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SOME PRINCIPLES

OF

Frontier Mountain Warfare

BY

BREVET-MAJOR W.D. BIRD, D.S.O.

(Late Professor at Indian Staff College.)

London:

HUGH REES, Ltd., 119, PALL MALL, S.W.

1909

SOME PRINCIPLES OF FRONTIER MOUNTAIN WARFARE.

The saying that there is no new thing under the sun, is as applicable to military affairs as to those of everyday life, for it is fully admitted that the principles underlying all strategy and tactics, whether of mountain or other warfare, are immutable.

But though the principles of strategy and tactics are unchanging, organisation, formations, and minor items of procedure, must be continually amended to meet ever varying circumstances, and, in addition, each campaign possesses special characteristics demanding further modifications.

There are, in fact, no invariable rules in the conduct of war, and whilst formalism is harmful in all matters, in military operations it is disastrous.

An army relying on an established code of rules will often defeat itself in their application, and even if this disaster is avoided, the enemy will soon become aware of the methods in vogue, and will so frame his tactics as most advantageously to counteract them.

Each problem, great and small, each set of circumstances, must, therefore, be considered on its merits, principles must be applied in the solution, not rules, and strategy, tactics, organisation, equipment, and other matters, arranged accordingly.

It is in this spirit that the problems of Indian Frontier warfare should be approached.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

The strength and organisation of a force destined to undertake operations against the transborder clans of the Indian frontier is naturally conditioned by the physical features of the area, by its fertility, and by the numbers, character, organisation, and armament of its inhabitants.

It has been truly said that in war every available man should be employed, for one can never be too strong, but this aphorism is always qualified by the number of men that can be fed in the district which is to form the seat of war. The problem of the numbers to be used against the Pathan tribes is, therefore, by no means easy of solution, for, as a great French King said of Spain, in mountainous countries possessing, as does the Indian borderland, few natural resources, but inhabited by a hardy though scanty population, large armies risk starvation, small are in danger of defeat.

The tribesmen of the North West Frontier are brave, and inured to fatigue and hardship, a considerable number have been trained in our Indian army, and these have some knowledge of tactics, and acquaintance with British methods.

The clansmen possess no artillery, but in other respects are fairly well armed, and owing to the cheap sale of rifles and ammunition in Afghanistan, are daily becoming more formidable in this respect. They suffer, however, from two grave military faults, lack of discipline and cohesion, and at present would, it is believed, be unable to mass against any one of several columns invading their fastnesses.

They would, more probably, be content merely to defend their own valleys and homesteads, rather than attempt to defeat, in detail, the divided forces of an invader operating from exterior lines.

It would seem, then, that in a campaign in the Indian borderland, British troops would be justified in undertaking a concentric invasion from several localities.

Certain advantages may also be claimed for this policy.

The road space occupied, in these pathless regions, by a large force moving on one line, is so great, that, as was demonstrated in Sir W. Lockhart's advance from Shinawari, in 1897, the rear of the column will be several days' march behind the leading troops. In these circumstances, not only will risk of defeat in detail be even greater than in the case of concentric invasion—for small columns can better exercise mutual support, than can a large force moving in a restricted valley—but the length of the convoy train, and the seeming strength of the force, will be a direct temptation to the tribesmen to avoid battle, and have recourse to guerilla warfare.

Besides, if small columns are employed, the whole country will be, in the first instance, over-run, and the enemy may, on account of the apparent weakness of the various detachments, take heart of grace and fight.

This, after all, is what is most desired, for the aim is always to attain rapid and decisive victory, and so end the campaign.

An argument against convergent invasion is, that since it may be necessary to use more than one line of communication, not only will the employment of larger numbers be necessary, but more transport animals, the provision and care of which really constitutes the main difficulty in frontier warfare, will be required.

This drawback may, however, be mitigated by opening only one line of communication, along the easiest route, the other detachments moving as flying columns, until the heart of the district is reached, when their surplus animals can be transferred to line of communication duties.

STRENGTH AND ORGANISATION OF COLUMNS.

In deciding the strength of a column for an expedition against the North West Frontier tribesmen, the first requisite, having regard to the foregoing considerations, is so to limit numbers, that, in the topographical conditions likely to be met, the force can, as an entirety, make a march of reasonable length, let us say eight or ten miles. Assuming that the column will move at an average rate of about two miles per hour, that, in order to avoid risk of disaster, it is, as a rule, desirable for the main force not to march before dawn, and to be in camp by dusk, and that ten—twelve hours of daylight are available, it is clear that the road space occupied must not, for a ten mile march, exceed ten to fourteen miles. That is to say, the numbers that can fulfil this condition on a narrow track, amount to about 4500 fighting men, carrying three days' rations on the person, and five days' on transport animals.

Suppose that four such columns are destined to invade the Afridi Tirah.

The Afridis are said to possess 25,000 to 30,000 fighting men, and if it be assumed that two-thirds of these have breech loading rifles, and that the whole mass is unlikely to attack any, one, or even two columns, the largest hostile gathering that a British detachment may expect to meet is 6000-8000 men, of whom 4500-5500 may be well armed.

