*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 14357 ***

RUDOLF EUCKEN

A Philosophy of Life

by

ABEL J. JONES, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D.

     Formerly Member of the University of Jena, Scholar of Clare
     College, Cambridge, and Assistant Lecturer at the University
     College, Cardiff

London: T. C. & E. C. Jack
67 Long Acre, W.C., and Edinburgh
New York: Dodge Publishing Co.







[Illustration]




PREFACE


The name of Eucken has become a familiar one in philosophical and
religious circles. Until recent years the reading of his books was
confined to those possessing a knowledge of German, but of late several
have been translated into the English language, and now the students of
philosophy and religion are agog with accounts of a new philosopher who
is at once a great ethical teacher and an optimistic prophet. There is
no doubt that Eucken has a great message, and those who cannot find time
to make a thorough study of his works should not fail to know something
of the man and his teachings. The aim of this volume is to give a brief
and clear account of his philosophical ideas, and to inspire the reader
to study for himself Eucken's great works.

Professor Rudolf Eucken was born in 1846, at Aurich in Frisia. He
attended school in his native town, and then proceeded to study at the
Universities of Göttingen and Berlin. In 1874 he was invited to the
Professorship of Philosophy at the University of Jena, and here he has
laboured for thirty-eight years; during this period he has been listened
to and admired by many of the more advanced students of philosophy of
all countries and continents.

His earliest writings were historical in character, and consisted mainly
of learned essays upon the classical and German philosophers.

Following upon these appeared valuable studies in the history of
philosophy, which brought out, too, to some extent, Eucken's own
philosophical ideas.

His latest works have been more definitely constructive. In _Life's
Basis and Life's Ideal_, and _The Truth of Religion_, he gives
respectively a full account of his philosophical system, and of his
ideas concerning religion.

Several smaller works contain his ideas in briefer and more popular
form.

As a lecturer he is charming and inspiring. He is not always easy to
understand; his sentences are often long, florid, and complex.
Sometimes, indeed, he is quite beyond the comprehension of his
students--but when they do not understand, they admire, and feel they
are in the presence of greatness. His writings contain many of the
faults of his lectures. They are often laboured and obscure, diffuse and
verbose.

But these faults are minor in character, compared with the greatness of
his work. There is no doubt that his is one of the noblest attempts ever
made to solve the great question of life. Never was a philosophy more
imbued with the spirit of battle against the evil and sordid, and with
the desire to find in life the highest and greatest that can be found in
it.

I have to thank Professor Eucken for the inspiration of his lectures and
books, various writers, translators, and friends for suggestions, and
especially my wife, whose help in various ways has been invaluable.

Passages are quoted from several of the works mentioned in the
Bibliography, especially from Eucken's "The Truth of Religion," with the
kind permission of Messrs. Williams & Norgate--the publishers.

ABEL J. JONES.

CARDIFF.




CONTENTS


CHAPTER

   I. THE PROBLEM OF LIFE

  II. HAS THE PROBLEM BEEN SOLVED?

 III. ANOTHER SEARCH FOR TRUTH

  IV. THE PAST, PRESENT, AND THE ETERNAL

   V. THE "HIGH" AND THE "LOW"

  VI. THE ASCENT TO FREEDOM AND PERSONALITY

 VII. THE PERSONAL AND THE UNIVERSAL

VIII. RELIGION: HISTORICAL AND ABSOLUTE

  IX. CONCLUSION: CRITICISM AND APPRECIATION

      BIBLIOGRAPHY

      INDEX





CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF LIFE


Before we proceed to outline Eucken's philosophical position, it will be
well if we can first be clear as to the special problem with which he
concerns himself. Philosophers have at some time or other considered all
the problems of heaven and earth to be within their province, especially
the difficult problems for which a simple solution is impossible. Hence
it is, perhaps, that philosophy has been in disrepute, especially in
English-speaking countries, the study of the subject has been very
largely limited to a small class of students, and the philosopher has
been regarded as a dreamy, theorising, and unpractical individual.

Many people, when they hear of Eucken, will put him out of mind as an
ordinary member of a body of cranks. From Eucken's point of view this is
the most unfortunate thing that can happen, for his message is not
directed to a limited number of advanced students of philosophy, but is
meant for all thinking members of the human race.

The problem he endeavours to solve is far from being one of mere
theoretical interest; on the contrary it has to do with matters of
immediate practical concern to the life of the individual and of the
community. To ignore him will be to fail to take account of one of the
most rousing philosophies of modern times.

The apathy that exists in regard to the subject of philosophy is not
easy to explain. It is not that philosophising is only possible to the
greatest intellects; it is indeed natural for the normal mind to do so.
In a quiet hour, when the world with its rush and din leaves us to
ourselves and the universe, we begin to ask ourselves "Why" and "How,"
and then almost unconsciously we philosophise. Nothing is more natural
to the human mind than to wonder, and to wonder is to begin to
philosophise.

Perhaps philosophers have been largely to blame for the indifference
shown; their terms have often been needlessly difficult, their language
obscure, and their ideas abstruse. Too often, too, their abstract
speculations have caused them to ignore or forget the actual experience
of mankind.

Those who have quarrelled with philosophy for these or other reasons
will do well to lay their prejudices aside when they start a study of
Eucken, for though he has some of the faults of his class, he has many
striking and exceptional excellences.

Philosophers in general set out to solve the riddle of the universe.
They differ in their statement of the problem, in the purpose of the
attempt, and in their methods of attempting the solution. Some will
wonder how this marvellous universe ever came into existence, and will
consider the question of the existence of things to be the problem of
philosophy. Others in observing the diversity of things in the universe
wonder what is behind it all; they seek to go beyond mere appearances,
and to investigate the nature of that behind the appearances, which they
call the reality. In their attempts to solve one or both of these
problems, thinkers are led to marvel how it is that we get to know
things at all; they are tempted to investigate the possibility of
knowledge, and are in this way side-tracked from the main problem.
Others in their investigations are struck with amazement at the
intricate organisation of the human mind; they leave the riddle of the
universe to study the processes of human thought, and examine as far as
they are able the phenomena of consciousness. Then thought itself claims
the attention of other philosophers; they seek to find what are the laws
of valid thought, what rules must be followed in order that through
reasoning we may arrive at correct conclusions. Others become attracted
to an investigation of the good in the universe, and their question
changes from "What is?" to "What ought to be?" Others interest
themselves in the problem of the beautiful, and endeavour to determine
the essence of the beautiful and of its appreciation. In this way the
subject of philosophy separates out into a number of branches. The study
of the beautiful is called Æsthetics; of the good, Ethics; of the laws
of thought, Logic; of the mind processes, Psychology; of the possibility
of knowledge, the Theory of knowledge; while the deeper problems of the
existence of things, of reality and unity in the universe, are generally
included under Metaphysics.

It need hardly be pointed out that all these branches are very closely
related, and that a discussion of any one of them involves to some
extent a reference to the others. One cannot, for example, attempt to
solve the great question of reality without touching upon the
possibility of knowledge, without some reference to the processes of the
human mind, and the standards of the validity of thought, of the good,
and of the beautiful.

It is however essential, if one is to appreciate a philosopher, to
understand clearly what his main problem is. Therein lies frequently the
differences among philosophers--that is, in the special emphasis laid on
one problem, and the attention to, or neglect of other aspects. To fail
to be clear on this matter frequently means to misunderstand a
philosopher.

And it would seem that many critics have failed to appreciate the work
of Eucken to the extent they should, because they have expected him to
deal in detail with problems which it is not his intention to discuss,
and have failed to appreciate what special problem it is that he
attempts to solve.

Eucken's special problem is that of the reality in the universe, of the
unity there exists in the diversity of things. In so far as he makes
this his problem, he is at one with other philosophers in investigating
what may perhaps be considered to be the most profound problem that the
human mind has ever conceived. The fact that distinguishes Eucken from a
large number of other thinkers is that he starts where they leave off.
At a rule, philosophers begin their investigation with a consideration
of matter, and proceed by slow degrees to attempt to explain the reality
at the basis of it. Some never get further, and dispense with the
question of human life and thought as mere aspects or manifestations of
the material world. But the problem of life is for Eucken the one
problem--he seeks to find the reality beneath the superficialities of
human existence, and he has little to say concerning the world of
matter. And, after all, it is the problem of life that urgently calls
for solution, for upon the solution that is accepted, the life of the
individual is to a large extent based. It is, of course, very
interesting to meditate and speculate upon the material world, its
origin and evolution, but the question is very largely one of mere
theoretical interest--a kind of game or puzzle for studious minds. It is
the question of life itself that is ultimately of practical interest to
every human soul. And this is the problem that Eucken would solve. Hence
those who expect to find a closely reasoned philosophy on matter and its
manifestations must look elsewhere, for Eucken has little for them.
Eucken's philosophy is a philosophy of life, and he only touches
incidentally those aspects of philosophy that are not immediately
concerned with his special problem. He refuses to be allured from the
main problem by subsidiary investigations, and perhaps rightly so, for
one problem of such magnitude would seem to be enough for one human mind
to attempt. Eucken is a philosopher who lays foundations and deals with
broad outlines and principles; it must be left to his many disciples to
fill in any gaps that exist on this account, by attempting to solve the
subsidiary problems with which Eucken cannot for the present concern
himself.

If Eucken's problem differs fundamentally from that of most other
philosophers, perhaps the purpose of his investigations is still a more
striking characteristic. He is anxious to solve the riddle of the
universe in order that there may be drawn from the solution an
inspiration which shall help the human race to concentrate its energies
upon the highest ideals of life. The desire to find a meaning which will
explain, and at the same time infuse zest and gladness into every
department of life has become a passion with him, and in finding that
meaning, his great endeavour is to prove the truth of human freedom and
personality. He wishes to solve the riddle in order that man may become
a better man, the world a better world. His aim is definitely an
ethical aim, and his purpose a practical one of the noblest order, and
not one of mere intellectual interest.

There is much, too, that is original in his methods--this will become
evident in the chapters that follow. He begins with an inquiry into the
solutions that have been offered. After careful investigation he finds
they all fail to satisfy the conditions which a solution should satisfy.
His discussions of these theories are most illuminating, and those who
do not agree with his conclusions cannot fail to admire his masterly
treatment.

Having arrived at this conclusion, he searches the story of the past,
studies the conditions of the present, and gazes into the maze of the
future, and finds revealed in them all an eternal something, unaffected
by time, which was, is, and ever shall be--the eternal, universal,
spiritual his, which then must be the great reality.

Upon this basis he builds a system of philosophy, which he considers to
be more satisfactory than the solutions already offered; with which
contention, there is little doubt, the majority of his readers will be
inclined to agree.

After the brief statement of Eucken's special problem, of the purpose
and methods of his investigation, we can proceed to outline his theories
in greater detail, beginning in the next chapter with his discussion of
the solutions that have in the past been offered and accepted.




CHAPTER II

HAS THE PROBLEM BEEN SOLVED?


What is the meaning, the value, and purpose of life, and what is the
highest and the eternal in life--the great reality? This is the question
that Eucken would solve. Before attempting a solution of his own, he
examines those that have already been offered. His discussion of these
theories is remarkable for the fairness, breadth of view, sympathy,
insight, and accurate knowledge that is shown. There is no superficial
criticism, neither does he concern himself with the inessential details
of the theories.

Jest-books tell us of a defendant against whom a claim for compensation
was made by a complainant who alleged that the former's dog had bitten
him. The defence was, first, that the dog was lame, blind, and
toothless; second, that it had died a week before; and third, that the
defendant never possessed a dog. A sensible judge would wish to be
satisfied in regard to the third statement before wasting time
discussing the others; if it proved to be true, then the case would be
at an end. The defences of philosophical systems are often similar, and
the critic is tempted to waste time discussing details when he should go
to the root of the matter. Eucken does not fall into this error. His
special method is to seek the idea or ideas which lie at the root of the
proposed solution; if these are unsatisfactory, then he does not
consider it necessary to discuss them further. Hence his work is free
from the flippant and superficial argument so common to-day; he makes a
fair and serious endeavour to find out the truth (if any) that is at the
basis of the proposed solutions, and does not hesitate to give them
their due meed of praise even though he considers them to be ultimately
unsatisfactory.

Before a solution can be regarded as a satisfactory one, Eucken holds
that it should satisfy certain conditions. It should offer an
explanation for life which can be a firm basis for life, it must admit
of the possibility of human freedom, and must release the human being
from sordid motives--unless it satisfy these conditions, then it cannot
be accepted as final.

The solutions of the problem of life that have been offered he considers
to be five--Religion and Immanental Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism and
Individualism, the first two regarding the invisible world as the
reality in life, the others laying emphasis on man's life in the present
world. The reader will perhaps wonder how his choice has fallen upon
these systems of thought and these alone. The explanation is a simple
one: he considers it necessary to deal only with those theories which
can form, and have formed, bases for a whole system of life. Mere
theoretical ideas of life, especially negative ideas such as those of
agnosticism and scepticism, do not form such a basis, but the five
chosen for discussion can, and have to some extent, posed as complete
theories of life, upon which a system of life can be built.

Has _Religion_ solved the question? If it has, then it must have done so
in that which must be considered its highest form--in Christianity.
Christianity has attempted the solution by placing stress upon a higher
invisible world, a world in sharp contrast with the mere world of sense,
and far superior to it. It unites life to a supernatural world, and
raises mankind above the level of the natural world. It has brought out
with great clearness the contrast between the higher world and the world
of sin, and has shown the need for a break with the evil in the world.
It has given to man a belief in freedom, and in the necessity for a
complete change of heart. It has proved a source of deliverance from the
feeling, of guilt, and a comfort in suffering. Indeed, considering all
the facts, there seems to be no doubt that, of all the solutions
offered, religion has been the most powerful factor in the history of
mankind.

Its influence would continue for the present and future, were it not
that doubt has been cast upon its very foundations, and had not
circumstances arisen to take men's minds away from thoughts of a higher
and invisible world, and to concentrate them to a greater extent than
formerly upon the world of sense. The progress of the natural sciences
has done much to bring about the change. Christianity made man the
centre of the universe, for whom all things existed, but the sciences
have insisted upon a broader view of the universe, and have deposed man
from his throne, and given him a much humbler position. Then as the
conception of law became more prominent, and scientists became more and
more inclined to explain all things as the result of natural laws, the
idea of a personal God in constant communion with, and supervision over
mankind, fell into disfavour.

