in a similar manner those of the soul. And as health of body is beneficial to both, so also is health of soul. The virtues, however, of the body are health, strength, vigour of sensation, and beauty. With respect to the virtues, also, some are more adapted to be exercised and possessed by a man, but others by a woman. For fortitude and prudence pertain more to the man than to the woman, both on account of the habit of the body, and the power of the soul; but temperance peculiarly belongs to the woman. Hence it is requisite to know the number and the quality of the things through which this virtue accedes to a woman. I say, therefore, that they are these five. And in the[71] first place, she obtains this virtue through sanctity and piety about the marriage bed. In the second place, through ornament pertaining to the body. In the third place, through egressions from her own house. In the fourth place, through refraining from the celebration of orgies, and the mysteries of the mother of the Gods[35]. And in the fifth place, through being cautious and moderate in the sacrifices to divinity. Of these, however, the greatest and most comprehensive cause of temperance, is that which causes the wife to be undefiled with respect to the marriage bed, and not to have connexion with any other man than her husband. For in the first place, by such illegal conduct, she acts unjustly towards the Gods who preside over nativities, rendering them not genuine but spurious adjutors of her family and kindred. In the second place, she acts unjustly towards the Gods who preside over nature, by whom she solemnly swore, in conjunction with her parents and kindred, that she would legally associate with her husband in the communion of life and the procreation of children. And in the third place, she acts[72] unjustly towards her country, by not observing its decrees. To which may be added, that to offend against right in those things for which the greatest punishment, death, is ordained, on account of the magnitude of the crime, and to do so for the sake of pleasure and wanton insolence, is nefarious, and most undeserving of pardon. But the end of all insolent conduct is destruction.

This, also, ought to be considered, that no purifying remedy has been discovered for this offence, so as to render a woman thus guilty pure and beloved by divinity. For God is most averse to pardon this crime. But the best indication of the chastity of a woman towards her husband is that which arises from the resemblance of her children to their father. And thus much concerning the marriage bed.

With respect, however, to the ornament of the body, it appears to me, that the garments of a woman should be white and simple, and by no means superfluous. But they will be so, if they are neither transparent nor variegated, nor woven from silk, but are not expensive, and are of a white colour. For thus she will avoid excessive ornament, luxury, and superfluous clothes; and will not produce a depraved imitation in others. And, in short,[73] she should not decorate her person with gold and emeralds. For they are very expensive, and exhibit pride and arrogance towards the vulgar. It is necessary, however, that a city which is governed by good laws, and is well arranged in all its parts, should accord with itself, and have an equable legislation; and should expel the artificers who make things of this kind from the city. She should, likewise, give a splendour to her face, not by employing adscititious and foreign colour, but that which is adapted to the body, and is produced by washing it with water; and adorning her person through modesty rather than through art. For thus she will render both herself and her husband honourable. But the lower class of women should go out of their houses, for the purpose of sacrificing to the tutelar deity of the city, for the welfare of their husbands and all their family. A woman, also, should depart from her house neither by twilight nor in the evening, but should openly leave it when the forum is full of people; accompanied by one, or at most two servants, for the sake of beholding a certain thing, or of buying something she may want. She should also offer frugal sacrifices to the Gods, and such as are adapted to her ability; but she should abstain[74] from the celebration of orgies, and from those sacred rites of the mother of the Gods, which are performed at home. For the common law of the city ordains that these shall not be performed by women. To which may be added, that these rites introduce ebriety, and mental alienation. It is necessary, however, that she who is the mistress of a family, and presides over domestic affairs, should be temperate and undefiled.

ETHICAL FRAGMENTS
OF
HIEROCLES,

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS THE GODS.

Such particulars, also, as the following, are to be previously assumed concerning the Gods, viz. that they are immutable, and firm in their decrees; so that they never change the conception of what appeared to them to be fit from the beginning. For there is one immutability and firmness of the virtues, which it is reasonable to suppose subsists transcendently with the Gods, and which imparts a never-failing stability to their conceptions. From which it is evident, that there is no probability that the punishments which divinity thinks proper to inflict can[76] be remitted. For it is easy to infer, that if the Gods change their decisions, and omit to punish him whom they had designed to punish, the world can neither be beautifully nor justly governed; nor can any probable reason for [the necessity of] repentance be assigned. Poetry also appears to have asserted such things as the following,—rashly, and without any reason:

Nor must we omit to observe, that though the Gods are not the causes of evil, yet they connect certain persons with things of this kind, and surround those who deserve [to be afflicted] with corporeal and external detriments; not through any malignity, or because they think it requisite that men should struggle with difficulties, but for the sake of punishment. For as pestilence and drought, and besides these excessive rain, earthquakes, and every thing of this kind, are for the most part produced through certain other more physical causes, yet sometimes are effected by the Gods, when the times are such that the iniquity of the multitude, publicly, and in common, requires to be punished; after the same manner, also, the Gods sometimes afflict an individual with corporeal and external detriments, in order to punish him, and convert others to what is right.

But to be persuaded that the Gods are never the cause of any evil[38], contributes greatly, as it appears to me, to proper conduct towards the Gods. For evils proceed from vice alone,[78] but the Gods are of themselves the causes of good, and of whatever is advantageous; while, in the meantime, we do not admit their beneficence, but surround ourselves with voluntary evils. Hence, on this occasion, it appears to me that it is well said by the poet:

For that God is never in any way the cause of evil may be proved by many arguments; but at present we shall only adduce what Plato[40] says: viz. “that as it is not the province of what is hot to refrigerate, but the contrary; so neither is it the province of that which is beneficent to be noxious, but the contrary.” Moreover, God being good, and immediately replete from the beginning with every virtue, cannot be noxious, or the cause to any one of evil; but on the contrary, must impart every good to those who are willing to receive it; bestowing on us, also,[79] such media[41] as are according to nature, and which are effective of what is conformable to nature. But there is only one cause of evil[42].

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR COUNTRY.

After speaking of the Gods, it is most reasonable to show, in the next place, how we should conduct ourselves towards our country. For, by Jupiter, our country is as it were a certain secondary God, and our first and greatest parent. Hence he who gave a name to the thing did not rashly denominate it πατρις, patris; this word being derived from πατηρ, pater, a father; but pronounced with a feminine[80] termination, in order that it might be as it were a mixture of father and mother. This reason, also, proclaims that our country is to be honoured equally with our two parents; so that we ought to prefer it to either of them taken separately, and not to honour the two more than it; but to pay an equal portion of respect to each. There is, likewise, another reason, which exhorts us to honour it more than our two parents conjointly; and not only to honour it beyond these, but also to prefer it to our wife, children, and friends; and, in short, after the Gods, to all other things.

As, therefore, he is stupid who esteems one finger more than the five, but he is most reasonable who prefers the five to one; for the former despises what is more eligible, but the latter, in the five, preserves also the one finger: after the same manner, he who wishes to save himself rather than his country, in addition to acting unlawfully, desires impossibilities. But he who prefers his country to himself is dear to divinity; and reasons fitly and firmly. At the same time it has been observed, that though some one should not be connumerated with the system [or the cooperating combination of the many], but should be considered apart from it, yet it is fit that he should prefer the safety of the system to his own preservation.[81] For the destruction of the city will evince that the safety of the citizen entirely depends on its existence, just as the abscission of the hand is attended with the destruction of one finger, as a part of the hand. We may, therefore, summarily conclude, that general is not to be separated from private utility: but is to be considered as one and the same with it. For that which is advantageous to the country is common to each of the parts of it; since the whole without the parts is nothing[43]. And vice versa, that which is advantageous to the citizen extends also to the city, if it is assumed as beneficial to the citizen. For that which is useful to a dancer, so far as he is a dancer, will also be advantageous to the whole choir. Depositing, therefore, all this reasoning in the discursive power of the soul, we shall receive much light from it in particulars, so that we[82] shall never omit to perform what is due from us to our country.