A column of 4500 disciplined troops need not therefore fear reverse.

The composition of a column is regulated by the topography of the area of operations, but the following example will show how the allotment of troops may be determined.

As basis for calculation a mixed brigade[1] organised for independent action may be taken. To these troops may be added a squadron of Silladar cavalry, if the country is suitable to its action, and a mountain battery, which, together with the infantry, form a handy force of the three arms.

But the column is still weak in infantry, on which the brunt of the fighting will necessarily fall, and possesses no technical troops for road-making, etc.

Both requirements may be fulfilled by the addition of a pioneer battalion, or, since some hold that sappers and miners are more economical than pioneers, a battalion, of British infantry, or of Gurkhas, and a company of sappers and miners may be included.

It now only remains to give the troops an ammunition column, the necessary staff, certain additional medical, and administrative details, and the force—one infantry brigade organised for independent action, one squadron, one mountain battery, one British battalion, one company sappers and miners, etc.—will be complete, and adequate for its purpose.

MARCHES AND PROTECTION.

A body of troops moving in an enemy's country is liable to be attacked at any time, and from any direction, and must, therefore, always take measures for the protection of its front, flanks, and rear.

In warfare in civilised and highly developed countries, when the enemy's object is rather to defeat the fighting force than to harry the convoy, and when troops can march on broad frontages, the protection given by bodies of cavalry with horse artillery, flung far to front and flanks, and supported, if necessary, by infantry, is usually adequate.

But when the line of march leads along a single file track, winding through narrow valleys, and over rugged mountains, when the column, compared to its strength, occupies an inordinate length of roadway, and is therefore especially vulnerable to flank attack, and when the enemy, or at any rate a portion of his warriors, prefer plunder of baggage to pitched battles, other measures to safeguard the force must be taken.

Flankguards can rarely make their way over the steeply scarped hills enclosing the North West Frontier valleys, and since the advanced guard can, in such conditions, effect no more than the clearance of the valley in which it is moving, it becomes necessary to adopt a sedentary form of protection for the flanks of the force. This consists of picquets, posted along the route, in localities commanding approaches to the roadway, or from which the enemy can fire on the column.

These picquets, together with the advanced and rear guards, secure the movement of the remaining troops; they are, as a rule, found by the units composing the advanced guard, and withdraw under the supervision, and if necessary with the assistance of the rear guard.

The order of march of a column, in border, as in other campaigns, is conditioned by the proximity, strength, and probable action of the enemy, by the topography of the district to be traversed, by the object to be attained, and by the composition of the force.

The first duty of the staff officer to whom is confided the drafting of orders for a march, will therefore be, by personal observation, and from intelligence and other reports, to find out as much as possible of the country, and of the enemy's dispositions and probable tactics. Armed with this information he will be in a position to arrange the order of march of his column according to the circumstances of the case.

When the enemy, for instance, is in force in the vicinity, and his actions, such as throwing up of entrenchments, harassing camp in large numbers, imply that he will offer vigorous resistance to the advance, it is probable that the baggage and supply column will be best parked, under sufficient guard, either in the camp, or in some other locality easy of defence, whilst the remainder move off, in preparatory formation for action.

If the clansmen are reported to be inclined to dispute the advance in force, but are some distance from the camp, the most suitable order of march may be deduced as follows.

The enemy being in strength, the column should move in compact formation, and deliberately, the advanced guard being pushed only so far forward as to secure the troops from surprise, and as few road picquets sent out as may be, in order that the fighting force may be reduced as little as possible.

The method of posting and withdrawing picquets will not materially differ from that which will be described later.

The tribesmen being known to be in force and prepared to resist, it follows that the bulk of the fighting men must be at the head of the column; and as the advanced guard will be near the remainder, it need be only sufficiently numerous to insure that the duties of protection are adequately performed.

Suppose the tribesmen five miles distant, and that, as a rough basis for calculation, two companies can secure about one-and-a-half to two miles of roadway; then about three companies will be required for picquetting.

If three companies be added for other purposes, the advanced guard infantry should be of sufficient strength.

The advanced guard will require a proportion of technical troops for road making and repair, and for this purpose two companies of pioneers, or the bulk of a company of sappers and miners may be allotted.

Cavalry are not, it is considered, in place with an advanced guard moving in an enclosed and intricate country, nor, since the main body will be close behind, need any special medical details be included.

Whether artillery should be allotted is a more open question. In favour of placing guns with the advanced guard, it can be argued that they may be of assistance in clearing the hills to be occupied by picquets or vanguard; against their inclusion it may be urged that artillery ammunition will necessarily be scarce, owing to the difficulty of carriage, and should only be employed when an advantageous opportunity for inflicting loss occurs, but that advanced guard commanders are prone to make too much use of their guns.

On the whole, when the advanced guard is not far from the main body, it would seem that the inclusion of guns in the former is unnecessary.

The organisation and order of march of the main body may be as under.