And the study of history has caused questions to be raised. Some
historians have endeavoured to show that the idea of an overworld is
merely the characteristic of a certain stage in the evolution of
mankind, and that the ideas of religion are, after all, little more than
the mental construction of a God upon the image of man's own self.
History has attacked the doctrinal form of religion, and has endeavoured
to show that religions have been very largely coloured and influenced by
the prevailing ideas of the time; and the question naturally arises as
to whether there is anything more in religion than these temporary
elements.

And this is not all. In the present age the current of human activity is
strong. Man is beginning to accomplish things in the material world, and
is becoming anxious to accomplish more. His railways cover the lands,
his ships sail the seas, and his aeroplanes fly through the air. He has
acquired a taste for this world, a zest for the conquest and the
utilising for his own pleasure and benefit of the world of nature. And
when this occurs, the overworld sinks into the background--he is
satisfied with the present, and feels no need, except under special
circumstances, of a higher world. The sense world at present makes a
strong appeal--and the stronger it becomes, the less he listens to the
call of an overworld.

The sciences, history, and the special phases of human activity have
drawn attention from a higher, invisible world, and have cast doubts
upon its very existence.

As a result of this, "Religion (in the traditional form), despite all it
has effected, is for the man of to-day a question rather than an answer.
It is itself too much of a problem to interpret to us the meaning of our
life, and make us feel that it is worth the living."

In these words Eucken states his conviction that Christianity in its
orthodox forms cannot solve the problem of the present. This, however,
is not all he has to say concerning religion. He is, in truth, a great
believer in religion, and as will be seen, he believes that later it
will again step forth in a changed form as "the fact of facts" to wield
a power perhaps greater than ever before.

As in the case of religion, _Immanent Idealism_ is a theory that gives
life an invisible basis, but the invisible has been regarded as that
which lies at the root of the present world, and not as a separate
higher world outside our own. The Divine it considers not as a personal
being apart from the world, but as a power existing in and permeating
it, that indeed which gives to the world its truth and depth. Man
belongs to the visible world, but inwardly he is alive to the presence
of a deeper reality, and his ambition must be to become himself a part
of this deeper whole. If by turning from his superficial life he can set
himself in the depths of reality, then a magnificent life, with the
widest prospects, opens out before him. "He may win the whole of
infinity for his own, and set himself free from the triviality of the
merely human without losing himself in an alien world." And if he does
so, he is led to place greater emphasis upon the high ideals of life
than upon material progress. He learns to value the beautiful far above
the merely useful; the inner life above mere existence, a genuine
spiritual culture above the mere perfecting of natural and social
conditions. There is brought into view a new and deeper life in which
the emphasis is placed upon the good, the beautiful, and the true. In
this way idealism has inspired many men to put forth their energies for
the highest aims, has lifted the individual above the narrowness of a
life devoted to himself alone, and has produced characters of
exceptional beauty and strength. It claims, indeed, to be able to shape
the world of man more satisfactorily than religion can, for it has no
need for doctrines of the Divine, the Divine being immediately present
in the world. But despite its great influence in the past, its power
has of late been considerably weakened.

The question of the existence of a deeper invisible reality in the world
has become as problematic as the doctrines of religion.

To be a whole-hearted believer in the older forms of idealism it is
necessary that the universe be regarded as ultimately reasonable and
harmonious, and there must be a belief in the possibilities of great
development on the part of the human being. But a serious study of
things reveals to us the fact that the universe is not entirely
reasonable and harmonious. If it were, then man's effort towards the
ideal would be helped by the whole universe, but that is far from being
the case; progress means fight, and difficult fight; there is definite
opposition to the efforts of man to raise himself. Moreover, there is
evil in the world, let pantheists and others say what they will. Eucken
refuses to close his eyes to, or to explain away, opposition, pain, and
evil--the world is far from being wholly reasonable and harmonious, and
idealists must acknowledge this fact. The natural sciences, too, by
emphasising the reign of law, tend to limit more and more the
possibilities of the human being, ultimately robbing him of all
freedom--hence of all possibility of creation. And how can one be an
enthusiastic devotee of idealism if he is led to doubt man's power to
aim at, fight towards, or even choose the highest?

Idealism was at its height in those red-letter days when a high state of
culture had been attained, and great personalities produced masterpieces
in art, music, and literature. The progress of the sciences and of man's
natural activity has directed the spirit of the age towards material
progress; the ideals of mankind tend to become external and
superficial, and the interest in the invisible world falls to a minimum.

To some extent, too, idealism breathes of aristocracy--a most unpopular
characteristic in a democratic age. Experience shows that man is raised
above himself only in rare cases, and that the great things in the
realms of art, music, and literature are very largely the monopoly of
the few, and these mainly of the leisured classes. Hence the appeal of
idealism to certain types of men and women must necessarily be a feeble
one.

Then, again, there is the general indifference of mankind to lofty aims;
this militates against the power of idealism even more than in the case
of religion, for while in the latter there is the idea of a personal God
who is pleased or displeased urging men to renewed effort, the teachings
of idealism may appear to be mere abstractions, and can, as such,
possess little driving-power for the ordinary mind.

Idealism, too, seems to be a mere compromise between religion and a life
devoted to sense experience, and like most compromises it lacks the
enthusing power of the original ideas.

Finally, the whole theory leaves us in uncertainty--"that which was
intended to give a firm support, and to point out a clear course to our
life, has itself become a difficult problem."

But Eucken has more to say concerning idealism, even though in a
different form from the theories of the past. Indeed, his philosophy is
generally classed amongst the idealisms. Eucken makes a great endeavour,
however, to avoid the difficulties and objections to the idealistic
position; later we shall see that a great measure of success has crowned
his efforts.

Having discussed the two solutions that place special stress on the
invisible world, he proceeds to deal with the theories which emphasise
the relation of the life of man to the material world.

He first treats of _Naturalism_, that solution of the problem that makes
the sense experience of surrounding nature the basis of life,
subordinating even the life of the soul to the level of the natural,
material world.

Nature in the early ages had been superficially explained, often in the
light of religious doctrine. Man gave to nature a variety of
explanations and of colouring, depending largely upon his ideas of the
place of nature in relation to himself and to the invisible world. But
such anthropomorphic explanations could not long survive the progress of
the sciences, for a scientific comprehension of nature could only be
attained by getting rid of all human colouring, and by investigating
nature entirely by itself, out of all relation to the human soul. Man
then investigated nature more and more as an object apart from himself.

The first result of these investigations was to impress upon him the
reality of nature as something independent, and to increase on a very
large scale his knowledge of, and control over nature. When man began to
formulate and understand nature, he began, too, to invent machines to
profit from the knowledge he gained. Hence followed a marvellously
fruitful period of human activity, an activity which at first
strengthened man in his own soul, and gave him increased consciousness
of independence and power. While he was compelled to admit the greatness
of the natural world, he became more and more convinced that he himself
was far greater, for could he not put the laws of nature to his own use
and profit? Hence the gain to man at this stage of the development of
the sciences was very great, for he had come to appreciate more than
before the superiority of the human soul over the material world. Hence
resulted a more robust type of life, "a life energetic, masculine,
pressing forward unceasingly." Matters, however, were not destined to
remain long at this stage. As man's knowledge of the processes of nature
increased further, a twofold result followed. On the one hand, the sense
world of nature became increasingly absorbing in interest; on the other
hand, laws were formulated and nature was conceived of as being a chain
of cause and effect, a combination of mechanical elements whose
interactions were according to law, and could be foretold with the
utmost precision.

These two factors worked in the same direction, namely, that of
rendering less necessary the conception of a spiritual world. The
interest of mankind became so concentrated upon material things that the
interest in the invisible decreased, while the mechanical, soulless
elements with their ceaseless actions and reactions in definite order,
and according to inviolable law, were held sufficient to account for the
phenomena of nature. The keynote was "relation to environment"; a
constantly changing environment, changing according to law, called for
ceaseless readjustment, and the adaptation to environment was held to be
the stimulus to all activity in the natural world.

The later development of biology, and the doctrine of the evolution of
species, gradually extended this conception of nature to include man
himself.

What he had regarded as his distinctive characteristics were held to be
but the product of natural factors, and his life was regarded, too, as
under the domain of rigid, inviolable law. There was no room for, and no
need of, the conception of free, originative thought. Thought was
simply an answer to the demand that the sense world was making, entirely
dependent upon the external stimulus, just as any other activity was
entirely dependent on an external stimulus. So thought came to be
regarded as resulting from mere sense impression, which latter
corresponded to the external stimulus. It is obvious that the idea of
the freedom of the human soul, and of human personality as previously
understood, had to go. Man was simply the result of the interaction of
numerous causes--and like the rest of nature, involved no independent
spiritual element. Everything that was previously regarded as spiritual
was interpreted as a mere adjunct to, or a shadow of, the sense world.
Such a conception accounted for the whole of nature and of man, and so
became an explanation of the universe, a philosophy.

In such a theory self-preservation becomes the aim of life, the struggle
for existence the driving-power, and adaptation to environment the means
to the desired end. Hence it comes about that only one standard of value
remains, that of usefulness, for that alone can be regarded as valuable
which proves to be useful towards the preservation and enjoyment of the
natural life. The ideas of the good, the beautiful, and the true, lose
the glory of their original meaning, and become comparatively barren
conceptions. Hence at a stroke the spiritual world is wiped away, the
soul of man is degraded from its high position, the great truths of
religion are cast aside as mere illusions.

The naturalistic explanation possesses the apparent advantage of being a
very simple one, and hence attracts the human mind with great force in
the early stages of mental culture. All the difficulties of the
conception of a higher world are absent, for the naturalistic position
does not admit of its existence. It gives, too, some purpose to life,
even though that purpose is not an ideal one.

Eucken is not reluctant to give the theory all the credit it deserves,
and he is prepared to admit that it fulfils to some extent the
conditions which he holds a satisfactory solution should fulfil.

He goes, however, immediately to the root of the matter, and finds that
the very existence of the theory of naturalism in itself is an eloquent
disproof of the theory. The existence of a comprehensive scientific
conception involves an activity which is far superior to nature itself,
for it can make nature the object of systematic study. An intellect
which is nothing more than a mirror of sense impressions can get little
beyond such sense impressions, whereas the highly developed scientific
conception of nature that obtains to-day is far beyond a mere collection
of sense impressions. Nature, indeed, is subdued and mastered by man;
why then degrade man to the level of a universe he has mastered? To
produce from the phenomena of nature a scientific conception of nature
demands the activity of an independent, originative power of thought,
which, though it may be conditioned by, and must be related to, sense
impressions, is far above mere sense impressions.

Naturalism, in directing attention to the things that are experienced,
fails to take proper account of the mind that experiences them; it
postulates nature without mind, when only by the mind processes can man
become aware of nature, and construct a naturalistic scheme of life. "To
a thorough-going naturalism, naturalism itself is logically impossible."
Hence the impossibility of the naturalistic theory as an explanation of
life.

Then it fails to provide a high ideal for life, and to release man from
sordid motives. It gives no place for love, for work for its own sake,
for altruistic conduct, or for devotion to the high ideals of life. The
aim of life is limited to this world--man has but to aim at the
enjoyment and preservation of his own life. The mechanical explanation
of life, too, does away with the possibility of human freedom and
personality, and it is futile to urge man to greater efforts when
success is impossible. It is a theory which does justice merely to a
life of pleasure and pain, its psychology has no soul, and its political
economy bases the community upon selfishness.

In this way Eucken disproves the claim of naturalism; in doing so he
points out that a satisfactory solution must take account of the life of
nature in a way which religion and idealism have failed to do.

Of late years _Socialism_ and _Individualism_ have come into prominence
as theories of life. Eucken attributes the movements in the first
instance to the receding into the background of the idea of an overworld
which gave meaning and value to life. When doubt was thrown upon
religion and idealism, when confidence in another world was shaken, man
lost to an extent his moral support. Where could he turn now for a firm
basis to life? He might, of course, turn from the invisible world to the
world of sense, to nature. But the first result of this is to make man
realise that he is separate from nature, and again he fails to find
support. He is an alien in the world of nature, and disbelieves the
existence of a higher world. When both are denied him he turns naturally
to his fellow-men--here at least he can find community of interest--here
at least he is among beings of his own type. Hence he confines his
attention to the life of humanity, and in this, the universe of
mankind, he hopes to find an explanation of his own life, and a value
for it.

The progress of humanity, then, must become the aim of life--all our
strength and effort must be focussed upon human nature itself. But an
immediate difficulty arises. Where are we to find Man? "Is it in the
social community where individual forces are firmly welded together to
form a common life, or among individuals as they exist for themselves in
all their exhaustless diversity?" If we put the community first, then
the social whole must be firmly rooted in itself and be independent of
the caprice of its members. The duty of the individual is to subordinate
himself to the community--this means socialism. If, on the other hand,
the great aim is to develop the individual and to give him the maximum
of opportunity to unfold his special characteristics, we arrive at an
opposing theory--that of individualism.

In the history of society we find an age of socialistic ideas followed
by one of individualistic ideas, and vice versa, and there is much that
is valuable in each, in that it tends to modify and disprove the other's
extreme position.

The present wave in the direction of _socialism_ arises, to an extent,
in reaction from the extremely individualistic position of previous
ages. Man is now realising that the social relations of life are of
importance as well as the character of his own life. He realises the
interdependence of members of a community, and the conception of the
State as a whole, a unit, instead of a mere sum of individuals, grows
up. The modern industrial development and the organisation of labour
have, too, emphasised the fact that the value of the individual depends
largely upon his being a part of society. His work must be in
co-operation with the work of others to produce the best effect; for in
such co-operation it produces effects which reach far beyond his own
individual capacity. Hence his life appears to receive value from the
social relations, and the social ideal is conceived. The development of
the individual no longer becomes the aim but rather the development of
the community. In setting out the development of society as his aim, the
individual makes considerable sacrifices. All that is distinctly
individual must go, in character, in work, in science, and art, and that
which is concerned with the common need of society must receive
attention. This means undoubtedly a limitation of the life of the
individual, and often entails a considerable sacrifice; but the
sacrifice is made because of the underlying belief that in the sum of
individual judgments there is reason, and that in the opinion of the
majority there is truth. This socialistic culture finds in the present
condition of society, plenty of problems to hand, and in its treatment
of these problems a vigorous socialistic type of life is developed. The
most pressing problem is concerned with the distribution of material and
spiritual goods. Material goods and the opportunity for spiritual
culture that go with them have been largely a monopoly of the
aristocracy. Now arises a demand for a more equal distribution, and this
is felt to be a right demand, not only from the point of view of
justice, but also for the sake of spiritual culture itself. So it is
that the movement for the social amelioration of the masses starts. The
welfare of humanity is its aim, and all things, religion, science, and
art, must work towards this end, and are only of value in so far as they
contribute towards it.