Hence, I say, it is necessary that every passion and disease of the soul should be removed from him who intends to act well by his country. It is likewise requisite that a citizen should observe the laws of his country as certain secondary Gods, and should render himself perfect conformably to their mandate. But he who endeavours either to transgress, or to make any innovation in the laws, should be with all possible diligence prevented from doing so, and in every way opposed. For a contempt of the existing laws, and preferring new to ancient laws, are things by no means beneficial to a city. Hence it is requisite that those should be restrained from giving their votes, and from precipitate innovation, who are pertinaciously disposed to act in this manner. I therefore commend Zaleucus, the Locrian legislator, who ordained, that he who intended to introduce a new law, should do it with a rope about his neck, in order that he might be immediately strangled, unless he could change the ancient constitution of the polity, to the very great advantage of the community. But customs, which are truly those of the country, and which, perhaps, are more ancient[83] than the laws themselves, are to be preserved no less than the laws. The present customs, however, which are but of yesterday, and which have been so very recently introduced into every city, are not to be considered as the customs of the country, [or as the institutes of ancestors]; and, perhaps, neither are they at all to be regarded as customs[44]. In the next place, because custom is an unwritten law, having for its inscription a good legislator, viz. the approbation of all those that use it; perhaps, on this account, it is proximate to things which are naturally just.

AFTER WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR PARENTS.

After speaking of the Gods and our country, what person deserves to be mentioned more than, or prior to our parents? Hence it is requisite that we should discourse about them. He, therefore, will not err who says, that they[84] are certain secondary and terrestrial Gods; since on account of their proximity to us, they are, if it be lawful so to speak, more to be honoured by us than the Gods themselves[45]. But it is necessary, previously, to assume, that the only measure of gratitude towards them is a perpetual and unremitting promptitude to repay the benefits we have received from them; since, though we should perform many things for their sake, yet they will be far less than what they deserve. At the same time, also, it may be said, that these our deeds are nearly theirs, because they produced us by whom they are performed. As therefore, if the works of Phidias and of other artists should themselves produce certain other things, we should not hesitate to say that these latter, also, were the works of the artists; thus, likewise, it may be justly said, that our performances are the deeds of our parents; through whom we likewise derived our existence. Hence, in order that we may easily apprehend the duties which we owe them, it will be requisite to have this sentence perpetually at hand, that our parents[85] should be considered by us as the images of the Gods; and by Jupiter, as domestic Gods, our benefactors, kindred, creditors, lords, and most stable friends. For they are most stable images of the Gods, possessing a similitude to them beyond the power of art to effect. For they are the guardian Gods of the house, and live with us; and besides this, they are our greatest benefactors, imparting to us things of the greatest consequence; and, by Jupiter, bestowing on us not only what we possess, but also such things as they wish to give us, and for which they themselves pray. Farther still, they are likewise our nearest kindred, and the causes of our alliance with others. They are, also, creditors of things of the most honourable nature, and only repay themselves by taking what we shall be benefited by returning. For what gain can be so great to a child as piety and gratitude to his parents? They are most justly, too, our lords: for of what can we be in a greater degree the possession, than of those through whom we exist? Moreover, they are perpetual and spontaneous friends and auxiliaries; at all times, and in every circumstance, affording us assistance. Since, however, the name of parent is the most excellent of all the before-mentioned appellations,[86] according to which we also denominate the Gods themselves; something else must also be added to this conception; viz. that children should be persuaded that they dwell in their father’s house, as if they were certain ministers and priests in a temple, appointed and consecrated for this purpose by nature herself; who entrusted a reverential attention to their parents to their care. Since of attentive regard, therefore, one kind pertains to the body, but another to the soul, we shall readily perform what each of these requires, if we are willing to do that which reason persuades us to do. But reason persuades us to pay less attention to the body than to the soul; though attention to the former is necessary. We should, therefore, procure for our parents liberal food, and such as is adapted to the imbecility of old age; and besides this, a bed, sleep, unction, a bath, garments; and in short, all the necessaries which the body requires, that they may never at any time experience the want of any of these; in thus acting, imitating their care about our nurture, when we were infants. Hence, we should compel ourselves to employ a certain prophetic attention to them, in order to discover what they particularly desire of things pertaining to the body, though they should not[87] indicate the object of their wish[46]. For they divined many things respecting us, when we frequently signified by inarticulate and mournful sounds, that we were in want of certain things, but were unable to indicate clearly the subjects of our wants. So that our parents, by the benefits which they formerly conferred upon us, become the preceptors to us of what we ought to bestow on them.

With respect to the souls of our parents, we should, in the first place, procure for them hilarity; which will be especially obtained, if we are conversant with them by night and by day, unless something prevents us, walking, being anointed, and living together with them. For as to those who are undertaking a long journey, the converse of their families and friends is most delightful, after the manner of those that accompany a solemn procession; thus, also, to parents who are now verging to the grave, the sedulous and unremitting attention[88] of their children is most acceptable, and most dear. Moreover, if at any time they should act wrong, which frequently happens to be the case with many, and especially with those who have been educated in a more vulgar manner; they should be corrected indeed, yet not by Jupiter with reprehension, as we are accustomed to do to our inferiors or equals, but as it were, with exhortation; and not as if they had erred through ignorance, but as if they had committed an oversight, through inattention; and that if they had attended, they would by no means have erred. For admonitions, and especially if they are vehement, are grievous to those that are old. Hence, it is necessary, that the remedy of their oversight should be accompanied by mild exhortation, and a certain elegant artifice. Children, likewise, increase the joy of their parents, by performing for them servile offices, such as washing their feet, making their bed, and waiting on them after the manner of servants. For they are not a little delighted, when they receive necessary servile attentions from the most dear hands of their children, and make use of their ministrant works. But parents will be especially gratified when their children are seen to honour those whom they love and very much esteem. On which account, it is fit that children[89] should affectionately love the kindred of their parents, and pay a proper attention to them, and in a similar manner should love the friends of, and all those that are dear to their parents. And this being admitted, we shall be enabled to collect many other duties of children to their parents, which are neither small nor casual. For since our parents are gratified by the attention which we pay to those whom they love, but we are in a most eminent degree beloved by our parents, it is evident that we shall very much please them, by paying a proper attention to ourselves.

ON FRATERNAL LOVE.

The first admonition, therefore, is very clear, easily obtained, and is common to all men. For it is a sane assertion, which every man will consider as evident. And it is this: Act by every one, in the same manner as if you supposed yourself to be him, and him to be you[47]. For he will use a servant well who considers[90] with himself, how he would think it proper to be used by him, if he indeed was the[91] master, and himself the servant. The same thing also must be said of parents with respect to children, and of children with respect to parents; and, in short, of all men with respect to all. This admonition, however, is transcendently adapted to the alliance of brothers to each other; since nothing else is necessary for him to admit previously, who considers how he ought to conduct himself towards his brother, than promptly to assume the natural sameness of the person of each of them. This, therefore, is the first admonition, that a man should act towards his brother in the same way in which he would think it proper that his brother should act towards him. But, by Jupiter, some one may say, I do not exceed propriety in my manners and am equitable, but my brother’s manners are rough and without affability. Such a one, however, does not speak rightly. For, in the first place, perhaps he does not speak the truth; since an excessive love of self is sufficient [to induce a man] to magnify and extol what pertains to himself, but to diminish and vilify what pertains to others. Frequently, therefore, men of inferior worth, prefer themselves to others who are far more excellent characters. And, in the next place, though the brother should be in reality such a person [as above described], I should say,[92] prove yourself to be a better man than he is, and you will vanquish his rusticity by your beneficence. For no great thanks are due to those who conduct themselves moderately towards worthy and benignant men; but to render him more mild who is stupid, and whose manners are rough, is the work of a man [properly so called], and deserves great applause. Nor is it at all impossible for the exhortation to take effect. For in men of the most absurd manners, there are the seeds of a mutation to a better condition, and of honour and love for their benefactors. For are not even savage animals, and such as are naturally most hostile to our race, and who are taken away by violence, and at first are detained by chains, and confined in iron cages,—are not these afterwards rendered mild by a certain mode of treatment, and by daily supplying them with food? And will not the man who is a brother, or even any casual person, who deserves attention in a much greater degree than a brute, be changed to milder manners by proper treatment, though he should not entirely forsake his rusticity? In our behaviour, therefore, towards every man, and in a much greater degree towards a brother, we should imitate the reply of Socrates to one who said to him, “May I die unless I am revenged on you.” For his[93] answer was, “May I die, if I do not make you my friend.” And thus much concerning these particulars.