It is clear that the numbers available for action will be those left over after suitable deduction has been made for baggage and rear guards. These, therefore, must first be allotted.

Light duty men, officers' servants, cooks, etc., should suffice to secure the regimental transport, and for policing the drivers, but the supply column, hospitals, and reserve ammunition, require special escorts, and perhaps one company each may be adequate for the two first mentioned, and one or two companies for the ammunition.

The strength and composition of the rear guard is the next item, and this is regulated by its function of supervision of the retirement of the picquets.

Such being the case, it appears that, in no circumstances, should a large force be detailed as a rear-guard. There is not space in a narrow valley for a strong rear-guard to manœuvre, so that it will merely afford the enemy a good target, without corresponding advantage; besides, the rear-guard can, if necessary, be continually reinforced by incoming picquets.

A rear-guard, then, should rarely include more than four companies of infantry, and in the circumstances under consideration, may be weaker.

Though cavalry may be useful for the delivery of a counter-attack, the horses afford an easy mark, whilst its presence with the rear-guard may cause the enemy to keep to the hills instead of descending into the valley, where they will be more vulnerable. Cavalry, it seems, should, therefore, not be added to the rear-guard infantry.

Mountain guns may be of assistance to picquets in distress, or in the delivery of a counter-attack, but they should, both for their own security, and to prevent waste of ammunition, be kept well back. In the present case the rear-guard is not likely to be harassed, so no artillery need be included.

A rear-guard does not require technical troops, but some hospital riding mules, etc., may be allotted for rapid transference of wounded.

The total deductions from the fighting force of the column will therefore be:—

Advanced Guard. Six companies Infantry, bulk of one company S. and M.

Escorts, etc. Three or four companies Infantry.

Rear-guard. Two or three companies, with machine guns.

In all about one and a half battalions, one company sappers and miners. There remain three and a half battalions, one mountain battery, one squadron, and the administrative services, at disposal.

The order of march of the main body can now be dealt with.

Perhaps half a battalion may move in front, then the mountain battery, which should not require a special escort, next the three battalions.

After these may follow the reserve ammunition, the hospitals, the 2nd line transport with B. echelon 1st line transport[2] of all troops, except the advanced and rear-guards, and then the supply column.

At the tail of the main body may move the B. echelon of the advanced and rear-guards, so as to be readily available in case any troops belonging to either are obliged to bivouac outside camp; and finally, since they are unlikely to be able to undertake effective pursuit, may come the cavalry, so as to be at hand in case they are required to assist the rear-guard to counter-attack, by charging any tribesmen who have ventured into the valley.

Though B. echelon 1st line transport of the advanced and rear-guards is placed at the end of the column, it is considered that all troops should be so equipped that they can be independent of camp and transport for at least two, and better still, for three days. It is a lesser evil to carry an extra, but in some degree decreasing load, even if it prejudices mobility, than to starve, or run undue risk of sickness from cold and damp.

The next case to be considered will be when the enemy is not in great force, and is more likely to harass than to seriously resist the advance of the column.

In such circumstances, the main objects will be to complete, as rapidly as may be, the proposed march, whilst inflicting on the enemy, should he give the opportunity, the greatest possible loss.

Since the distance is to be quickly traversed, and because a road picquet takes some time, even as much as an hour, to secure and establish itself on a hill, it follows that, unless risk is to be run of the march of the main body being delayed, the advanced guard must precede the main body by at least one hour, and may even move off in the twilight which precedes dawn.

This settled, the composition of the advanced guard may be dealt with.

If it is proposed to make a ten mile march, then, calculating from the data previously mentioned, about one battalion will be sufficient to picquet the roadway. To this force some four companies may be added, so as to leave a good margin for securing the camp site, and for unexpected contingencies.

Technical troops will, as before, be required, and as the advanced guard will be some way from the main body, a section of mountain artillery may be included. Neither cavalry, nor special medical units, seem necessary.

The composition of the advanced guard may, therefore, be:—one-and-a-half battalions infantry, one section mountain battery, the bulk of one company sappers and miners.

As already stated, before deciding on the order of march of the main column, the deductions to be made for escort and rear-guard duties must be fixed.

Light duty men, etc., should suffice to secure the regimental transport, three companies to safeguard the reserve ammunition, hospitals, and supply column, whilst the mountain battery hardly needs a special escort.

In respect of the rear-guard, in the case under consideration it is possible that the picquets may be harassed as they withdraw, the strength of the rear-guard may, therefore, amount to four companies of infantry, with machine guns, and one section mountain artillery, with some ambulance riding mules, etc., in addition.

The total deductions, for purposes of protection, from the fighting force of the column, therefore, amount to:—infantry, two battalions three companies; artillery, two sections; sappers and miners one company; and there remain, for disposal, infantry, two battalions five companies, artillery, one section, cavalry, one squadron, besides various administrative units.

No serious opposition being expected to the march of the column, the comfort of the troops may be considered in regulating the order of march.