Now it is a fundamental principle of a logical socialistic system that
truth must be found in the opinions of the masses, and the average
opinion of mankind must be the final arbiter of good and evil. The
tendency of the masses as such is to consider material advancement the
most cherished good. Hence, inevitably, a thorough-going socialism must
become materialistic, even though at an earlier stage it was actuated by
the desire for opportunities of spiritual culture.

A genuinely socialistic culture, too, makes the individual of value only
as a member of society. This, Eucken affirms, is only true in the most
primitive societies. As civilisation progresses, man becomes conscious
of himself, and an inner life, which in its interests is independent of,
and often opposed to society, develops. His own thought becomes
important to man, and as his life deepens, religion, science, art, work
&c., become more and more a personal matter.

All such deepening of culture, and of creative spiritual activity, is a
personal matter. From this deepening and enriching of the inner life of
the individual proceeds creative spiritual activity, which attempts
spiritual tasks as an end in themselves, and which gradually builds up a
kingdom of truth and spiritual interest which immeasurably transcends
mere human standards. All these are historical facts of experience; the
socialistic system finds no place and no explanation for them, and
consequently it cannot be regarded as a sufficiently comprehensive
explanation of the problem. To a man who has once realised these
individual experiences, the merely human, socialistic system becomes
intolerable.

Again, if considerations of social utility limit creative activity, the
creations of such activity must be meagre in nature. Spiritual
creativeness is most fruitful when it is concerned with tasks that are
attempted for their intrinsic value, and is not fettered by the thought
of their usefulness to society.

It is, too, a dangerous thing to look for truth in the opinion of the
majority, for this is such a changing phenomenon that only a part, at
most, can be permanent truth. The course of history has taught us, too,
that great ideas have come to individuals and have been rejected by the
masses for long periods of time.

The immediate effect of the failure of socialism is the encouragement of
_individualism_, for indeed some of the arguments against the former are
arguments in favour of the latter. Individualism opens up a new life, a
life which is free, joyous, and unconventional.

But can individualism give a meaning and value to life as a whole? Man
cannot from his own resources produce a high ideal which compels him to
fight for higher development, and it is not possible for him from an
individualistic standpoint to regard himself as a manifestation of a
larger life. His whole life must be spent in the improvement of his own
condition. Even in the case of strongly marked personalities, they can
never get beyond themselves and their own subjective states, for they
must always live upon themselves, and eternally reflect upon their own
doings.

But such a view of life cannot satisfy man; he is a contemplative being,
and he must find some all-inclusive whole, of which he is a part. If he
fails to find it, life for him must become a blank, and he must fall a
prey to boredom and satiety. Man's life is not to be confined to his own
particular sphere, his life must extend far beyond that--he must concern
himself with the infinite in the universe; "He must view life--nay,
more, he must live it--in the light of this larger whole." A life based
upon individualism then, will seem, even in the case of strong
personalities, to be extremely narrow. How much more so will this be
true of the ordinary man, who takes little interest in his own
individuality, or pleasure in its development?

Thus it is that both forms of humanistic culture--socialism and
individualism--fail to give a real meaning to life. "Socialistic culture
directs itself chiefly to the outward conditions of life, but in care
for these it neglects life itself." Individualistic culture, on the
other hand, endeavours to deal with life itself, but fails to see life
as a whole, or as possessing any real inwardness.

Both types of culture are apt to deceive themselves in regard to their
own emptiness, because, unconsciously, they make more out of man than is
consistent with their assumptions. "They presuppose a spiritual
atmosphere as a setting for our human life and effort. In the one case,
this cementing of a union between individuals appears to set free the
springs of love and truth; in the other, each single unit seems to have
behind it the background of a spiritual world whose development is
fostered by means of its individual labour." In this way life acquires
in both cases a meaning, but it does so only by departing from both
positions, and taking up what is, at least partly, an idealistic
position.

The theories, too, can only be made really plausible by idealising man
to an unwarrantable extent. The socialist assumes that a change of
material surroundings will be immediately followed by a change in the
character of man, and that men will work happily together for the sake
of the community. The individualist asks us to believe that man is
naturally noble and highminded, and cares only for the higher and better
things. But experience, says Eucken, does not justify us in placing so
much faith in humanity. "Do we not see the great masses of our
population possessed by a passion that sweeps all before it, a reckless
spirit of aggressiveness, a disposition to lower all culture to the
level of their interests and comprehension--evincing the while a defiant
self-assertion? And on the side of individualism, what do we see? Paltry
meanness in abundance, embroidered selfishness, idle self-absorption,
the craving to be conspicuous at all costs, repulsive hypocrisy, lack of
courage despite all boastful talk, a lukewarm attitude towards all
spiritual tasks, but the busiest industry when personal advantage is
concerned."

The theories of socialism and individualism can never be adequate
explanations of the great problem of life, for life cannot have a real
meaning if man cannot strive towards some lofty aim far higher than
himself, and such a goal the two humanistic theories do not provide for
him.

Religion, Idealism, Naturalism, Socialism, Individualism, while calling
attention to important facts in life, all fail in themselves to form
adequate theories to explain life. We have given the main outlines of
Eucken's arguments, but such a brief summary cannot do justice to his
excellent evaluations of these theories--these the reader may find in
his own works.




CHAPTER III

ANOTHER SEARCH FOR TRUTH

The result of the inquiry into the solutions of the problem offered in
the past is to show that they are all inadequate to explain and to give
an ideal to the whole of life. Perplexed as to the truth of the
existence of a higher world, man looked to the natural world for a firm
basis to life. Here he failed to find rest--rather, indeed, he found
less security than he had previously felt, for did not naturalism make
of him a mere unconscious mechanism, and deny the very existence of his
soul? Then he turned to humanity, and the opposing tendencies of
socialism and individualism came into evidence. Each hindered the other,
each shook his traditional beliefs, and each failed to give him a
satisfactory goal for life. Socialism concerned itself with external
social relations, but it gave life no soul. Then individualism confined
man to his own resources, and there resulted an inner hollowness which
became painfully evident. Socialism and individualism fail to provide a
sure footing. Instead of finding certainty, man has fallen into a still
deeper state of perplexity.

What shall he do? Must he once again leave the realistic systems of
Naturalism, Socialism, and Individualism, and return to the older
systems of Religion and Idealism? Was he not wrong in giving up the
thought of a higher invisible world? Has not the restriction of life to
the visible world robbed life of its greatness and dignity? This it
certainly has done, and there is little wonder that the soul of mankind
is already revolting, and shows a tendency once again to look towards
religion and idealism for a solution of life.

But the educated mind can never again take up exactly the same position
as it once did in regard to religion and idealism. The great realistic
theories have made too great a change in the standard of life, and in
man himself, to make it possible for him to revert simply to the old
conditions, and the older orthodox doctrines of religion can never again
be accepted as a mere matter of course. But the great question has again
come to the forefront--is there a higher world, or is the fundamental
truth of religion a mere illusion? This is the question that calls for
answer to-day, an answer which must be different, as man is different,
from the answers that were given in the past. A satisfactory answer is
impossible without understanding clearly the relation between the Old
and the New, and without taking account of the great, if partial, truths
that the realistic schemes of life have taught mankind.

To accept unreservedly Naturalism, Socialism, and Individualism is
impossible, for these rob life of its deeper meaning. To return to the
older doctrines without reserve is equally impossible.

Shall we ignore the question? This would be a fatal mistake. Some throw
themselves into the rush of work, and endeavour to forget the deeper
problems of life--but "the result is a life all froth and shimmer,
lacking inward sincerity, a life that can never in itself satisfy them,
but only keep up the appearance of doing so." There must be some
decision; for is not society being more and more broken up into small
sections, possessing the most variable standards of life, and
evaluating things in a diversity of ways? Such an inward schism must
weaken any effort on the part of humanity to combine for ideal ends.
Perhaps he of narrow vision, who sees nothing in life but sensuous
pleasure, is happy--but it is the happiness of the lower world. Perhaps,
too, he of the superficial mind is happy, who sees no deep
contradictions in the solutions offered, and is prepared to accept one
to-day and another tomorrow--but his happiness is that of the feeble
mind.

What then can be done? Shall we despair? Never! The question is far too
urgent. To despair is to accept a policy that spells disaster to the
human race. The immediate environment is powerless to give life any real
meaning. We must probe deeper into the eternal--and it is from such
investigations that Eucken outlines a new theory of life.

But before we proceed to deal with Eucken's contribution to the problem,
it will be profitable to stay awhile to consider how it is that we can
obtain truth at all, and what are the tests that we can apply to truth
when we think we have attained it. It is the problem of the possibility
of knowledge, really, that we have to discuss in brief. Eucken himself
does not pay much direct attention to this difficult question, for, as
has been already pointed out, he refuses to be drawn from his main
problem. It is impossible, however, to appreciate Eucken without
understanding clearly the position he takes up in this matter.

What is truth? How can we know?--these are entrancing problems for the
profound thinker, and have been written upon frequently and at great
length. But we can do little more at present than give the barest
outline of the positions that have been taken up. Every search for truth
must assume a certain position in this matter; in studying Eucken's
philosophy it is of the first importance--more so perhaps than in the
case of most other philosophers--to keep in mind clearly from the outset
the position he implicitly assumes.

The simplest theory of knowledge is that of _Empiricism_, which holds
that all knowledge must be gained through experience of the outside
world, and of our mental states. We see a blue wall, we obtain through
our eyes an impression of blueness, and are able to make a statement:
"This wall is blue." This, of course, is one of the simplest assertions
that can be made, and consists merely in assigning a term--"blue"--the
meaning of which has already been agreed upon, to a colour that we
appear to see on a wall. The test of the truth of this assertion is a
simple one--it is true if it corresponds with fact. If the same
assertion is made in regard to a red wall, then it is obviously untrue.
Our sense impressions give rise to a great variety of such expressions.
We state "the wall is blue" as a result of an impression obtained
through the organs of sight; then we speak of a pungent smell, a sweet
taste, a harsh sound, or a rough stone, on account of impressions
received respectively through the organs of smell, taste, hearing, and
touch. But, of course, all such assertions are superficial in
character--there is little more in them than the application of a
conventional term to an observed phenomenon, they avail us little in
solving the mysteries of the universe.

Strictly speaking, this is for the empiricist the limit of possible
knowledge, but he would be a poor investigator who would be content with
this and no more. The empiricist tries to go a distinct step in advance
of this. The scientist observing the path of a planet travelling round
the sun, finds that its course is that of an ellipse. He studies the
path of a second planet, and finds that this also travels along an
elliptical orbit. Later he finds that all planets he is able to observe
travel in the same kind of path--then he hazards a general statement,
and says, "All planets travel round their suns in elliptical orbits."
But now he has left the realm of certainty for that of uncertainty.
There may be innumerable planets which he cannot observe that take a
different course. He hazards the general statement, because he assumes
(sometimes without knowing that he does so) that nature is uniform and
constant, that it will do to-day as it did yesterday, and does in
infinite space as it does in the visible universe.

The knowledge that is possible to the empiricist, then, is merely that
which is derived from direct experience, and simple summations or
generalisations into a single assertion of a number of similar
assertions, all of which were individually derived from experience. This
is the position scientists as such, and believers in the theory of
naturalism, take up as to the possibility of the knowledge of truth to
the human mind. They are entirely consistent, therefore, when they
arrive ultimately at the agnostic position, and contend that our
knowledge must necessarily be confined to the world of experience, and
that nothing can be known of the world beyond. But they are
fundamentally wrong in overestimating the place of the sense organs, and
forgetting that while these have a part to play in life, they do not
constitute the whole of life.

A far more satisfactory theory is that of _Rationalism_. It
is a theory that admits that the human mind has some capacity for
working upon the data presented to it by the sense organs. Man is
no longer quite so helpless a creature as empiricism would make
him. He is able to weigh and consider the facts that are presented
to the mind. The method rationalism uses to arrive at truth is that
of logical deduction, and the test of truth is that the steps in the
process are logically sound. We may start from the data "All dogs
are animals" and "Carlo is a dog," and arrive very simply at the
conclusion "Carlo is an animal." The conclusion is correct because
we have reasoned in accordance with the laws of logic, with the laws
of valid thought. All logical reasoning is, of course, not so simple
as the example given, but it may be stated generally that when there
is no logical fallacy, a correct conclusion may be arrived at,
provided, too--and herein lies the difficulty--provided that the
premises are also true. These premises may be in themselves general
statements--how is their truth established? They may be, and often
are, the generalisations of the empirical sciences, and must then
possess the same degree of uncertainty that these generalisations
possess. Some philosophers have contended that certain general ideas
are innate, but few would be found nowadays to accept such a
contention. At other times mere definitions of terms may serve as
premises. One might state as a premise the definition "A straight
line is the shortest distance between two points," and the further
statement that "AB is a straight line between A and B," and conclude
that the line AB represents the shortest distance between two points A
and B. In a manner similar to this Euclid built his whole mathematical
system upon the basis of definitions and postulates, a system the
complexity and thoroughness of which has caused all students of
mathematics at one time or another to marvel and admire. But, of
course, a definition is little more than assigning a definite term to
a definite thing. It is when we begin to consider the premises that are
necessary for arriving at the profound truths of the universe that we
find the weakness of rationalism. How are we going to be provided with
premises for this end? Shall we begin by saying "There is a God" or
"There is no God"? How is the pure reasoning faculty to decide upon the
premises in the matter of the great Beyond? We may weigh the arguments
for and against a certain position, and we may think that the probability
lies in a certain direction, but to decide finally and with certainty
by mere cold logical reasoning is impossible. We may bring out into
prominence through logical reasoning truths that were previously only
implicit, but to arrive at absolute truth with regard to the invisible
world, through intellect alone, has long been admitted to be an
impossibility. The illusion of those who would believe that truth which
was not already implied in the premises could ever be obtained by mere
intellectual reasoning has long since been dispelled.