In the next place, a man should consider that after a manner his brothers are parts of him, just as my eyes are parts of me; and likewise my legs, my hands, and the remaining members of my body. For brothers have the same relation to a family considered as one thing [as the parts to the whole of the body]. As, therefore, the eyes and the hands, if each of them should receive a peculiar soul and intellect, would, by every possible contrivance, pay a guardian attention to the remaining parts of the body, on account of the before-mentioned communion, because they could not perform their proper office well without the presence of the other members; thus also it is requisite that we who are men, and who acknowledge that we have a soul, should omit no offices which it becomes us to perform to our brothers. For again, brothers are more naturally adapted to assist each other, than are the parts of the body. For the eyes, indeed, being present with each other, see what is before them, and one hand cooperates with the other which is present; but the mutual works of brothers are, in a certain respect, much more multifarious. For they perform things which are profitable[94] in common, though they should be at the greatest distance from each other; and they greatly benefit each other, though the interval which separates them should be immeasurable. In short, it must be considered, that our life appears to be a certain long war continued to the extent of many years; and this partly through the nature of the things themselves which possess a certain opposition; and partly through the sudden and unexpected occurrences of fortune; but most of all through vice itself, which neither abstains from any violence, nor from any fraud and evil stratagems. Hence nature, as not being ignorant of the purpose for which she generated us, produced each of us accompanied, after a certain manner, by an auxiliary. No one, therefore, is alone, nor does he derive his origin from an oak or a rock, but from parents, and in conjunction with brothers, and kindred, and other familiars. But reason affords us great assistance, conciliating to us strangers, and those who have no connection with us by blood, and procuring for us an abundance of auxiliars. On this account we naturally endeavour to allure and make every one our friend. Hence it is a thing perfectly insane to wish to be united to those who have not any thing from nature which is capable of procuring our love, and voluntarily to[95] become familiar with them in the most extended degree; and yet neglect those prompt auxiliars and associates which are supplied by nature herself, such as brothers happen to be.

ON WEDLOCK.

The discussion of wedlock is a thing most necessary. For the whole of our race is naturally adapted to society. But the first and most elementary of all associations is that which is effected by marriage. For cities could not exist without a household; but the household of an unmarried man is truly imperfect; while, on the contrary, of him who is married, it is perfect and full. Hence we have shown in our treatise On Families, that a life accompanied by wedlock is to be precedaneously chosen by the wise man; but a single life is not to be chosen, except particular circumstances[48] require it. So that as it is requisite[96] we should imitate the man of intellect where we can, but marriage is with him an object of precedaneous choice; it is evident that it will also be proper for us, unless some circumstance occurs to prevent it from taking place. And this is the first reason why wedlock is most necessary.

But it seems that Nature herself, prior to the wise man, incites us to this, who also exhorts the wise man to marry. For she not only made us gregarious, but likewise adapted to copulation, and proposed the procreation of children and stability of life, as the one and common work of wedlock. But Nature justly teaches us, that a choice of such things as are fit should be made so as to accord with what she has procured for us. Every animal, therefore, lives conformably to its natural constitution, and, by Jupiter, in a similar manner every plant lives agreeably to the life which is imparted to it. Only there is this difference between the two, that the latter do not employ any reasoning, or a certain enumeration, in the selection of things which they explore; as they make use of nature alone, because they do not participate of soul; but animals are led to investigate what is proper for them by imaginations and exciting desires. To us, however, Nature gave reason, in order that it might survey every[97] thing else, and, together with all things, or rather prior to all things, might direct its attention to Nature herself, so as in an orderly manner to tend to her as to a very splendid and stable mark, and choosing every thing which is consonant to her, might cause us to live in a becoming manner. Hence he will not err, who says that a family is imperfect without wedlock. For it is not possible to conceive of a governor without the governed, nor of the governed without a governor. And this reason appears to me to be very well calculated to make those ashamed who are adverse to marriage.

I say, therefore, that marriage is likewise advantageous. In the first place, indeed, because it produces a truly divine fruit, the procreation of children, since they will be assistants to us in all our actions (as partaking of our nature), while our strength is yet entire; and they will be good auxiliars, when we are worn out, and oppressed with old age. They will also be the familiar associates of our joy in prosperity, and sympathizing participants of our sorrows in adversity. Farther still, besides the procreation of children, the association with a wife is advantageous. For, in the first place, when we are wearied with labours out of the house, she receives us with[98] officious kindness, and recreates us by every possible attention. In the next place, she produces in us an oblivion of our molestations. For those sorrowful circumstances of life which take place in the forum, or the gymnasium, or the country, and, in short, all the cares and solicitudes occasioned by converse with our friends and familiars, do not so obviously molest us, being obscured by our necessary occupations; but when we are liberated from these, return home, and our mind becomes, as it were, at leisure, then these cares and solicitudes approach, availing themselves of this occasion, in order to torment us, at the time when life is destitute of benevolence, and is solitary. Then, however, the wife being present becomes a great solace on this occasion, by making some inquiries about external affairs, or by referring to, and considering, together with her husband, something about domestic concerns, and thus, by her unfeigned alacrity, affords him a certain exuberance of pleasure and delight. But it would be too prolix to enumerate particularly the benefit of a wife in festivals, for the purpose of procuring sacrifices and victims; in the journeys of her husband, by preserving the family in a stable condition, and not suffering it to be entirely without a ruler; in paying proper attention to[99] the domestics; and in the aid which she affords her husband when he is afflicted with disease. For it is sufficient summarily to say, that two things are necessary to all men, in order to pass through life in a becoming manner, viz. the aid of kindred and sympathetic benevolence. But we cannot find any thing more sympathetic than a wife, nor any thing more kindred than children. Both these, however, marriage affords. How is it possible, therefore, that it should not be most advantageous to us?

I also think that a married life is beautiful. For what other thing can be such an ornament to a family, as is the association of husband and wife? For it must not be said that sumptuous edifices, walls covered with marble plaster, and piazzas adorned with stones, which are admired by those who are ignorant of true good, nor yet paintings and arched myrtle walks, nor any thing else which is the subject of astonishment to the stupid[49], is the ornament of a family. But the beauty of a household[100] consists in the conjunction of man and wife, who are united to each other by destiny, and are consecrated to the Gods who preside over nuptials, births, and houses, and who accord, indeed, with each other, and have all things in common, as far as to their bodies, or rather their souls themselves; who likewise exercise a becoming authority over their house and servants; are properly solicitous about the education of their children; and pay an attention to the necessaries of life, which is neither excessive nor negligent, but moderate and appropriate. For what can be better and more excellent, as the most admirable Homer says,

On which account I have frequently wondered at those who conceive that the life with a woman is burdensome and grievous. For a wife is not by Jupiter either a burden or a molestation, as to them she appears to be; but, on the contrary, she is something light and easy to be borne, or rather, she possesses the power of exonerating her husband from things truly troublesome and weighty. For there is not any thing so troublesome which will not be[101] easily borne by a husband and wife when they are concordant, and are willing to endure it in common. But imprudence is truly burdensome, and difficult to be borne by its possessors: for through it things naturally light, and among others a wife, become heavy. In reality, indeed, marriage to many is intolerable, not from itself, or because such an association as this with a woman is naturally insufferable; but when we marry those whom we ought not, and, together with this, are ourselves entirely ignorant of life, and unprepared to take a wife in such a way as a free and ingenuous woman ought to be taken, then it happens that this association with her becomes difficult and intolerable. It is certain, indeed, that marriage is effected by the vulgar after this manner. For they do not take a wife for the sake of the procreation of children, and the association of life; but some are induced to marry through the magnitude of the portion, others through transcendency of form, and others through other such like causes; and by employing these bad counsellors, they pay no attention to the disposition and manners of the bride, but celebrate nuptials to their own destruction, and with their doors crowned introduce to themselves a tyrant instead of a wife, whom they cannot resist, and with whom they are unable[102] to contend for the chief authority. It is evident, therefore, that marriage through these causes, and not through itself, becomes burdensome and intolerable to many. It is proper, however, as it is said, neither to blame things which are innoxious, nor to make our imbecility in the use of things the cause of complaint against them. Besides, it is also in other respects most absurd, to investigate on all sides the auxiliaries of friendship, and procure certain friends and associates, as those who will aid and defend us in the difficulties of life, and yet not explore and endeavour to obtain that relief, defence, and assistance which are afforded us by nature, by the laws, and by the Gods, through a wife and children.