As before, and for the same reasons, the cavalry, and the B. echelon 1st line transport of the advanced and rear-guards, and of the picquetting troops, may march at the tail of the main body.

It should hardly be necessary to place, in addition, a body of infantry at the end of the column, but, if desired, the remaining four companies of the battalion furnishing the rear-guard may move immediately in front of, or behind, the cavalry. The rest of the fighting force can march at the head of the main column, followed by the reserve ammunition, hospitals, B. echelon 1st line transport, with the 2nd line transport, and then the supply column.

In circumstances where little or no resistance is expected to the forward movement of a column, but serious opposition to the withdrawal of picquets, and to the march of the rear-guard, the following modification will be necessary in the order of march just dealt with.

The strength, composition, and time of march of the advanced guard need only be altered by the deduction of, say, one section of sappers and miners, and perhaps, too, the withdrawal of the mountain guns.

The escorts, etc., of the non-fighting portions of the main column may remain as before suggested, as may the strength and composition of the rear-guard.

The order of march of the main column will, however, require transposition somewhat as follows:

Since the principal opposition will take the form of pursuit by the enemy, the bulk of the fighting troops should move in rear of the main column, so as to be in position to undertake the offensive if required.

The units may, therefore, march as follows:

Two companies of infantry; the supply column; the B. echelon 1st line transport, (except, of the advanced and rear-guards,) with the 2nd line transport; the hospitals; the reserve ammunition; B. echelon 1st line transport of the advanced and rear-guards; the rest of the infantry, less four companies; the remainder of the artillery; one section of sappers and miners, the cavalry, and finally four companies.

ACTION OF THE ADVANCED & REAR-GUARDS, AND OF ROAD PICQUETS.

Speaking generally, the procedure followed by an advanced guard may be somewhat as follows:—

Both on account of considerations for its own security, and because hills will thus be more rapidly secured, it is desirable that the positions to be occupied by road picquets should, so far as it is practicable to do so from the valley, be decided some time before the main guard arrives opposite the various localities. It is also understood that considerable latitude is allowed to the picquet commander as to the position occupied, and that he is at liberty either to demand reinforcement, or to return redundant men to the advanced guard, as occasion may demand.

The advanced guard may move in the following order.

First a vanguard of one or more companies, preceding the remainder by about half a mile, and adapting its formation to the ground.

Then the mainguard, at the head of which should be the advanced guard commander, his staff officer, the battalion commander of the unit furnishing the leading company, and the company commander.

As the troops march up the valley, the advanced guard commander should decide what localities are to be held, and in what strength. He should issue his orders to the battalion or company commander, as the case may be, when the picquets should move direct to their positions. Meanwhile, the staff officer should make, in sections, a rough sketch of the positions occupied by the various picquets, which should be numbered consecutively as they move out, the sections of the sketch being sent, as completed, to the officer commanding the rear-guard.

In addition, to insure that no picquet is overlooked by the rear-guard, a double sentry, with a paper showing the number of its picquet, should be placed in the roadway beneath the height occupied, and it is the duty of the picquet commander to keep in touch with this sentry post.

In this manner the roadway should be picquetted, until the locality is reached where the column is to halt, when the advanced guard commander should take the usual measures for the security of the camp, for safe-guarding the water supply, etc.

It has been suggested that an advanced guard should be divided into two portions, advanced guard, and the picquetting troops, each under a separate leader, the object being to free the advanced guard commander from the work of picquetting, so that his whole attention can be devoted to tactics. The advanced guard is to clear the hills, which are then to be occupied by picquets.

This system does not appear sound, for it necessitates two men doing the work of one, and, in practice, the advanced guard usually either meets with little or no resistance, or with such serious opposition that picquetting is in abeyance.

Each picquet, when it reaches the position selected by its leader, should intrench, taking especial care to provide head cover, so that the enemy may not be easily able to observe the moment of its final withdrawal.

Before the last troops of the main column have quitted camp, the rear-guard commander should have arranged his force in a series of successive positions, calculated to enable the units to mutually support one another's retirement, as well as to assist, if necessary, the withdrawal of picquets.

The guns should, for reasons already given, be kept well back, and this system of successive positions should be continued throughout the march.

It is, of course, understood that the main column keeps contact with, and regulates its march by that of the rear-guard.

It is sometimes advocated that the camp picquets should, before the column marches off, be relieved by the rear-guard, with the object of enabling the picquets to rejoin their units.

This arrangement does not appear advantageous. The troops detailed for the relief of the picquets will probably have to move out in darkness, and over an unknown area, and though, if the enemy advances during the relief, he will be opposed in double strength, should his attack be delivered later, units who do not know the ground will be placed in positions they will not be able to defend to the best advantage. Besides, the men composing the rear-guard, whose functions are in any case sufficiently arduous, will be involved in additional and unnecessary fatigue.

The withdrawal of picquets may be carried out on the following principles:—

When a picquet commander sees, or receives reports that the rear-guard is approaching, he should send the bulk of his picquet to a position, previously reconnoitred, on the lower slope of the hill, and in the direction of the line of march of the column, whence the retirement of the remainder can be covered by fire.