Perhaps it comes as a shock to the reader who has always insisted upon a
clear intellectual understanding and a rigid reasoning upon all things,
to find within what narrow limits, after all, the intellect itself has
to work--it can do little more than make more or less certain
generalisations concerning the world of experience, and then to argue
from these, or from definitions that it itself has framed. Of course
some of the ancient philosophers did try through a course of rigid
reasoning to solve the great problems, and for a long time it was
customary to expect that all philosophers should proceed in the same
way.

Modern philosophers, of whom William James, Bergson, and Eucken are
conspicuous examples, have appreciated the futility of such a task, and
have sought other means of solving the problem. The mistake in the past
has been to forget that the intelligence is but one aspect of human
life, and that the experience of mankind is far more complicated a
matter than that of mere intellect, and not to be solved by intellect
alone. Intellect has to play a definite part in human life, but it does
not constitute the whole of life. Life itself is far greater than
intellect, and to live is a far more important thing than to know. The
great things are life and action; knowledge is ultimately useful in so
far as it contributes to the development of life and the perfection of
action. Philosophers have for too long a period made knowledge an aim in
itself, and have neglected to take proper account of the experiences of
mankind. Their intellectual abstractions have tended to leave actual
life more and more out of consideration, with the result that they have
been baffled at every turn. The more we think about it, the more we
become convinced that the mysterious universe in which we live will only
divulge just enough of its secrets to enable us to act, and this it
gives us with comparatively little trouble on our part. If we consider
an ordinary piece of wood, we find it is hard and offers a certain
resistance, and our knowledge of these elementary facts enables us to
put it to use, but we shall never really solve the mysteries of its
formation and growth. These lead of course to very interesting
speculations, but their solution seems to be as far off as ever. We can
know little but that which we require for life. The making of life and
action the basis of truth rather than trusting to the intellect alone,
is the great new departure in modern philosophy.

One of the theories of knowledge that springs from laying emphasis upon
life and action is that of _Pragmatism_, of which the late Professor
William James was one of the greatest exponents. Pragmatists contend
that the test of truth is its value for life--if the fact obtained is
the most useful and helpful for life, then it is the true one. Suppose
we are endeavouring to solve the great question, "Is there a God?" We
weigh the arguments for and against, but find it difficult to arrive at
a definite conclusion, because the arguments on both sides seem equally
plausible. How are we to decide? We cannot postpone the decision
indefinitely--we are forced to make a choice, for upon our decision
depends our aim and ideals in life. We are faced with a "forced option,"
and must choose one or the other. We ask ourselves the question, "Which
will be of the greatest help to our lives--to believe that there is, or
that there is not a God?" and we decide or will to believe the option
that will help life most. It is a striking theory, but space forbids our
discussing it in detail.

The position Eucken adopts is that of _Activism_. In common with
pragmatism it makes truth a matter of life and action rather than of
mere intellect, and considers fruitfulness for action a characteristic
of truth. He differs from the pragmatic position in that he contends
that truth is something deeper than mere human decision, that truth is
truth, not merely because it is useful, that reality is independent of
our experience of it, and that truth is gained intuitively through a
life of action.

The riddle of the universe is solved for Eucken through life and action.
While continual contemplation and thought is apt to paralyse us, "action
is the best defensive weapon against the dangers and trials of human
existence." "Doubt is not cured by meditation, but by action." He
believes that we can attain certainty through action of much that cannot
be justified on rational grounds. If we wish to understand the vital
truths of life we must concentrate our souls on a good purpose--the
activity that follows will bring its revelation. The problems of life
are solved by the life process itself. By acting in a certain way, man
comes into intimate relationship with the great reality of life, and
then he comes to know, not so much _about_ reality, as _within_ reality.
The ant in whom such complex instincts are developed, knows probably
nothing at all _about_ its little world, but knows everything necessary
_within_ its little world. It does not err, it does the right thing at
the right time, and that because it is in tune with its universe, hence
acts from pure instinct in the right way. If intellect were to enter
into the case, its actions might become less reliable, and it would
blunder far oftener. In the case of man, his thinking capacity often
militates against successful instinctive and habitual actions--the
moment we start to consider, we hesitate and are lost. In the same way,
if the soul of man is brought into tune with the great reality, it has
but to act, and though it may never know all _about_ reality and be able
to frame abstract theories of the universe, still it may know _with_ or
_within_ reality, and be thus enabled to act in the best way under
various circumstances. This is the theory of activism; it lays great
stress upon action, and upon intuition through action, and while it does
not ignore the intellect, it holds that when the intellect fails there
is a possibility of the practical problem of life being solved through a
life of action, when life is directed towards the highest ideals. The
danger of an activistic position, of course, is to undervalue the
reasoning powers of man. Some critics hold that Eucken does this; the
reader must judge for himself, but in doing so it will be well to
remember that before trusting to intuitive revelation, Eucken demands
the setting of one's face towards the highest and best.

In the next chapter we can follow Eucken in his search for the great
reality in life.




CHAPTER IV

THE PAST, PRESENT, AND THE ETERNAL

In investigating the problem of human life, Eucken lays great stress
upon the history of man in past ages--this is one of the special aspects
of his philosophy. The fact is, of course, not surprising; he who would
explain the life of man would be unwise to ignore the records of the
past life of the human race. The thinker who examines the present only,
is apt to be narrow in his ideas, to fail to look upon events in their
proper perspective, and to be unduly affected by the spirit of the age
in which he lives--the student of history avoids these pitfalls.

Moreover, man does not become aware of the depth of his own soul, until
he has "lived into" the experience of the past. This is what the
profound investigator of history does; he lives again the life of the
hero, he feels with him as he felt upon special occasions, and in this
way there is revealed to him a profundity and greatness of human
experience, of which he would have been largely unaware if he had
trusted to his own experience alone, and to the superficial examination
he is able to make of the experiences of those living men with whom he
comes into contact. In this way he is able in a sense to appropriate the
experience of the greatest personalities unto himself, and enrich
considerably the contents of his own soul.

Through a study of history, too, we become aware of the intimate
connection that exists between the present and the past. The present
moment is a very transient thing; its roots are in the past, its hopes
in the future. "If all depends on the slender thread of the fleeting
moment of the present, which illumines and endures merely for a
twinkling of an eye, but to sink into the abyss of nothingness, then all
life would mean a mere exit into death.... Without connection there is
no content of life." We are apt to look on the past as something dead,
but it exists in living evidence in our souls to-day. It oppresses us or
stimulates us to action, it tyrannises over us or inspires us to higher
things. It has been customary to look upon the past as irrevocable.
Recent writers, of whom Maeterlinck and Eucken are striking instances,
have endeavoured to show how the past can be remoulded and changed. The
past depends upon what we make of it to-day; if we despise our evil
conduct in former days, then the past itself is changed and conquered.
The mistake that is made is to regard the past as a thing complete in
itself; what appears to be finished is really only completing itself,
and we must take a view of the whole of a thing, and not merely the
parts that have already manifested themselves. Through such
considerations we become more and more aware of the ultimate connection
between the past and present, and of the part the present can play in
the remaking of the past.

Our investigations of history leads us, too, to differentiate between
the temporary and the eternal in the realm of thought. We find at a
certain period of history a trend of thought that can largely be
accounted for by the special conditions of life at the time, and which
disappears at a later age. But in addition to this we become aware of
truths that have found a place in the thoughts of various ages and
countries, and we are led to regard these as the eternal
truths--expressions of an eternal ever-present reality. This eternal
present we find to be something independent of time, something that
breaks the barriers between the past, present, and future. "Thought,"
says Eucken, "does not drift along with time; as certainly as it strives
to attain truth it must rise above time, and its treatment must be
timeless." The beliefs of any age are too much coloured by the special
circumstances of that age to express the whole of truth, yet beneath the
beliefs of the ages there is often an underlying truth, and this
underlying truth is the eternal truth, which is not affected by time,
and at the basis of which is the eternal reality.

This eternal truth persisting through a variety of temporary and more or
less correct expressions of it is to be observed in a marked manner in
the moral ideas of mankind. What a variety of ethical doctrines have
been expounded and believed, yet how striking the similarity that
becomes apparent when they are further examined! In practice, the
standard of morality has often been based on mere utility, but it has
taken a higher and more absolute basis in the mind of man. Ideas
concerning morality have generally been nobler than can be accounted for
by environment, and by the subjective life of the individual. Why this
ultimate consistency in the moral aspirations of the ages, why a
categorical imperative, and why does conscience exist in the human
being?--these facts cannot be accounted for if there is no deeper basis
for life than the life of humanity at any definite period of time.

The unchangeable laws of logic, too, are instances of the eternal truth.
The principles of the validity of thought are entirely independent of
individuals, of the passage of time, and of the environment of man. "Our
thought cannot advance in the definite work of building up science
without producing and employing a definite logical structure, with fixed
principles; these principles are immanent in the work of thought, they
are above all the caprice and all the differences of the individuals."
Whence again this consistency in a changeable and subjective world?

The marvellous influence that ideas have exerted upon man again points
to the persistence and power of the eternal. Is it not strange how it is
that man often serves but as a mere instrument for the realisation of an
idea, and how he is often carried away by an idea to do things which are
against his own personal interests and desires? And when he and his
generation have passed beyond human sight, we often find a new
generation direct their endeavours in the same way, and we wonder what
is behind such a continuity in the struggles of mankind.

The history of great personalities in the realms of literature, art, and
science show in a remarkable way how men have risen above the influences
of their time, and beyond the cramping tiredness of the mere flesh.
Could a great thinker like Aristotle be entirely conditioned by flesh
and environment? And what of the great artists and poets who have
conquered the chains of mortal finitude and breathed of higher worlds?
Every one of them is a convincing testimony of the possibility of
mankind transcending the material, and taking unto itself of the
resources of a deeper world.

Then the dissatisfaction of the ages with their limited knowledge of
truth cannot but tell of a great eternal something that stirs at the
basis of the human soul. The people of to-day find the various systems
of the day inadequate; they search for something higher, and the mere
fact that they search beyond matter and the mere subjective human
qualities is in itself a testimony to the existence of a world higher
than the material and subjective.

What is it that makes it possible for one human being to "live into" the
experience of others who lived long ago, and for the present to conquer
and alter the past? How can we account for the eternal trait in thought,
for the unchanging laws of logic, for the consistency of moral ideals,
and their transcendence over flesh and immediate circumstances? What is
the force behind the idea, and how can we account for the continuous
struggle of mankind in certain directions? And, finally, what is it that
makes it possible for men to rise beyond themselves, to shake away the
shackles of matter and vicinity, and to delve deep into the profounder
world?

If we can find what it is that makes all this possible, then surely we
have found the greatest thing in the world--the reality. And Eucken's
answer is clear and definite. It must be something that persists, is
eternal and independent of time, and it must extend beyond the
individual to a universal whole. This must be "the Universal Spiritual
Life," which, though eternal, reveals itself in time, and though
universal, reveals itself in the individual man, and forms the source
from which the spiritual in man "draws its power and credentials."

This, then, is the result of Eucken's search for reality--he has found
it to exist in a Universal Spiritual Life. Of course he has not arrived
at his conclusion by a system of rigid proof; it has already been
pointed out how impossible it is to arrive at the greater truths of life
in such a manner.

He has done, however, that which can be reasonably expected in such
cases. To begin with, he has given us a striking analysis of the
essential characteristics of human life, and he has found there a
yearning and a void. He has given us a masterly discussion of eternal
truth as contrasted with the temporary expressions of it. He has taught
us how the present can overcome the past, and how man can ascend beyond
the subjective and material. And he has led us to feel that reality must
lie in the eternal that appears to be at the basis of the highest and
greatest in man.

Moreover, he has given a fair and thorough treatment of the solutions
that have been offered in the past. He has shown how inadequate they are
to explain life. He has shown how the modern solutions "cannot perform
their own tasks without drawing incessantly upon another kind of
reality, one richer and more substantial." This in itself shows "beyond
possibility of refutation that they do not fill the whole of life." He
has demonstrated how the acceptance of these systems depends upon an
implicit acceptance of a higher life. "The naturalistic thinker ascribes
unperceived to nature, which to him can be only a coexistence of
soulless elements, an inner connection and a living soul. Only thus can
he revere it as a higher power, as a kind of divinity; only thus can he
pass from the fact of dependence to a devotional surrender of his
feelings. The socialist bases human society, with its motives mixed with
triviality and passion, on an invisible community, an ideal humanity....
The individualist in his conception exalts the individual to a height
far more lofty than is justified by the individual as he is found in
experience." All these assume more or less unconsciously the existence
of that "something higher" which they attempt to deny.

So far, then, we have seen how Eucken proves the inadequacy of the
realistic conceptions of life, and how they really depend for their
acceptance upon the assumption of a Universal Spiritual Life. We have
still to see how he attempts to prove that basing human life upon an
eternal spiritual life satisfies the conditions he himself has laid down
for a satisfactory solution of the problem. He has to show that the
theory gives a satisfactory explanation of human life, that it gives a
firm basis for life, that it releases man from being governed by low
motives, and admits of the possibility of human personality, freedom,
and creation. We shall see in the chapters that follow that he makes a
convincing case for accepting the belief in the Universal Spiritual Life
as the basis of human life and endeavour.




CHAPTER V

THE "HIGH" AND THE "LOW"

Eucken makes the recognition of the existence of a Universal Spiritual
Life the starting-point of his constructive work. He takes up a position
which he calls the nöological position. Many theories take up a
materialistic position; they assert the reality of the material world,
and endeavour to explain the world of matter as something independent of
the human mind. Other theories assert the superiority of mind over
matter, and endeavour to examine the mind as though it were independent
of the material world. These two types of theories have been in
continual conflict; the one has attempted to prove that thought is
entirely conditioned by sense impressions received from the material
world, the other regards the phenomena of nature as really nothing other
than processes of the mind.

Eucken finds reality existing in the spiritual life, which while neither
material nor merely mental, is superior to both, admits the existence
(in a certain sense) of both, and does away with the opposition between
the rival types of theories. Eucken does not minimise or ignore the
existence of the natural world. The question for him is not the
independent existence of the worlds of nature and mind--this he admits;
he is concerned rather with the superiority of the spiritual life over
the merely material and mental.

The natural life of man has been variously viewed in different ages. The
writer of the Pentateuch described man as made in the image of God, and
the natural man was exalted on this account. Some of the old Greek
philosophers, too, found much in nature that was divine. Christianity
took a different view of the matter--it exalted the spirit, and
emphasised the baseness of the material. The growth of the sciences made
man again a mere tool of laws and methods, but it considered matter as
superior to mind, mind being entirely dependent upon impressions
received from matter. The question continually recurs--which is the
high, which is the low? Shall nature triumph over spirit, or spirit over
nature?