With respect to a numerous offspring, it is after a certain manner, according to nature and consentaneous to marriage, that all, or the greatest part of those that are born, should be nurtured. Many, however, appear to be unpersuaded by this admonition, through a cause not very decorous: for they are thus affected through a love of riches, and because they think poverty to be a transcendently great evil. In the first place, therefore, it must be considered, that in procreating children, we not only beget assistants for ourselves, nourishers of our old age, and participants with us of every fortune[103] and every circumstance that may occur in life;—I say, we do not beget them for ourselves alone, but in many things also for our parents. For the procreation of children is gratifying to them; because, if we should suffer any thing of a calamitous nature prior to their decease, we shall leave our children instead of ourselves, as the support of their old age. But it is a beautiful thing for a grandfather to be conducted by the hands of his grandchildren, and to be considered by them as deserving of every other attention. Hence, in the first place, we shall gratify our own parents, by paying attention to the procreation of children. And, in the next place, we shall cooperate with the prayers and ardent wishes of those that begot us. For they from the first were solicitous about our birth, conceiving that through it there would be a very extended succession of themselves, and that they shall leave behind them children of children, and have to pay attention to our marriage, our procreation, and nurture. Hence, by marrying and begetting children, we shall accomplish, as it were, a part of their prayers; but, by being of a contrary opinion, we shall cut off the object of their deliberate choice. Moreover, it appears that every one who voluntarily, and without some prohibiting circumstance, avoids[104] marriage, and the procreation of children, accuses his parents of madness, as not having engaged in wedlock with right conceptions of things. It is easy also to see, that such a one forms an incongruous opinion. For how is it possible that he should not be full of dissension, who finds a pleasure in living, and willingly continues in life as one who was produced into existence in a becoming manner by his parents, and yet conceives that for him to procreate others is one among the number of things which are to be rejected? In the first place, however, as we have before observed, it is requisite to consider, that we do not beget children for our own sakes alone, but for those also through whom we ourselves were begotten; and, in the next place, for the sake of our friends and kindred. For it is gratifying to these to see children which are our offspring, both on account of benevolence and propinquity, and on account of security. For the life of those to whom these pertain, is established as in a port by a thing of this kind, analogously to ships, which, though greatly agitated by the waves of the sea, are firmly secured by many anchors. On this account, the man who is a lover of his kindred, and a lover of his associates, will earnestly desire to marry[105] and procreate children. We are likewise loudly called upon by our country to do so. For we do not beget children so much for ourselves as for our country, procuring a race that may follow us, and supplying the community with our successors. Hence the priest should know that he owes priests to his city; the ruler that he owes rulers; the public orator public orators; and, in short, the citizen that he owes citizens to it. As, therefore, to a choir the perennial continuance of those that compose it is gratifying, and to an army the duration of the soldiers, so to a city is the lastingness of the citizens. If, indeed, a city was a certain system of a short duration, and the life of it was commensurate with the life of man, it would not be in want of succession. But since it is extended to many generations, and if it employs a more fortunate dæmon endures for many ages, it is evident that it is not only necessary to direct our attention to the present, but also to the future time, and not despise our natal soil, and leave it desolate, but establish it in good hopes from our posterity.

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR [OTHER] KINDRED.

The consideration of the duties pertaining to [our other] kindred is consequent to the discussion of those that pertain to parents, brothers, wives, and children; for the same things may, in a certain respect, be said of the former as of the latter; and on this account may be concisely explained. For, in short, each of us is, as it were, circumscribed by many circles; some of which are less, but others larger, and some comprehend, but others are comprehended, according to the different and unequal habitudes with respect to each other. For the first, indeed, and most proximate circle is that which every one describes about his own mind as a centre, in which circle the body, and whatever is assumed for the sake of the body, are comprehended. For this is nearly the smallest circle, and almost touches the centre itself. The second from this, and which is at a greater distance from the centre, but comprehends the first circle, is that in which parents, brothers, wife, and children are arranged. The third circle from the centre is that which contains uncles and aunts, grandfathers and grandmothers, and the children of brothers and[107] sisters. After this is the circle which comprehends the remaining relatives. Next to this is that which contains the common people, then that which comprehends those of the same tribe, afterwards that which contains the citizens; and then two other circles follow, one being the circle of those that dwell in the vicinity of the city, and the other, of those of the same province. But the outermost and greatest circle, and which comprehends all the other circles, is that of the whole human race[51].

These things being thus considered, it is the province of him who strives to conduct himself[109] properly in each of these connections to collect, in a certain respect, the circles, as it were, to one centre, and always to endeavour earnestly to transfer himself from the comprehending circles to the several particulars which they comprehend. It pertains, therefore, to the man who is a lover of kindred [to conduct himself in a becoming manner[52]] towards his parents and brothers; also, according to the same analogy, towards the more elderly of his relatives of both sexes, such as grandfathers,[110] uncles and aunts; towards those of the same age with himself, as his cousins; and towards his juniors, as the children of his cousins. Hence we have summarily shown how we ought to conduct ourselves towards our kindred, having before taught how we should act towards ourselves, our parents, and brothers; and besides these, towards our wife and children. To which it must be added, that those who belong to the third circle must be honoured similarly to these; and again, kindred similarly to those that belong to the third circle. For something of benevolence must be taken away from those who are more distant from us by blood; though at the same time we should endeavour that an assimilation may take place between us and them. For this distance will become moderate, if, through the diligent attention[53] which we pay to them, we cut off the length of the habitude towards each individual of these. We have unfolded, therefore, that which is most comprehensive and important in the duties pertaining to kindred.

It is requisite, likewise, to add a proper measure conformably to the general use of appellations, calling indeed cousins, uncles[111] and aunts, by the name of brothers, fathers and mothers; but of other kindred, to denominate some uncles, others the children of brothers or sisters, and others cousins, according to the difference of age, for the sake of the abundant extension which there is in names. For this mode of appellation will be no obscure indication of our sedulous attention to each of these relatives; and at the same time will incite, and extend us in a greater degree, to the contraction as it were of the above mentioned circles. But as we have proceeded thus far in our discussion, it will not be unseasonable to recall to our memory the distinction with respect to parents, which we before made. For in that place in which we compared mother with father, we said that it was requisite to attribute more of love to a mother, and more of honour to a father; and conformably to this, we shall here add, that it is fit to have more love for those who are connected with us by a maternal alliance, but to pay more honour to those who are related to us by a paternal affinity.

ON ECONOMICS.

Prior to all things, it is requisite to speak of the works through which the union of a family is preserved. These, therefore, are to be divided after the accustomed manner; viz. rural, forensic, and political works are to be attributed to the husband; but to the wife, such works as pertain to spinning wool, making of bread, cooking, and, in short, every thing of a domestic nature. Nevertheless, it is not fit that the one should be entirely exempt from the works of the other. For sometimes it will be proper when the wife is in the country that she should superintend the labourers, and perform the office of the master of the house; and that the husband should sometimes convert his attention to domestic affairs; and partly inquire about, and partly inspect what is doing in the house. For thus, what pertains to the mutual association of both will be more firmly connected by their joint participation of necessary cares. Since, however, our discussion has extended thus far, it appears to me that I ought not to omit to mention manual operations;[113] for it will not be incongruous to add this also to what has been said about works.