Whilst on the hill, and especially as the time for withdrawal approaches, the men of a picquet should be careful not to show themselves, in order that the enemy may not, by counting heads, be able to divine that retirement has been begun. Similarly, the men left on the hill to the last, should, above everything, avoid exposure.

When the picquet commander sees the rear-guard commander, who will usually be with the last troops, and whose presence will be shown by a flag, is opposite his post, he should give the signal for the evacuation of the hill top, on which the men should creep back, and as soon as they are below the sky line, run down the hill to a position beyond that of their covering party. The withdrawal should then be continued according to the accepted principles, until the whole picquet has reached the valley, when its leader should report to the rear-guard commander, receiving orders whether the picquet is to proceed to the main column, or to join the rear-guard.

The rear guard commander should have previously called in the road sentry post marking the locality held by the picquet, and the map furnished by the advanced guard will have been of assistance in identifying its position.

It is contended that the withdrawal of a picquet rests, except in special circumstances, entirely with the picquet leader. He is the man on the spot, and can best judge when the retirement should commence.

The rear-guard commander should rarely attempt to regulate the actions of the picquets, of whose situation he cannot have adequate knowledge, but should exercise general supervision, ready to afford assistance if required.

At times picquets may be able to support one another's movements, but, as a rule, a picquet will be too fully occupied with its own affairs to be able to render assistance to its neighbours.

The above outline of a withdrawal presupposes that hostile pressure is not unduly severe.

If the enemy venture to close with the rear-guard and picquets, it is submitted that an immediate counter-attack should be delivered, the main body being halted.

To lose so golden an opportunity of inflicting loss on a volatile foe seems on the one hand unwise, whilst, on the other, it is surely both undignified and demoralising to permit savages to hunt British regulars into camp.

The delivery of a counter-attack is accompanied by some risk, and its success will depend on the aptitude of the rear-guard commander for stratagem, for, if loss is to be inflicted, the enemy must, as a rule, be trapped.

Simple ruses which suggest themselves are, either to attempt to attract the tribesmen into the low ground by a bait of ammunition or transport animals, the cavalry, guns, and part of rear-guard, infantry being previously concealed in positions from which they can take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, and the retirement of picquets stopped, as soon as the attack is delivered. Or, two or more picquets, which have been previously reinforced by troops moving along concealed lines of advance to the hill tops, may feign retirement, and attack the tribesmen as they follow over the crest line.

If stratagem fails, the column should halt and drive off the enemy, a proceeding which should be repeated until he is taught that to follow up British troops is neither profitable nor advantageous.

ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

Success in war depends in some degree on adaptation of tactics to local conditions, and it is therefore clear that, to attain rapid success against the inhabitants of the North Western Frontier, a knowledge of their tactics is required, and that, whilst the British aims are pursued with unswerving determination, their probable movements must be met and defeated.

The tribesmen, like most savages, are only really formidable when one is running away from them. They fight well in positions strongly fortified, and with flanks secure, but, being without the discipline or cohesion to meet envelopment, are much influenced by pressure against their flanks.

Pathans are fearful of artillery, and do not, as a rule, seriously resist a determined advance, preferring the easier and less dangerous enterprise of harassing the retirements which they believe are an inevitable corollary to forward movements; or of attacking isolated detachments, whose operations they have observed from their hill-tops.

They are suspicious of ambuscades, except when excited in pursuit, and are not prone to accept battle unless surprised.

Like other people, they shoot well when not themselves under effective fire, and, when shooting into a valley, where the strike of the bullet can be observed, their fire is accurate. On the other hand, owing to their relatively defective armament, and to lack of ammunition, tribal fire as a rule lacks volume.

The tribesmen skirmish well, and move quickly over their hills, but rarely, except when engaging a small force, or by night, attack in mass. On the other hand, they often crowd their defensive positions with men.

They are said to dislike being overlooked by their opponents, and therefore do not care to attack up hill, but will, at times, try to rush a detachment, with the object of capturing rifles and ammunition.

The fact that a proportion of the men possess only inferior fire-arms, renders possible resort to shock tactics, especially when roused to a pitch of fanaticism.

Pathans are partial to night operations, probably because they believe that there is little fear of interference after dark. Their enterprises are usually on a small scale, but night attacks in force, are possible. Their inadequate clothing, and the cold of the early morning, however, usually forces them to seek shelter as the night wears on.

From the above description it will be seen that British troops, so long as they observe the ordinary principles of war, have nothing to fear from the tribesmen. But it is to be remembered that, unless stratagem is intended, the offensive is the general rule in tribal warfare, for the enemy construes a defensive attitude as a sign of fear, and becomes correspondingly elated.

The composition of forces despatched on reconnaissance and minor punitive expeditions requires careful consideration. Columns composed of men drawn from many different infantry units are inherently weak, so that, in all operations, complete units, so far as they are required, should be employed, cavalry being added when local conditions are favourable. Artillery will generally be necessary, as well as a proportion of technical troops, but the strength of columns should, within limits of safety, be low, in order to insure mobility, and to encourage resistance. The military value of the enemy must not, however, be underestimated.