Pantheism replies to the question by denying that there is anything high
as distinguished from the low. There is but one; and that one--the whole
universe--is God. There is no evil in the world, says pantheism,
everything is good--if we could understand things as they really are we
should find no oppositions in the universe, and no contradictions in the
nature of things. The world as it is, is the best of all possible
worlds--there is perfect harmony, though we fail to appreciate it. Other
optimistic theories, too, deny the existence of evil and pain, and try
to explain our ideas of sin to be mere "points of view." If we could see
the whole, they tell us, we should see how the parts harmonise, but now
we only see some of the parts and fail to appreciate the harmony. In
this way they try to explain away as unreal the phenomena of evil and
pain.

But Eucken has no patience with such theories. For him the oppositions
and contradictions of life are too real and persistent. The antagonisms
"stir us with disgust and indignation." Evil cannot be considered
trivial, and must not be glossed over; it is in the world, and the more
deeply we appreciate the fact the better it will be for the human soul.

Man in his lower stages of development is just a child of nature, and
his standards of life are those of the lower world. He seeks those
things that satisfy the senses, he attempts the satiation of the lower
cravings. In the realm of morals his standard is utility--that is good
which helps him to obtain more pleasure and to avoid pain. In social
life his conduct is dictated by custom--this is the highest appeal. The
development of man along the lines of nature ends at this point--and if
nothing more is to happen, then he must remain at a low level of
development. Matter and mind cannot take him beyond--the mind as such
only helps towards the further satisfaction of the lower demands of man.

But there is something far greater in highly developed manhood than the
petty and selfish. Man is capable of conceiving and adopting higher
standards of morality than those of utility and pleasure, and it is the
spiritual life that enables him to do this. It is the spiritual that
frees the individual from the slavery of the sense world--from his
selfishness and superficial interests--that teaches him to care less for
the things of the flesh, and far more for the beautiful, the good, and
the true, and that enables him to pursue high aims regardless of the
fact that they may entail suffering and loss in other directions. This,
then, is the "High" in the world; the natural life is the "Low."

But what is the relation of the natural to the spiritual life? In the
first place, the spiritual cannot be derived from the natural, inasmuch
as the former is immensely superior to the latter, and that not merely
in degree, but in its very essence. The spiritual is entirely on a
higher plane of reality, and there cannot be transition from the natural
to the spiritual world. The natural has its limitations, and beyond
these cannot go. So far as the natural world is concerned man can never
rise above seeking for pleasure, and making expediency and social
approbation the standards of life, hence there is little wonder that
those ethical teachers who make nature their basis, deny the possibility
of action that is unselfish and free. "The Spiritual Life," however, as
Eucken says, "has an independent origin, and evolves new powers and
standards."

Neither do the two aspects run together in life in parallel lines. On
the contrary, the spiritual life cannot manifest itself at all until a
certain stage of development is reached in nature. It would seem
impossible to conceive of the animal rising above its animal instincts
and tendencies; its whole life is conditioned by its animal nature and
its environment. Man stands at the junction of the stages between the
purely natural and the purely spiritual. On the one hand, he is a member
of the animal world, he has its instincts, its desires and its
limitations; on the other hand, he has within him the germ of
spirituality. He belongs to both worlds, the natural and the spiritual.
He cannot shake off the natural and remain a man--to separate the two
means death to man as we know him. But there is a great difference
between his position in the natural world and his position in the
spiritual world. He seems to be the last word in the world of nature, he
has reached heights far beyond those reached by any other flesh and
blood. He is, so far as we know, the culminating point of natural
evolution--the final possibility in the natural world. But the stage of
nature only represents the first stage in the development of the
universe.

There is an infinitely higher stage of life, the spiritual life. And if
man is the final point of progress in the world of nature, he is, in his
primitive state, only at the threshold of the spiritual world. But he
is not an entire stranger to the spiritual--the germ is in him, and the
spiritual is consequently not an alien world for him. If the spiritual
were something entirely foreign it would be vain to expect much progress
through mere impulses from without. On the contrary, it is the spiritual
that makes man really great, and is the most fundamental part of his
nature.

The two stages of life, then, are present in man--the natural and the
spiritual; the former highly developed, the latter, at first, in an
undeveloped state.

Now the great aim of the universe is to pass gradually from the natural
to the spiritual plane of life. This does not mean that the latter is
the product of the former stage, for this is not the case. It means that
the deeper reality in life is the spiritual, and that the spiritual
develops through the natural in its own particular way. And this
particular way is not a mere development but a _self_-development. The
aim of the spiritual is to develop its own self through the human being.
In this way man is given the possibility of developing a self--a
personality in a very real sense.

Thus we arrive at some idea of the relation there exists between the
spiritual and the natural, and of the place of the spiritual and the
natural in man. The spiritual is neither the product nor an attribute of
the natural. Man is the border creature of the two worlds; he represents
the ultimate possibility of the one, and possesses potentialities in
regard to the other. The great object of his life must be to develop,
through making use of and conquering the life of nature, his higher self
into a free, spiritual, and immortal personality. The progressive stages
in this direction must be dealt with in the next chapter.




CHAPTER VI

THE ASCENT TO FREEDOM AND PERSONALITY


In the previous chapter we found that man in his primitive stage is
largely a creature of the lower world. His desires are those of the
animal kingdom, his ideal is utility, and social approbation his God. At
this stage he is a mere nothing, no better than a slave to his passions
and to the opinions of his fellow-beings. He possesses neither freedom
nor personality--for he is but a tool in the hands of other impulses and
forces. There is no controlling self--he is not a lord in his own
kingdom. Some men do not get beyond this very low level, but for ever
remain mere shuttlecocks driven hither and thither by more or less
contradictory impulses.

The germ of the higher world that resides within him may sometimes make
itself felt, but "so long as there is a confused welter of higher and
lower impulses, ... so long is there an absence of anything essentially
new and lofty."

Man's aspirations for things that are higher, are at the outset very
sluggish and vague, for a being that is so much dominated by the natural
world is apt to concentrate its attention upon it and to remain
contented with it.

But there comes a time in the lives of perhaps most men when a distinct
feeling of dissatisfaction is felt with the life of natural impulse and
of convention. The man feels--perhaps in a vague way at first--that
there is something too merely animal in the sense world, or that there
is an intolerable emptiness and hypocrisy in a life of slavish devotion
to the opinions of society. Perhaps he feels that his passions govern
him, and not he his passions. The higher life stirs within him, and he
begins to question the rightness of things. He learns to appreciate for
the first time that the natural impulses may not be the noblest, and
that custom may not be an ideal guide. His soul is astir with the
problem of life--the result very largely depends upon the solutions that
are presented to him. Perhaps the naturalistic solution is made to
appeal to him, and he is taught to trust nature and it will lead him
aright. Or maybe the pantheistic theory is accepted by him, and he is
led to believe that the world as it is is entirely good, and that he has
but to live his life from day to day, and not worry himself about the
ultimate end and purpose of things. Or other optimistic theories of life
that deny the existence of evil may influence him. All these solutions
may give him temporary peace of mind, and perhaps indeed form efficient
stumbling-blocks to any further spiritual progress.

But the spiritual beginnings within us often show remarkable vitality.
They may under certain conditions lead us to appreciate the existence of
a distinct opposition in the world--the opposition between the lower
world and the higher self. Man finds that the natural is often low,
evil, and sordid, and at this stage the higher spiritual world makes a
strong appeal to him. By degrees he comes to feel the demands of the
lower world to be a personal insult to him. What is the lower material
world that it should govern him, and he a _man_? The claims of pleasure
and utility to be standards of conduct strike him as arrogant, and he
revolts against the assumption that higher aims can have no charm for
him. His previous acceptance without consideration of the moral
standard of the community he now looks upon as a sign of weakness on his
part--for is he not himself, a person with the power of independent
judgment and evaluation? It is the first great awakening of the
spiritual life in man, when his whole soul is in revolt against the low,
sordid, and conventional. What shall he do? There is only one course
that is worthy of his asserting personality--he must break with the
world. Henceforth he sees two worlds in opposition--the world of the
flesh on the one hand, the world of the spirit on the other, and he
arrays himself on the side of the higher in opposition to the lower.
When he does this the spiritual life in him makes the first substantial
movement in its onward progress--this movement Eucken calls the
_negative movement_. It does not mean that the man must leave the world
of work and retire into the seclusion of a monastery--that means
shirking the fight, and is a policy of cowardice. Neither does it mean a
wild impatience with the present condition of the world--it means rather
that man is appreciating in a profound way the oppositions that exist,
and is casting his lot on the side of right. He renounces everything
that hinders him from fighting successfully, then goes forth into the
thick of the battle. The break must be a definite one and made in a
determined manner. "Without earnestness of renunciation the new life
sinks back to the old ... and loses its power to stimulate to new
endeavour. As human beings are, this negation must always be a sharp
one."

The negative movement, then, is the first substantial step in the
progress of the spiritual life. The man's self breaks out into
discontent with nature, and this is the first step to the union of self
to the higher reality in life. The break with the world is in itself of
course but a negative process. This must attain a positive significance.
If the self breaks away from one aspect of life, it must identify itself
more intimately with another. This occurs when the individual sets out
definitely on a course of life in antagonism to the evil in the world.

When this takes place, there arises within him a _new immediacy_ of
experience. Hitherto the things that were his greatest concern, and that
appealed to him most, were the pleasures of the natural world. But these
things appeal to him no longer as urgent and immediate--but as being of
a distinctly secondary character. A new immediacy has arisen; it is the
facts of the spiritual world that now appeal to him as urgent and
immediate. "All that has hitherto been considered most immediate, as the
world of sense, or even the world of society, now takes a second place,
and has to make good its claim before this spiritual tribune.... That
which current conceptions treat as a Beyond ... is now the only world
which exists in its own right, the only true and genuine world which
neither asks nor consents to be derived from any outside source."

This new immediacy is the deepest possible immediacy, it is an immediacy
of experience where the self comes into contact with its own vital
principle--the Universal Spiritual Life--and brings about a fundamental
change in the life of the individual. The inner life is no longer
governed by sense impressions and impulses, but the outward life is
lived and viewed from the standpoint of the inward life.

But a new immediacy is not all that follows in the train of the negative
movement--on the contrary, the highest possible rewards are gained, for
freedom, personality, and immortality are all brought within the range
of possibility.

Once a human being decides for the highest he is on the highroad to
complete freedom. The freedom is not going to be won in a moment, but
must be fought for by the individual through the whole course of his
life. His body is always with him, and will at times attempt to master
him--he must fight continually to ensure conquest. Difficulties will
arise from various quarters, but he is not going to depend only upon his
own resources. All his activity involves in the first place the
recognition of the spiritual world, but more than this, he appropriates
unto himself of the spiritual world--this in itself is an act of
decision. And the more we appropriate unto ourselves of the Universal
Spiritual Life, the more we decide for the higher world, the freer we
become. Indeed, "it is this appropriation ... of the spiritual life that
first awakens within the soul an inward certitude, and makes possible
that perfect freedom ... so indispensable for every great creative
work." By continually choosing and fighting for the progress of the
Universal Spiritual Life, it comes to be our own in virtue of our deed
and decision. Hence man has attained freedom--the lower world no longer
makes successful appeal. He has become a part of the spiritual world,
and his actions are no longer dictated by anything external, but are the
direct outcome of his own self. He has freely chosen the highest, and
continually reaffirms his choice--this is perfect freedom.

Man gains for himself, too, a personality in the true sense of the term.
Eucken does not mean by personality "mere self-assertion on the part of
an individual in opposition to others." He means something far deeper
than this. "A genuine self," says Eucken, "is constituted only by the
coming to life of the infinite spiritual world in an independent
concentration in the individual." Following a life of endeavour in the
highest cause, and continual appropriation of the spiritual life, he
arrives at a state of at-one-ness with the universal life. "Man does not
merely enter into some kind of relation with the spiritual life, but
finds his own being in it." The human being is elevated to a self-life
of a universal kind, and this frees him from the ties and appeals of the
world of sense and selfishness. It is a glorious conception of human
personality, infinitely higher than the undignified conceptions of
naturalism and determinism.

And if man wins a glorious personality, he may gain immortality too.
Unfortunately, Eucken has not yet dealt fully with this question, but he
is evidently of the opinion that the spiritual personalities are
immortal. As concentration points or foci of the spiritual life, he
believes that the developed personalities are at present and in prospect
possessors of a spiritual realm. But there will be no essential or
sudden change at death. That which is immortal is involved in our
present experience. Those who have developed into spiritual
personalities, who have worked in fellowship with the great Universal
Life, and become centre-points of spirituality, have thus risen supreme
over time and pass to their inheritance. Those who have not done so, but
have lived their lives on the plane of nature, will have nothing that
can persist.

Hence it is that the negative movement leads to freedom, personality,
and immortality; the neglect to make the movement consigns the
individual to slavery, makes a real "self" impossible, and at death he
has nought that a spiritual realm can claim. The choice is an
all-important one; for, as a recent writer puts it, "In this choice, the
personality chooses or rejects itself, takes itself for its life-task,
or dies of inanition and inertia."




CHAPTER VII

THE PERSONAL AND THE UNIVERSAL


In the last chapter the ascent of the human being from serfdom to
freedom and personality was traced. In doing so it was necessary to make
frequent reference to the Universal Spiritual Life.

When we turn to consider the characteristics of the Universal Spiritual
Life, many problems present themselves. How can we reconcile freedom and
personality with the existence of an Absolute? What is the nature of
this Absolute, and in what way is the human related to it? What place
should religion play in the life of the spiritual personality? These
are, of course, some of the greatest and most difficult problems that
ever perplexed the mind of man, and we can only deal briefly with
Eucken's contribution to their solution.

Can a man choose the highest? This is the form in which Eucken would
state the problem of freedom. His answer, as already seen, is an
affirmative one. The personality chooses the spiritual life, and
continually reaffirms the decision. This being so, it is now no longer
possible to consider the human and the divine to be entirely in
opposition. And the more the spiritual personality develops, so much the
less does the opposition obtain, until a state of spirituality is
arrived at when all opposition of will ceases--then we attain perfect
freedom. "We are most free, when we are most deeply pledged--pledged
irrevocably to the spiritual presence, with which our own being is so
radically and so finally implicated." Thus freedom is obtained in a
sense through self-surrender, but it is through this same self-surrender
that we realise spiritual absoluteness. Hence it is that perfect freedom
carries with it the strongest consciousness of dependence, and human
freedom is only made possible through the absoluteness of the spiritual
life in whom it finds its being.