What occasion, therefore, is there to say, that it is fit the man should meddle with agricultural labours? For there are not many by whom this will not be admitted. But though so much luxury and idleness occupies the life of men of the present day, yet it is rare to find one who is not willing to engage in the labour of sowing and planting; and to be employed in other works which pertain to agriculture. Perhaps, however, the arguments will be much less persuasive, which call on the man to engage in those other works which belong to the woman. For such men as pay great attention to neatness and cleanliness will not conceive the spinning of wool to be their business: since, for the most part, vile diminutive men, and the tribe of such as are delicate and effeminate apply themselves to the elaboration of wool, through an emulation of feminine softness. But it does not become a man, who is truly so called, to apply himself to things of this kind; so that neither shall I, perhaps, advise those to engage in such employments, who have not given perfectly credible indications of their virility and modesty. What, therefore, should hinder the man from partaking of[114] the works which pertain to a woman, whose past life has been such as to free him from all suspicion of absurd and effeminate conduct? For in other domestic works, is it not thought that more of them pertain to men than to women? For they are more laborious, and require corporeal strength, such as to grind, to knead meal, to cut wood, to draw water from a well, to transfer large vessels from one place to another; to shake coverlets and carpets, and every other work similar to these. And it will be sufficient, indeed, for these things to be performed by men. But it is also fit that some addition should be made to the legitimate work of a woman, so that she may not only engage with her maid servants in the spinning of wool, but may also apply herself to other more virile works. For it appears to me that the making of bread, the drawing of water [from a well], the lighting of fires, the making of beds, and every other work similar to these are the proper employments of a freeborn woman. But a wife will seem much more beautiful to her husband, and especially if she is young, and not yet worn out by the bearing of children, if she becomes his associate in gathering grapes, and collecting olives; and if he is verging to old age, she will[115] render herself more pleasing to him, by partaking with him of the labour of sowing and ploughing, and extending to him, while he is digging or planting, the instruments proper for such works. For when a family is governed after this manner by the husband and wife, so far as pertains to necessary works, it appears to me that it will be conducted in this respect in the best manner.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Dissertation on Phalaris, p. 273.

[2] In Lib. de Philosophorum Sectis.

[3] The following extract from Bentley’s Eighth Sermon at Boyle’s Lectures, sufficiently shows the doctor’s deficiency in intellect. “Nor do we count it any absurdity, that such a vast and immense universe should be made for the sole use of such mean and unworthy creatures as the children of men. For if we consider the dignity of an intelligent being, and put that in the scales against brute inanimate matter, we may affirm, without overvaluing human nature, that the soul of one virtuous and religious man is of greater worth and excellency than the sun and his planets, and all the stars in the world.” For this opinion is not only stupid and arrogant in the extreme, but is also contrary to the doctrine of the Scriptures, of which the doctor was a teacher. For as I have observed in p. 13 of the Introduction to my translation of Proclus On the Theology of Plato, “the stars are not called Gods by the Jewish legislator, as things inanimate like statues fashioned of wood or stone.” This is evident from what is said in the book of Job, and the Psalms. “Behold even the moon and it shineth not, yea the stars are not pure in his sight. How much less man that is a worm, and the son of man which is a worm?” (Job, xxv. v. 5 and 6). And, “When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou visitest him.” (Psalm viii. v. 3 and 4.) It is evident, therefore, from these passages, that the heavens and the stars are more excellent than man; but nothing inanimate can be more excellent than that which is animated. To which may be added, that in the following verse David says, that God has made man a little lower than the angels. But the stars, as I have demonstrated in the above mentioned Introduction, were considered by Moses as angels and Gods; and consequently they are animated beings, and superior to man.

Farther still, it is said in Psalm xi. v. 4, that “the Lord’s throne is in heaven.” And again, in Isaiah, chap. lxvi. v. 1. “Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool.” If, therefore, the heavens are the throne of Deity, they must evidently be deified. For nothing can come into immediate contact with divinity, without being divine. Hence, says Simplicius, (in Comment in Lib. ii. de Cælo.) “That it is connascent with the human soul to think the celestial bodies are divine, is especially evident from those (the Jews), who look to these bodies through preconceptions about divine natures. For they also say that the heavens are the habitation of God, and the throne of God, and are alone sufficient to reveal the glory and excellence of God to those who are worthy; than which assertions what can be more venerable?”

Indeed, that the heavens are not the inanimate throne and residence of Deity, is also evident from the assertion in the nineteenth Psalm, that “the heavens declare the glory of God.” For R. Moses, a very learned Jew, (See Gaffarel’s Unheard-of Curiosities, p. 391.) says, “that the word saphar to declare, or set forth, is never attributed to things inanimate.” Hence he concludes, “that the heavens are not without some soul; which, says he, is no other than that of those blessed intelligences who govern the stars, and dispose them into such letters as God has ordained; declaring unto us men, by means of this writing, what events we are to expect. And hence this same writing is called by all the ancients, chetab hamelachim; that is to say, the writing of the angels.”

[4] In the Fragments of his Life of Isidorus the Platonist, preserved by Photius. The greater part of what Suidas has said about Hierocles is taken from these memoirs of Isidorus.

[5] The discourses of Socrates in Plato.

[6] For so the Christians were called by the heathens, when the religion of the latter was rapidly declining, and that of the former had gained the ascendency. Thus Porphyry, in a passage preserved by Theodoret, (in lib. i. De Curat. Græc. Superst.) Χαλκοδετος γαρ η προς θεους οδος, αιπεινη τε και τραχεια, ης πολλας ατραπους Βαρβαροι μεν εξευρον, Ελληνες δε επλανηθησαν, οι δε κρατουντες ηδη και διεφθειραν. i.e. “For the way which leads to the Gods is bound with chains of brass, and is arduous and rough, many paths of which were indeed discovered by the Barbarians; but the Greeks have wandered from them, and they are entirely corrupted by those who now prevail.”

This passage of Porphyry, derived its origin from the following oracle of Apollo, preserved by Eusebius:

Αιπεινη γαρ οδος μακαρων τρηχεια τε πολλον,

Χαλκοδετοις τα πρωτα διοιγομενη πυλεωσιν.

Ατραπετοι δε εασσιν αθεσφατοι εγγεγαυιαι,

Ας πρωτοι μεροπων επ’ απειρονα πρηξιν εφηναν

Οι το καλον πινοντες υδωρ Νειλωτιδος αιης·

Πολλας και Φοινικες οδους μακαρων εδαησαν,

Ασσυριοι Λυδοι τε, και Εβραιων γενος ανδρων.

But for Εβραιων, in the last line, I read Χαλδαιων, it not being at all reasonable to suppose that an oracle of Apollo would say that the Hebrews knew many paths which led to the knowledge of the Gods. It is probable, therefore, that either Aristobulus the Jew, well known for interpolating the writings of the heathens, or the wicked Eusebius, as he is called by the Emperor Julian, has fraudulently substituted the former word for the latter. The Oracle, with this emendation, will be in English as follows:

The path by which to deity we climb

Is arduous, rough, ineffable, sublime;

And the strong massy gates, through which we pass

In our first course, are bound with chains of brass.

Those men the first who of Egyptian birth

Drank the fair water of Nilotic earth,

Disclosed by actions infinite this road,

And many paths to God Phœnicians show’d.

This road the Assyrians pointed out to view,

And this the Lydians and Chaldeans knew.

But when Porphyry says that the Greeks have wandered from the path which leads to divinity, he alludes to their worshipping men as Gods; which, as I have shown in the Introduction to my translation of Proclus On the Theology of Plato, is contrary to the genuine doctrine of the heathen religion; and was the cause of its corruption, and final extinction, among the Greeks and Romans.

[7] Odyss. lib. ix. v. 347.

[8] Fragments of this work are to be found in Photius. But they are fragments of a treatise or treatises, On Providence, Fate, and Free Will.