The main object of all operations is to quickly attain a decisive success. To this end the tribesmen must be induced to stand and fight with the purpose of inflicting casualties on them.

It is to be remembered that the enemy can, less easily than the British, afford losses, especially of arms. Commanders, without being prodigal of their men's lives, need not, therefore, be afraid of incurring casualties, especially when there is likelihood that the enemy will suffer loss to at least an equal extent. If the tribesmen's losses are heavy, those of the British troops will probably be considerably less. Close fighting is all to the advantage of trained soldiers.

As has been stated, the clansmen will rarely commit themselves to battle in conditions favourable to the British, unless they can be outwitted or surprised. Night operations may, therefore, frequently be necessary, having special regard to the fact that, from their hill tops, the enemy will overlook all manœuvres. As the natives are not often abroad in the early morning, surprise, at dawn, will not present unusual difficulties.

The enveloping form of tactics, when the enemy is attacked both in front and flank, is as effective in tribal as in other warfare. But, owing to the topographical advantages enjoyed by the tribesmen, it will be necessary to hold them closely in frontal attack, and so distract their attention from outflanking movements. This may be possible, for they fight with confidence when behind cover. Mere frontal attack is likely to be at once costly and ineffective; hence, if neither envelopment, nor night operations, are practicable, resort may be had to such stratagems as a feigned retirement, or bait of transport animals, to tempt the Pathans from their hills.

Though the possibility of tribal counter-attack, by shock, must not be lost sight of, the British advantage in training and armament should enable a central general reserve to be dispensed with, the object being to so dispose the troops as to insure envelopment.

Good information and staff work, and a sound system of inter-communication, will, moreover, if all ranks are imbued with the spirit of mutual support, go far to insure success.

Commanders, especially of small forces, should remember that hesitation will be quickly observed by the enemy, but a bold front, and ready stratagem, will soon cause him to lose heart.

When a post or isolated detachment requires assistance, aid can often be most rapidly and effectively given by application of such indirect pressure as will tend to divert the enemy's attention.

In minor tactics, whilst taking every advantage of the cover afforded by features of ground, troops must beware of seeking shelter in hollows or nullahs, places which will, assuredly, have been marked by the enemy's riflemen, so that their occupation will rarely escape punishment.

In attack, infantry units, whilst securing their flanks, should advance up salients, taking care to afford one another mutual fire assistance. Supports and local reserves should be pushed as near to the firing line as the shape of the ground will permit; but, at times, reserves may be able to effectively support the troops in front by covering fire, from suitable positions, behind, or on the flanks of, the line of advance.

Fire should be reserved until units have closed on the enemy, the object being to prevent the early evacuation of a position, after having caused a few casualties at long range.

As the enemy's fire, though likely to be accurate, will probably lack volume, resort need not be had to widely extended formations.

To gain ground, and when assaulting, the procedure outlined in the training manuals requires no modification.

Artillery should be handled with discretion, and should be on its guard against the tendency to open fire whenever a target is seen. Its aim should be not to evict, but to hold the enemy to his sangars, and to inflict loss when he retreats.

The steep forward slopes of hills will enable fire to be continued until the infantry has closed on the tribesmen, but oblique, rather than frontal fire should be employed.

It is, of course, important to insure close inter-communication between infantry and artillery.

In tribal, as in other warfare, unless the enemy is completely enveloped, efficient pursuit is necessary to set the seal on victory. Pursuit can, at first, probably be best undertaken by the enveloping wings, artillery co-operating to head the enemy off in the required direction, whilst the cavalry press forward.

A portion of the artillery should, therefore, move with the outflanking wings, keeping as near as possible to the firing line.

Pathans, familiar with the country, and confident that they have everything to gain, and but little to lose by such tactics, favour the harassing of troops as they withdraw from heights, or along valleys. Though it may be taken as a maxim that there will be no pursuit if the enemy has, in any recent fighting, been adequately punished, the conditions may have been such that casualties could not be inflicted.

In these circumstances, the clansmen must surely not be permitted to embarrass the British movements, and must be convinced that pursuit is both dangerous and unprofitable.

Mere counter-attack, when the enemy is not surprised, is likely to lead to no advantage, but a few skilfully laid ambushes will soon discourage his zeal for pursuit. Should he, however, persist in following up the troops, counter-attack should at once be made, and the retirement discontinued. The enemy, it is to be remembered, will, as a rule, offer the greatest opportunity of inflicting loss when he follows up a retirement, and, in such operations, the aim must be rather to cause than to avoid casualties.

All withdrawals should be pre-arranged and systematic, flanks being securely held, and the principle of mutual support observed. But formalism must be avoided, and procedure must never be permitted to become so stereotyped that the enemy will be able to confidently anticipate the movements of the troops.