English philosophers have dealt at length with the question of the
possibility of reconciling the independence of personality and the
existence of an Absolute. From Eucken's point of view the difficulty is
not so serious. When he speaks of personality he does not mean the mere
subjective individual in all his selfishness. Eucken has no sympathy
with the emphasis that is often placed on the individual in the low
subjective sense, and is averse from the glorification of the individual
of which some writers are fond. Indeed, he would prefer a naturalistic
explanation of man rather than one framed as a result of man's
individualistic egoism. The former explanation admits that man is
entirely a thing of nature; the latter, from a selfish and proud
standpoint, claims for man a place in a higher world. There is nothing
that is worthy and high in the low desires of Mr. Smith--the mere
subjective Mr. Smith. But if through the mind and body of Mr. Smith the
Absolute Spirit is realising itself in personality--then there is
something of eternal worth--there is spiritual personality. There will
be opposition between the sordidness of the mere individual will and the
divine will, but that is because the spiritual life has not been gained.
When the highest state of spiritual personality has been reached, then
man is an expression--a personal realisation of the Absolute, is in
entire accord with the absolute, indeed becomes himself divine.

This does not rob the term personality of its meaning, for each
personality does, in some way, after all, exist for itself. Each
individual consciousness has a sanctity of its own. But the
being-for-self develops more and more by coming into direct contact with
the Universal Spiritual Life.

Here, then, we arrive at something that appears to be a paradox. We have
the phenomenon of a being that is free and existing for itself, yet in
some way dependent upon an absolute spiritual life. We have, too, the
phenomenon of a human being becoming divine. How is it really possible
that self-activity can arise out of dependence? Eucken does not attempt
to explain, but contends that an explanation cannot be arrived at
through reasoning. We are forced to the conclusion, we realise through
our life and action that this is the real state of affairs, and in this
case the reality proves the possibility. "This primal phenomenon," he
says, "overflows all explanation. It has, as the fundamental condition
of all spiritual life, a universal axiomatic character." Again he says,
"The wonder of wonders is the human made divine, through God's superior
power." "The problem surpasses the capacity of the human reason." For
taking up this position, Eucken is sharply criticised by some writers.

When we approach the problem of the nature of the Absolute in itself,
the main difficulty that arises is whether God is a personal being. God,
says Eucken, is "an Absolute Spiritual Life in all its grandeur, above
all the limitations of man and the world of experience--a Spiritual Life
that has attained to a complete subsistence in itself, and at the same
time to an encompassing of all reality." The divine is for Eucken the
ultimate spirituality that inspires the work of all spiritual
personalities. When in our life of fight and action we need inspiration,
we find "in the very depths of our own nature a reawakening, which is
not a mere product of our activity, but a salvation straight from God."
God, then, is the ultimate spirituality which inspires the struggling
personality, and gives to it a sense of unity and confidence. Eucken
does not admit that God is a personality in the sense that we are, and
deprecates all anthropomorphic conceptions of God as a personal being.
Indeed, to avoid the tendency to such conceptions he would prefer the
term "Godhead" to "God." Further considerations of the nature of God can
only lead to intellectual speculations. For an activistic philosophy,
such as Eucken's philosophy is, it would seem sufficient for life and
action to know that all attempts at the ideal in life, originate in, and
are inspired by, the Absolute Spiritual Life, that is by God.

We cannot discuss fully the relation of human and divine without, too,
dealing with the ever urgent problem of religion. This is a problem in
which Eucken is deeply interested, and concerning which he has written
one of his greatest works--_The Truth of Religion_--a work that has been
described as one of the greatest apologies for religion ever written.

What is religion? Most people perhaps would apply the term to a system
of belief concerning the Eternal, usually resting upon a historical or
traditional basis. Others would include in the term the reverence felt
for the Absolute by the contemplative mind, even though that mind did
not believe in any of the traditional systems. Some would emphasise the
fact that religion should concern itself with the establishment of a
relationship between the human and the Divine.

But Eucken does not find religion to consist in belief, nor in a mere
attitude towards the mysteries of an overworld. In keeping with the
activistic tone of his whole philosophy he finds religion to be rooted
in life, and would define religion as an action by which the human being
appropriates the spiritual life.

The first great concern of religion must be the conservation--not of
man, as mere man, but of the spiritual life in the human being, and it
means "a mighty concentration of the spiritual life in man." The
essential basis that makes religion possible is the presence of a Divine
life in man--"it unfolds itself through the seizure of this life as
one's own nature." Religion must be a form of activity, which brings
about the concentration of the spiritual life in the human soul, and
sets forth this spiritual life as a shield against unworthy elements
that attempt to enter and to govern man.

The essential characteristic of religion must be the demand for a new
world. "Religion is not a communication of overworld secrets, but the
inauguration of an overworld life." Religion must depend upon the
contradiction and opposition that exists in human life, and upon the
clear recognition of the distinction between the "high" and the "low" in
life. It must point to a means of attaining freedom and redemption from
the old world of sin and sense, and to the possibility of being elevated
into a new and higher world. It must, too, fight against the extremes of
optimism and pessimism, for while it will acknowledge the presence of
wrong, it will call attention to the possibility of deliverance. It must
bring about a change of life, without denying the dark side of life; it
must show "the Divine in the things nearest at hand, without idealising
falsely the ordinary situation of life."

The great practical effect of religion, then, must be to create a demand
for a new and higher world in opposition to the world of nature. For
this new life religion must provide an ultimate standard. "Religion must
at all times assert its right to prove and to winnow, for it is
religion--the power which draws upon the deepest source of life--which
takes to itself the whole of man, and offers a fixed standard for all
his undertakings." Religion must provide a standard for the whole of
life, for it places all human life "under the eternity." It is not the
function of religion to set up a special province over against the other
aspects of his life--it must transform life in its entirety, and affect
all the subsidiary aspects.

But religion is not gained, any more than human freedom, once for all
time--it must be gained continually afresh, and sought ever anew. Thus
the fact of religion becomes a perpetual task, and leads to the highest
activity.

Eucken speaks of two types of religion--Universal and Characteristic
Religion. The line of division between them is not easy to draw, but the
distinction gives an opportunity for emphasising again the essential
elements of true religion.

_Universal Religion_ is a more or less vague appreciation of the
Spiritual, which results in a diffused, indefinite spiritual life. The
personality has appreciated to some extent the opposition between the
natural and the spiritual, and has chosen the spiritual. He adopts a new
attitude or mood, towards the world in consequence, and that is an
attitude of fight against the world of nature. But everything is vague;
the individual has not yet appreciated the spiritual world as his own,
and feels that he is a stranger in the higher world, rather than an
ordinary fully privileged citizen. He has not yet associated himself
closely enough with the Universal Spirit, everything is superficial,
there is hunger and thirst for the higher things in life, but these have
not yet been satiated.

Some people never get beyond this vague appreciation of the spiritual
until perhaps some great trial or temptation, a long illness or sad
bereavement falls to their lot. Then they feel the need for a religion
that is more satisfying than the Universal Religion with which they have
in the past been content. They want to get nearer to God; they feel the
need of a personal God who is interested in their trials and troubles.
They are no longer satisfied with the conception of a God that is far
away, they thirst for His presence. This feeling leads the individual to
search for a more definite form of religion, in which the God is
regarded as supremely real, and reigns on the throne of love. The
personality enters into the greater depths of religion, and it becomes a
much more real and powerful influence in his life. He has no longer a
mere indefinite conception of a Deity, but he thinks of God as real and
personal. Instead of adopting a changed attitude towards the world of
nature, he comes to demand a new world. He is now a denizen of the
spiritual world, and there results "a life of pure inwardness," which
draws its power and inspiration from the infinite resources of the
Universal Spiritual Life in which he finds his being. This type of
religion Eucken calls _Characteristic Religion_.

The historical religions would seem to represent, to some extent, the
attempts of humankind to arrive at a religion of this kind. A further
distinction arises between the historical forms of religion, of which
one at most, if any, can express the final truth, and the Absolute form
of religion, which if not yet conceived, must ultimately express the
truth in the matter of religion.

Eucken is never more brilliant than he is in the examination he makes of
the historical forms of religion, for the purpose of formulating the
Absolute and final form; some account of this must be given in the next
chapter.




CHAPTER VIII

RELIGION: HISTORICAL AND ABSOLUTE


In examining the various historical forms of religion, Eucken, as we
should expect, is governed by the conclusions he has arrived at
concerning the solution of the great problem of life, and especially of
the place of religion in life.

A religion which emphasised the need for a break with the world, and of
fight and action for spiritual progress, the possibility of a new higher
life of freedom and of personality, and the superiority of the spiritual
over the material, and which presented God as the ultimate spiritual
life, in which the human personality found its real self, would thus
meet with highest favour, while a form of religion that failed to do so
would necessarily fail to satisfy the tests that he would apply.

He does not spend time discussing various religions in detail, but deals
with them briefly in general, in order to show that the Christian
religion is far superior to all other religions, then he makes a
critical and very able examination of the Christian position. He
considers it necessary to discuss in detail only that form of religion
that is undoubtedly the highest.

The historical religions he finds to be of two types--religions of law
and religions of redemption. The religions of law portray God as a being
outside the world, and distinct from man, One who rules the world by
law, and who decrees that man shall obey certain laws of conduct that
He lays down. Failure to obey these laws brings its punishment in the
present or in a future life, while implicit obedience brings the highest
rewards. To such a God is often attributed all the weaknesses of the
human being, sometimes in a much exaggerated form--hence His reign
becomes one of fear to His subjects.

A religion of law assumes that man is capable of himself of obeying the
law, and is responsible for his mode of life; it assumes that man is
capable through his own energy of conquering the world of sin, and of
leading the higher life.

Religions of this type possess of course the merit of simplicity,
transparency, and finality. The decrees, the punishments and rewards are
given with some clearness and are easily understood; there is no appeal
and little equivocation. They served a useful purpose in the earlier
ages of civilisation, but cannot solve the problem for the complex
civilisation and advanced culture of the present age. They place God too
far from man, and attribute to man powers which he cannot of himself
possess. The conceptions of the Deity involved in them are too
anthropomorphic in character--too much coloured by human frailties.

The religions of law have had to give place to those of a superior
type--the religions of redemption. These religions appreciate the
difficulty there exists for humankind of itself to transcend the world
of sin, and are of two types--one type expressing a merely negative
element, the other a negative and positive element.

The typical negative redemptive religion is that of Buddhism. Buddhism
teaches us that the world is a sham and an evil; and the duty of man is
to appreciate this fact, and to deny the world, but here the matter
ends--it ends with world-renunciation and self-renunciation. There is
only a negative element in such a religion, no inspiration to live and
fight for gaining a higher world. This, of course, cannot provide a
satisfactory solution to the problem, for no new life with new values is
presented to us. It is a religion devoid of hope, for it does not point
to a higher life. "A wisdom of world-denial, a calm composure of the
nature, an entire serenity in the midst of the changing scenes of life,
constitute the summit of life."

Christianity teaches us that the world is full of misery and suffering,
but the world in itself is really a perfect work of Divine wisdom and
goodness. "The root of evil is not in the nature of the world, but in
moral wrong--in a desertion from God." Sin and wickedness arise from the
misuse and perversion of things which are not in themselves evil.
Christianity calls for a break from the wickedness of the world. It
calls upon man to give up his sin, to deny, or break with, the evil of
which he is guilty. But it does not expect man to do this in his own
strength alone--God Himself comes to his rescue. Unlike Buddhism, it
does not stay at the denial of the world, but calls upon man to become a
citizen of a higher world. This gives a new impetus to the higher life;
man finds a great task--he has to build a kingdom of God upon the earth.
This demands the highest efforts--he must fight to gain the new world,
and must keep up the struggle to retain what he has gained. The
inferiority of Buddhism as contrasted with Christianity is well
described by Eucken in the following words: "In the former an
emancipation from semblance becomes necessary; in the latter an
overcoming of evil is the one thing needful. In the former the very
basis of the world seems evil; in the latter it is the perversion of
this basis which seems evil. In the former, the impulses of life are to
be entirely eradicated; in the latter, on the contrary, they are to be
ennobled, or rather to be transformed. In the former, no higher world of
a positive kind dawns on man, so that life finally reaches a seemingly
valid point of rest, whilst upon Christian ground life ever anew ascends
beyond itself."

From such considerations as these, Eucken comes to the conclusion that
of the redemptive religions, which are themselves the highest type,
Christianity is the highest and noblest form, hence his main criticism
is concerned with the Christian religion. This does not mean that he
finds neither value nor truth in any other form of religion. His general
conclusion with regard to the historical religions is that they "contain
too much that is merely human to be valued as a pure work of God, and
yet too much that is spiritual and divine to be considered as a mere
product of man." He finds in them all some kernel of truth, or at least
a pathway to some part of truth, but contends that no religion contains
the whole truth and nothing but the truth. "As certainly," he says, "as
there is only one sole truth, there can be only one absolute religion,
and this religion coincides entirely in no way with any one of the
historical religions."

Eucken's great endeavour in his discussion of the Christian religion is
to bring out the distinction between the eternal substance that resides
in it and the human additions that have been made to it in different
ages, between the elements in Christianity that are essentially divine
and those essentially human. Divested of its human colourings and
accretions, Christianity presents a basis of Divine and eternal truth,
and this regarded in itself, can well claim to be the final and absolute
religion.

The conclusion he has come to with regard to the eternal truth as
contrasted with the temporary colourings of Christianity, with the
essential as contrasted with the inessential, can best be outlined by
taking in turn some of the main tenets and characteristics of the
Christian faith.

Eucken's conception of the negative movement is very much akin to the
Christian idea of _conversion_. The first stage is merely a movement
away from the world, but after a time, in the continuous process of
negation, the negative movement attains a positive significance; when
this stage is arrived at Eucken would apply the term conversion. He
would not limit the negative movement to one act or to one point in
time; the movement towards a higher world must be maintained--the
sustaining of the negative movement being a test of the reality of
conversion. The process of conversion is not a process to be passively
undergone, or to originate from without, but is a movement starting in
the depths of one's own being.