[9] An adept in the philosophy of Plato will at once be convinced of the truth of this assertion, by comparing what Hierocles has said about prayer in his Commentary On the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans, with what is said respecting it by Iamblichus, in his Treatise on the Mysteries; and by Proclus, at the beginning of the second book of his Commentary On the Timæus of Plato. See the Introduction to the second Alcibiades, in Vol. 4. of my translation of Plato, and the Notes to my translation of Maximus Tyrius; in which the reader will find what Iamblichus, Proclus, and Hierocles have said on this subject. And that he was not consummately accurate in his knowledge, will be evident by comparing what he says in his above mentioned Commentary, about that middle order of beings denominated the illustrious heroes, with what Iamblichus and Proclus have most admirably unfolded concerning them. And this will still more plainly appear from what he says about the celebrated tetrad, or tetractys of the Pythagoreans, in p. 166, and 170, of the same Commentary. For in both these places, he clearly asserts, that this tetrad is the same with the Demiurgus, or maker of the universe. Thus, in the former of these places και την τετραδα πηγην της αιδιου διακοσμησεως, αποφαινεται την αυτην ουσαν τῳ δημιουργῳ θεῳ. i.e. “And the author of these verses shows that the tetrad, which is the fountain of the perpetual orderly distribution of things, is the same with the God who is the Demiurgus.” And in the latter passage, εστι γαρ ως εφαμεν, δημιουργος των ολων και αιτια η τετρας, θεος νοητος, αιτιος του ουρανιου και αισθητου θεου. i.e. “For as we have said, the tetrad is the Demiurgus and cause of the wholes of the universe, being an intelligible God, the source of the celestial and sensible God.” The tetrad, however, or the animal itself, (το αυτωζωον) of Plato; who, as Syrianus justly observes, was the best of the Pythagoreans; subsists at the extremity of the intelligible triad, as is most satisfactorily shown by Proclus in the third book of his Treatise On the Theology, and in the fourth book of his Commentary On the Timæus of Plato. But the Demiurgus, as it is demonstrated by the same incomparable man, in the fifth book of the former of these works, subsists at the extremity of the intellectual triad. And between these two triads another order of Gods exists, which is denominated intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, as partaking of both the extremes. The English reader who has a genius for such speculations, will be convinced of this by diligently perusing my translations of the above mentioned works. Notwithstanding, however, the knowledge of Hierocles was not so consummately accurate on certain most abstruse theological dogmas as that of Iamblichus, Proclus, and Damascius, yet where ethics are concerned, his notions are most correct, most admirable, and sublime.

[10] Thus, too, Plato in his Laws mingles his polity from a democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. He was, however, decidedly of opinion, as is evident from his Politicus, that the best form of government is that in which either one man, who is a most excellent character, is the supreme ruler, or a few excellent men rule conjointly.

[11] In the original there is only πρωτος ὦν ο νομος, which is evidently defective; but by adding εμψυχος the sense will be complete. And in what immediately follows τουτω γαρ ο μεν βασιλευς νομιμος which also is defective, Gesner adds τηρησει after τουτω γαρ, but he should doubtless have added ει τηρησει.

[12] i.e. To a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason, and not to a perfect insensibility, as is stupidly supposed by many who do not understand the proper meaning of the word apathy, as used by the Pythagoreans, Platonists, and Stoics.

[13] The original is, I conceive, evidently defective in this place; for it is, ουτε γαρ γα τως αυτως καρπως, ουτε ψυχα ανθρωπων ταν αυταν αρεταν παραδεξασθαι δυναται. It appears, therefore, to me, that πανταχου should be added after καρπως, and that for ουτε ψυχα we should read ουτε πασα ψυχα.

[14] Among the Lacedæmonians the three men were thus denominated, who were chosen by the Ephori to preside over the equestrian order. But the ephori were magistrates corresponding to the tribunes of the people among the Romans.

[15] In the original, α μεν γαρ πλεονεκτια γινεται περι το αγουμενον μερος τας ψυχας· λογικα γαρ α επιθυμια. But for αγουμενον, I read αλογον; and for λογικα, it is necessary to read ου λογικα. For the vices, according to the Pythagoreans, subsist about the irrational part of the soul, which consists, according to them, as well as according to Plato, of anger and desire. Hence Metopus, the Pythagorean, says: “Since there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational, the latter is divided into the irascible and the appetitive. And the rational part, indeed, is that by which we judge and contemplate; but the irrational part is that by which we are impelled and desire.” See my translation of Pythagoric Ethical Fragments, at the end of my translation of Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras.

[16] I here read, with Victorius, κατ’ οικειοτατα εγγενη, for και οικειοτατον εν γενοιν.

[17] This sentence within the brackets is not to be found in Stobæus.

[18] i.e. God is not in want of ministers or servants to assist him in the government of the universe: for he produces and provides for all things at once by his own immediate energy. But the cooperation of subordinate divine powers with him is necessary to the proper participation of him by the different beings which the universe contains.

[19] For οι μιμευμενοι των αυτων in this place, I read οι μιμευμενοι τον αυτον.

[20] Instead of ενιοτε here, I read παντοτε.

[21] Conformably to this, Plato also in the Politicus says: “It is requisite to call him royal who possesses the royal science, whether he governs or not.”

[22] Plato says somewhere (I think in his Laws), that a greater evil than impudence cannot befall either cities or individuals.

[23] i.e. The seed which pertains to the propagation of his children.

[24] i.e. To his children while they live in his house under his protection and are unmarried; and who are in danger through having a stepmother of losing that property which ought to be theirs on the death of their father.

[25] Pæan is a song of rejoicing, which was sung at festivals and on other occasions, in honour of Apollo, for having slain the serpent Python.

[26] A kind of harp beaten with sticks.

[27] In the original ουρανιον ζωον a celestial animal; but as Callicratidas is here speaking of the Demiurgus, or artificer of the universe, who is an intellectual god, for ουρανιον I read νοερον. For the Demiurgus is the maker, and not one of the celestial gods. But he is called an animal, as being the cause of life to all things. Thus, too, Aristotle, in the 12th book of his Metaphysics, says, “that God is an animal eternal and most excellent.”

[28] This Perictyone is different from her who was the mother of Plato.

[29] In this extract no mention whatever is made of the harmony of a woman; for it wholly consists of the duty of children to their parents.

[30] και νοσῳ is omitted in the original, but ought, as it appears to me, to be inserted.

[31] It is well observed by Olympiodorus, on the Phædo of Plato, “that the soul is not punished by divinity through anger but medicinally; and that by eternity of punishment we must understand punishment commensurate with the soul’s partial period; because souls that have committed the greatest offences cannot be sufficiently purified in one period.”

[32] For φρονεειν in this place, which is evidently erroneous, I read φθονεειν.

[33] The whole of this extract is to be found in the fourth book of Plato’s Laws. (See tom. viii. p. 187, and 188, of the Bipont edition.) But there is occasionally some little difference between the text of Plato and that of Aristoxenus, as the critical reader will easily discover. Neither Fabricius nor the editors of Stobæus have noticed the source of this extract.

[34] The whole of this extract is taken from the eleventh book of Plato’s Laws, but what is there said is here somewhat amplified.

[35] See p. 137, and 138, of my Translation of Iamblichus on the Mysteries.

[36] Iliad IX. v. 495. 6. 7.

[37] Iliad IX. v. 493. Hierocles is mistaken in saying that poetry rashly asserts that the Gods are flexible. For as I have observed in my Notes to Iamblichus on the Mysteries, divine flexibility indicates in Homer, and other theological poets of antiquity, that those who through depravity become unadapted to receive the illuminations of the Gods, when they afterwards obtain pardon of their guilt through prayers and sacrifices, again become partakers of the goodness of the Gods. So that divine flexibility is a resumption of the participation of divine light and goodness, by those who through inaptitude were before deprived of it.

[38] See on this most interesting subject, that divinity is not the cause of evil, my translation of the Fragments of Proclus on the Subsistence of Evil, at the end of my translation of his six books On the Theology of Plato.

[39] See Odyss. I. v. 32, 33, 34.

[40] See the first book of his Republic.

[41] i.e. Such things as are neither really good, nor really evil, but media between these.