Men must beware of entering nullahs, or depressions of any kind, until the further edge has been secured; and, when on a hill top, the provision of such cover as will conceal the head-dress is of importance.

Transport animals should be clear of the fighting troops before retirement is begun.

If the object is to slip away from the enemy, the retirement should be made at a time when movement is not expected.

When a valley is to be swept in course of punitive operations, an adequate force should be left to secure the entrance, if the column is to leave by this route.

Troops, as has already been suggested, should, in respect of ammunition, food, and warm coats, be independent of transport animals, and it should be understood that units are always to be prepared to remain for the night away from camp. The men should be trained to economise water, which is often scarce across the border.

Ammunition and rifles being the main objects of tribal ambition, special care should be taken to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands.

Against the North West Frontier clans, the offensive, as usual, is normally the best defensive, but it may sometimes happen that small British forces are temporarily obliged to act on the defensive.

In such circumstances, it is to be expected that the enemy will adopt the tactics, common amongst savages, of seeking the flanks of the troops, both to avoid fire, and to obtain the advantages of enfilade. It follows, then, that defensive measures should include all round protection, whilst a relatively large reserve should be kept ready to attack the hostile levies, as soon as any portion comes within charging distance.

Experience tends to prove that a compact body of even a section, if well entrenched and supplied with ammunition, has nothing to fear from Pathans, especially when the British leader is animated by the proper spirit of timely offensive.

CAMPS.

It is desirable for a column escorting a large baggage train—and this is essentially the predicament of civilised troops engaged in frontier mountain warfare—to be collected in camp before nightfall, otherwise the enemy may be given unduly favourable opportunities of employing harassing methods.

But it does not result that the situation of troops unable, for any cause, to reach camp, is at all desperate.

Strong and compact forces adopting the usual precautions, can probably, in many, if not in most cases, march in safety after nightfall, but small detachments and baggage can rarely do so without undue risk. These, then, should always park and intrench towards nightfall, wherever they may find themselves, when they will have little to fear, for experience, as has been stated, tends to show that even a section, securely intrenched, and with ample ammunition, can hold its own against heavy odds.

The form of camp, and the nature of the protection adopted, depend, as usual, on the topography, and on the character of the enemy.

A common method is to place transport, etc., within a perimeter occupied by the fighting troops, but this arrangement is by no means invariable, and it may be convenient to form two or more camps, or to separate transport from fighting troops.

The camp will, as a rule, be located in proximity to water, that is to say in a valley, and in such circumstances, if it can be sited well under one of the enclosing ranges of hills, protection from sniping will be afforded from this direction, though the overhanging heights must be securely held.

Sometimes a small basin is available for the bivouac, and in this case, the troops can, to a great extent, be secured from this favourite tribal device of firing into camp after nightfall.

As is the case in all war, the measures taken for the security of a camp include a system of picquets, and in frontier expeditions these are placed all round camp, either on the level, or on any commanding heights, within, at any rate, effective rifle range.

Picquets may be pushed even further forward, but when so situated, must be numerically strong, as they are liable to be rushed, though more for the sake of capturing their arms, than with the object of inflicting loss. No picquet should be of less strength than one section, all should be intrenched against attack from any direction. Their bearing from camp should also be taken, and they should be in signalling communication with the main body, so that assistance may be requested and despatched when necessary, or warning given of the approach of the enemy in force.

Bombs should be useful adjuncts to picquet defence, in case the enemy should succeed in forming a lodgment near the sangar.

Though a sedentary system of picquets may discover the presence of a large hostile body near camp, and may, in some degree, check sniping, the latter evil cannot, by this means, be completely prevented. Tribesmen, especially since they are aware that the British rarely risk troops, other than picquets, outside the perimeter, will often creep in and snipe from the area between the picquets and camp.

There seems, however, no valid reason why sniping should be passively tolerated, when it can probably be effectively combated by placing, in certain localities between the camp and picquets, small patrols of picked men, provided with grass shoes, whose duty will be to stalk and bayonet venturesome marauders.

Against this proposal it has been argued that the British, and especially the European soldiers, are unfit to cope, by night, with tribesmen, inured from childhood to move silently in darkness over rough ground. The contention is considered to be inadmissible, for though there is, and must be, risk in stalking snipers, picked British soldiers are surely now, as formerly, more than a match for Pathans, in all circumstances when the numbers are fairly even.

The form of intrenchment, if any, excavated round the bivouac, is conditioned by the character of the enemy.

If he is prone to adopt shock tactics, and to attempt to rush the camp under cover of darkness, a ditch to check his charge, backed by a parapet with head cover, will be the most favourable form of defence.

But if he is partial merely to harassing methods, such as firing into camp, the perimeter defences should be calculated to mitigate their effects, by providing, for all troops, trenches well traversed, and with parapets both to front and rear.

If both forms of attack are possible, parapets with trench and ditch should be made, the trench, or ditch, being first dug, according as a charge or sniping is most to be feared.

Naturally units protected by high ground on one or more flanks, need only make cover so as to secure themselves from the directions from which fire can be delivered.