As already pointed out, Eucken believes in _redemption_. The past is
capable of reinterpretation and transformation, because we can view our
past actions in a new light and so change the whole, since the past is
not a closed thing, definite in itself, but a part of an incomplete
whole. He considers, however, that the Christian doctrine of redemption
makes it too much a matter of God's mercy, instead of placing stress
upon the part that man himself must play. The possibility of redemption
in his view follows from the presence and movement of the spiritual life
in man, not merely from an act of the founder of Christianity, and he
avers that while traditional Christianity emphasises the need for
redemption from evil, it does not emphasise sufficiently the necessary
elevation to the good life that must result.

Closely bound up with the Christian doctrine of redemption is that of
_mediation_. Eucken believes that the Christian conception of mediation
resulted from the feeling of worthlessness and impotence of man, and the
aspirations which yet burned within him after union with the Divine. The
idea of mediation bridges the gulf, "a mid-link is forged between the
Divine and the human, and half of it belongs to each side; both sides
are brought into a definite connection which could be found in no other
way." Eucken acknowledges that such a mediation seems to make access to
the Divine easier, gives intimacy to the idea of redemption, and offers
support for human frailty. But he points out that there is an
intolerable anthropomorphism involved in the idea, that it removes the
Divine farther away from man, and that the union of Divine and human is
held to obtain in one special case only--that of Christ. He urges that
in a religion of mediation, one or other, God or Christ, must be chosen
as the centre. "Concerning the decision there cannot be the least doubt;
the fact is clear in the soul-struggles of the great religious
personalities, that in a decisive act of the soul the doctrinal idea of
mediation recedes into the background, and a direct relationship with
God becomes a fact of immediacy and intimacy."

So Eucken will have nothing to do with the idea of mediation in its
doctrinal significance--pointing out that "the idea of mediation glides
easily into a further mediation." "Has not the figure of Christ receded
in Catholicism, and does not the figure of Mary constitute the centre of
the religious emotional life?"

He does, however, lay great store by the help that a man may be to other
men in their upward path: "The human, personality who first and foremost
brought eternal truth to the plane of time, and through this
inaugurated a new epoch, remains permanently present in the picture of
the spiritual world, and is able permanently to exercise a mighty power
upon the soul ... but all this is far removed from any idea of
mediation."

Eucken believes in _revelation_, but through action, and not through
contemplation. To the personality struggling upward, with its aims set
towards the highest in life, the spiritual life reveals itself. He does
not confine revelation to certain periods in time, and believes that
such revelation comes to all spiritual personalities.

He holds, too, that the spiritual personalities are themselves
revelations of the Universal Spiritual Life, and that the Spiritual Life
does reveal itself most clearly in personalities.

How the revelation comes he does not discuss in any detail, but he is
very certain that it comes through action and fight for the highest.

It is perhaps largely due to his activistic standpoint that Eucken does
not deal with _prayer_. In the _Truth of Religion_, which deals very
fully with most aspects of religion, and purports to be a complete
discussion of religion, no treatment of prayer is given. He speaks of
the developing personality as drawing upon the resources of the
Universal Spiritual Life, but this appears to be in action, and not in
prayer or communion.

He is ever suspicious of intellectual contemplation, and this leads him
to attribute less importance than perhaps he should to _mysticism_, to
prayer, adoration, and worship. He admits that mysticism contains a
truth that is vital to religion, but complains that it becomes for many
the whole of religion. Its proper function is to liberate the human mind
from the narrowly human, and to emphasise a total-life, the great Whole.
It fails, however, "because it turns this necessary portion of religion
into the sole content. To it, religion is nothing other than an
absorption into the infinite and eternal Being--an extinguishing of all
particularity, and the gaining of a complete calm through the suspension
of all the wear and tear of life."

Eucken's discussion of _faith and doubt_ is very illuminating. He
protests against the conception of faith which concerns itself merely
with the intellectual acceptance of this or that doctrine. This narrows
and weakens its power, confining it to one department of life; whereas
faith is concerned with the whole of life.

Faith is for Eucken "a conviction of an axiomatic character, which
refuses to be analysed into reasons, and which, indeed, precedes all
reasons ... the recognition of the inner presence of an infinite
energy."

If faith concerns itself with, and proceeds from the whole of life, it
will then take account of the work of thought, and will not set itself
in opposition to reason. But it will lead where reason fails. It is not
limited by intellectual limitations, though it does not underrate or
neglect the achievements of the intellect. Faith enables life to
"maintain itself against a hostile or indifferent world; ... it holds
itself fast to invisible facts against the hard opposition of visible
existence."

The vital importance of such faith to religion is clearly evident; and
bound up with this is the significance of doubt. Doubt, too, becomes
now, not an intellectual matter, but a matter for the whole of life. "If
faith carries within itself so much movement and struggle, it is not
surprising ... if faith and doubt set themselves against each other, and
if the soul is set in a painful dilemma." Eucken considers it to be an
inevitable, and indeed a necessary accompaniment of religious
experience, and his own words on the point are forcible and clear.
"Doubt ... does not appear as something monstrous and atrocious, though
it would appear so if a perfect circle of ideas presented itself to man
and demanded his assent as a bounden duty. For where it is necessary to
lay hold on a new life, and to bring to consummation an inward
transformation, then a personal experience and testing are needed. But
no proof is definite which clings from the beginning to the final
result, and places on one side all possibility of an antithesis. The
opposite possibility must be thought out and lived through if the Yea is
to possess full energy and genuineness. Thus doubt becomes a necessary,
if also an uncomfortable, companion of religion; it is indispensable for
the conservation of the full freshness and originality of religion--for
the freeing of religion from conventional forms and phrases."

Eucken's views on _immortality_ have already been dealt with. He does
not accept the Christian conception of it, for he seems to limit the
possibility to those in whom spiritual personalities have been
developed, and he evidently does not believe that the "natural
individuality with all its egoism and limitations" is going to persist.

In discussing the question of _miracle_, Eucken weighs the fact that a
conviction of the possibility of miracle has been held by millions in
various religions, and particularly in Christianity. He considers that
the question of miracle is of more importance in the Christian religion
than in any other, one miracle--the Resurrection--having been taken
right into the heart of Christian doctrine. He finds, however, that the
miracle is entirely inconsistent with an exact scientific conception of
nature, and means "an overthrow of the total order of nature as this
has been set forth through the fundamental work of modern
investigation." He does not consider such a position can be held without
overwhelming evidence, and does not feel the traditional fact to have
this degree of certainty, or to be inexplicable in another way. He
considers that the explanation of the miracle probably lies in the
psychic state of the witnesses.

Eucken shows in general extreme reluctance to make a historical event a
foundation of belief, and this no doubt accounts to some extent for his
attitude with regard to miracles. He points out that "the founders of
religion have themselves protested against a craving after sensuous
signs," and that this protest "is no other than the sign of spiritual
power and of a Divine message and greatness." He considers that the
belief in, and craving for, sensuous miracle is an outcome of a
"mid-level of religion," where belief is waning and spirituality
declining. While, thus, he does not believe in sensuous miracle, he
acknowledges and lays the greatest stress on one miracle--the presence
of the Spiritual Life in man. It is, indeed, this miracle that renders
others unnecessary.

In discussing the doctrine of the _Incarnation_, Eucken attempts to get
at the inner meaning--the truth which the doctrine endeavours to
express, and he finds this to consist in the fact of the ultimate union
of the human and Divine, and this truth is one that we dare not
renounce. He criticises the attempt that is made in Christianity to show
that such union only obtained once in the course of history. Incarnation
is not one historical event, but a spiritual process; not an article of
belief, but a living experience of each spiritual personality.

He considers as injurious to religion in general the Christian
conception of the _Atonement_. He believes that the idea that is to be
expressed is that of the nearness of God to man in guilt and in
suffering. In endeavouring to express this close intimacy the idea of
suffering was transferred to God himself. The anthropomorphic idea of
reconciliation and substitution thus arose, and this Eucken considers to
have done harm. "The notion that God does not help us through His own
will and power, but requires first of all His own feeling of pity to be
roused, is an outrage on God and a darkening of the foundation of
religion." So Eucken objects to the attempt to formulate the mystery
into dogma. "All dogmatic formulation of such fundamental truths of
religion becomes inevitably a rationalism and a treatment of the problem
by means of human relationships, and according to human standards." "It
is sufficient for the religious conviction to experience the nearness of
God in human suffering, and His help in the raising of life out of
suffering into a new life beyond all the insufficiency of reason.
Indeed, the more intuitively this necessary truth is grasped, the less
does it combine into a dogmatic speculation and the purer and more
energetically is it able to work."

The conception of the _Trinity_ is again an attempt to express the union
of Divine and human, "the inauguration of the Divine Nature within human
life." The dogma, however, involves ideas of a particular generation,
and so threatens to become, and has indeed become, burdensome to a later
age which no longer holds these ideas. Further, the doctrine of the
Trinity has mixed up a fundamental truth of religion with abstruse
philosophical speculations, and this has provided a stumbling-block
rather than a help.

At the same time, Eucken lays the greatest stress on the _personality of
Jesus_. He considers the personality of Jesus to be of more importance
to Christianity than is the personality of its founder to any other
religion. "Such a personality as Jesus is not the mere bearer of
doctrines, or of a special frame of mind, but is a convincing fact, and
proof of the Divine life, a proof at which new life can be kindled over
anew." And again: "It is from this source that a great yearning has been
implanted within the human breast ... a longing for a new life of love
and peace, of purity and simplicity. Such a life, with its incomparable
nature and its mysterious depths, does not exhaust itself through
historical effects, but humanity can from hence ever return afresh to
its inmost essence, and can strengthen itself ever anew through the
certainty of a new, pure, and spiritual world over against the
meaningless aspects of nature and over against the vulgar mechanism of a
culture merely human." But while he would appreciate the depth and
richness of the personality of Jesus, he protests against the worship of
Jesus as divine, and the making of Him the centre of religion. The
greatness of Christ is confined to the realm of humanity, and there is
in all men a possibility of attaining similar heights.

Christianity is, in Eucken's view, much more closely bound up with
historical events than any other religion, and it thus suffers more
severe treatment at the hands of historical criticism than any other
religion. Eucken considers such historical criticism to be of great
value. In Christianity as in other religions we find the eternal not in
its pure form, but mixed with the temporal and variable, and historical
criticism will help in the separation of the temporal from the eternal
elements. In so doing it does an immense service, for it frees religion
from fixation to one special point of time, and enables us to regard it
as ever developing and progressing to greater depths.

Eucken emphasises that the _historical basis_ of Christianity is not
Christianity itself, is not essentially religious; and he quotes
Lessing, Kant, and Fichte to support him in his contention that a belief
in such a historical basis is not necessary to religion, and may even
prove harmful to it. The historical basis is, of course, useful as
bringing out into clear relief the personality of Jesus, and the other
great spiritual personalities associated in His work, and Eucken lays
stress upon the use that history can be to Christianity in giving
records of the experiences of great spiritual personalities in all ages,
but it is important that the history is here a means to an end, and not
an end in itself, and that the importance lies in the spiritual
experience and not in the historical facts.

When one considers how little Eucken has to say concerning worship, and
how little emphasis he places upon historical and doctrinal forms in
religion, one wonders how it is he attaches so much importance to the
functions of the _Church_. He points out that a Church is necessary to
religion, that it seems to be the only way of making religion real and
effective for man. "The Church seems indispensable in order to introduce
and to hold at hand the new world and the new life to man in the midst
of his ordinary existence; it is indispensable in order to fortify the
conviction and to strengthen the energy in the midst of all the opposite
collisions; it is indispensable in order to uphold an eternal truth and
a universal problem in the midst of the fleetingness of the moment." In
the past, however, much harm has been done to religion by the Church.
This has arisen from several reasons. To begin with, it tends to narrow
religion, which is concerned with life, to the realm of ideas, and to
tie down religion by connecting it with a thought-system of a particular
age. Further, the necessary mechanical routine, and the appointment of
special persons to carry out this routine, tends to elevate the routine
and these special persons to a far higher place than they should occupy.
Again, spiritual things have been dragged into the service of personal
ambition, and bound up with human interests. The most serious danger,
however, is that religion, from being an inward matter, tends to become
externalised.

Despite this, an organised Church cannot be dispensed with, and Eucken
points out what changes are necessary to make the Church effective. One
important point he makes clear, namely, that as the Church must speak to
all, and every day, and not only to spiritually distinguished souls, and
in moments of elevated feeling, then the teaching of the Church will
always lag behind religion itself, and must be considered as an
inadequate expression of it.

It is necessary that there should be no coercion with regard to men's
attitude towards the Church, and men should be free to join this or that
Church, or no Church at all.

Then there must be more freedom, movement, and individuality within the
Church. What the Church holds as a final result of the experience of
life cannot be expected as the confession of all, especially of the
young. "How can every man and every child feel what such a mightily
contrasted nature as Luther's with all its convulsive experiences felt?"

Then the Church must not so much teach this or that doctrine as point to
the Spiritual Life, set forth the conditions of its development, and be
the representative of the higher world. Thus, and thus only, Eucken
thinks that the Church can fulfil its proper function, and avoid being a
danger to religion.

Eucken's _appreciation of Christianity_ is sincere. Viewing it from the
standpoint of the Spiritual Life, he finds that it fulfils the
conditions that religion should fulfil. It is based on freedom, and on
the presence of the Divine in humanity, even to the extent of a complete
union between them. The ideal of the Christian life is a personal life
of pure inwardness, and of an ethical character. He speaks of the "flow
of inner life by means of which Christianity far surpasses all other
religions," and of the "unfathomable depth and immeasurable hope which
are contained in the Christian faith."

In Christianity the life of Christ has a value transcending all time,
and is a standard by which to judge all other lives. There is, too, in
Christianity a complete transformation or break, which must take place
before any progress or development can take place.

"There is no need of a breach with Christianity; it can be to us what a
historical religion pre-eminently is meant to be--a sure pathway to
truth, an awakener of immediate and intimate life, a vivid
representation and realisation of an Eternal Order which all the changes
of time cannot possess or destroy."