[42] After this last sentence, the words ταυτα χρη, follow in the original; which evidently show that something is wanting: as they are only the beginning of another sentence. This defect, however, is supplied in my copy of Stobæus, (Eclog. Ethic. lib. II. p. 207), by some one in manuscript, as follows: ταυτα χρη προνοειν, μη δια νου τυφλοτητα και αγνωμοσυνην, τα (lege ταυτα) ημιν απαντασωσι; and he has also added the following Latin translation of these words: “Hæc oportet prospicere ne per mentis cæcitatem et ignorantiam hæc nobis occurrant.” But the addition, from whatever source it was obtained, does not appear to me to be at all apposite; and therefore I conceive it to be spurious.

[43] This is true of the whole which consists of parts, so as not to be able to subsist without them. For whole has a triple substance; viz. it is either prior to parts, or in other words, is a whole containing parts causally; or it consists of parts; or is in a part, so that a part, also, becomes a whole according to participation. A city, therefore, is a whole consisting of parts, any part of which being absent, diminishes the whole. See Prop. 67 of my translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology; and the second book of my translation of Proclus on the Timæus.

[44] When the intelligent reader considers that Hierocles flourished about the middle of the fifth century after Christ, he will immediately understand what the recent customs are to which Hierocles, in the above passage, alludes. Needham, in his translation of this passage, either did not understand the meaning of it, or wilfully omitted to translate it.

[45] The honours which we pay to divinity can be of no advantage to him, but benefit us; but the honours which we pay to our parents are beneficial to them. And in this sense, and in this only, the latter are to be honoured more than the former.

[46] This reminds me of what Pope, no less piously than pathetically says, respecting his mother, in the following most beautiful lines:

“Me let the tender office long engage,

To rock the cradle of reposing age,

With lenient arts extend a mothers breath,

Make languor smile, and smooth the bed of death;

Explore the thought, explain the asking eye,

And keep awhile one parent from the sky.”

See his Seventh Epistle, near the end.

[47] The following extract from Sir William Jones, as given by Moor in his Hindu Pantheon, p. 421, demonstrates the great antiquity of this precept:

“Our divine religion has no need of such aids as many are willing to give it; by asserting that the wisest men of this world were ignorant of the two great maxims—that we must act in respect of others as we should wish them to act in respect of ourselves—and that, instead of returning evil for evil, we should confer benefits on those who injure us. But the first rule is implied in a speech of Lysias, and expressed in distinct phrases by Thales and Pittacus; and I have even seen it word for word, in the original of Confucius, which I carefully compared with the Latin translation. If the conversion, therefore, of the Pandits and Maulavis, in India, shall ever be attempted by protestant missionaries, they must beware of asserting, while they teach the gospel, what those Pandits and Maulavis would know to be false. The former would cite the beautiful Arya couplet, which was written at least three centuries before our era, and which pronounce the duty of a good man, even in the moment of destruction, to consist, not only in forgiving, but even in a desire of benefiting his destroyer—as the sandal tree, in the instant of its overthrow, sheds perfume on the axe which fells it. And the latter would triumph, in repeating the verse of Sadi, who represents a return of good for good as a slight reciprocity; but says to the virtuous man, ‘Confer benefits on him who has injured thee:’ using an Arabic sentence, and a maxim apparently of the ancient Arabs. Nor would the Mussulmans fail to recite four distichs of Hafiz, who has illustrated that maxim with fanciful but elegant allusions:—

“Learn from yon orient shell to love thy foe,

And store with pearls the hand that brings thee woe:

Free, like yon rock, from base vindictive pride,

Emblaze with gems the wrist that rends thy side.

Mark where yon tree rewards the stony shower

With fruit nectarious, or the balmy flower:

All nature calls aloud—‘Shall man do less

Than heal the smiter, and the railer bless?’”

As. Res. Vol. IV.

[48] viz. Such circumstances as induced Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, and many other ancient philosophers, not to engage in wedlock, because they found that they could give greater assistance to philosophy by continuing single; but Pythagoras and Socrates, though they rank among the wisest men that ever lived, did not find a married life incompatible with the cultivation of philosophy in the highest perfection possible to man. Wedlock, therefore, is never to be avoided from any sordid and selfish motives.

[49] Hence Diogenes, in perfect conformity with that dignified independence of character which he so eminently possessed, and which is to be found more or less in the conduct of all the ancient philosophers, when a certain wealthy and ostentatious man brought him to a fine house which he had built, and desired him not to spit, as he perceived he begun to hawk, spit in the man’s face, observing at the same time, that he could not find a worse place to spit in.

[50] Odyss. lib. 7, v. 183.

[51] This admirable passage is so conformable to the following beautiful lines in Pope’s Essay on Man, that it is most probably the source from whence they were derived. The lines are these:

“Self love but serves the virtuous mind to wake,

As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake,

The centre moved, a circle straight succeeds,

Another still, and still another spreads,

Friend, parent, neighbour first it will embrace,

His country next, and next all human race;

Wide and more wide th’ o’erflowings of the mind,

Take every creature in of every kind.”

In Hierocles, however, the circles are scientifically detailed; but in Pope they are synoptically enumerated. Pope, too, has added another circle to that which is the outermost with Hierocles, viz. the circle which embraces every creature of every kind. But as Hierocles in this fragment is only speaking of our duties to kindred, among which the whole human race is, in a certain respect, included, he had no occasion to introduce another circle, though the Platonic doctrine of benevolence is as widely extended as that of Pope.

As the selflove, however, mentioned here by our poet is of a virtuous nature, and is wholly different from that selflove which is reprehensible, and is possessed by the vulgar, I shall present the reader with what Aristotle says concerning the former in the 9th book of his Nicomachean Ethics, as the distinction between the two is at present but little known.

Aristotle, therefore, having observed, that the selflove of the multitude leads them to distribute to themselves the greater part in wealth and honours, and corporeal pleasures, and that in consequence of vindicating to themselves more of these things than is fit, they are subservient to desires and passions, and the irrational part of the soul, adds as follows:

“He who always earnestly endeavours to act justly or temperately, or to act according to any other of the virtues, the most of all things, and, in short, who always vindicates to himself that which is beautiful in conduct; such a man will never be called by any one a lover of himself, nor will he be blamed by any one. It would seem, however, that such a man as this is, in a greater degree, a lover of himself; for he distributes to himself things which are most eminently beautiful and good, is gratified in his most principal part [intellect], and in all things is obedient to it. But as that which is the most principal thing in a city appears to be most eminently the city, and this is the case in every other system of things; thus, also, that which is most principal in man is especially the man. He, therefore, who loves this principal part of himself, is especially a lover of himself, and is gratified with this. That every man, therefore, is principally intellect, and that the worthy man principally loves this is not immanifest. Hence, he will be especially a lover of himself, according to a different species of selflove from that which is disgraceful, and differing as much from it as to live according to reason differs from living according to passion, and as much as the desire of that which is beautiful in conduct differs from the desire of that which appears to be advantageous. Hence it is necessary that a good man should be a lover of himself; for he himself is benefited by acting well, and he also benefits others. But it is not proper that a depraved man should be a lover of himself; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours, in consequence of being subservient to base passions. With the depraved man, therefore, there is a dissonance between what he ought to do and what he does; but with the worthy man, those things which he ought to do he also does.”

Conformably to what Aristotle asserts in this last sentence, Seneca also says, “Sapiens nihil facit quod non debet, et nihil prætermittit quod debet.” i.e. “The wise man does nothing which he ought not to do, and omits nothing which he ought to do.”

[52] There is a deficiency here in the original, which I have endeavoured to supply in the translation by the words in the brackets. It appears to me, therefore, that the words χρησθαι καλως are wanting.

[53] For ενστασεως, in this place in the original, I read επιστασεως.

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AN ANSWER to Dr. Gillies’s Supplement to his Translation of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics, in which the extreme Unfaithfulness of that Translation is unfolded. 12mo. 2s. 6d. sewn.

A POETICAL PARAPHRASE on the SPEECH OF DIOTIMA ON THE BEAUTIFUL, in the Banquet of Plato. See the Translation of the Fable of Cupid and Psyche.