Only infantry should hold the perimeter of a camp, machine guns being placed at the angles, and the defence of each confided to one unit, divided responsibility not being permissible.

Supports may, if necessary, be located in intrenchments behind the perimeter, and a homogeneous body of about half a battalion, allotted as reserve, and given a bivouac near that of the column commander.

In case of attack, the duty of cavalry soldiers is to stand to their horses, of artillery to man their guns. To neither, therefore, in normal circumstances, should a portion of the perimeter be confided, and both should be placed within its circumference.

At the same time, guns should be so disposed, in pits or epaulments, that they can sweep ground across which attack is most likely to be made; or they may be laid so as to search localities where tribesmen may collect prior to delivering an assault.

PROTECTION OF LINE OF COMMUNICATION.

The protection of a line of communication is secured by combination of passive and active measures, though the latter are of the greatest importance.

Passive measures include the provision of fortified staging posts, linked up by a series of road picquets, and supplemented by escorts to convoys. The active defence is by means of flying columns.

Roughly speaking, it may be said that about 100 men per mile suffice for all protective purposes, and it is assumed that the responsibility of a staging post commandant extends half way to the posts on either side of his own.

The garrison of a staging post must be of sufficient strength, and of suitable composition, to secure the convoys halting there for the night, to furnish them with police escorts for the next day's march, and, if road picquets are found from the post, to supply these also.

Road picquets can either be sent out each day from staging posts, can be permanently located in a succession of blockhouses, or can be semi-permanent, that is to say can be supplied from a series of minor posts connecting staging centres. In each of the above cases the same number of men will be required.

The first method, by concentrating the troops each evening, makes for their general security, but, since picquets must daily, and at fixed hours, move to and from their places, a good deal of fatigue will be imposed on the men, and there will, in addition, be some risk of minor disasters to individual picquets, which may be ambuscaded. Moreover, since the convoys cannot march until the picquets are in position, and as picquets cannot be risked outside the post before sunrise and after sunset, the hours available for the movements of the convoys will be a good deal curtailed.

Under the second alternative, a weak cordon is formed, portions of which cannot, owing to the topography, easily render one another support in case any picquet is attacked in force. On the other hand, no time will be wasted in posting and withdrawing picquets.

The third system is a compromise between the two already mentioned, and seems, on the whole, to be the most advantageous. If three or four relatively large posts are placed, in dangerous localities, such as valley junctions, between staging centres, there will be little or no risk of their capture by the enemy. Since the picquets necessary to watch, by day, the area between the posts, will have but short distances to traverse to reach their positions, the time available for movement of convoys will not be curtailed; and as the ground intervening between two posts will, in some degree, be overlooked from them, there will be less chance, than under the first method, of picquets falling into ambuscades.

The efficiency of the protection of a line of communication depends, however, on the active, not on the passive measures for its security.

Active defence is maintained by flying columns, of strength and organisation suitable to the character of the enemy and the nature of the country. To these columns is confided the protection of certain areas, an end attained, not by inactivity, for the troops should be continually on the move, so that the enemy can never be certain when and where to expect them, but by a vigorous and energetic offensive in whatever directions an efficient service of intelligence reports hostile gatherings.

The enemy's movements and projects must, in fact, be anticipated, rather than countered when in course of execution.

DEFENCE OF A POST.

When considering what steps are to be taken for the defence of a post, large or small, the maxim that the offensive is the best defence must be ever prominently before the mind.

It follows that the first step, after a site has been selected, the water supply secured, and the usual measures for security taken, should be to set apart as many men as possible for offensive purposes, including reconnaissance. In other words, the strength of the reserve should be calculated from these premises, having due regard to the number of nights in bed required by the whole garrison; and the reserve should not be such men as may be left over after the requirements of passive defence have been fully satisfied.

The next item should be the selection of a keep or citadel, where stores and ammunition can be placed, and where hospital, headquarters, and a central signalling and communicating station can be located.

In this keep may be placed machine or other guns, if available, so arranged that they can sweep approaches to the post, and also, if possible, protect with fire the flanks of picquet stations.

It will now be time to allocate, generally, the troops destined for guard and picquet duty.

These arrangements may be primarily made from the interior of the post, its safety being the first consideration, though for reasons of sanitation the more space that can be given to troops and convoys the better.

Picquets having been roughly allotted, the plan of defence should be regarded from the enemy's point of view, and the necessary changes made; and, finally, the bearings of the picquet positions should be taken from the keep, and routes to them cleared, in case they should require reinforcement by night.

It should only be necessary to keep picquets at their full strength in night-time. By day the bulk of the men could fall back into the interior of the post, an arrangement which would at once facilitate water and food supply, and would also be advantageous from a sanitary point of view.

The next duties will be to deal with the general sanitation of the post, and especially of the rest and convoy camps, to mark out the latter, and to secure their policing.

As time goes on, the post commandant can arrange for improved communication between the keep and picquets, as well as throughout the interior of the enceinte, sign posts being erected and the water supply enclosed.