At the same time, there are changes necessary in the form of
Christianity, if it is to answer to the demands of the age, and be the
Absolute Religion. It must be shorn of temporary accretions, and must
cast aside the ideas of any one particular age which have now been
superseded. No longer can it retain the primitive view of nature and the
world which formerly obtained, no longer must it take up a somewhat
negative and passive attitude, but, realising that religion is a matter
of the whole life, must energetically work itself out through all
departments of life. It must remedy wrong, not merely endure it. It must
proceed from a narrow and subjective point of view to a cosmic one,
without at the same time losing sight of the fact that religion is an
inward and personal matter. It must take account to the full of the
value of man as man, and of the possibilities latent in him, and take
account of his own activity in his salvation.

The Christian ideal of life must be a more joyous one, of greater
spiritual power, and the idea of redemption must not stop short at
redemption from evil, but must progress to a restoration to free and
self-determining activity. Since an absolute religion is based on the
spiritual life, the form in which it is clothed must not be too
rigid--life cannot be bound within a rigid creed. With its form modified
in this way, Eucken considers that Christianity may well be the Absolute
Religion, and that not only we can be, but we _must_ be Christians if
life is to have for us the highest meaning and value.




CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION: CRITICISM AND APPRECIATION


We have attempted to enunciate the special problem with which Eucken
deals, and to follow him in his masterly criticisms of the solutions
that have been offered, in his further search for the reality in life,
in his arguments and statement of the philosophy of the spiritual life,
and finally in his profound and able investigation into the eternal
truth that is to be found in religion. In doing so, we have only been
able in a few cases to suggest points of criticism, and sometimes to
emphasise the special merits of the work. It was necessary to choose
between making a critical examination of a few points, and setting forth
in outline his philosophy as a whole. It was felt that it would be more
profitable for the average reader if the latter course were adopted.
Thousands who have heard the name of Eucken and have read frequent
references to him are asking, "What has Eucken really to say?" and we
have attempted to give a systematic, if brief, answer to the question.
Having done this it will be well to mention some of the main points of
criticism that have been made, and to call attention again to some of
the remarkable aspects of the contributions he has made to philosophy
and religion.

Several critics complain of the obscurity of his writings, of his loose
use of terms, and of his tendency to use freely such indefinite and
abstruse terms as "The Whole," "The All," &c., and of his tendency to
repeat himself. Of course, if he is guilty of these faults, and he
certainly is to some extent, they are merely faults of style, and do not
necessarily affect the truth or otherwise of his opinions. In the matter
of clarity he is very variable; occasional sentences are brilliantly
clear, others present considerable difficulty to the practised student.
His more popular works, however, are much clearer and easier to
understand than the two standard treatises on _The Truth of Religion_
and _Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_. His tendency to repetition is by no
means an unmixed evil, for even when he appears to be repeating himself,
he is very often in reality expressing new shades of meaning, which help
towards the better understanding of the first statements.

The slight looseness in the use of terms, and a certain inexactness of
expression that is sometimes apparent, must of course not be
exaggerated; it is by no means serious enough to invalidate his main
argument. It gives an opportunity for a great deal of superficial
criticism on the part of unsympathetic writers, which, however, can do
little harm to Eucken's position. One has to remember that it is
difficult to combine the fervour of a prophet with pedantic exactness,
and that an inspired and profound philosopher cannot be expected to
spend much time over verbal niceties.

Of course one would prefer absolute clarity and exactness, but we must
guard against allowing the absence of these things to prejudice us
against the profound truths of a philosophical position, which are not
vitally affected by that absence.

Frequent criticism is directed towards the incompleteness of Eucken's
philosophy. He does not introduce his philosophy with a systematic
discussion of the great epistemological and ontological problems.
Philosophers have often introduced their work in this way, and it has
been customary to expect an introduction of the kind. To do so, however,
would be quite out of keeping with Eucken's activistic position, as it
would necessarily involve much intellectual speculation, and he does not
believe that the problem of life can be solved by such speculation. It
is unfortunate that he has so little to say concerning the world of
matter. Beyond insisting upon the superiority of the spiritual life,
which he calls the "substantial," over matter, which he calls the merely
"existential," he tells us very little about the material world. Rightly
or wrongly, thinkers are deeply interested in the merely existential, in
the periphery of life, in the material world, but for the solution of
this problem Eucken contributes little or nothing. His sole concern is
the spiritual world, and although we should like an elaboration of his
views on the mere periphery of life, we must not let the fact that he
does not give it, lead us to undervalue his real contributions. Another
serious incompleteness lies in the fact that he pays little attention to
the psychological implications of his theories. Until he does this, his
philosophy cannot be regarded as complete. Eucken, however, would be the
last to claim that his solution is a finished or final one; he is
content if his work is a substantial contribution to the final solution.

Objection has been taken to the fact that he starts upon his task with a
definite bias in a certain direction. He candidly admits from the outset
that his aim is to find a meaning for life, and in doing this he of
course tacitly assumes that life has a deep and profound meaning. Strict
scientists aver that the investigator must set out without prejudice, to
examine the phenomena he observes; and Eucken's initial bias may form a
fatal stumbling-block to the acceptance of his philosophy by these, or
indeed, by any who are not disposed to accept this fundamental position.
If we deny that life has a meaning, then Eucken has little for us; but
if we are merely doubtful on the matter, the reading of Eucken will
probably bring conviction.

Many critics point to the far-reaching assumptions he makes. He assumes
as axiomatic certainties and insoluble mysteries the existence of the
spiritual life in man, the union of the human and divine, and the
freedom of the spiritual personalities, though in a sense dependent upon
the Universal Spiritual Life. This of course does not mean that he is in
the habit of making unjustifiable assumptions. This is far from being
the case; on the contrary, he takes the greatest care in the matter of
his speculative bases. There are some fundamental facts of life,
however, which according to Eucken are proved to us by life itself; we
feel they must be true, but they are not truths that can be reasoned
about, nor proved by the intellect alone. These are the three great
facts mentioned above, which, while not admitting of proof, must be
regarded as certainties.

His contention that they cannot be reasoned about has led to the further
charge of irrationalism. The question that has to be decided is, whether
Eucken in emphasising the fact that great truths must be solved by life
and action, is underestimating the part that intellect must play in
life. The decision must be largely one of individual opinion. Many
critics are of the opinion that he does lay too little stress upon the
intellectual factor in life. In actual fact, however, the fault is more
apparent than real, for Eucken does in fact reason and argue closely
concerning the facts of life. The charge, too, is to some extent due to
the fact that he continually attacks the over-emphasis on the
intellectual that the people of his own race--the Germans--are apt to
place. With the glorification of the intellect he has no sympathy, for
he feels there is something higher and more valuable in life than
thought--and that is action.

These are the main points of criticism that have been raised--the reader
must judge for himself how seriously they should be regarded. But before
arriving at a final opinion he must think again of the contributions
Eucken has indubitably made to philosophy and religion, of which we
shall again in brief remind him.

He has given us a striking examination of the various theories of life,
and has ably demonstrated their inadequacy. He has displayed great
scholarship in his search for the ultimate reality. He has found this
reality in the universal life, and has urged the need for a break with
the natural world in order to enter upon a higher life. He has traced
the progress of the spiritual life, and has given us ultimately a bold
vindication of human personality and of the freedom of the spiritual
being.

He has raised philosophy from being mere discussions concerning abstract
theories to a discussion of life itself. In this way philosophy becomes
not merely a theory concerning the universe, nor merely a theory of
life, but a real factor in life itself--indeed it becomes itself a life.
Thus has he given to philosophy a higher ideal, a new urgency--by his
continued emphasis upon the spiritual he has given to philosophy a
nobler and a higher mission. He has placed the emphasis in general upon
life, and has pointed out the inability of the intellect to solve all
life's problems. He has given to idealistic philosophies a possible
rallying-point, where theories differing in detail can meet on common
ground. As one eminent writer says: "The depth and inclusiveness of
Eucken's philosophy, the comprehensiveness of its substructure and its
stimulating personal quality, mark it out as the right rallying-point
for the idealistic endeavour of to-day."

And what does he give to religion? Many will reply that he has given us
nothing that is not already in the Christian religion. Therein lies the
value and strength of Eucken's contributions. He has given a striking
vindication of the spiritual content of Christianity as against the
effects of time changes. He has attempted to bring out the contrast
between what is really vital, and what are merely temporary colourings
and accretions. He makes many of the main elements of Christianity
acceptable without the need of a historical basis or proof. Not only
does he present the Christian position as a reasonable view of the
problem of life, but as the only solution that can really solve the
final problem. He has cleared the decks of all superfluous baggage, and
has laid bare a firm basis for a practical, constructive endeavour.

He has given us in himself a profound believer in the inward and higher
nature of man, and in the existence of the spiritual life. As one critic
says: "The earnestness, depth and grandeur, humility and conscious
choice of high ideals, have raised his work far above mere intellectual
acuteness and minuteness."

In Eucken we have one of the greatest thinkers of the age--some would
say _the_ greatest--setting his life upon emphasising the spiritual at a
time when the tendency is strongly in materialistic directions. He has
gathered around him a number of able and whole-hearted disciples in
various countries, and future ages may find in Eucken the greatest
force in the revulsion of the twentieth century (that is already making
itself felt) from the extreme materialistic position, to take religion
up again, and particularly the Christian religion, as the only
satisfying solution of humanity's most urgent problem.




BIBLIOGRAPHY


The English reader should first read:

_The Meaning and Value of Life_ (A. & C. Black), which is a good
    introduction to Eucken's philosophy; and
_The Life of the Spirit_ (Williams & Norgate).

He can then proceed to study Eucken's three comprehensive and important
works:

_Life's Basis and Life's Ideal_, in which he gives a detailed presentation
    of his philosophy (A. & C. Black).
_The Truth of Religion_, in which he gives his ideas on religion (Williams
    & Norgate).
_The Problem of Human Life_, in which he makes a searching analysis of the
    philosophies of the past (Fisher Unwin).

The student will be much helped in his study by the following books:

_Eucken and Bergson_, by E. Hermann (James Clark & Co.).
_Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life_, by Professor W.R. Boyce Gibson
    (A. & C. Black).

When he has studied these he will probably be anxious to read other
works of Eucken's, of which translations have already appeared, or are
soon to appear.




INDEX


Absolute, the, 63
---- Freedom and the, 61, 62
---- Personality and the, 62, 63
---- and historical religion, chap. viii.
---- religion, Christianity as the, 72

Activism, 41, 42

Atonement, the, 79


Bergson, 39

Buddhism, 70, 71


Characteristic Religion, 66, 67

Characteristics of a satisfactory solution of life, 16

Christ, as mediator, 74
---- Personality of, 80
---- Value of life of, 83

Christian Church, 81, 82

Christianity, and historical bases, 80, 81
---- Appreciation of, 83
---- as absolute religion, 72
---- highest form of religion, 71, 72

Conversion, 57, 73


Doubt, 76


Empiricism, 36, 37

Eternal and transient in religion and Christianity, 72, 73
---- truth contrasted with its temporary expression, 44, 45

Eucken, assumptions made by, 88
---- bias, 87
---- charge of irrationalism, 88, 89
---- contributions to philosophy and religion, 90, 91
---- faults of style, 86
---- Incompleteness of philosophy of, 87
---- Special excellences of philosophy of, 89

Evil, 51


Faith, 76

Freedom, ascent to, 59
---- and the absolute, 61, 62
---- and naturalism, 26


God, is God a person? 63, 64
---- Nature of, 63, 64


Historical and absolute religion, chap. viii.
---- bases of Christianity, 80, 81

History and philosophy, 43-49
---- and religion, 17, 18


Idealistic presuppositions of socialism and individualism, 31, 48

Ideas, power of, 46

Immanent idealism as a solution of the problem of life, 19-22

Immediacy, the new, 58

Immortality, 60, 77

Incarnation, 78

Independence of the spiritual life, 52, 53

Individualism, and personality, 59, 62
---- as a solution of the problem of life, 26-32
---- idealistic presuppositions of, 31, 48

Irrationalism, charge of, 88, 89


James, William, 39, 40


Law, religions of, 69, 70

Life, independence of the spiritual, 52
---- spiritual, relation of, to natural life, 52-54
---- ---- superiority over natural life, 52-54
---- The spiritual, 14
---- The universal spiritual, 44, 49, chaps. v., vi., vii. (vii.
       especially).


Maeterlinck, 44

Man, natural and spiritual, 53, 54
---- transcending the material, 46

Mediation, 74

Mediator, Christ as, 74

Methods of Eucken, 14, 15

Mind, limits of, 52

Miracle, 77

Mysticism, 75


Naturalism and freedom, 26
---- as a solution of the problem of life, 22-26
---- its own disproof, 25

Natural life, relation to spiritual life, 52-54
---- ---- Superiority of spiritual over, 52-54
---- man and spiritual man, 53, 54

Nature, limits of, 52
---- of God, 63, 64

Negative movement, the, 57, 73

New immediacy, the, 58

Nöological position, the, 50


Pantheism, 20, 51, 56

Past, the, not irrevocable, 44, 73

Personality and individualism, 59, 62
---- and the absolute, 62, 63
---- gaining of, 54, 59
---- of Christ, 80
---- of God, 63, 64

Philosophy and history, 43-49
---- of life, 13
---- problems of, 10, 11

Pragmatism, 40, 41

Prayer, 75

Problem, Eucken's special, 12-14

Problems of philosophy, 10, 11

Purpose of Eucken's investigation, 13
---- of religion, 65, 66


Rationalism, 37-39

Redemption, 73

Religion and history, 17, 18
---- and human activity, 18
---- and science, 19
---- as solution of problem of life, 16, 19
---- Characteristic, 66, 67
---- Christianity as highest form of, 71, 72
---- Christianity as the absolute, 72
---- Essential characteristics of, 65, 66
---- Eternal and transient in, 72, 73
---- Eucken's contributions to, 90, 91
---- Historical and absolute, chap. viii.
---- of law, 69, 70
---- of redemption, 69, 70
---- Purpose of, 65, 66
---- Universal, 66
---- what is it? 64, 65

Resurrection, the, 77

Revelation, 75


Science, and religion, 17

Socialism, as a solution of the problem of life, 26-32
---- idealistic presuppositions of, 31, 48

Spiritual life, 14
---- ---- Independence of the, 52
---- ---- Relation of, to natural life, 52-54
---- ---- Superiority of, over material and mental, 52-54
---- ---- The universal, 47-49, and chaps. v., vi., and vii. (vii.
            especially)

Spiritual man and natural man, 53, 54


Trinity, the, 79

Truth, 44, 45
---- another search for, chap. iii.


Universal Religion, 66
---- spiritual life, 47-49, and chaps, v., vi., and vii. (vii. especially)





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