HYMNS. See the before-mentioned Sallust, Julian, Plotinus, and Cupid and Psyche.

A new edition of HEDERIC’S GREEK LEXICON, in which many words are inserted, not found in other modern Lexicons, and an Explanation is given of some words agreeably to the Platonic Philosophy. 4to. 1803. 2l. 2s. boards.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE TRUE ARITHMETIC OF INFINITES, in which all the Propositions in the Arithmetic of Infinites invented by Dr. Wallis, relative to the Summation of Infinite Series, and also the Principles of the Doctrine of Fluxions, are demonstrated to be false; and the Nature of Infinitesimals is unfolded. 4to. 5s. sewn.

MISCELLANIES IN PROSE AND VERSE; containing the Triumph of the Wise Man over Fortune, according to the Doctrine of the Stoics and Platonists; The Creed of the Platonic Philosopher; A Panegyric on Sydenham, &c. &c. 12mo. 2s. 6d. boards.

A DISSERTATION ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE, in four Books; in which his principal Physical and Metaphysical Dogmas are unfolded; and it is shown from indubitable evidence, that his Philosophy has not been accurately known since the destruction of the Greeks. The insufficiency also of the Philosophy that has been substituted by the Moderns for that of Aristotle is demonstrated. This volume was written as an Introduction to the Translation of Aristotle’s Works. 4to. 5l. 5s. boards.

THEORETIC ARITHMETIC, in three Books; containing the Substance of all that has been written on this Subject by Theo of Smyrna, Nicomachus, Iamblichus, and Bœtius.—Together with some remarkable particulars respecting perfect, amicable, and other Numbers, which are not to be found in the writings of any ancient or modern Mathematicians. Likewise a Specimen of the manner in which the Pythagoreans philosophized about Numbers; and a Developement of their mystical and theological Arithmetic, 8vo. 14s. boards.

ORPHIC FRAGMENTS, hitherto inedited. See No. XXXIII. of the Classical Journal.

The Project Gutenberg eBook of Political fragments of Archytas, Charondas, Zaleucus, and other ancient Pythagoreans, preserved by Stobæus

Political and Ethical Fragments.

INTRODUCTION.

POLITICAL FRAGMENTS
OF THE
PYTHAGOREANS.

FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS THE THURIAN ON A REPUBLIC.

FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ARCHYTAS ON LAW AND JUSTICE.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

IN ANOTHER PART ALSO OF THE SAME WORK.

ON THE MUTATIONS OF POLITIES, FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS ON A POLITY.

FROM DIOTOGENES IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING A KINGDOM.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME TREATISE.

FROM THE TREATISE OF STHENIDAS THE LOCRIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ECPHANTUS, THE CROTONIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

FROM ARCHYTAS.

FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.

THE PREFACE OF CHARONDAS, THE CATANEAN, TO HIS TREATISE OF LAWS.

THE PREFACE OF ZALEUCUS, THE LOCRIAN, TO HIS LAWS.

FROM THE TREATISE OF CALLICRATIDAS ON THE FELICITY OF FAMILIES.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

AND AGAIN, IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE[28] ON THE DUTIES OF A WOMAN.

FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE ON THE HARMONY OF A WOMAN[29].

ON THE REVERENCE DUE TO PARENTS. FROM THE APOPHTHEGMS OF ARISTOXENUS, THE TARENTINE.

AND IN THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE SAME WORK[33].

FROM THE TREATISE OF PEMPELUS ON PARENTS[34].

FROM THE TREATISE OF PHINTYS, THE DAUGHTER OF CALLICRATES, ON THE TEMPERANCE OF A WOMAN.

ETHICAL FRAGMENTS
OF
HIEROCLES,

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS THE GODS.

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR COUNTRY.

AFTER WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR PARENTS.

ON FRATERNAL LOVE.

ON WEDLOCK.

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR [OTHER] KINDRED.

ON ECONOMICS.

FOOTNOTES:

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

INTRODUCTION.
POLITICAL FRAGMENTS OF THE PYTHAGOREANS.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS THE THURIAN ON A REPUBLIC.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF ARCHYTAS ON LAW AND JUSTICE.
	AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.
	IN ANOTHER PART ALSO OF THE SAME WORK.
	ON THE MUTATIONS OF POLITIES, FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS ON A POLITY.
	FROM DIOTOGENES IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING A KINGDOM.
	AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME TREATISE.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF STHENIDAS THE LOCRIAN, ON A KINGDOM.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF ECPHANTUS, THE CROTONIAN, ON A KINGDOM.
	AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.
	FROM ARCHYTAS.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.
	THE PREFACE OF CHARONDAS, THE CATANEAN, TO HIS TREATISE OF LAWS.
	THE PREFACE OF ZALEUCUS, THE LOCRIAN, TO HIS LAWS.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF CALLICRATIDAS ON THE FELICITY OF FAMILIES.
	AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.
	AND AGAIN, IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE ON THE DUTIES OF A WOMAN.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE ON THE HARMONY OF A WOMAN.
	ON THE REVERENCE DUE TO PARENTS. FROM THE APOPHTHEGMS OF ARISTOXENUS, THE TARENTINE.
	AND IN THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE SAME WORK.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF PEMPELUS ON PARENTS.
	FROM THE TREATISE OF PHINTYS, THE DAUGHTER OF CALLICRATES, ON THE TEMPERANCE OF A WOMAN.
ETHICAL FRAGMENTS OF HIEROCLES,
	HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS THE GODS.
	HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR COUNTRY.
	AFTER WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR PARENTS.
	ON FRATERNAL LOVE.
	ON WEDLOCK.
	HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR [OTHER] KINDRED.
	ON ECONOMICS.

The Project Gutenberg eBook of Political fragments of Archytas, Charondas, Zaleucus, and other ancient Pythagoreans, preserved by Stobæus

Political and Ethical Fragments.

INTRODUCTION.

POLITICAL FRAGMENTS OF THE PYTHAGOREANS.

FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS THE THURIAN ON A REPUBLIC.

FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ARCHYTAS ON LAW AND JUSTICE.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

IN ANOTHER PART ALSO OF THE SAME WORK.

ON THE MUTATIONS OF POLITIES, FROM THE TREATISE OF HIPPODAMUS ON A POLITY.

FROM DIOTOGENES IN HIS TREATISE CONCERNING A KINGDOM.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME TREATISE.

FROM THE TREATISE OF STHENIDAS THE LOCRIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

FROM THE TREATISE OF ECPHANTUS, THE CROTONIAN, ON A KINGDOM.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

FROM ARCHYTAS.

FROM THE TREATISE OF DIOTOGENES ON SANCTITY.

THE PREFACE OF CHARONDAS, THE CATANEAN, TO HIS TREATISE OF LAWS.

THE PREFACE OF ZALEUCUS, THE LOCRIAN, TO HIS LAWS.

FROM THE TREATISE OF CALLICRATIDAS ON THE FELICITY OF FAMILIES.

AND IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

AND AGAIN, IN ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME WORK.

FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE[28] ON THE DUTIES OF A WOMAN.

FROM THE TREATISE OF PERICTYONE ON THE HARMONY OF A WOMAN[29].

ON THE REVERENCE DUE TO PARENTS. FROM THE APOPHTHEGMS OF ARISTOXENUS, THE TARENTINE.

AND IN THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE SAME WORK[33].

FROM THE TREATISE OF PEMPELUS ON PARENTS[34].

FROM THE TREATISE OF PHINTYS, THE DAUGHTER OF CALLICRATES, ON THE TEMPERANCE OF A WOMAN.

ETHICAL FRAGMENTS OF HIEROCLES,

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS THE GODS.

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR COUNTRY.

AFTER WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR PARENTS.

ON FRATERNAL LOVE.

ON WEDLOCK.

HOW WE OUGHT TO CONDUCT OURSELVES TOWARDS OUR [OTHER] KINDRED.

ON ECONOMICS.

FOOTNOTES:

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

POLITICAL FRAGMENTS
OF THE
PYTHAGOREANS.

ETHICAL FRAGMENTS
OF
HIEROCLES,